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New York, April 8, 1929,
10 o'clock A. M.
Trial continued.
Same appearances.
SAUL LEVY, witness on behalf of the plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows:

Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, at the time of adjournment
we were discussing those accounts that had been
assigned several times; and I think you gave some
summary of some of them. Now, as I understand
you, six of these invoices were assigned just once;
twenty-seven of the invoices were assigned twice;
seven of the invoices were assigned three times, and
one of the invoices assigned four times. Is that
a correct summary of what you found to be the
fact? A. Yes, sir.
Q. As I understood it you were basing that statement upon the work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.
as compared with the accounts receivable ledger
and such letters, particularly the letters of Huth
and Bingham as were received and have been
marked in evidence from the people of whom inquiry was made by Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Yes,
sir. But it was only the letters from Huth & Company and Bingham that were involved in this comparison.
Mr. Podell: Now, if you will be good
enough, Mr. Marshall, to produce the letters,
all of the other letters besides those already
produced.
Mr. Marshall: They are all in the work
sheets, I think.
Mr. Podell: Have you got them (handed)?

1448

1449
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Q. Can you readily separate the other replies
that were received? I will have somebody do that
and save time. A. It would take considerable time.
Q. I will have somebody do that. Do you find
any record on the work sheets of Touche, Niven &
Co. that a letter had been received from J. B.
Moors & Company? A. I see the name J. B.
Moors included in a list that was submitted by
Fred Stern & Company to Touche, Niven & Co., a
list of all banks with whom some time or another
during the year Stern had had some dealings.
Q. Will you look at Schedule No. 2 in evidence,
prepared
by yourself, Exhibit 80? Your first item,
1451
' which is taken, as I understand it, verbatim from
the work sheets, that is Item No. 5, do you see a
reference there to record following shipments sold
to Dunlap, paid for by them, shown by J. B. Moors
& Company on their confirmation letter, December
31, 1923? A. Yes, sir. That refers to a journal
entry prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. There was
some reference in that journal entry to a letter
which they had received from J. B. Moors.
Q. Have you any such letter, or have you been
able to find any such letter among the work sheets?
Would you have to look through, or would you
know? A. It would necessitate my going through
all of these sheets.
1452
Mr. Marshall: I would be glad to help
you find it if you want me to.
Q. Have you prepared, Mr. Levy, a detailed
schedule referring to Schedule No. 3 of accounts receivable assigned to Huth & Company and William
Brandt's Sons & Company, Bingham & Company,
agent, as at December 31, 1923? A. Yes, sir, I
have prepared such a schedule.
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Q. And what did you prepare that from? A.
That was prepared from the papers and documents
that I have just testified to, and books; and that is
from the letters received from Huth & Company,
the letters from Bingham & Company, the schedule
of accounts receivable, in the Touche-Niven working papers and from the customer's ledger account.
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection as to the
basis upon which it is made, and the further
objection that it is perfectly irrelevant and
immaterial.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

1454

(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 84.)
Q. Now, summarizing this schedule, Mr. Levy,
out of a total of 41 accounts, how many purport to
have been assigned more than once? A. Thirty-five
out of the forty-one appear to have been assigned
more than once.
Q. And the schedule is a detailed schedule of
the account and to whom assigned? A. Yes.
Q. Now, do I understand you correctly that if
you take these individual accounts on ToucheNiven's working papers to see to whom they were
assigned, and compare them with the accounts receivable ledger, the same accounts, at least certain
of them, would appear to have been assigned to
different people? A. The same invoices.
Q. The same invoices, is that right? I mean, the
working sheets do not agree with the statement of
assigned accounts in the accounts receivable ledger?
A. In some instances they agree and in some instances they do not.

1455
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Q. On the other hand, if you compare the working papers with the two letters of Huth and Bingham, there is a difference there? A. In some instances, yes, sir.
Q. In some instances they agree and in some instances they do not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. If you take the two letters alone, you have
stated, I think, that there are certain accounts that
would appear to have been claimed by both of these
concerns to have been assigned to them, the identical account, as of a specified date, as of December 31st, 1923? A. Yes, sir. Two invoices were
claimed to be held and assigned to them.
1457
Q. By each of them? A. By each, yes, sir.
Q. So that none of these documents agree among
themselves to whom these assignments were made
or outstanding as of December 31st, 1923? A. That
is correct.
Q. Now, I assume that in its effect upon the net
assets, if the same account is assigned three or four
times, will not necessarily reduce the net assets of
the concern, will it? A. I am not sure that I
understand your question, but the question as to
whether or not an account has been assigned does
not relate to the amount of net assets on hand.
Merely as to whether those assets are free or are
hypothecated.
1458
Q. Merely shows whether the assets, the particular accounts receivable, are free or pledged?
A. Exactly.
Q. But has that situation any significance to an
accountant? A. It is a very important
Q. Quite aside from assets? A. Quite aside from
assets, it has a very important significance, I would
say.
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Q. And what is that significance which it has to
an accountant looking over those books? A. In a
situation of this sort, where out of forty-one invoices
I find that thirty-five appear to be assigned doubly
and triply, it certainly is an indication to me of
something radically wrong. Those things would
not happen unless there was a reason for them and
I would expect that that reason would be financial
difficulties of some sort or irregularities of some
other kind within the organization.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the
part in which he says—gives his conclusion
at the end.
Mr. Podell: He has a perfect right to,
your Honor.
The Court: I will allow it as his opinion
as an expert. That is the only basis upon
which it is offered.
Mr. Marshall: He made a statement not
as if it were an opinion, but as a fact.
The Witness: I believe I stated that I
would suspect that might be the fact. It
would be some indication of the likelihood
and it would call for further examination
and further investigation.
Q. Well now, do you not consider it a piece of
dishonesty for any merchant to take the same account on several occasions or a number of accounts
so that there is no possibility of just an inadvertent
mistake, to take a large proportion of the accounts
and assign them to a number of different people?
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
do not see how he can pass on the question
of dishonesty.

1460
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Mr. Podell: An accountant examining
books, to find out whether they are an honest
set of books or a dishonest set of books,
whether it is an accurate statement or an inaccurate statement, whether it is a true statement or a fraudulent statement I think that
is proper.
The Court: If you put it on that theory,
I doubt it, Mr. Podell.
By Mr. Podell.
1463

1464

Q. What would be your conclusion, or the conclusion of any accountant using ordinary care and
prudence with respect to the reliability, the honesty, the accuracy of that financial statement, if
you find a condition of affairs such as you have described?
Mr. Marshall: Now, if your Honor please,
he may be an expert on accountancy, but he
is not an expert on honesty, and I do not
think anybody could go on the stand as an
expert on honesty.
Mr. Podell: I am asking for conclusions
by an accountant who is familiar with books
and competent to pass an opinion as to what
is prudent care, that is all.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. I can tell you in a few words just what my
mental reaction would have been.
The Court:

Go ahead and tell us.

Q. Tell us. A. As an experienced accountant,
familiar with business matters in connection with
my business of examination of books of account, I
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would, of course, know that it was most unusual
and irregular for the same invoice to be assigned to
two people, and when I find a recurrence of that
sort of thing as frequently as it recurs here, my
suspicion would be strengthened, and I would immediately look for the reason for that; knowing as
a matter of common sense, as well as of a matter
of professional experience, that irregularities of
that sort are not done as a matter of idle amusement. There usually is some hidden reason for it,
and I would search for that reason.
Q. When a man has an ample quantity of good
accounts receivable, or an ample quantity of assets
to pledge, is it your experience that he would resort
to that kind of practice? A. Why of course not,
if he had a sufficient

1465

1466

Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
argumentative.
Mr. Podell: It is not argumentative.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Now Mr. Levy, you have given a statement of
what the conclusions of an accountant using ordinary and prudent care would be or should be on
finding these separate things that you have stated.
Now, if an accountant finds all of these items that
you have described in the course of his examination,
to wit, that the inventory must be reduced by more
than $200,000, that accounts receivable have no
support in the records of shipments and in the sales
journal or memorandum book or journal voucher
that is supposed to support them, and his accounts
receivable aggregate over $700,000, in fact $957,000,
that a creditor who would normally have an account payable, is reported on the books to be a

1467
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debtor in the sum of $113,000, and that a number
of accounts have been assigned to different people,
the same accounts assigned to different people, having a general situation like that, with your knowledge of those books, tell the jury what an ordinary
reasonable prudent careful accountant—nothing
extraordinary—what would be his conclusions from
the entire situation? A. Well, he couldn't help concluding that there was something radically wrong
with the entire situation, that these people probably
were in financial difficulties, and that there were
manipulations in their accounts. The effect of all
of these things would be cumulative and it would
put him in a highly suspicious frame of mind, and
put him on his guard and make him feel that he had
to exhaust every means at his command to investigate these items and to ascertain the actual facts
before he could certify to the balance sheet.
Q. Would that include communication with the
accounts receivable, those that owed the money on
the accounts? A. In my judgment that would be
indispensable in this situation.
Q. Regardless of what the client wished. For
the accountant's protection, I am talking about. A.
If I were to certify to his statement, of course. I
could not compel him to let me write to those accounts, but I might have to withdraw from the examination if he did not permit me to do so.
Q. Or when you do certify to a statement, certify
to a statement disclosing these things that you have
described? A. Yes, sir, very fully.
Q. What you have stated to this jury just a
moment ago, is that a general recognized principle
of accountancy?
Mr. Marshall:
too indefinite.

Which?

I think that is
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drawn.

1471

The conclusions he has just

Q. The conclusions you have just stated, is that
within general recognized principles of accountancy?
Mr. Marshall: I am still vague as to what
he means by that question, and I object to
it for that reason. He does not tell us what
of his numerous conclusion he is now referring to.
The Court: Or of this summation that
has just been primarily made. I will allow
it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Witness: May I have the question
again please?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
The Witness: Yes, sir.
Q. Who are your authorities on accountancy?
Who is generally recognized as the leading authority? I mean in the way of text, text books? A.
There are numerous authorities. I think Montgomery on Auditing is regarded generally by all
accountants as the leading American authority. It
has been a standard textbook fifteen years, probably, and is to-day.
Mr. Podell:

You may examine.

Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. Mr. Levy, when were you engaged as an expert in this case? A. Some time early this year, I
believe. I think it was January of this year.
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Q. And shortly after that is the first time that
you ever looked at the books of Fred Stern, or the
work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. The first
time I knew anything about this case, yes, sir.
Q. And by whom were you engaged? A. By Mr.
Limburg.
Q. That is, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what have you been paid for your work
and testimony so far? A. So far?
Q. Yes. A. I have been paid a retainer of
$250.00.
Q. And do you expect to get paid anything further? A. I expect to be paid for every day of time
I devote to this case, yes, sir.
Q. And about how much do you expect to be
paid? A. Exactly $300 per day.
Q. $100 a day? A. Yes, sir, that is my arrangement with Mr. Limburg.
Q. That is, every day you are here in Court you
get $100, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. It does not
matter
Q. Whether it is in Court or the work you have
done outside? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you are also an attorney, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Admitted to the practice of law in this state?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in the course of your presentation here,
you have presented it as an accountant and from
your knowledge of law, as an attorney? A. I don't
recall that I have testified to any question of law.
I have testified to my examination of these books
and to my knowledge of what is regular and usual.
In
Q. But you
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Mr. Podell:
ahead.

Let him finish, please.

Go

A. Regular and usual in the practice of accountancy.
Q. You can not forget you are an attorney, quite,
can you? A. Not when you remind me of it.
Q. Is that the only time you remember you are
an attorney? A. I wouldn't say that.
Q. Now, you recognize that as an expert witness
here, you are in effect an advocate, whether you
are an attorney or not? A. That is not so.
Q. You would not say that you are an advocate?
A. That is not so, no, sir. I am not an advocate.
I would like to make a further statement with respect to that.
Q. No. You have answered the question on that.
You said you were not an advocate. A. Most emphatically so.
Q. I think we can make up our minds about that.

1478

Mr. Podell: There is no occasion for that
remark, Mr. Marshall. Ask questions, please.
Do not make remarks.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please-—
The Court: Come along; do not let us
waste time. Let us get started and move.
Q. When you went over these books, did you discuss them at all with Mr. Djorup? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you knew that Mr. Djorup had been over
the books in some detail? A. Yes, sir.
Q. He had been accountant for the receiver and
trustee in bankruptcy of Stern, had he not? A. I
understand that is so.
Q. You also understood that he was the accountant for Ultramares, did you not? A. I learned that
only the other day.
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Q. But he had been over the books before you?
A. So he told me.
Q. Did he tell you that he had had the assistance
of Mr. Romberg on parts of these books? A. No,
sir.
Q. But you had the help and advice of Mr. Djorup
in locating some of these things which you have
testified to in court? A. He worked with me to a
large extent. I also worked independently.
Q. But he was able to show you certain things
and save you a good deal of time and effort in going
over these books, was he not? A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Now, before you ever started on these books,
you knew that Stern & Company was bankrupt, did
you not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were told, were you not, by Mr.
Djorup, what he thought was wrong with the books
or with Stern? A. Told some of the things, yes.
Q. Yes. So that you were very much in the position of a doctor performing an autopsy, were you
not—the man was dead and you wanted to find out
what he died of? A. To some extent, I would say
yes. I do not know enough about the medical profession to answer that question.
Q. What I am trying to bring out is that the
point of view that you took when you made this
audit was a different point of view than the point
of view that would be taken by an auditor auditing
the books of a going concern, is that not so? A. No,
sir.
Q. Well, now— A. Not the point of view.
Q. Just a minute. You said no. Now, let us see.
Here you have a concern that is bankrupt, that is
dead; you are told by Mr. Djorup that he believes
certain things caused the bankruptcy. Now, do
you not begin therefore from a different point of
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view than an auditor called in to audit the books
of the ordinary going concern? A. But I wasn't
auditing the books with a view to ascertaining their
financial condition. We knew that.
Q. That is just the point I am trying to make.
A. You asked me about my point of view.
Q. You were auditing it for a different purpose,
from a different point of view than Touche-Niven
was?
Mr. Podell: There are two questions in
that—-different purpose and different point
of view. Which are you speaking of? Let
the witness understand.
Q. You were auditing them for a different purpose that Touche-Niven, were you not? A. For
a different purpose, yes, sir.
Q. And you were auditing them consequently
from a different point of view, were you not? A.
No, sir, because my very purpose was to ascertain
what their point of view should have been in view
of the state of the records.
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, you were trying to find out
what their point of view should have been? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. That was your point of view? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Their point of view was to determine what
the books of account showed as of December 31,
1923, is not that so? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, are not those different points of view?
A. Stated as you state them now, I will state yes.
Q. Now, you would not claim, would you, that
there was only one plan of audit that was proper
for any kind of examination? A. No, sir.
Q. Nor would you say, I suppose, that any particular order of procedure was essential because of

1484

1485

496
1486

1487

1488

Saul Levy—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

any given audit? A. Oh, certain things are essential in every audit, yes, sir.
Q. But I mean the order of procedure? A. That
depends largely upon circumstances.
Q. Yes. The audit on the whole depends largely
on the discretion of the man in charge, how far he
is to go and as to what order he is to take things
up, is not that correct? A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Now, as an attorney, you know the difference,
do you not, between what is hearsay and what a
man knows of his own knowledge, do you not? A.
Yes, sir. As an attorney, I think I do.
Q. Now, if you can remember that you are an
attorney for just one minute, as I have just reminded you of it
Mr. Podell: May I suggest that counsel
put a question instead of making prefatory
speeches?
The Court: I think so, yes, sir. Let us
have the question.
Mr. Marshall: I was just about to put the
question when Mr. Podell interrupted.
Mr. Podell: Let us have the question. We
are all trying to save time. Let us have
the question.
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps if you would not
interrupt, we would save time.
Mr. Podell: I would not have to interrupt
if you asked a question properly.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Now, with this knowledge of yours in mind,
will you state whether in your opinion an audit is
not on the whole in almost every instance based
upon hearsay so far as the accountant is concerned?
A. Largely so, but I must qualify that from a legal
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standpoint, because recent legislation has made
book entries proof. They are no longer mere
hearsay.
Q. But as far as the accountant is concerned,
Mr. Levy, he does not know any of the facts in the
books, does he? A. No, sir. He merely knows
what they purport to state.
Q. What they purport to state. That is correct.
So that when he goes through the balance sheet,
take the item of cash—he counts the cash in the
petty cash drawer; he does not know of his own
knowledge that that cash belongs to the concern,
does he? A. No, sir. But he finds it there in the
regular course of his audit, and he usually makes
a surprise audit as to cash.
Q. But it might very well be that that cash is
put in out of the president's pocket and will be
taken out again a month later, is not that so? A.
That might be, yes, sir.
Q. Now, on the question of accounts receivable,
does not the auditor have to depend on the books
and the information that is given to him, that the
accounts receivable are genuine? A. Not entirely.
Q. Supposing he were to write to a customer, is
it not possible that a man with a well worked out
scheme to defraud, could have someone write back
an answer to the accountant's letters? A. That is
possible, but it is most unlikely that all of his customers would be involved in that sort of conspiracy.
Q. Is it a customary thing to find, for example,
that the head of a concern is a crook and that the
whole of his organization is crooked? A. No, sir,
that is not customary.
Q. That is a pretty rare thing, is it not? A.
Yes, sir.
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Q. So that if you found that all of the heads of
a concern, the president, the cashier, the credit
man and the sales manager were all engaged in a
conspiracy to defraud, you would say that was a
pretty unusual circumstance, would you not? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you are pretty well acquainted, are you
not, with the accounting profession? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I think you just said you regarded Montgomery as an authority? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now tell me whether you have heard of the
following accountants, and whether you regard
them as men of good standing: George O. May?
A. Yes, sir, very highly reputed.
Q. Charles B. Couchman? A. Yes, sir. He is
the author of a textbook.
Q. Henry B. Fernald? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Alan R. Dunlap? A. I don't think I have
heard of him.
Q,. S. B. Cboley? A. I don't think I have heard
of him. I have probably heard of his firm.
Q. Earl A. Saliers? A. I have heard of him,
yes, sir. I do not know of him as a man who has
had any broad practical experience. He was a
professor at Yale, I believe, and the editor of a
certain handbook on accountancy. I happened to
have met him professionally a number of years ago.
Q. You know that handbook, do you not? You
know that handbook? A. Yes, sir, I have a copy
of it in my library.
Q. And you know that it there says that it is a
pretty dangerous thing for an auditor to follow
any given method of auditing a set of books, any
given audit program? A. I don't recall that quotation, but I think it is sound in principle.
Q. It is a sound principle? A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Now, how long have you known of the firm of
Touche, Niven & Co.? A. How long have I known
of them?
Q. Yes. A. Oh, perhaps thirteen years. I think
as long as I have been in the practice of public
accountancy, as long as I have done public accounting work.
Q. And except for whatever opinion you may
have formed of this audit in the course of your engagement here, they are a reputable firm, so far
as you know?
Mr. Podell:
That is not an
The Court:
Mr. Podell:

I object to that, your Honor.
issue here.
I will allow it.
I except.

1496

A. I have always known of them as a very reputable firm. I wouldn't hesitate—that is, answering
your question before my contact with this case, if
anyone had asked me whether their statements
were reliable, I would say that they could be relied
upon.
Q. You always regarded them as honest men?
A. Certainly.
Mr. Podell: Whom? Regarded whom?
Who are they? There are a lot of people in
there. He does not know everybody in
Touche, Niven & Co. I move to strike the
last statement out.
The Court: Touche-Niven is purely a
partnership name, that is all, and he refers
to the firm. Is that what you refer to?
The Witness: Yes. I might say I would
regard any reputable C. P. A. as an honest
man until I learned of something to the
contrary.
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Mr. Podell: Is that all?
Mr. Marshall: That is all.
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell.

1499

1500

Q. There has been some statement here as to
any given method is a dangerous method to follow.
You were asked about that? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you explain the reason for that a little
more fully? A. One of the most important reasons
for that is that we start with a certain tentative
program in mind, but that program contemplates
ordinary usual circumstances, the appearance of
regularity in the accounts. If, in the course of
our work, we encounter unusual circumstances
which arouse suspicion, then, of course, one must
depart from his ordinary usual audit program, because the fundamental object of the audit is to
ascertain and to confirm facts.
Q. So that there is no such thing, once an unusual situation is found, then the accountant must
use every resource at his command to get at the
truth? A. Certainly. That is where his experience
as an accountant comes into play.
Q. Now, tell the jury what was the nature of
your engagement. What were you asked to do?
There was some discussion here as to the point of
view. Of course, you knew that this concern was
bankrupt, did you not?
Mr. Marshall: I object to Mr. Podell making a speech for the witness. I think he had
better ask a question.
The Court: Yes. Sustained.
Q. Will you tell us what the nature of your—
what were you asked to do on this job? A. I was
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given a general summary of the situation. I was
asked to examine the records, to examine ToucheNiven's working papers, and to report on what I
found and whether from those books of account and
whether from the working papers of Touche-Niven
these errors should have been discovered by them
in the course of their audit.
Q. Either were or should have been, is that it?
A. Either were or should have been, yes, sir.
Q. And that is the way— A. I was asked to express an opinion as to whether or not they had
done what they should have done in connection with
this audit.
Q. And it is from that point of view that you
approached it? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell:

1501

1502

That is all.

Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. This is not the first time you have testified, is
it, Mr. Levy? A. In the course of my ten years I
have testified a number of times, yes, sir.
Q. One of the principal items of your work, is
it not? A. No, sir.
Q. A very frequent item of work? A. Not as
frequent as I would like to have it. It is interesting work.
Q. At $100 a day? A. It is just one of a number
of things I do in the general practice of accountancy.
Q, I see. A. I would estimate that surely less
than 5 per cent. of my time, surely less than that.
Q. About how many times have you testified? A.
Oh, I don't know. Perhaps a half a dozen times.
Perhaps somewhat more than that.
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Q. Now, have you ever found any two audits that
are identical? A. That is a hard question to answer. I would have to answer yes or no. I will
find certain things that are present in all audits,
and they differ in certain other respects.
Q. They all differ somewhat, do they not? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. So that you cannot really— A. Just as two
human beings always differ in some respects.
Q. That is just the point. So you cannot really
go in with any preconceived idea of how you are
going to make an audit; you have got to use your
discretion in the course of it? A. You have a general idea as to what you are going to do.
Q. You know your business? A. Yes. And if
you had made that audit in prior years, then you
ought to know almost definitely what you are going to do.
Q. But they all differ from year to year, you find
different things? A. To some extent, depending
on your findings in the course of the work.
Q. And in the main, the order and the way you
do it depends on the use of your discretion, does
it not? A. To a large extent depending on circumstances, yes, sir.
By Mr. Podell,

1506

Q. You always expect honesty and you always
expect reasonable care in the making of any audit?
A. Yes.
Q. No matter what plan you pursue? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Have you ever testified against an accountant's firm in your life?
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Mr. Marshall: I object; it is immaterial.
Mr. Podell: Every accountant is called
upon more or less to furnish details of any
audit he has made, and he has a right to say
whether he has testified.
The Court: Yes.
Q. Have you ever testified in any suit against
accountants? A. Never.
Mr. Podell: That is all.
The Court: All right, sir; step down.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the
other day we were to be permitted to put in
the balance sheets for the years 1921 and
1920, and I now offer them in evidence.
Mr. Podell: What are those?
The Court:
1920 and 1921 balance
sheets.
Mr. Podell: Let me see them first. I ask
for the audit of 1922.
Mr. Marshall: That was in evidence and
then it was stated we could put in the rest
of them. The Court so ruled.
The Court: That was in.
Mr. Podell: I do not remember, your
Honor, making any such rulings. I submit
they ought to be reserved for his case, and
not clutter up my case. I am presenting my
case. I do not know about those things. I
have never gone into them and never seen
them in my life.
Mr. Marshall: There is no reason why he
should put in one year without all of them.
The Court: That is what we agreed on
when the question came up over the 1922 report.
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Mr. Podell: Then they should be marked
for identification.
The Court: No. I allowed them in evidence.
Mr. Podell: I do not want to contradict
your Honor about making an agreement, but
frankly I have no recollection.
The Court: We will mark them for identification, until that has been verified. My
recollection was that, although it may be at
fault. Mark them for identification.
1511

(Received and marked Defendants' Exhibits J and K for Identification.)
The Court: Who is the next witness now?
Mr. Podell: I am getting some papers
ready, your Honor. Is it understood that
all the work sheets and the letters are in
evidence?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Djorup, will you
take the stand?

CHRISTIAN DJORUP, was recalled as a witness:

1512
Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. You are an accountant by profession, Mr.
Djorup? A. I am.
Q. And have been practicing accountancy how
long? A. Since 1910.
The Court: Talk a little louder; the jury
cannot hear.
Q. Since 1910? A. Yes.
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Q. And prior to that time have you had experience in accounts, accountancy work, or bookkeeping? A. Since 1898.
Q. Since when? A. 1898.
Mr. Podell: Just talk to me over here, so
that these last jurors can hear.
Q. Just tell us briefly what does that experience
embrace, and what does it include; first, with what
firm are you now? A. My own firm, Christian
Djorup & Company, which was started in 1913.
Prior to that time, with Marwick Mitchell & Company, for over thirteen years, and before that time
in Wall Street offices. I was employed with other
companies, Redmond & Company, and other concerns, for twelve years. In between I have been in
the import and export business, I mean as an accountant in Egypt from 1905 to 1906, and as an accountant I have specialized in foreign exchange
and in foreign trade, and particularly in rubber and
silk houses of that kind.
Q. Now, did you take possession of books and
records of Fred Stern & Company at the time when
the receiver in bankruptcy took possession? A.
Prior to that time.
Q. Just when, what day, did you go in there to
take possession? A. On the 3rd of January, 1925.
Q. That was before the receivership? A. Before
the receiver was appointed, I was called by Mr.
Hunt of the Chemical National Bank, whether I
could jump in that afternoon in the office of Fred
Stern & Company on behalf of the creditors' committee, to find out how the situation was, and how
the financial standing was of the concern. I started
working that same afternoon, on Saturday
Q. Before you come to that, did you take possession then of all of those books that had been marked
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in evidence? A. On the 3rd of January I did not
take possession but all the books were not in the
office and I had not located all the books at that
time, but I took full possession of the records on
the 7th of January, when the receiver was appointed.
Q. Now, that was about a week or so after Stern
died? A. Stern, I believed, died on the 2nd of
January.
Q. You took possession of them on the 7th.
Whom did you find in there when you came in? A.
When I came in I found Mr. Von Goeben in the
office of Fred Stern & Company, and I believe his
son.
Mr. Marshall: Which Mr. Von Goeben?
The Witness: And I believe his son, and
they asked me to go ahead with the work.

1518

Q. From that day, that is the 7th of January,
up to the beginning of this trial, have you had custody and charge of the books and records of Fred
Stern & Company? A. I have continuously, for I
was engaged by the receiver, and subsequently by
the trustee as accountant.
Q. As accountant? A. And I have the records
in my own office.
Q. And you are now the accountant for the
trustee in bankruptcy? A. I am.
Q. And originally engaged by the creditors' committee, and also at the same time, before the trustee
was elected, you were acting as accountant for the
receiver? A. That is right.
Q. With the exception of such entries you might
have made in checking up the various books of accounts and records, can you state to the Court and
jury that these books and records that have been
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marked in evidence, are the same as they were at
the time when you took possession? A. The books
and records are the same as they were when I took
possession. A great many of the records we had to
write up ourselves. On Monday, the 5th of January, Romberg brought in the general ledger and
the journal vouchers for the first six months of 1924.
The general ledger was an empty book without an
entry. We wrote up the general ledger from
Q. You are talking now of entries made up for
the year 1924? A. 1924.
Q. With respect to the year 1923, and such records as there were with respect to that year, with
the exceptions of such notations as you made in
checking over, are they the same? A. The records
for the year 1923 are the same as when we came to
the office and took possession.
Q. In fact, these books and records have been
in your office, that is, the Christian Djorup & Company? A. From the time we gave up the office of
Fred Stern & Company.
Q. And you had care of them? A. First I had
them in the office of Fred Stern, when I took possession of these records.
Q. Now, did you make an extensive audit, or an
audit of these books, or what did you do in connection with them, when you came in? A. When I
came in and found that assets were short of liabilities, I was presented with a statement of Fred
Stern & Company's financial condition as of December 31, 1923, by two members of the creditors'
committee, and I was looking for a million dollars—
to find it quickly. I told my accountants that were
working with me—"Look for a million dollars."
Whether they lost a million dollars during 1924 or
where it went to, when they did not find it, I looked
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for it myself and found $957,000, within a couple
of hours, through the credit memorandum book,
where there was entered the reversal of invoices
made out in November and December, 1923; they
were all reversed by one touch in the credit memorandum book in March
Mr. Marshall: May we have the date of
this reversal, to show it was after our audit?
The Court: Yes.
A. Yes, it was entered in the March credit memorandum book, 1924.
1523

1524

Mr. Marshall: After the date of this balance sheet?
The Witness: After the accountants were
out, of course.
Q. How do you know that, Mr. Djorup? A. For
the report of Touche, Niven & Co. dated—after the
report was out, the report of Touche-Niven was
dated February, 1924, I believe.
Q. Then you found $957,000 of fake accounts
receivable? A. Yes, I found this Monday evening.
Also other circumstances, and went on Tuesday
morning back to Mr. Hunt, to tell him it was insolvent a year ago. They did not believe it, for
there was a statement—I said positive, I would
swear to it, and the next day we went through the
receivership.
Q. And so you found a million dollars—you
found at least it was not there? A. Yes, the million
had disappeared.
Q. And it had been lost during the course of
1924? Or rather, that particular million had never
existed at the end of 1923? A. That is right.
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By the First Juryman.
Q. You came there and did not find all the books,
you say; where did they come from after? A. The
books were in our office.
Q. You said they were not there? A. The general ledger was not in the office, that was brought
in on Monday morning by Romberg.
Q. Monday morning, what date? A. 5th of January.
Q. From where? A. From his home with the
journal voucher. He was supposed to help me, but
he only attended to things after I found them.

1526

By Mr. Marshall.
Q. That was Romberg?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Podell.
Q. What books—state in answer to the juror,
please, what books did you find there, when you
came there, and what books did Romberg bring in
afterwards? A. He only brought in an empty
journal ledger. I looked for the general ledger.
There was no general ledger.
Q. For the year 1924? A. For the year 1924.
Q. Just so that we will be sure, you understand
the question, Mr. Djorup—state what books did you
find in the office when you first came there? A. All
the other books. In other words, cash receipt and
disbursements.
Q. All the other books does not mean very much.
Name them first. A. Cash receipts and disbursements. Purchase journal, or debit memorandum
book. Invoice register. I made a mistake before—
sales journal. Debit memorandum book—say summary, debit memorandum book. Purchase journal.
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Invoice register. Credit memorandum book for
allowances, returns, and so forth. The shipment
records for incoming and outgoing shipments. Lot
books.
Q. Which books? A. Lot books.
Q. What are those? A. Par East books and
European books showing rubber that was received,
and how it was disposed of.
Q. Yes. A. The bank ledger was kept up to date,
showing the relationship with banks as to commercial letters of credit, and acceptances.
Q. Now, is it correct to say that you found all
the books that have been marked in evidence with
the exception of one which you have described as
what? A. General ledger for 1924.
Q. And that was brought in by whom? A. By
Romberg on the 5th of January.
Q. Was it the 1923 general ledger? A. The 1923
general ledger was in the office, and I tied it up
with a statement of Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. I beg your pardon? A. I tied it up with the
statement of Touche, Niven & Co.
Q. We will come to that. Now, Mr. Djorup, did
you then proceed to make and go over the audit of
the statement that had been made by Touche, Niven
& Co. for the year 1923; did you have that with you
in mind? A. At first I wanted to find all the assets
I could find.
Q. I know you told us what you did at first. Did
you at any time thereafter examine the certified
statement, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 of Touche,
Niven & Co. and likewise in connection with the
books? A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, just tell us what you did in that connection; make it as brief as you can? A. I tried
to ascertain whether they were insolvent also in
1922 and in 1921.
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Q. We are not interested in 1922 or 1921. We
are interested in 1923. A. I check back all the records for the year 1923.
Q. You did check back? A. Yes, some of them,
my accountants did.
Q. When you found those $957,000, just what did
you do in that connection, to check up with that,
and the accuracy of the statement of Touche, Niven
& Co.; did you go to any of the supporting books?
A. We checked back all the shipments received and
all the shipments made by the lot numbers. I
wanted to find whether Stern had taken some
rubber and sold it and did not account for it to
the corporation, for that would have been another
means of getting away with money; so we checked
all the shipments back for 1924 and 1923, to ascertain what rubber had been received and what
rubber had been sold, and found, of course, additional shipments that came in in 1923.
Q. How did you check that; what books did you
use? A. We checked all the shipment books.
Q. The shipment books, the books of shipment
made by Stern & Company? A. Books of shipment
made by Stern & Company, and books of shipment
received by Stern & Company from the Far East,
from London, and from the local market.
Q. Was there any time when you were asked—
or when you took the statement furnished by
Touche, Niven & Co., and checked it up with the
books, was there any time when you did that—do
you understand my question? A. In January, 1925.
Q. You did that? A. Yes.
Q. What did you find; did you examine the work
sheets of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. In January
1925, we went to the office of Touche, Niven & Co.
and called their attention to the fact that I
found out those fake invoices. Then two account-
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ants I believe were sent over by Mr. Rea to Touche,
Niven & Co.'s office to check back the entries there,
and he also checked back the United Baltic invoices,
and told one of my accountants, Smidt, over the
phone, that it corresponded with my findings that
the United Baltic invoices amounted

1535

Mr. Marshall: I object to what this man
said.
Mr. Podell: You are not allowed to do
that.
Mr. Marshall: What somebody else told
his assistants I object to.
The Court: Will this testimony be more
or less cumulative of the other witness?
Mr. Podell: Very much so. Our primary
purpose in calling this witness is to get his
conclusions with regard to the facts found.
The Court: Why don't you put hypothetical questions to him?
Mr. Podell: I think that will probably
save us a lot of time.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. First, did you examine the accounts

1536

The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, I do
not know whether you caught the significance of my statement. I am asking counsel
as to whether or no this witness' testimony
would not be of a character alleged to be
confirmatory of that which the previous witness has said, and which as he says, as a
matter of his own knowledge, he knows it
would be, now he is going to put hypothetical
questions based on the same proposition as
already asked of the previous witness, instead of going over the whole thing again.
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Mr. Podell: There is one item that is not
cumulative, and I would like to cover that
first.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Marshall: I take it your Honor is not
telling the jury that this man would give the
same opinions as did the last witness?
The Court: No, I say based on the questions asked. I do not know.
Q. Mr. Djorup, did you look into the United
Baltic account? A. I did.
Q. On the books and records of Stern & Company? A. I did.
Q. Tell us briefly what you did, what books and
records you looked at? A. From the United Baltic
shipment record in which the shipments received
from the United Baltic are kept separately from
the other shipments that came from Singapore and
London.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
want to specifically object to any testimony
from this book because this was Exhibit 6
which I believe Romberg said he thought had
not been given to Touche, Niven & Co.
Mr. Podell: What is that?
The Court: He said it had not been given
to Touche, Niven & Co.
Mr. Podell: What is that?
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit 6, the
United Baltic Company book.
Mr. Podell: He did not say anything of
the kind. Your Honor will remember what
he said. This is the second time counsel has
made that statement.
Mr. Marshall: I was right.
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Mr. Podell: You were wrong the last
time and wrong again. Counsel is referring
to that point when Mr. Romberg said what
misled me about this book that it had handwriting in it that he did not recognize, but
that when he turned the book over and saw
the handwriting for subsequent years, he recognized it as a book that had been in the
files and in the handwriting of one of the
employees, and was in the premises January and February of 1924. Now, it was not
a case where anybody had to pick up books
and hand them to these people when they
were making an audit. The book was there.
That is all we are required to show.
The Witness: May I make a remark about
the book?
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, please. Are
you so anxious that you cannot let me talk?
The Witness: I am sorry.
Mr. Marshall: I call your Honor's attention to page 140.
The Court: Tell me what it says.
Mr. Marshall
(reading from stenographer's minutes) : "Q. All these others you
did not know? A. No, they never saw this
one. Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 6."
Mr. Podell: Will you let me show the
Judge the correction that he made on crossexamination?
Mr. Marshall: No, it was in your examination. Romberg was the cashier and the
man in charge of the general bookkeeping
system of Stern, the man who testified here
to that.
Mr. Podell: May I have these minutes for
a moment. I am getting my copy and I will
show you what he said thereafter.
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The Court: I remember this witness testifying
Mr. Podell: Not this witness, your Honor.
I am confident of that and I will read it to
you in a moment. This same question came
up before. Opposition in regard to these
things is very essential.
The Court: But you have to identify
them as books that were there.
Mr. Podell: We go a little further than
that, and we take the position that if when
these accountants going through these records found any important record missing or
unavailable to them, that it would have been
their duty to make inquiry to get that record,
or else—to stop.
The Court: Stop.
Mr. Podell : I am talking of the cross-examination of Romberg.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please,
there might have been other books which
would have given all the information we were
after. They are trying to say that this book
was there in that condition at that time.
The Court: There may have been other
books. I want this book connected with the
conditions that existed there. It may not
be a necessary book to your examination at
all—I am quite familiar with that proposition.
Mr. Marshall: It ought to be connected
in its present form.
The Court: I am afraid it will have to
be.
Mr. Podell: Of remittances received from
the United Baltic, there ought to be some
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book somewhere. So far there is no evidence there was more than this book. If they
will produce any other records, if they had
shipments received from the United Baltic,
we will be glad to introduce them.
Mr. Marshall: We do not have those records, Mr. Podell.
The Court: Would they be in any other
book?
By Mr. Podell (reading from testimony given by
Romberg upon this trial) :
1547

1548

"Q. Did you conceal that book from anybody? A.
No.
Q. So far as you know, did anybody conceal it
from the accountants? A. No.
Q. You have identified it previously as being one
of the books kept by Fred Stern & Company? A.
Yes.
Q. So that so far as you know had Touche-Niven
sought to use it or ask for it, it was there available
for them? A. Right.
Q. That is correct? A. Yes."
Mr. Podell: And we will not take any
more time with that.
Mr. Marshall: He said he did not know
the book, so how could he conceal it?
Mr. Podell: He said he did.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Now, what is the answer of the witness?
(Record repeated as recorded.) What did you find
• by examination of that book? A. That we found
shipments from the United Baltic, from pages on
which we wanted to get the invoices.
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Q. Pardon me, Mr. Djorup. I would like to be
particularly clear about this item. What book did
you look at first, at the accounts payable ledger
first? A. No, the United Baltic shipment.
Q. Did you look at the accounts payable ledger
first; either yes or no? A. Yes, at the United Baltic
account.
Q. You looked at the United Baltic account; was
it one of the accounts? A. Yes.
Q. And the first book you looked at was? A. I
found in the United Baltic account the accounts
payable ledger.
Mr. Marshall: Let us have that ledger he
is talking about.
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to have it
now as he testifies.
The Court: Let us have it. I think that
is right. We shall be able to follow.
The Witness: That is it (indicating). I
found in 1924, in March, 1924, a number of
credit items which showed the date of 1923.
That is how I immediately went over shipments that had been received in 1923, and
had not been recorded.

1550

Q. Then what was your next step? A. The invoice register where those invoices were recorded
in 1924.
Q. And what did you find in the invoices? A.
How about letting me have the invoice register of
1924?
Q. Please tell us what you found. Answer my
question. A. Invoices entered in 1924 which were
all dated prior to December 31, 1923, for rubber
bought from United Baltic Corporation.
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Q. Yes. When you speak of invoices you speak
of money of the United Baltic that Stern owed to
the United Baltic? A. Money that Fred Stern
owed to the United Baltic.
Q. Now, was the United Baltic among the accounts payable or among the accounts receivable?
A. The United Baltic was in the accounts payable
ledger which contained
Q. Go ahead. A. Which contains accounts payable and dealers' accounts.
Q. And dealers' accounts? A. As a differentiation from customers' accounts.
Q. From what? A. Customers' account which
are in the accounts receivable ledger.
Q. Is it customary to find in the accounts payable ledger an indebtedness to a creditor? A. The
United Baltic Corporation being a foreign shipper
would usually have a large credit balance, unless
they draw drafts against commercial letters of
credits, when the balances would be approximately
even.
Q. There would be no occasion in the ordinary
course of business when the United Baltic would
owe money to Stern?
Mr. Marshall: I object. He is testifying
to Stern's course of business.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: What is the ground of objection?
The Court: You are testifying, instead of
the witness.
Mr. Podell: I do not know how I can ask
that differently because I am calling specific attention to a specific item.
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Q. Is it customary to find in an accounts payable ledger that there is a heavy indebtedness to
a creditor? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: I do not think it makes
much difference whether it is customary.
The Court: I allow it.
Q. Now, what did you do to check up this item
of indebtedness to a creditor; what did you do after
the accounts payable ledger, where did you go to,
what book? A. To the book of original entry from
which those credits came.
Q. And what was that book? A. The invoice
register. In the invoice register I found all the invoices for merchandise received prior to December
31, 1923.
Q. Now, we want that invoice register. A. And
to find out what became of that merchandise I
looked for a record which would show me what
shipments had been received for those invoices, and
then found this shipment record which showed me
that merchandise was sold in 1923. The invoice—
that is one of these books.
Q. All right; we will get that, Mr. Djorup. Did
you find that Stern had omitted those invoices
from the United Baltic account that should have
been charged up as a liability for the year 1923,
in the sum of $371,000 odd? A. We tabulated those
invoices and the invoices aggregated £82,552-16-6.
Q. I want to save time on that account. You
will help me, Mr. Djorup, and answer my questions
yes or no, please? A. Yes.
Q. What was the amount that you found in dollars and cents that he had omitted to charge? A.
To credit $371,487.80, to credit to the United Baltic
Corporation.
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Q. With that amount for the year 1923; is that
right ? A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Djorup, was that the liability that
Stern owed to the United Baltic, that item? A.
The ledger account showed a debit balance.
Q. I did not ask you that—was the sum of
$371,487.80 a liability which Stern should have
entered upon his books prior to December 31, 1923?
A. Yes.
Q. That had not been entered? A. Right.
Q. What did the account show; what did he have
entered? A. The account showed a debit balance.
Q, Of how much? A. Of $113,199.60.
Q. Upon a correction of that item, what would
have been the true state of the balance as revised?
A. $258,288.20.
Q. What would have been due from whom to
whom? A. It would have been due from Stern to
the United Baltic Corporation.
Q. So that that resulted from his omission to
enter up the $371,000 as due to the United Baltic
and resulted in an over-statement of the assets of
over a quarter of a million dollars? A. That is
correct.
Q. And an under-statement of liabilities in that
amount; it is the same as an over-statement of the
assets, is that right? A. That is right.
Q. Now, did you in checking up this figure, did
you communicate with the United Baltic Corporation? A. We took it up with the agent of the
United Baltic in State Street.
Q. In State Street? A. Yes, 24 State Street,
Q. They had an office here, had they not? A.
They had an office here in New York.
Q. And have you got the invoices of the United
Baltic for these shipments? A. Yes, those we
found in the office of Fred Stern & Company.
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Q. You found them there the very first day you
came in? A. It may have been the second or third
day.
Q. I mean as soon as you looked for them you
found them? A. As soon as we looked for them we
found them.
Mr. Marshall: May I have those?
The Witness : Yes (handing papers).
The Court: What is that exhibit?
Mr. Marshall: No. 24.
Q. Have you heard the testimony here in court
of Mr. Saul Levy, who proceded you, with respect
to the various items that he testified to? A. Yes, I
have.
Q, Assuming that an accountant comes into an
establishment like Fred Stern & Company, and
finds there that in the inventory that was furnished
him, that there had been included merchandise aggregating $215,795.27, which should not have been
included; that there had been included $20,000
worth of accounts receivable which should not have
been included; that there had been omitted $67,000
of accounts payable which should not have been
omitted, and the accountant, by reason of those
omissions of inventory is compelled to reduce the
inventory by the sum of three hundred and three
odd thousand dollars—I withdraw that figure.
The Court:

$303,861.

Q. (Continuing) The result of which is to reduce the net assets by the sum of three hundred and
three odd thousand dollars—assuming that he finds
accounts receivable entered in the ledger in the sum
of $950,000 off for which there were no supporting
entries, either in the sales memo book or sales
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journal or in the shipping record; assuming that he
finds the condition of affairs that you have described in regard to the United Baltic account; and
assuming that he finds on a comparison of the accounts receivable ledger, his own working sheets,
and communications from bank creditors and other
creditors that various accounts have been assigned,
forty-one accounts that he has investigated have
been assigned more than once—thirty-five accounts
out of forty-five have been assigned more than once
—and that accountant is then required to furnish
a certified statement, what, in your judgment,
would an accountant, exercising reasonable care,
just ordinary care, finding such a condition of affairs, what would he have been required to do? A.
Refuse to give a statement.
Q. And why do you make that statement—he
should have refused to give a certified statement in
such form as appears in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?

1566

Mr. Marshall: He said he should refuse
to give a statement. Mr. Podell is trying to
ask leading questions.
The Court: Our whole attention is directed towards Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, so
when he says—to refuse to give a statement, there could be no other deduction except as that which is represented by Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand that.
I do not think Mr. Podell should lead him.
The Witness: I would refuse to give a certified balance sheet.
Q. You will have to talk up louder. A. I would
refuse to give a certified balance sheet when I
found conditions as existed in Fred Stern & Company.
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Q. You should have refused to give a certified
balance sheet except upon what?
The Court: He would refuse to give a certified balance sheet based on the conditions
as found in Fred Stern & Company. It is
awfully warm, gentlemen, won't you talk up,
Mr. Witness, please. Reaching makes it
harder for all.
Q. If he did furnish any certified statement, in
what respect should he have qualified it, if at all?
A. A most exhaustive examination would have to
be made first, to even give a qualified statement in
a condition of that kind.
Q. And the qualifications should have then required him to make full disclosure in the statement that he had furnished of such conditions as I
have described, if he found them? A. A certificate
would be of no value
Q. Whether it would be of value or not, that is
another question; but in furnishing a certificate
should he have made full disclosure of conditions
such as I have described? A. If a certificate is
given, yes.
Q. If it is given? A. Yes.
Q. You said that if the client insisted upon getting a certificate and did not wish to have those
qualifications, and denied in writing, what should
the accountant have done? First, as to the accounts receivable, what should he have done? A.
Just a minute, on all crude rubber
Mr. Marshall: I object to this as not calling for a mere matter of information. He is
going into what he thinks physically happened, and that is not a matter that he can
get here.
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The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: Exception for counsel for the
defendant.
By Mr. Podell.

1571

Q. Did you understand my question; you are familiar with these letters that have just been shown?
A. In the crude rubber business
Q. I cannot hear you. A. In all audits of crude
rubber importers, one should either communicate
with the customer from whom the money is due or
see that the payments for the money are received
for the invoices during the course of the examination, if the examination has not been made.
Q. What is the usual
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out that
answer as not responsive.
Mr. Podell: I think it is very responsive,
if you will allow me to ask one more question.

1572

Q. What are the usual terms— A. The usual
terms in the rubber trade are net cash ten days for
dealers and thirty days usually is the maximum for
tire and rubber manufacturers. They sometimes
give trade acceptances when they want a longer
time.
Q. So that if an accountant who is auditing these
books waits thirty days, he will know whether
most of those accounts are fake or whether or not
they are genuine?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Q. That is his answer, your Honor. A. I have not
finished my answer.
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The Court: It may be his answer, but he
also said in the meantime there may be acceptances given which would even continue
the further auditing of the books by the accountant.
Mr. Podell: An acceptance in payment.
The Court: That may be. I think the
question is beyond what the witness said.
The witness gave the answer what the customary thing would be, but he concluded
that if the accountant waited thirty days before he gave his report, then he would know
whether they were all paid or not.
Mr. Podell: I will reframe it.
Q. If your maximum terms in the rubber trade
are thirty days, would you say it was the duty of
the accountant to communicate with the people who
owed the money, to find out whether they owed
the money or to wait those thirty days? A.
Usually the accountant does not come in the office
until two or three weeks after the close of the
audit, and before the audit is finished, the thirty
days are expired; so that the accountant can either
communicate with the customer on the 31st day
of December when the crude rubber importer stands
for the communication or he says that the money
has been received during the course of the audit,
but those customers where the money is not received, should be looked into and communicated
with, particularly after our 1921 experience with
all the crude rubber houses.
Mr. Podell: I will consent to that being
stricken out—after the 1921 experience.
The Court: Strike it out.
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Q. Surely this audit was as of December 31, 1923,
was it not? A. Right,
Q. And the work sheets show at least the statement was not given until 24th of February? A.
24th of February which is almost sixty days after
the end of the year.
Mr. Podell:

You may cross-examine.

Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall.
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Q. Now, Mr. Djorup, you referred in looking to
these invoices, Exhibit 24, you went to them, didn't
you, after you had seen this account of the United
Baltic in the general ledger? A. That is right,
Q. Will you turn to that account, please, the
accounts payable ledger, Exhibit No. 17? A. Yes,
accounts payable ledger.
Q. Now, that purports to be entered after the
date of the balance sheet certified to by Touche,
Niven & Co.; is not that so? A. That is right.
Q. And so when you came to that account you
had right there in the books the sign post showing
in effect that in March, 1924, accounts payable were
entered which should have been entered in 1923?
A. Right.
Mr. Marshall: May I show this to the
jury, your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Marshall explaining to the jury the
accounts payable ledger.)
Q. That is the first and only entry of these liabilities, is it not? A. No. The invoice register is
used as a posting medium for this book.
Mr. Podell: Wait a moment. Mr. Marshall has told the jury that is the only one.
You told them that right here.
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Mr. Marshall: You asked whether it was
a reversing entry.
Mr. Podell: Is that what is called a reversing entry, that is, the 1st of October of
the posting?
The Witness: That is the first posting on
the original books which were entered at the
time when the shipments were received in
1923.
Q. Were you there, Mr. Djorup; how do you know
that? A. It must have been.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out.
The Court: Strike it out.

1580

Q. And this is not a reversing entry, is it? A.
No, that is not a reversing entry; that is a posting.
Q. But you cannot say of your own knowledge
that it was in the other book from which you say
it was posted in 1923, can you? A. No. The original book from which that was posted was only entered in 1924.
Mr. Marshall: You are giving the impression that he knows it was entered.
Mr. Podell: I am not.
Q. You are not testifying from your own knowledge as to anything in this business in 1923? A.
I was not there in 1923.
Mr. Marshall: That is the point.
Q. You did not intend to give the impression,
did you, that it was customary in 1924, when this
audit was made, it was customary for accountants
to circularize customers of a concern, accounts receivable customers? A. You mean communicate
with the accountants receivable?
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Q. Yes. A. That has been customary for years
with crude rubber houses, silk houses, dealers in
coffee, and other concerns.
Q. It was not the general custom, was it? A.
To my knowledge it is the general custom.
Q. You mean you always did? A. I always did
for the past fifteen years.
Q. But you do not say it is the general custom of
other accountants, do you? A. Accountants that
are familiar with that line of business would communicate either with the customers or see the
money is received before they quit.
Q. Do you know of any other accountants besides
yourself that does that? A. I do not know what
other accountants are doing.
Q. You do not know of any one else? A. (No
reply.)
Q. Would you communicate to a customer without knowing what the other accountants are doing
in that connection? A. That has been advocated
in 1918 by the Federal Reserve Board.
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute; I object to
what was advocated.
Mr. Podell: He wants any customer and
the witness is referring to a well recognized
authority, the Federal Reserve Board.
Mr. Marshall: That is not a justified
statement. He is talking about what was advocated, not the custom. We are asking
what the custom was. He said he did not
know what other accountants did in the matter.
The Court: I understand that, Mr. Marshall.
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Q. Now, as a matter of fact, did not you know
that the Federal Reserve Board Bulletin says that
"circularizing customers is optional"; is not that
so?
Mr. Podell:
industry?

Are you talking about this

A. Yes, it is optional in the case of a merchandise concern.
Q. Does not the Federal Reserve Bulletin say
that? A. With 5,000 customers you would not communicate with each customer.
Q. It applies only to the merchandise concern of
5,000 customers? A. No. Accountants use their
discretion.

1586

The Court: He answers by saying it is
a matter of discretion.
Q. Now, I ask you whether you do not know that
the Federal Reserve Bulletin says: "Optional. The
best verification of an open balance is a confirmation by the customer. Therefore, if time permits,
and the client does not object, it is advisable to
circularize the customer." It is held optional, you
know that—I do not think the stenographer can
hear you. A. Yes.
Q. Now, you know, don't you, that accountants
are not in the custom of guaranteeing their audits?
Mr. Podell: Nobody claims that they
guarantee their audits.
A. I do not know what you mean by that.
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
no such thing.

There is
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The Court: There is no such claim here,
Mr. Marshall, and the Court will charge that
there is no such guarantee.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor will so
rule, that there is no guarantee at all——
The Court: I will charge it as a matter
of law.
Mr. Podell: And I will stipulate. We are
not suing under a guarantee, and you know
it. You know perfectly well that we are not
suing on any guarantee.
Mr. Marshall: I do not know what your
next amendment will be.
Q. I understood you to say that you are an expert in foreign trade and foreign trade accounting?
A. I am considered that.
Q. What is that? A. I am considered that.
Q. Did not you testify that you were this morning?
Mr. Podell: Is not that an answer?
The Court: I cannot hear either one of
you now.

1590

Q. Didn't you testify that you were this morning? A. I testified that I had been specializing on
foreign exchange and foreign trade audits for fifteen
years or more, and I am considered an authority
on foreign exchange.
Q. Would you say that this is a correct statement : "If banks would inspect and appraise merchandise used as collateral for documents, and
would refuse to accept those documents without
inspection of the certificates signed by reputable
examiners, many frauds perpetrated through documents could not occur." Is that a correct state-
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ment? A. I wrote that sixteen years ago, but the
custom has not been adopted in the United States
as yet.
Q. But you still believe that that would prevent
frauds being perpetrated? A. Yes, that would cut
down frauds.
Q. Yes? Yes or no?
Mr. Podell: He has answered.
Mr. Marshall: He is arguing.
stated it would cut down frauds.

He has

Q. Now, with respect to lending money on trust
receipts, would you say, "Being a credit and a 1592
trust, or rather a trusting business, very accurate
accounting and a continuous follow-up system as
to the credit and standing of customers is imperative''? A. Yes.
Q. And that is still your opinion? A. It has
always been my opinion.
Q. And did you say "that the credit department
of a bank or a concern lending money should obtain frequent information as to the responsibility
of its active customers"? A. I wrote all that.
Q. You wrote that away back in 1912, didn't
you? A. Yes.
The Court: He is asking if that is still
your opinion?
The Witness : Of course.
Q. Now, did you write this: "Frequently banks
will release to the customer under trust receipt the
collateral received under acceptance agreements.
They often overlook the fact that they hold only
a lien, like a chattel mortgage, on merchandise
which originally belonged to the customer, and that
to be effective and against other creditors, in case
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the customer should get into financial difficulties,
such chattel mortgage must be recorded." You
wrote that? A. Yes.
Q. You wrote that as recently as 1926? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: The law happens to be quite
different. Mr. Djorup is entitled to his view,
but the question is, what are we entitled to?

1595

Q. Did you then go on to say at the same time:
"For the protection of the banking community and
to restrict dangerous inflation of business, it is of
the utmost importance to standardize the acceptance business and recognize only one kind of trust
agreement, namely, the legal and valid documents,
the terms of which will be lived up to by the merchants and strictly enforced by the bank." You
wrote that? A. Yes, that is my opinion against
bankers.
Q. And it still is?
Mr. Podell:

Is that the practice?

A. No, it is not.

1596

Mr. Marshall: I object to being interrupted in the midst of the examination that
way.
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, we are
wasting a lot of time.
The Court: No, I think it is important
as to the question of contributory negligence.
Mr. Podell: If the practice is universally
the other way, how does it become important
what the opinion of any one individual in
the community might be?
The Court: You made him your expert,
Mr. Podell: Not on that subject. I have
not asked him a single question about that.
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The Court: Now it is cross-examination
as to what an accountant should have done,
as compared to what a man lending money
should have done. I will allow the question.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Did you go on to say, "Recently"—this is in
1926—"recently the author had occasion to investigate acceptances and trust receipt agreements made
by bankers with a merchant who became bankrupt." You said that—you remember saying that?
A. Yes, but I talked to bankers at a convention 1598
in Dallas.
Q. The person who became bankrupt, to whom
you are referring there, was Stern, was it not? A.
I believe so, though I did not mention any names.
Q. Are you not certain in that book of yours,
written in 1926, that you were referring to the
audit you had made of Stern's books in the year
1925—were you not referring to Stern there? A.
No. Some examples which I put down from my
experience, gotten from Stern's records, yes, without mentioning the names.
Q. "Recently the author had occasion to investigate acceptances and trust receipt agreements made
by bankers with a merchant who became bankrupt. 1599
To illustrate the dangers attached to lax investigation of the transactions upon which the acceptance agreements are based and to the careless issuing of trust receipts, the following examples are
cited—" And then do you remember you gave two
illustrations drawn from your experience in this
Stern's affair, is not that so? A. Yes.
Q. And do you recollect—I will shorten this by
handing you a copy of your book in this connection. You refer to the way fourteen tons were
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imported under a commercial letter of credit and
you show how that was pledged several times, and
then you say—you end up by saying, "the actual
merchandise, amounting to fourteen tons, was sold
and the invoices were assigned to a fourth institution from which another advance was obtained."
Now, was not that fourth institution named there
the Ultramares Corporation (handing paper) ? A.
It might have been, or it may have been another
concern.
Q. Well, to your best recollection, is not that
the Ultramares Corporation? A. This particular
fourteen tons
Q. It describes a typical Ultramares transaction?
Mr. Podell: I object to that. It does not
do anything of the kind.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. You are not sure whether it is an Ultramares
transaction or not, is it? A. I am not positive.
Q. But you go on to say, "Of course, banks will
hold that the best credit department cannot protect the bank against fraud." Did you say that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you believe that still? A. I still believe
that.
Q. "This may be true, but even in connection
with old customers, undue chances should not be
taken." That is still your opinion? A. That I
have been preaching to banks for twenty years.
Q. "Where the banks do not actually import or
own and have title in the merchandise, a trust receipt should not be executed. When an acceptance
agreement is made, based upon assignment of in-
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voices, the bank should communicate with the
buyer of the merchandise and obtain confirmation
that the customer is aware of such assignment, and
particularly that he has not been notified of a prior
pledge or assignment to some other institution."
You said that? A. I say a lot, but the bankers will
tell you it is all theory.
Q. But you said that in your book, and you believe that to be true? That is still your opinion?
A. I know and you know that there are two
kinds
Mr. Marshall: Now
Mr. Podell: He is entitled to answer.
Please do not interrupt the answer. He is
trying to give it,
Mr. Marshall: It is not responsive.
The Court: Then I will strike it out.
Mr. Podell: It may be partly his opinion.
Mr. Marshall: I will reframe the question.
Mr. Podell: I submit—is the question
withdrawn?
The Court: Yes.
Q. Are you still of the same opinion that you
were in 1926 with respect to the matter I just read
from your book? A. This is all like my old book,
which is like lecturing in my courses at the New
York University. That is theory as compared with
the actual practice that I find in every bank. I
have examined fifty-six banks
The Court: What we want to know is, do
you believe in that theory now? That is all
we want to know—do you still believe it.
The Witness: Naturally, what I write.
The Court: Lots of us do not believe in
what we write, but do you believe now?
The Witness: I believe that would be an
ideal condition, but we can never get it.

1603

1604

1605

536
1606

Christian Djorup—For

Plaintiff—Cross.

Q. I am reading this, "In liquidating the affairs
of the above mentioned bankrupt estate there were
four creditors, claimants to one and the same invoice in a number of cases. The above cited examples should emphasize the importance of investigating collateral that is forming the basis for
acceptance under agreement, and more particularly
the collateral which is released under the terms of
a trust receipt." You said that, didn't you? Did
you say it? A. I suppose so.
Q. Look at page 81
1607

Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the book speaks
for itself. How long are we going to keep
this up?
The Court: I do not know how long it
will last.
Mr. Marshall: Not very much longer.
Mr. Podell: I object to the question. It
is an attempt to read into the record the
contents of a written document which is not
in evidence nor has been offered.
The Court: Overruled. Just a few minutes recess.
By Mr. Marshall,

1608

Q. Now, you were the accountant of Ultramares
in the year 1921, were you not? A. Yes, I was.
Q. And you are still? A. I still am.
Q. I mean, independently of your engagement on
this trial, you have been the auditor of their books?
A. I have been the auditor of their books. That
means my assistants do the audit,
Q. Now, let me ask you whether this is a proper
practice, in your opinion, a proper statement of
proper practice: " A s an additional precaution
against the omission of liabilities, a certificate
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should be obtained from the proper officer or member of the concern stating that all outstanding liabilities, purchases and expenses have been included
in the accounts of the period under review or of
former periods." Is that a correct statement? A.
It is customary for accountants to obtain certificates.
Q. Similar to those in evidence here? A. Similar
to those that are in evidence.
Q. Now, let me ask you whether this is, in your
opinion, a correct statement: " A balance sheet
audit is generally understood to cover a sufficient
verification of the financial facts and transactions
of an individual or of an organization to enable
the accountant to certify that the completed statement properly represents in his opinion a financial
condition of the business unit named as of the date
indicated." Would you say that is a correct statement or an incorrect statement? A. What is that
question, please?

1609

1610

(Question repeated as recorded.)
The Witness: I would say that is a correct statement.
Q. " A balance sheet audit is valuable for many
reasons. It is not, however, a completely satisfying
procedure from many viewpoints. It is not broad
enough in its scope to insure the discovery of defalcation or fraud on the part of the organization
owners or its employees. It is entirely possible
for such conditions to exist in an organization and
not be disclosed by balance sheet audits, even
though these be performed by able accountants.
This condition may result in unexpected crises to
the organization, with a possible resultant loss to
creditors." Would you say that that is a correct
statement? A. Yes and no.

1611
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Q. Well, tell us yes first, how far? A. It is possible that the balance sheet audit will not disclose
the wasting of assets, but the balance sheet audit
should show the assets and liabilities as they exist
as at the date of the examination. A concern may
be robbed of a million dollars and still be worth
five million dollars in excess of liabilities at the
end of the year. The balance sheet audit would
show that the assets in excess of liabilities are five
million, but would not show they should have been
six millions.
Q. Now, do you disagree with the part that says,
" I t is not broad enough in its scope to insure the
discovery of defalcation or fraud on the part of
the organization owners or employees"? Do you
agree or disagree with that? A. I agree that there
may be internal fraud which may not be disclosed
by the balance sheet audit unless there are some
instances that call it to the attention of the accountant who makes the balance sheet audit, that
there are unusual conditions and he ought to look
closer into it,
Q. But the balance sheet audit may not disclose
those even to an able accountant in some instances;
that is all I am asking. A. In some instances is
right.
Q. Now let me ask you whether you agree with
this statement, "Some business men seem to feel
that an accountant in order to certify to a balance
sheet containing an element of accounts receivable
must have obtained confirmation of the amounts by
direct communication with the debtor represented
in the list. Bankers, I am confident, are quite well
aware that this procedure in the verification of
accounts receivable is the exception and not the
rule." Do you agree with that? A. I do for the
general, broad business, but not for particular lines.
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may it appear
counsel is reading not from anything written by the witness?
The Witness : No, I did not write that.
Mr. Marshall: This is the authority.
Mr. Podell: This is what?
Mr. Marshall: This is the authority I am
reading from.
Mr. Podell: May I also ask that counsel
state what he is reading from in putting his
questions?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think that is
essential.
Mr. Podell: Then I object to reading into
the record the contents of a paper which is
neither offered nor in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: I am asking the man's
opinion.
Mr. Podell: He is obviously reading from
a paper in the presence of the jury. We are
entitled to know what document he is reading from.
Mr. Marshall: He says he is agreed. I
do not think when he agrees I have to say
what I am reading from.
The Court: I do not think so either. Objection overruled.
Mr. Podell: I except, I ask that the paper
be marked for identification, the paper counsel is holding in his hand.
Mr. Marshall: I have two papers in
hand.
The Court: Mark them for identification.
(Marked respectively Defendants'
hibits L and M for Identification.)

Ex-
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By Mr. Marshall.

1619

Q. Now, you know Mr. George O. May, do you
not, of Price, Waterhouse? A. By name.
Q. Do you know of his reputation? A. Yes.
Q. He is one of the leaders in the field of accountancy, is he not? A. I don't know.
Q. You do not know? You know Price, Waterhouse & Company? A. Yes, I do know Price, Waterhouse & Company.
Q. One of the biggest firms of accountants, are
they not? A. Right.
Q. I am reading from something that he said—
Mr. Podell:

I object to that statement.

Q. Asking you whether you

1620

Mr. Podell: I object to a statement by
counsel that he is reading from something
he said.
The Court: That is right. Objection sustained. Strike it out.
Mr. Podell: I ask now that the paper
counsel is reading from be marked in evidence. That the paper he is going to read
from be marked in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: He would not let me read.
The Court: Do not let us argue. Mark
it in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: I have not read from it
yet, your Honor.
The Court: But you are going to read
from it.
Mr. Marshall: Can I not test the witness'
opinion without having the document marked
in evidence?
The Court: Any source. But you quoted
it yourself.
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Mr. Marshall: I have not quoted it once
yet, your Honor; and even if I have quoted
it, I cannot see why it should be marked in
evidence.
Mr. Podell: Because reading a snatch
here and reading a snatch there does not give
a fair statement. He might have said in half
a dozen places that certain things are suspicious and a man must make a statement
of it
The Court: The Court rules it be marked
in evidence, and an exception given.- Now,
we will have no more argument, if you
please, gentlemen.
Mr. Marshall: I except, because I have
not read from it.
The Court: Then you do not need to, if
you do not want to.
Mr. Marshall: If it is marked in evidence,
I certainly shall.
Mr. Podell: I offer it. It is on my offer.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, your
Honor.
The Court: Certainly.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85.)

1622

1623

By Mr. Marshall.
Q. How long did you work on the books of Fred
Stern, Mr. Djorup? A. How long?
Q. Yes. A. Since January 3rd, 1925. We are
still working on them.
Q. How many hours did you and your assistants
put in on these books?
The Court:

1621

Describe the working hours.
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A. I happen to have the calendar here for 1925.
From six to twenty hours a day. I worked for a
long time.

1625

Mr. Podell: So that the record will be
clear, I think it should appear that the witness did a great many other things besides
checking up for 1923.
Mr. Marshall: I understand that.
The Witness: I went back to 1918.
Mr. Podell: He checked up from 1918.
The Witness: Back to 1918, for Romberg
made a
Mr. Marshall: I object to this.
The Court: What do you want?
Mr. Marshall: I asked him how many
hours he spent on the books of Stern.
The Court: Answer that.
The Witness: For several months from
six to twenty hours a day, and then I left
the assistants do most of the work and I
spent a few hours a day, for I had other
engagements.
Q. And what have you been paid for your
services?

1626

Mr. Podell: By whom?
Mr. Marshall: By the trustee in bankruptcy or by Ultramares.
The Witness: By the trustee in bankruptcy, nothing as yet. By the receiver I
was paid at the same rate as by other clients,
at the rate of $15 an hour.
Q. How much did you get in all, have you any
idea, so far? A. The bill from the receiver is
$9,000—the bill rendered was $9,057 and I received
$9,000.

543
Christian Djorup—For Plaintiff—Cross—Redirect.

1627

Q. And how much have you received from Ultramares for your testimony—Ultramares, the plaintiff? A. A retainer of $250 and a usual charge of
double the amount for my time spent. In other
words, $30 an hour for court work. $15 an hour
for preparatory work, as has been my custom for
the past ten years.
Mr. Marshall: That is all, Mr. Djorup.
I would like to read in evidence parts of
this document, the exhibit which was
marked, your Honor. I did not ask the witness any question on it.
The Court: All right, sir.
Mr. Podell: Is this paper in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: This is the one you offered.
Mr. Podell: Yes. I would like to have
the whole of it.
Mr. Marshall: I understand the whole of
this article is in evidence, is it not?
Mr. Podell: Yes. But you are going to
read parts of it?
Mr. Marshall: Yes. You can read the
rest, or I will hand it to the jury (reading
from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85). Your witness.
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Djorup, there has been some talk
here about your book. What is that book? A. It
is a book on foreign exchange accountings which
I wrote principally for banks and for foreign departments of banks.
Q. And you state throughout that book, in those
passages which have been read and in other passages, that banks would be safer if they recorded
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their trust receipts, and whatever other instruments of title they took, that it should be recorded;
is not that what you urged? A. I didn't say that,
In my book I said there were two kinds of trust
receipts, and that the banks segregate their trust
receipt customers in two classes—those that they
watch carefully, where the trust receipt has to be
a legal document, and those where the trust receipt
is a scrap of paper. That in many cases
Q. Pardon me. I am referring now to the part
where you say in your book—spoke of chattel mortgages and recording them. Do you remember that
part that counsel read? A. Right.
Q. That is what you argued for, is it not? A.
I am only arguing for that, for those trust receipts
that are not trust receipts but
Q. Just scraps of paper? A. Yes, scraps of
paper.
Q. Now, do you know that since then the courts
of the State of New York have held that it is not
necessary to record them to make them valid? A.
A trust receipt where the title in the merchandise
belongs to the bank does not have to be recorded,
but a trust receipt where the merchandise never
was in the possession of the bank should be recorded.
Q. That is the practice. Is the practice in all
the banks—do you know of a single instance where
any bank makes it its practice
Mr. Marshall: I object to what the practice may be.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: I assume this is all offered
on the theory that we were contributorily
negligent?
Mr. Marshall: Certainly.
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Q. When you talk of trust receipts in the part
that was read, are you talking of the practice of
banks or of the practice of factors? Which are
you talking about? A. I am talking in the book
what I would like the banks to do. It is my theory
as against the practice which is never lived up to.
Q. Yes. But are you talking about what banks
should do in usual transactions, or what factors
do? A. I wasn't speaking about factors at all in
the book. I was only talking about foreign exchange departments of banks.
Q. Of banks? A. Yes.
Q. You know that in this case accounts were
assigned, do you not, in connection with these
papers called trust receipts, additional accounts
were assigned? You heard the testimony as to
additional security? A. I know that the trust
receipts
The Court: Answer the question.
is a simple question.
The Witness: Yes.
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Q. Do you know also that immediately they were
assigned to us notice was given to the customer
who owed on the account? A. Yes.
Q. You know that? A. Yes, I do.
Q. That is one of the things that you recommend
in there, that notice be given when accounts are
assigned? A. Right.
Q. Now, in connection with all these articles that
have been read—of course, I assume that a great
many articles have been written on auditing, have
they not? Have they or have they not? A. Yes,
thousands.
Q. And on the processes of auditing, have they or
have they not? A. They have.
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Q. By a great many writers? A. Right.
Q. Books have been written on the subject? A.
Yes.
Q. Tell me whether it is universally recognized
that where an accountant going over records finds
suspicious circumstances, that then it is his business before certifying to any statement, whether it
is a balance sheet audit or any other kind of an
audit, to investigate those to the end? A. Yes, sir,
of course.
Q. Until he finds out what the true facts are?
A. Of course.
Q. Before he certifies? A. Right.
Q. No matter who wrote the article or whoever
wrote a book on the subject, has that rule been
universally recognized? A. It has been recognized
by all accountants, to my knowledge.
Mr. Podell:

That is all.

Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. You do not mean, do you, that factors should
use less care in their transactions than banks? You
did not mean to give that impression, did you?
A. No.
1638

Redirect examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. But they are different transactions? A. They
are different transactions altogether.
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. You mean the advancing of money under trust
receipts or under documents by a factor is any
different from the advancing of money under documents or trust receipts by a bank? A. The factor
usually relies upon
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Q. No.
Mr. Podell: Let him answer.
The Witness: Yes.
Q. You do mean there is a difference? A. Yes.
Q. Between advances on the same kind of security? A. It is usually not the same kind of
security.
Q. If there is the same kind of security
Mr. Podell: That is begging the question,
your Honor. It is not the same kind of
security. That is just the point.
The Court: Let us not have a great deal
of discussion on this.
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel——
The Court: You bring it out.
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel assuming
a fact which is entirely at variance with the
facts we have proven. We were not a bank.
Mr. Marshall: You were a factor.
Mr. Podell: We were a factor.
The Court: Question.
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Q. If there is the same kind of security given
as you described here, should not the same results
follow? A. The factors usually rely on their assigned accounts, and the trust receipt is only a
transit period until they get their assignments.
Q. But the same procedure should be followed
with respect to trust receipts by a factor as is followed by a bank, should it not? A. In all the
factors that I have audited, I never found trust
receipts.
Q. In no other case? A. Not that I remember.
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By Mr. Podell
Q. They relied on the assigned accounts? A. On
the assigned accounts.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. But in this case you had trust receipts? A.
I suppose the reason for that was that the merchandise
Q. Please. Just a minute. I did not ask you
for any reason, did I? A. Here there are trust
receipts, yes.

1643

By Mr. Podell.
Q. They had in addition to the assigned accounts, did they not? A. Yes.

1644

(Witness excused.)
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I find that inadvertently I omitted to offer the assigned accounts for account No. 104. I offered all
the others that were subsequent. I would
like to offer those now, all as one batch.
The Court: Now, are we ready with that
statement of other accounts, Mr. Limburg?
Mr. Limburg: We will come to that in
just a moment, Judge.
Mr. Marshall: The same objection as I
stated to the others, as not being binding on
us, and an exception. I assume that the
statement will be added that no claim is
made under these?
Mr. Limburg: He has already testified.
Mr. Marshall: These were all paid?
Mr, Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Podell: That is, only subject to the
come-backs that we had.
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Mr. Marshall: The come-backs you claim
you had.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 86.)
Mr. Podell: I would like to offer a statement that we prepared, your Honor, showing the amounts that were assigned to us by
Stern & Company on the dates in between
December 9th and December 16th, 1924.
The Court: Does that include this $8,000
which I already admitted in evidence?
Mr. Limburg: No. This is an assignment
of accounts merely. This is not collections.
This is assignment of accounts.
Mr. Marshall: It is already in in the tabulation you have made.
Mr. Podell: This is a tabulation to show
that the amount that we received and kept
on receiving during the month of December,
1924, assignments of accounts between the
9th and the 16th, that is on four dates, December 12th, 13th, 15th and 16th, we received
a total of $54,000 of accounts that were assigned to us.
The Court: That is from Stern & Company?
Mr. Podell: From Stern & Company.
After December 16th, 1924—that is, the 18th,
the 23rd, the 26th, 27th, the 31st—we received assignments of an additional $65,000
of assigned accounts. All as bearing upon
our reliance and good faith that this man
was sending us assigned accounts at that
time. They run in large sums. That is the
same period your Honor has in mind where
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he agreed to repay the $100,000 within a
week. We were getting these assigned accounts.
The Court: Yes, I follow.
Mr. Marshall: Now, I will object to this,
your Honor, unless it shows the date of the
trust receipt.
Mr. Limburg: They are all in evidence.
That is why we put that in evidence just
now.
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 87 and 88.)
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Mr. Podell: That shows, as I read it,
assignments received by Ultramares Corporation between December 9th and December
16th, 1924; that is, received assignments of
accounts on the various trust receipts. "T.
R," means trust receipt, 104; the date of
the assignment is given here, the name of the
account, and the amount. Received assigned
accounts between the 9th and the 16th aggregating $54,000; and then, after the 16th, continued receiving assignments of accounts
from then right to the very last day, December 31st, From the 16th to the 31st the assigned accounts were $65,000 additional.
Now, your Honor, in connection with the
promise of the payment to be made, of the
$100,000 by December 16th, I would like to
offer in evidence a statement of what we
actually received on these assigned accounts;
not these identical assigned accounts, because they, of course, had not been collected
yet, but on assigned accounts we held, what
we actually received, between the 9th and
the 16th of December. Do I make myself
clear, your Honor?
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Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to that,
your Honor.
The Court: Objection sustained and exception to counsel for the plaintiff.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor bear with
me just a moment on that? We have not
done anything different with regard to that
$100,000, and that is just what I am complaining about, than we have done with regard to other loans we had made. The only
difference, we took the added precaution of
asking him to clean up his account by the
end of the month.
The Court: But you had no accounts receivable.
Mr. Podell: I had. Now, please bear with
me. Counsel is misleading you, and I said
that to you before.
Mr. Marshall: I am not. Will you produce them?
Mr. Podell: I will produce them right
now.
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am asking.
Three accounts receivable on loan 107.
Mr. Podell: Wait a minute, please. Here
are trust receipts 107, 108 and 109.
The Court: Right, sir.
Mr. Podell: We have the trust receipts.
The Court: You have that.
Mr. Podell: At the foot of it
The Court: That is the piece of paper.
Mr. Podell: Yes. At the foot of it there
is a statement, "Sold to Detroit Insulated
Rubber Wire Company, five tons; Whitney
Blake Company, eighteen tons; Goodyear
Rubber Insulating Company, seven tons;
Michelin Tire Company, ten tons." Those
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were the accounts to whom he claimed to
have sold what is referred to in these trust
receipts. Now, take every one of them——
The Court: Mark it for identification.
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 89 and 90 for
Identification.)
(Recess until 2.05 o'clock P. M.)

AFTER RECESS.
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I would like to
offer in evidence these various depositions of
the accounts receivable, people who were reported as having accounts receivable. I will
ask permission to read one of them, because
they are all in the same form.
The Court: All right, sir.
Mr. Podell: I will get up a list of what
they are. Those are filed papers.
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Podell: So we will consider them
in evidence. I do not have to mark them.
The Court: No.
Mr. Podell: Will the stenographer please
note the following depositions are offered in
evidence: Michelin Tire Company, Firestone
Tire & Rubber Company, Goodrich Company,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Miller
Rubber Company, General Tire & Rubber
Company, Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Manufacturing Company, Pennsylvania Rubber Company, Sprekles-Savage Tire Company, Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corporation of
America, A. A. Wire Company, Western
Electric Company, Endicott-Johnson Cor-
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poration, Hood Rubber Company, Ford
Motor Company, Garlock Packing Company.
Mr. Marshall: How many now?
The Stenographer: Sixteen.
Mr. Podell: In reading the deposition of
the Ford Motor Company, with the statement of the questions put, all of the depositions are the same, and the answers are the
same; that is, they are all the same—''There
is no such account." This is the deposition
of Ned Fuller of the Ford Motor Company.
The questions and answers were as follows:
"Q. Please state your full name, age and residence. A. My name is Ned Fuller. I am forty
years of age and reside at 746 Collingwood Avenue,
Detroit, Michigan.
"Q. Are you at present in the employ of the Ford
Motor Company? A. I am at present in the employ
of the Ford Motor Company.
"Q. Were you in the employ of the Ford Motor
Company on December 31, 1923? A. I was in the
employ of the Ford Motor Company on December
31, 1923.
"Q. What period of time prior to December 31,
1923, were you in the employ of the Ford Motor
Company? A. Prior to December 31, 1923. I had
been in the employ of Ford Motor Company for a
period of approximately fifteen years.
"Q. State the nature of your duties as an employee of the Ford Motor Company at the present
time and the nature of your duties as an employee
on December 31, 1923. A. All disbursements for
the Ford Motor Company, with the exception of
payrolls and a few small local purchases at various
branches in the country, come under my jurisdiction at the present time and did on December 31,
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1923. My official position is auditor of disbursements. As auditor of disbursements, the custody
and supervision of invoices covering accounts payable is under my supervision and control after the
order is placed until the item covered by the invoice or order is paid. The files and records and
the orders and invoices on all merchandise purchased by the Ford Motor Company upon which
disbursements must be made, with the exception of
payrolls and small local purchases mentioned, are
kept by me in the regular course of business.
"Q. Was there any sale by Fred Stern & Company, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of the merchandise shown on the photostat of invoice
annexed hereto and marked Exhibit A ? "
Mr. Marshall: As to this question, I repeat the objection that I made at the time
the deposition was propounded, just to keep
t"he record straight, your Honor.
The Court: What was that objection?
Mr. Marshall: The objection that it calls
for a conclusion and a comparison of the
photostatic copy of the document annexed to
the deposition.
The Court: Alleged to be an extract from
the books?
Mr. Marshall: Alleged to be, yes.
The Court: And on that original ground?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
The Court: I will give you an exception.
Mr. Marshall: And also on the ground it
calls for a conclusion.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Your Honor,
I do not repeat this, and may that same objection be made to any question of that char-
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acter referring to documents or books of
Stern's?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Or purported copies?
The Court: Yes, you may have an exception.
Mr. Podell: The next, your Honor, is a
photostatic copy of the invoice of November
12, 1923, one of those in form as per the
seventeen invoices that we spoke of on Friday. It is addressed to the Ford Motor
Company of Detroit, due March 1st. First
it was down as February 15, 1924, and that
was stricken out and put down as March
1st, 1924, of 900 C & S, mold deal red smoke
sheets as per sample 3257, G-223, 845 1.109,
44½, U. 22,900½ pounds at 29 cents per
pound, $64,421.14.
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The witness' answer to that is:
"There was not any sale by Fred Stern &
Company, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of
merchandise shown on photostat annexed to
written interrogatories and marked Exhibit
A, so far as I have been able to ascertain
from the files and records in my possession."
"Q. Was there any delivery by Fred Stern &
Company, Inc., to Ford Motor Company of the
merchandise shown on said photostat of invoice
marked Exhibit A ? "
"To the Eighth interrogatory he saith:
"The files and records in my possession covering
the account of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., do not
show any delivery by Fred Stern & Company, Inc.,
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to the Ford Motor Company of the merchandise
shown on the photostat of invoice marked Exhibit
A attached to written interrogatories.
"Q. Did the Ford Motor Company on or about
November 12, 1923, purchase from Fred Stern &
Company rubber of the purchase price of $64,641.14? A. The Ford Motor Company did not on
or about November 12, 1923, purchase from Fred
Stern & Company, Inc., rubber of the purchase
price of $64,641.14, so far as I have been able to
ascertain from the files and records in my possession.
"Q. Did the Fred Stern & Company, Inc., on or
about November 12, 1923, deliver to the Ford Motor
Company rubber of the purchase price of $64,641.14? A. Fred Stern & Company, Inc., did not
deliver to the Ford Motor Company on or about
November 12, 1923, rubber of the purchase price of
$64,641.14, so far as I am able to ascertain from the
files and records in my possession.
"Q. Did the Ford Motor Company at any time
during the year 1923 purchase rubber from Fred
Stern & Company, Inc.? A. Ford Motor Company
did upon several occasions during the year 1923
purchase rubber from Fred Stern & Company, Inc.
"Q. If so, state the terms of credit. A. The terms
of credit upon such purchases were at all times net
cash, ten days.
"Q. Did Ford Motor Company purchase any
merchandise from Fred Stern & Company, Inc.,
upon terms of credit exceeding three months? A.
I am unable to locate any terms of credit exceeding
three months. So far as the records in my possession are disclosed covering all records of purchase
from Fred Stern & Company, Inc., by the Ford
Motor Company, all invoices bear terms 'Net Cash,
Ten days.'"
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Mr. Podell: That is signed by Ned Fuller
and sworn to before the notary.
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out all
the testimony in which the witness states
based upon records and not personal knowledge.
The Court: Denied.
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Limburg, please
take the stand.
Mr. Marshall: You are assuming that
these depositions are all the same?
Mr. Podell: I think Endicott-Johnson
said they had lost their records, and we will
take them subject to correction.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to know
whether they have read over those documents which I handed them about the Equitable Trust of Baltimore suit, which they
said they were going to read over, and I was
going to offer them.
The Court: The summons and pleadings.
Mr. Marshall: The complaint and answer.
The Court : Have you gone over those?
Mr. Podell: I have not gone over them,
and I assume they are the same, so counsel
can allow some of them in.
The Court: Is that the one of which we
were speaking, the $8,000 payment?
Mr. Podell: No, that is the $52,000 which
your Honor and I discussed this morning.
Mr. Marshall: I would like it to go in
separately because I offered it myself separately and apart from this $52,000.
Mr. Podell: He can offer them in the first
part of his case. He can offer all the things
which he thinks ought to be offered. I will
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offer the summons and complaint served
on us.
Mr. Marshall: I offered it specially to indicate that they had been sworn under oath.
The Court: As to some witness on the
stand, yes, the cashier, was it not?
Mr. Podell: What does he want to do
now?
The Court: He wants to introduce that
in evidence.
Mr. Podell: What are you offering?
Mr. Marshall: The summons and complaint and answer.
Mr. Limburg: Exhibits H and I.
The Court: They were only offered for
identification when they went in. They are
now in evidence.
(Received in evidence and marked Defendants' Exhibits H and I.)
Mr. Podell:

1674

Now, Mr. Limburg.

HERBERT R. LIMBURG, called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and having been duly sworn,
testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. What is your address? A. 31 East 72nd
Street, New York City.
Q. Mr. Limburg, you are one of the attorneys
for the plaintiff here? A. I am.
Q. And you have had charge of this litigation
right from its beginning? A. I have.
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Q. You have also represented the Ultramares
Corporation in other matters that arose out of this
entire situation? A. I have.
Q. Now will you state, just naming the claims,
without stating their character, that were made
against the Ultramares Corporation on accounts
that had been assigned by Stern to some one other
than to the Ultramares?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not
binding upon the defendants.
The Court: It is overruled at this time
and exception given at this time.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands
I am making my objection in the same spirit
as your Honor is ruling.
The Court: Certainly.

1676

A. There was the Equitable Trust Company of
Baltimore, which brought a suit against Ultramares, the pleadings in which are now in evidence
as Exhibits H and I. That suit covered accounts—
that is, giving the date.
Mr. Marshall: I object to that because
the documents are in evidence.
The Court : They speak for themselves.
Q. Briefly, state what accounts.
The Court: Yes. I assume the familiarity
would show the conformity.
Q. They covered accounts which had been collected by the Ultramares Corporation in November
and December, 1924, the last date being December
15, 1924, the earliest date November 20, 19124, and
aggregating $84,904.67, for which judgment was
demanded.
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Q. Now, when had those accounts been assigned
to Ultramares? Just give us the date of assignment; you haye given the date of collection. A.
If you will give me that Exhibit No. 76, I can
probably tell you. I can give you the trust numbers, if that will help you. It was under trust
Nos. 90 and 96.
Q. We want the dates. A. That will give me the
date.
Q. Exhibit 76 is what?
The Court:
1679

1680

It is a long sheet.

A. Mr. Popkin, if you will give me account No.
5, I will get it quickest right out of that. (Paper
handed.) The dates incidentally appear in the
complaint.
Q. You understand the date I am asking for is
the date when the first of those accounts was assigned by Stern to Ultramares? A. November 14.
There is another one assigned November 14th.
Q. Mr. Limburg, we will save a lot of time if
you can state without looking at those papers in
all those accounts— A. One was December 8.
There were four involved here.
Q. You are talking now about the Equitable
Trust Company? A. Correct.
Q. Can you look at those figures and tell this
jury what is the earliest one, speaking now of all
the complaints, what is the earliest one, the earliest,
assignment of account from Stern to Ultramares,
that is involved in these claims?
The Court: That is covering the whole
set?
The Witness: No. Not involved in this
set.
The Court: All of them?
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Q. Of various dates?
The Court: In other words, he wants just
a concise date.
A. It was prior to October 31, because one of
those accounts was collected by us on October 31
and must have been assigned to us some time
earlier, and I will find out the date.
Q. Get us that date. That is the first one.
The Court: Do you mean the first assignment?
Mr. Podell: That was the first. The title
by anybody that he had assigned it.
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A. October 31, the claim was not made until then.
Mr. Marshall:
yet.

I have not got that item

Q. The earliest assigned account, the earliest
date of assignment, the claim was made later, was
it not? A. Yes.
Q. It was made after January, 1925? A. Correct.
Q. But the first assigned account was in October,
1924, as to which somebody else claimed he had an
assignment? A. Correct.
Q. I think this is 76? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall:
of that yet.

I have not got the date

Q. Early in October? A. October 31, 1924.
Q. That is the date it was paid? A. No. I made
a mistake. That is the date of the assignment to
us. It was paid afterwards.
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By Mr. Marshall.

1685

Q. Just a minute. Can you point out on this
list, because I cannot see it. I do not follow that
at all. A. I think so.
Q. Under what trust receipts? A. Under trust
receipt 93. The date of the account was October
31st. I see we actually got it November 3. It was
paid on November 25, 1924.
Q, The date of the loan was November 3, according to this? A. The date of the loan was numbered 93, November 3. The assignment was dated
on the same date, and the account itself was dated
October 31 and collected by us at the end of November.
The Court: Have you got that, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I do not know that I have.
I do not understand where the October 31
comes in.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. Shipment was made October 31 by Stern, who
sent an invoice on October 31 and assigned that
to us on November 3, and we made a loan on the
same date? A. Correct.
Q. Now, have you totaled the total amount of
such claims? Just give the amount of the claim on
all the losses.
Mr. Marshall:
Q. No.

This is Equitable Trust?

All of them.
The Court:

All of them.
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Q. The total amount of all the claims.
The Court: Subject to your objection.
Mr. Marshall: I make a further objection,
that I would like to see the pleadings in the
other claims.
The Witness: They are right here. I
have given them to you separately. There
was one Bank Beige.
Mr. Marshall: May I see the pleadings?
The Witness: Certainly.
Mr. Podell: Let us offer all the pleadings,
for that matter. I offer in evidence all the
pleadings, your Honor, the complaints and
the answers.
Mr. Marshall: At this time I object to
them as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and not binding upon us. If I read
them I may permit them to go in.
Mr. Podell: I understood the only thing
your Honor decided would be excluded
would be the amount of it in settlement.
The Court: That is all I am interested in.
I do not care what kind of pleadings they are
or what they contain, I do not think the
amount is admissible here. I want the total
amount, and the pleadings are subject to any
further disposition that may be legally made
of them.
Mr. Marshall: Is your Honor admitting
them?
The Court: No, sir, I am not admitting
them.
Mr. Podell: Let them be marked for identification, and let the record show that we
made an offer of the pleadings and your
Honor excluded them.
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Yes, sir, and an exception

(The pleadings were received and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibits 91 and 92 for Identification. )

1691

The Witness: We were likewise sued by
the Bank of London and South America.
The pleadings are here.
Mr. Marshall: The same objection.
The Court: Same ruling and exception.
Mr. Podell: I offer those.
The Court: With the exception for counsel for the plaintiff.
(Received and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
93 for Identification.)
The Witness: There was the Federal International Banking Corporation, in which
a claim was made, and it was disposed of
without suit being filed.
By Mr. Podell.

1692

Q. You have no pleadings in the claim by the
Federal Banking Corporation? A. The Federal
International Banking Corporation, no.
Q. There was a disposition made of that?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Same ruling. Just give the
figures now. I want it on the record as a
matter of figures and not as an item of
damage.
Mr. Marshall: The amount of the claim.
The Court: Yes, sir.
The Witness: The amount of the claim
and the action by the Bank Beige, was $46,854.13 plus interest.
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Q. Does that summarize the claims that were
made, Mr. Limburg? A. The Federal International
claim was $23,494.16, and the Bank of London and
South America—I have not the figure here, but it
is right in the complaint, so you have it.
The Court: Can you give us that (indicating)?
The Witness: $16,124.95.
Q. Does that summarize all of the claims, Mr.
Limburg? A. No, there were other claims in which
nothing has been done, either by way of adjustment
or by way of suit.
Q. Now, Mr. Limburg, upon receipt of these complaints, did you investigate the situation; just
answer yes or no? A. I did.
Q. Did you investigate the law and the facts
in each situation? A. I did.
Q. And as a result of such an investigation,
could you say from the law, as it stands, or as it
stood, that there was a definite liability one way
or the other; just answer that yes or no; can you
say that?
Mr. Marshall: I object.
The Court: I will let him say whether
he can say it or not.
Q. Can you say whether there was a definite liability one way or the other so that you could with
reasonable certainty state that either you were
liable or not liable on these claims? A. I can only
express my own opinion and the action I took upon
it. There was no adjudication.
Mr. Marshall:
action you took.

Please don't tell us what
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Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me
to get that on the record?
The Witness: I only want to state that
so that if you have any objectionMr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me
to get this witness' opinion for the purpose
of laying a proper foundation as to what the
situation was?
The Court: No, sir.
Mr. Podell: Let it appear on the record,
your Honor, that a question was asked as
to what his opinion was, and your Honor
sustained an objection to that and granted
me an exception.
The Court: That is right,
Q. As the result of the conclusion or opinion
that you reached, did you, yes or no, make any
adjustment of those cases?
Mr. Marshall: Objection.
The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: I object on the ground it
cannot be binding on us any way.
The Court: I will allow the question as
to whether he did or not.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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A. I did.
Q. Will you state—and do not answer. You understand the Judge's attitude. Will you state what
was the adjustment that you made?
Mr. Marshall: Objection.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor allows me an
exception?
The Court: Yes.
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Mr. Podell: And I take it any other question seeking to prove the amount paid would
meet with the same ruling?
The Court: Yes, sir, and you have an exception to that. Gentlemen of the jury,
these figures have been placed before you
and there is a rule to which your attention
will be called to the fact that only that testimony which is admitted in evidence will
be subject to your examination; so therefore
these figures having come before you and
having been excluded from evidence, it is
only just and proper that I should call your
attention to the fact that you must disregard them, and it is only for the purpose of
establishing a record that they come before
you at all.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully submit, your
Honor, that I think Mr. Podell's suggestion
and the ruling of your Honor should be on
the record.
The Court: No.
Mr. Podell: I asked a number of leading
questions, and that is what is on the record.
Now your statement to the jury would not
exclude the fact which is in evidence that
claims were made, and I am particularly
concerned with showing that those claims
affected accounts.
The Court: That is all on the record and
part of the record, but the result is excluded.
Mr. Podell: I understand.
The Court: Mr. Limburg calls my attention to the fact that you have not recorded
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the dates when this litigation was instituted,
but I cannot see what materiality it would
have.
The Witness: As to the first notice to us
on the subject.
Mr. Podell: I take it it won't be disputed
at all, but that those litigations were commenced long after—I thought I said long
after January, 1925.
The Witness: That covers it; that is the
fact.
Mr. Podell: There is no misunderstanding about that. I am sure that was begun
after the bankruptcy.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Now, Mr. Limburg, have you compiled a statement here—I am taking off the item the Court has
just excluded—of the sums of money that were
advanced by Ultramares to Fred Stern & Company,
and when they were collected or repaid from any
source? A. I have.
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Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to this
witness' testimony as to that.
Mr. Podell: I t is merely a tabulation of
damages.
The Court: It is merely a tabulation.
Mr. Podell: The facts are in evidence.
The Witness: Tabulation of interest.
Q. What date did you calculate that interest
from? A. I calculated interest in each instance
from the date of the advance and I gave credit
of interest in each instance from the date of the
collection by us.
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The Court: On any part of it?
The Witness: On any part of it, and
then I had these interest calculations checked
up by the bookkeeper of the Ultramares Corporation, to be sure that I was right.
Q. That is calculated until to-day (indicating
statement ).
Mr. Marshall: When you say "payments"
you mean collections?
Q. Yes. A. Payments to us on assigned accounts. No. Those are the ones that were in the
interpleaders.
Mr. Marshall: But you have collected
them, it looks as if you paid them out in that
statement, and that is my objection.
The Witness: Pardon me. (Inspecting.)
It is now complete, Mr. Marshall (correcting accounts).
Mr. Marshall: Will your Honor allow
me a minute to compare these with the bill.
Now, here, your Honor, we come up against
the same proposition again. Your Honor
recollects on trust receipt 107
Mr. Podell: I cannot hear you, Mr.
Marshall; speak louder. I offer that statement in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Under trust receipt 107,
as you will recollect, there were three accounts assigned, only part of which was collected.
The Court: That is right,
Mr. Podell: We give you credit for that.
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, may I finish
a statement, please, without being inter-

1706

1707

570
1708

1709

1710

Herbert R. Limburg—For

Plaintiff—Direct.

rupted? Now, as I recollect it, there were
$8,000 difference between the amount of the
accounts assigned and the amount of the accounts collected, because of this interpleader
that has been referred to.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: And I think the statement
is incorrect because this reduction is in no
way binding upon us. We ought to get the
credit of the full amount, the account is assigned and actually collected.
The Court: That would come under the
same proposition of law that we have made.
Mr. Podell: I told Mr. Marshall I did
not hear what he said.
The Court: In that amount of the three
accounts of the 107, there was an interpleader and an adjustment made some time in
which I have admitted in evidence some
$8,000 difference.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: So that let us add on to the
amounts received by Ultramares this sum
of $8,000.
Mr. Podell: That is not in here.
The Witness: That is not in here. We
did not receive it. The question I understand your Honor will rule on is whether
we shall give credit for it even if they did
not receive it, and if so, that will be deducted
from the amount.
Mr. Podell: I think I know what Mr.
Limburg has in mind. There is a distinction in the cases.
Mr. Marshall: We ought to discuss that
before your Honor at the bar.
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The Court: That is all right.
Mr. Podell: When we are collecting an
account and somebody else makes a claim
against us for reimbursements to him, as I
stated to your Honor, the law is very much
confused. Wherever we received only part
payment of a certain account, and we have
never received the full amount, and received
only part payment, we cannot be compelled
to give credit for the full amount, if we
have never received it. In the case where
we collected the full amount and other people made claims against us for part of it,
in these cases of $8,200 we never collected
the full amount; all we could ever get was
the $8,200; is that right?
The Witness: That is correct.
Mr. Podell: We made a claim against
them and were interpleaded and all we ever
collected out of them was $8,200.
The Witness: The amounts which are
about $8,000 less than the principal amount,
and those amounts were collected as the results of litigation.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, we
cannot be bound by their interpleader action
any more than any other action before us.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception, and may I call
attention to the fact that there are three
other items, collections of the bills which
are not taken into account.
Mr. Podell: A little louder, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall: There are three other
items on the bill of particulars which are
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not included in this account, I believe in
this summary, an item of $1,215 on February
3, 1925; one of $2,400 February 9; and one
of $12,400 of July 14th.
The Court: That had been collected?
Mr. Marshall: That was there collected
in their bill of particulars.
The Witness: Those were not collected
on account of any of these loans. They were
collected on account of other loans as a
result of which other loans were paid in full.
Mr. Podell: We give you credit for that.
The Witness: We give you credit by saying that all the loans up to 106 were paid
in full, and by saying that we included not
only everything we collected on account of
those loans before the bankruptcy, but these
other additional figures which I have set up
and which we collected subsequent to the
bankruptcy.
The Court: And they are applied to the
same loan that has been made?
The Witness: To previous loans, yes;
and the result of which these previous loans
are wiped out.
The Court: I see.
Mr. Marshall: May I ask Mr. Limburg
some questions on this point?
The Court: Certainly.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. To what loans were those applied? A. I will
see if I have that statement here, will you let me
have that typewritten sheet, that long sheet there,
I think I have the details. If your Honor will
permit me, I probably can locate it right away.
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The Court: Certainly, go ahead.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to get your
Honor's distinction between these two situations.
The Court: I would like to get it clear
myself.
Mr. Podell: It is just the difference, your
Honor, between somebody making a claim
against us, and we settling with them, and
our making a claim against somebody else.
The Court: I know your distinction, but
in law is there any great distinction? However, I am letting it go as a matter that I
will not take very much time on. I will
tell you that frankly.
The Witness: The two items of $1,215.16
and $2,435.39, were collected on account of
loan 105.
The Court: Or rather applied to loan
105.
The Witness: Were applied to it. Those
were assignments of accounts against loan
105. The item "collected on July 14, 1926"
was on account 105.
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By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Do those represent the full amounts of the
assigned invoices, Mr. Limburg? A. Yes, they do ;
and in the case of the $12,499.93 they include not
only the amount of the invoices, but likewise interest and costs because we had to sue and collect
them, without deduction of any cost of collection.
Mr. Marshall: My only objection is that
you are omitting that $8,000 item, your
Honor.
The Court: Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: And I assume we shall
get a copy of it so that we can check it up.
Mr. Podell: What about "payments";
have you changed it to "collections"?
Mr. Marshall: Changed it to "collections
by Ultramares Corporation."
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence.
(Paper received in evidence and marked
Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 94.)
Mr. Marshall: Please note my exception.
I wonder if your Honor had not better instruct the jury that that is not to be taken
as proof of anything itself, but merely a
summary of their claim.
Mr. Podell: I think his Honor will have
the chance at the proper time to instruct
the jury.
The Court: Really, at this time I do not
think it is a matter that the jury could
have the typewritten sheet of that kind,
which is not a matter of evidence.
Mr. Podell: I am sorry. The paper was
in evidence and I did not think your Honor
would have an objection. What I wanted
the jury to know I could read the result.
Mr. Marshall: It should be stated, it is
your claim.
The Court: My only thought is this : It
is a wise procedure for the clarification of
the conditions of fact, but I do not think
I would burden the jury with these figures
at this time, that is what I mean.
Mr. Podell: The amount of our claim we
have cut off the item which your Honor excluded, and as computed, aggregates $187,576.32.
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The Court : That includes interest and
all?
Mr. Podell: Everything.
Mr. Marshall: No cross-examination.
Mr. Podell: That is our case.
The Court: The plaintiff rests?
Mr. Marshall: I believe I have a right
to read this to the jury, these pleadings,
before the plaintiff rests.
The Court: Yes, I will allow that.
Mr. Podell: Are you going to read the
complaint and answer?
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to point
out
Mr. Podell: I do not think this is giving
the jury a fair view of the entire situation.
I think if he reads any, he ought to read
the whole.
The Court: That is what he is going to
do.
Mr. Marshall: I was going to read the
affirmative defense.
Mr. Podell: But unless the jury knows
all about it
The Court: I cannot stop any part that
is in evidence, but it is your privilege to
go forward and read the rest of it.
Mr. Podell : It is unnecessary to read
that whole complaint to this jury. That is
what I am trying to avoid. I wish to avoid
it unless it becomes absolutely necessary. I
think the jury should know that counsel is
reading part of the answer and has not read
the complaint.
The Court: Yes.
(Witness excused.)
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Mr. Marshall: You can read it, all you
want. I will explain it to the jury.
Mr. Podell: I object to the explanation.
The Court: Do it.
Mr. Marshall: This was an action brought
by
Mr. Podell: Objection.
The Court: Sustained. Read it, not your
conclusions of it.
Mr. Marshall: I will save my conclusions until after.
The Court : All right.
Mr. Marshall: I am reading from the
third affirmative defense to the answer which
they say that Mr. Manning identified as having been sworn to by him the other day.
Mr. Podell: We have stipulated that. We
have said that is the answer we filed.
Mr. Marshall (reading) :
"Equitable
Trust Company against Ultramares," That
is the Ultramares Corporation saying this:
"The plaintiff (that was Equitable Trust
Company of Baltimore) entrusted Fred
Stern & Company as agents to the possession of the bill of lading and now their documentary evidence of title" (reading). Now
the 10th paragraph (reading). That is all
I care to read.
Mr. Podell: Gentlemen of the jury, this
is the complaint of the Trust Company
against us, which contains a great many
other things in the statement. I want the
jury to know I am reading only a part of it,
"Down to about the 18th and 25th days of
November, 1924, the bankrupt, Stern & Company, without the knowledge or consent of
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the Trust Company"—that is the plaintiff,
the Equitable Trust Company (reading to
the jury).
Your Honor, it is impossible to read any
more without a summary of what this complaint is to this jury and I won't take the
time. There are seven defenses in the answer, and it takes twenty-two pages of typewritten matter, and I do not know how many
causes of action there, and that is stating
two causes of actions, and there are a number of exhibits.
The Court: Now, does the plaintiff rest?
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell asked the other
day for a consent to read part of Von Geoben's testimony.
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I asked
for the consent for the whole, and not part.
Mr. Marshall: I said you asked for the
consent to read Von Goeben's testimony.
We are perfectly ready to have him read
part of it, between pages 227 to 241 of the
record.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I happen to
know that reading that particular part and
not the rest will give the jury a wholly erroneous view of Von Goeben's testimony, so
that I either offer the whole or no part.
Mr. Marshall: You may read it all.
The Court: You may read it all.
Mr. Podell : Let me have it.
Mr. Podell (reading) :
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"Q. Mr. Von Goeben, you were an officer of the
Ultramares Corporation within the past two years,
weren't you? A. I was.
"Q. What office did you hold? A. I was the
president.
"Q. And for what period of time, approximately?
A. From 1919 until the end of 1924.
"Q. When did you sever your connection with
the Ultramares Corporation? A. I resigned early
in November, 1924.
"Q. To take effect immediately? A. December
31st.
"Q. You were a director during that time, too,
of the Ultramares Corporation? A. I was."
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may it appear
that this was an examination conducted on
behalf of the trustee in bankruptcy, by the
attorney for the trustee in bankruptcy?
The Court: Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: That all the eminent attorneys of New York were present. There
seems to be a list of about twenty of them
here.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
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"Q. And a stockholder? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What officers or agents of the Ultramares
Corporation did Mr. Fred Stern deal with on behalf of the Fred Stern Corporation in the transactions between the bankrupt corporation and the
Ultramares Corporation? A. I do not quite understand that question.
"Q. (Question read). A. Until early November,
all transactions went through my hands.
"Q. Mr. Von Goeben, will you state, in your own
way, what the general nature of the transactions
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between the Ultramares Corporation and Fred
Stern & Company, Inc. was? A. Mr. Stern asked
us if we would be willing to finance some rubber
accounts; that we would be willing to furnish him
with the money to take up the rubber which he
had bought from dealers here in New York.
"Q. And what was the basis on which you would
finance that? A. He was to assign the accounts to
us.
"Q. You do not mean the accounts with those
people from whom he bought the rubber; you mean
to whom he sold it? A. To whom he sold the rubber.
"Q. On what basis did you finance it? What
did the Ultramares get for financing it? A. We
got 6 per cent, interest and commission.
"Q. Was that a flat rate of commission, or did
it vary? A. The commission varied.
"Q. Was the commission a half a cent per pound,
or a one-half per cent. per month? A. No. Onehalf a cent per pound.
"Q. That was the— A. (Interrupting) That
was the first arrangement we had.
"Q. And when was that arrangement changed?
A. I believe it was in May. I have to look up the
records; I cannot remember the date.
"Q. Last year? A. Last year. It was reduced."
Mr. Podell: Can we get a stipulation as
to when Von Goeben died?
Mr. Limburg: It was in 1927.
Mr. Podell: He died in 1927?
Mr. Limburg: Yes, in 1927.
Mr. Shamos: This examination was conducted March 2nd, 1925, so when he refers
to "last year" he means 1924—when the witness refers to "last year."
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The Court: This examination was conducted in 1925?
Mr. Shamos: Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: March 2nd, 1925.
The Court: So his reference was to March,
1924.
Mr. Podell: And his reference was to
1924.
Mr. Limburg: The date of his death was
March 22nd, 1927.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
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"Q. To what amount? A. One per cent.
"Q. And remained that way until the end of
December, 1924? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Well, when you say reduced to 1 per cent.,
just how do you calculate that as a reduction?
A. Half a cent a pound is more than, or was more
than 1 per cent.
"Q. You mean 1 per cent. of the advance per
month commission, instead of the— A. (Interrupting) Not per month.
"Q. Just flat? A. Flat 1 per cent.
"Q. Now you stated, Mr. Von Goeben, that these
advances were made against local purchases of
rubber? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What evidence did you have? A. We had
the contracts between Mr. Stern and the New York
sellers.
"Q. Such as Littlejohn, and Meyer & Brown, and
local dealers? A. Littlejohn; Meyer & Brown; and
American Trading, and several other concerns.
"Q. And did you examine the contracts of the
sellers before you advanced money on each of the
trust receipts? A. Yes, sir.
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"Q. Did you ever check any of those contracts
with the sellers ; communicate with them to verify
them? A. No.
"Q. Now, as to any specific transaction, we will
say trust receipt No. 104, dated November 24th,
1924, which specifies 75 tons ex 'Perseus'"
Mr. Podell: That is the name of the
steamer, I suppose. It is in quotations
(Continuing reading) :
"Mr. Stern would come to you and show you
the contract that he had with the seller, and you
would, on the basis of that, agree to make the advance, say, of $50,000, and take his trust receipt
for that amount? A. November 24th was after I
had resigned.
"Q. You had nothing to do with it at that time?
A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you happen to know who was handling
the transactions for the Ultramares at this date
of November 24th, 1924? A. Either he called me
up, or he called up Mr. Manning.
"Q. He still called you up with reference to
these transaction after the date of your resignation? A. He did.
"Q. And did you O. K. the advance of $50,000
on this trust receipt No. 104 dated November 24th,
1924? A. If I am not mistaken, with the chairman
of the board of directors.
"Q. Were you present at the time? A. I could
not say."
Mr. Podell: Chairman of the board, I
take it will be stipulated at that time was
Mr. Schlubach?
Mr. Shamos: He so testified.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
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"Q. And trust receipt No. 105 dated the following date, November 25th 1924, for $50,000 advance;
specifies 75 tons ex 'Veen Dyck'; did you discuss
that matter with Mr. Stern before the loan was
made? A. (After examining paper) I cannot
recollect, because, as I said before, after my resignation these things were taken up with the chairman of the board.
"Q. Well, is not it a fact, Mr. Von Goeben, that
Mr. Stern would first call you about these matters?
A. When I was in the office.
"Q. Well, even as late as December 8th 1924,
1745 on three trust receipts which were executed that
date, were not they discussed with you before the
loan was made? A. I was frequently away from
the office during November and December, two or
three days a week.
"Q. You have no recollection of having discussed or passed upon or approved the advance
of moneys by the Ultramares Corporation on the
three trust receipts on December 8th, 1924? A.
No, sir.
"Q. You have a recollection of various trust receipts which Fred Stern & Company gave to the
Ultramares Corporation for advances up to the time
that you resigned in November, 1924? A. Yes,
sir, that is correct.
1746
"Q. Those were all handled between Mr. Stern
and you? A. The details were handled by Mr.
Manning.
"Q. Well, Mr. Manning, of course, never passed
on whether or not the loan was to be made and the
amount of the advance and the security, which
were matters that you passed on? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now, who checked up the various accounts
that were assigned to the Ultramares Corporation
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as applying against these trust receipts? Or was
there ever any check made by the Ultramares Corporation of that? A. We received the assigned
accounts which had to correspond with the trust
receipt.
"Q. Well, now, if you have a trust receipt which
called for rib smoked sheets and you accept an
assigned account covering sixty-one tons of Peruvian tailed rubber, would you consider that it was
one of the accounts to which you were entitled under that trust receipt? A. It was one of substitution.
"Q. There were substitutions from time to time?
A. From time to time.
"Q. And who passed upon the substitutions? A.
In May the first substitution came up and Mr.
Manning reported to me that he received an assigned account which did not correspond with the
trust receipt. I called up Mr. Stern, and he said
it could not be avoided, because frequently some
buyers requested him to delay shipments; some
buyers occasionally asked him for earlier shipment;
and also, at times, there were some questions as
to quality. He asked me whether we would take
a substitution; and we agreed, provided the substitution was by a responsible firm, and the
amounts of the accounts so assigned to us were
equal to accounts mentioned in the trust receipt.
"Q. And the first of those substitutions occurred
in May of 1924? A. Around that time.
"Q. Now Mr. Von Goeben, will you please just
state exactly how the transaction was handled between the bankrupt corporation and the Ultramares Corporation, taking any of the trust receipts preceding No. 104 of November 24th, 1924.
You have already stated—I do not want to try to
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have you repeat it—that Mr. Stern would come
down to see you, or would communicate with you,
and then he would show you his contracts for the
sale of the rubber? A. Contracts from his buyers
and his sellers.
"Q. Both? A. Both.
"Q. And then would he have the trust receipt
with him at the time, filled out; or would he prepare it— A. That trust receipt was sent up
when he got the money. The trust receipt was
to take the place for the time until the rubber was
weighed and shipped, and the accounts assigned to
us.
"Q. Then after Mr. Stern had talked the matter
over with you, they would send the trust receipt
down to the Ultramares, and if it was in satisfactory form the Ultramares would then issue its
check to Stern? A. That is right,
"Q. The checks were never issued before the
trust receipt was delivered? A. Not before we
received the trust receipt.
"Q. And did the trust receipt specify to whom
the rubber was sold? A. Always."
Mr. Podell: So there will be no confusion, your Honor, I think it ought to be
stated here that the trustee for some reason asked about 104. 104 is one of the
advances that were fully collected, is that
right?
Mr. Limburg: Yes.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
"Q. You are not familiar with substitutions that
took place in the latter part of November on, say,
trust receipt No. 104, where the Firestone Tire
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& Rubber Company was specified as the purchaser,
and twenty different accounts were turned over as
assigned accounts? A. No, sir.
"Q. Had you resigned before November 18th,
1924? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Well, as I understood it, your resignation
was to take effect at the end of the year, was it?
A. I resigned early in November, and my resignation was accepted November 12th, to take effect
December 31st, But during November and December I was away two or three days a week.
"Q. And did Mr. Manning, or some other person there, actually make advances to Fred Stern
& Company subsequent to the date of your resignation, without consulting you about it at all? A.
When I was not there Mr. Manning took it up
with Mr. Schlubach.
"Q. On trust receipt No. 94, Mr. Von Goeben,
dated November 1st, 1924, it is stated that the rubber had been sold to the Avon Sole Company. Do
you have any recollection of that trust receipt,
for $3,000? A. No.
"Q. You do not recall whether you handled that
personally or not? A. I do not recall that,
"Q. When these substitutions began in May of
1924, were they on a large scale; did they develop
on a large scale, or was it only a question of one
or two invoices? A. In the beginning there were
very few substitutions.
"Q. And when did they begin to become more
frequent? A. From the records, in November.
"Q. Well, you did not have much to do with it
at that time, did you? A. No.
"Q. During the time previous to your resignation there were very few substitutions? A. I did
not object to the substitutions, as long as we got
satisfactory accounts in place of them.

1753

1754

1755

586

1756

1757

1758

Deposition to Mr. Von Goeben—For Plaintiff.
"Q. Well, did they take up the substitution with
you first; or simply hand you an invoice which
you found was not the one that was specified in
the trust receipt? A. Sometimes they were taken
up with Mr. Manning, and he referred to me.
"Q. And sometimes they were not taken up with
you at all? A. And sometimes they simply sent
in the accounts.
"Q. Do you know of any instance where you
refused to accept a substitution? A. No, sir.
"Q. Now, at the time the advances were made,
what papers, other than the trust receipt, were
given to the Ultramares by Fred Stern & Company? A. We received first all the contracts from
his sellers and contracts from his buyers, which
were returned to Mr. Stern, and he wrote us a
letter asking for a certain amount, and with that
letter he usually sent up the trust receipt against
which we handed him a check.
"Q. And when did you get your assigned accounts? A. As soon as the rubber was weighed
and shipped, or delivered to the buyer.
"Q. Well, were not there numerous instances
where the sale of the rubber was subsequent, maybe
a month or more before delivery should be made?
A. The sales were always made prior to our advances.
"Q. I understand. But the time of delivery?
A. Sometimes there were delays.
"Q. Did you make advances against rubber
which—say in May, which was deliverable in September or October? A. No, sir.
"Q. Only for rubber that was then delivered?
A. Always spot rubber.
"Q. Well, it might be spot rubber, Mr. Von
Goeben, and not deliverable to Stern's customers
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until a month or two later. A. We never did any
such thing.
"Q. Why did your trust receipts describe the
rubber as ex a certain ship if you got only rubber
which Stern had bought from another dealer? A.
Because he bought rubber to arrive."
Mr. Podell: I take it that is included in
the description of spot rubber. (Continuing
reading) :
"Q. And under what arrangement was he getting the rubber; did you inquire into that? A.
He got the rubber against cash payment which
he made with our money.
"Q. Cash against documents? A. Yes; cash
against delivery orders.
"Q. Cash against delivery orders? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And those purchases that he made were
always ex dock and not ex warehouse? A. All that
came, that I saw, were for rubber to be shipped.
For instance, he bought rubber in February
for February, March and April shipment, or February, March and April delivery in New York;
and when that rubber was tendered to him, with
our money he paid for it.
"Q. And all of the contracts that were ever
shown to you at the time you were passing upon
them, so far as it concerned sellers of the rubber
to Fred Stern & Company, were sales cash against
documents in New York? A. Yes, sir.
Q. None of them specified any letter of credit
arrangement? A. Never.
"Q. And none of them were any open credit
sales? A. No, sir.
"Q. Well, had the Ultramares a record of exactly how each of these quantities of rubber that
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are specified in the respective trust receipts, were
purchased by Stern? A. We never kept any record
of that.
"Q. You never kept any record of that? A. No.
"Q. You never inspected the rubber or made any
investigation of the rubber, so far as the quality
or arrangement, other than to inspect the original
contracts which Mr. Stern submitted as the ones
which he had made with his sellers? A. We never
inspected any rubber.
"Q. Did you check up as to whether the quantities of rubber specified came in on the ship which
was mentitoned in your trust receipt? A. The
quantity had to correspond—the accounts which
were assigned had to correspond with the quantities mentioned in the trust receipts.
"Q. Do you recall any discussion about accepting Peruvian tailed rubber instead of rib smoked
sheets? A. No, sir.
"Q. Was there any record kept by the Ultramares Corporation as to whether the rubber which
is mentioned in the trust receipt as merely so many
tons ex a certain ship was rib smoked sheets, or
first ladick or crepe or otherwise? A. No, sir.
"Q. You made no notation from the contracts
that were submitted to you from the sellers, as
showing what the quality of the rubber was, or
what the grade was? A. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Manning might have taken a note of that;
but
"Q. If he did, that would be after November
1st, 1924? A. Either after or previous to that.
"Q. Even prior to November, 1924, Mr. Manning
handled the details? A. All the details.
"Q. Now, was there any general agreement
signed by Fred Stern & Company with respect to
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what security you were to have, other than what
is stated in the trust receipts? A. With the first
transaction a letter was exchanged, with the stipulation—with the agreement we were to advance
money against assignment of accounts.
"Q. That was simply in the form of an exchange
of letters? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And about what date was that? A. Early
in April.
"Q. Of what year, Mr. Von Goeben? A. 1924.
"Q. The Ultramares had transactions with Stern
only beginning April, 1924? A. April, 1924, yes,
sir.
"Q. You had no transaction prior to April, 1924,
with the bankrupt corporation? A. He bought
rubber from us.
"Q. He bought rubber. But no advance of any
sort? A. No, sir.
"Q. When you resigned from the Ultramares
Corporattion, Mr. Von Goeben, was that with the
expectation of becoming interested in the Fred
Stern Company business? A. No, sir.
"Q. When did you first take up the negotiations
to acquire an interest of the business, or become
an employee of the bankrupt corporation? A. In
the latter part of November.
"Q. In the latter part. And those negotiations
had proceeded to the point of actually signing a
contract of employment with the bankrupt corporation? A. The contract was signed, yes, sir.
"Q. And as I understand it, your position is
that that contract never became of force, never
became effective as a contract? A. The contract
was signed, but no election was held.
Mr. Podell: He was to be elected an
officer, I assume, and no election was held.
(Continuing reading) :
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"Q. What was the beginning of the negotiations?
Did Mr. Fred Stern approach you, or did you approach him regarding becoming interested in the
corporation? A. Mr. Stern approached me years
ago, as early as '14, '15, '16.
"Q. Had he approached you again in 1924, prior
to the time that you resigned, for the same purpose? A. He mentioned to me, in January or February, 1924, asked me whether I would be willing
to join him in business.
"Q. Now, that arrangement that you were negotiating about at the end of 1924 contemplated that
you and your son both were to become employees
of Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And was that predicated on any financial
statement that was made to you, or shown to
you, of the business? A. Yes, sir. Stern showed
me, first off, a statement as of December 31st, 1923,
of Touche-Niven which showed approximately
$1,070,000 capital and surplus.
"Q. When did Mr. Stern show you that statement? A. He showed us that statement the last
week in March, prior to the beginning of the Ultramares advancing money.
"Q. 1924? A. 1924.
"Q. Now, was any other statement given to you
by Mr. Stern as to the financial condition of the
Stern Corporation? A. No. When I spoke to
Mr. Stern—or rather, when he had a conference
I told him I would request a statement for the
year of 1924. And he then proposed to close the
books November 30th, so that Touche-Niven would
have the month of December in making up their
report. And it was agreed that after the receipt
of that statement I should join the firm. He told
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me he had made in 1924, up to November,
approximately $240,000, bringing the capital up
to $1,300,000.
"Q. He did not show you any statement of that
sort, whether one that he had made up, or Romberg, or anybody else? A. He had the tentative
statement made up in the office there, up to—I do not remember the date.
"Q. Made up in the latter part of 1924 I presume? A. Yes.
"Q. You did not get a copy of that statement,
did you? Have you got a copy of that statement?
A. No, sir, I have not."
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(After discussion, off the record.)
"Q. Do you recall whether the statement that
you saw, this tentative statement, applied up to the
date of August 1st, 1924, or was it later? A. My
recollection is, up to August."
Mr. Podell: There was some discussion,
and the witness repeats that answer.
Mr. Marshall: Will you read Mr.
Djorup's statement there?
Mr. Podell: Mr. Coplan, Mr. Rosenberg,
Mr. Djorup, and seventeen other lawyers
present. What they said does not appear
here, because there is a statement here that
the discussion was off the record.
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Djorup made a statement on the record.
Mr. Podell: I object to that. Statements
made by any outsiders do not represent Von
Goeben's testimony, your Honor. (Continuing reading) :
"Q. Now, the papers which were delivered to
the Ultramares, and kept by the Ultramares, were
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the exchanges of letters at the beginning of the
transactions, and the trust receipts which were
given to the Ultramares from time to time as advances were made? A. And copies of the accounts.
"Q. Which were delivered? A. Assigned accounts which were sent out by Ultramares to the
buyer.
"Q. When did Mr. Stern begin the practice of
sending the original assigned account along with
the copy in an envelope whereby the Ultramares
could mail out the original invoices? A. That was
a condition we stipulated when the business was
started.
"Q. Was that mentioned in your letter, or was
it just an understanding, an agreement? In the
exchange of letters was that mentioned?
"Mr. Rosenberg: Would not the letter
be the best evidence of that?
"Mr. Coplan: I just wanted to know if
he recollected it.
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"Q. Under the method in which the Ultramares
carried these transactions in their own books, Mr.
Von Goeben, when you had collected assigned invoices on a specific trust receipt sufficient to pay
you back your advance, did you cancel that item
out and account for the surplus, if there was any?
A. We had a so-called running account.
"Q. And in the way that those accounts are
carried on your books, none of these trust receipts
was ever closed out as a completed transaction?
A. It is a running account.
"Q. You charged every advance as a debit, and
credited all items received as credits, and simply
show a net result? A. Yes, sir."
(After discussion, off the record.)
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"Q. Have you any recollection that any particular time a number of trust receipts were returned to Mr. Stern as having been closed matters? A. Yes, sir, I recollect that some trust receipts were returned.
"Q. On one or more occasions? Mr. Manning
would know that? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know what the practice was, Mr.
Von Goeben, with respect to an assigned account
if a customer of Stern should send him a trade
acceptance? Did you ever watch how that was
being handled with the Ultramares? A. It was
understood that the trade acceptance was to be discounted, and the proceeds turned over to the Ultramares.
"Q. And that is the way that that would be
handled; by a direct payment of the proceeds by
Stern & Company to the Ultramares Corporation?
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now, in this account that you called a running account, you would debit all the advances,
and charge interest, and then you would credit
the moneys received and credit the interest on
those, would you? A. Yes, sir.
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"By Mr. Sykes:"
Mr. Podell: Who is Mr. Sykes?
Mr. Limburg: He is attorney for the
Bank of London in South America.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
"Q. So all of the assignments of accounts that
were delivered to you were assignments that you
received at the same time that you received the
trust receipt? A. No.
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"Q. And at the same time that you delivered
the money? A. No.
"Q. No? A. Stern applied for advances against
which he wanted to assign the accounts to us, after
the rubber was weighed and shipped. In the meantime, we held the trust receipt.
"By Mr. Copland
Mr. Podell: Mr. Coplan, whom did he
represent?
Mr. Limburg: The trustee.
Mr. Podell (continuing reading) :
1781
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"Q. Let me ask you this: Sometimes, though, it
was a month or more before you got an assignment
of an invoice under the trust receipt ? A. I understand it happened once, because of some delay.
"Q. What explanation was given to the Ultramares Corporation for such delay as a month or
more? A. The question of quality, or such thing
as that.
"Q. But you got an assignment of the account
immediately on the shipment going forward by
Stern & Company, didn't you? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So that a question of controversy about
quality would not prevent your getting an assignment at the time it was shipped? A. No.
"Q. Now, did some of those contracts that were
shown to you show sales by the Crude Rubber
Brokerage Company to Stern & Company? A. I
do not recollect.
"Q. You don't remember. Or were any of the
sellers Anglo-French Trading Company? A. I
cannot recollect. I do not remember."

595
Case.
Mr. Podell: Subscribed and sworn to the
— day of March, 1925, before special commissioner.
Mr. Marshall: I think the record should
show that Mr. Limburg was present at that
examination.
Mr. Podell: That Mr. Limburg was what?
The Court: Was present at that examination?
Mr. Podell: Put in all the appearances,
if you want to.
Mr. Marshall: That is not necessary, but
I should think it should show that Mr. Limburg was there and we were not.
Mr. Podell: I think it should show
the following were present: Edwards H.
Childs, Esq., receiver-trustee, in person;
Messrs. Zalkin & Cohen, attorneys for the
receiver-trustee, by Nathan Coplan, Esq.;
Messrs. Hirsch, Sherman & Limburg, attorneys for Ultramares Corporation, by Herbert R. Limburg, Esq.; James N. Rosenberg,
Esq., of counsel; Messrs. Sullivan & Cromwell, representing the Bank of London, by
Mr. Sykes; Messrs. Root, Clark, Howland
& Ballantine, representing the Equitable
Trust Company of Baltimore, by Mr. Hamilton; Messrs. Griggs, Baldwin & Baldwin,
representing Federal International Banking
Company, by Mr. Moore; Charles J. Lane,
Esq., representing Chemical National Bank,
by Mr. Sheftel; Messrs. McArdle, Djorup &
McArdle, accountants for the trustee, by
Christian Djorup, Esq.
The only ones who were not present were
Mr. Marshall and myself. We were in the
same category.
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Motion to Dismiss.
Mr. Marshall: Or anybody for ToucheNiven?
Mr. Podell: We rest again, your Honor.
The Court: Plaintiff rests.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

1787

1788

Mr. Marshall: I move, your Honor, to
dismiss the complaint severally as to each
cause of action, on the ground that neither
of them state facts sufficient to state a cause
of action at law. On the further ground
as to each cause of action that the plaintiff
has failed to prove facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action or to make out a
prima facie case. I further move specifically on the ground of the utter failure to
identify the books that were put in evidence
and testified from as having been in that
condition at the time we made our audit.
I move further on the ground of the failure of the plaintiff to show freedom from
contributory negligence, and on the ground
that we have distinctly shown the intervening frauds of Stern, a third party both at
the time that we made the audit, at the
time that the first advances were made
to Ultramares, and with respect to Ultramares, and further frauds with respect to
Ultramares by Stern, by the making of false
statements of profit during the year and by
giving trust receipts which were fake and
representing that he was going to assign nonexistent accounts receivable, and furthermore by committing larceny by diverting
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moneys which he was given for the purpose
of paying for merchandise, to pay off other
banks, which is a larceny by trick, I believe,
under the penal law.
For all these grounds I move that the
complaint be dismissed.
The Court: Decision reserved.
Mr. Marshall: Now, again I move and
make a specific motion as to the second
cause of action, on the ground that no intent to defraud has been shown on the part
of any of the defendants.
The Court: A t this time decision is reserved.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor will allow me
an exception to all these rulings?
The Court: Certainly.

1789

1790

DEFENDANTS' PROOFS.

recalled on behalf of the defendant, having been previously duly sworn, further testified as follows:
SYDNEY TOWELL,

Direct examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, will you state as briefly as
you can what your accounting experience has been?
A. From November, 1918, until to-day's date, in
public accounting.
Q. What experience had you had prior to 1924?
A. All experience in public accounting from November, 1918.
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Q. Yes, but will you please tell me; you were a
chartered accountant? A. I was a chartered accountant.
Q. And when did you become a chartered accountant? A. In June, 1922.
Q. And where did you serve as an accountant
prior to 1923, what firms prior to 1923? A. With
Ronald Briggs & Company in Winnipeg and Manitoba, Canada, and with George A. Touche & Company in Winnipeg, Canada.
Q. And you came from George A. Touche &
Company to Touche, Niven & Co. here, did you?
A. I did.
Q. Now, when you got your degree or certificate
as a chartered accountant, did you at the same
time win some kind of a prize? A. I did.
Q. Will you state to the jury just what that
was? A. I was awarded the
Q. Now, louder, please? A. I was awarded the
first prize by the Institute of Manitoba, and their
war memorial gold medal.
Q. Is that gold medal given every year or only
if you obtain a certain degree of proficiency? A.
Only if you obtain a certain degree of proficiency.
Q. And you have to rank first, do you not, in the
examinations that are given for that medal in order to get it? A. Yes. It must be the first time
of writing, and you must rank first.
Q. Now, you were the senior accountant that
made this audit of the books of Stern & Company
as of December 31st, 1923, were you not? A. I
was.
Q. And what were you told to do in connection
with that audit?
Mr. Podell:

And by whom?
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Q. And by whom? A. I received instructions
from Mr. Rea that I had been assigned by the
office secretary to take charge of the audit of the
books of Fred Stern & Company, and the preparation of a balance sheet.
Q. And what did you do after you received those
instructions? A. I first examined the previous
years' working papers.
Q. Did you go to Stern or Stern's office, or what?
A. My first examination of the previous years'
working papers took place in the office of Touche,
Niven & Co.
Q. In other words, you examined the working
papers that had been made on audits of prior years
of Stern & Company, by Touche, Niven & Co.? A. I
did.
Q. Did you examine also the balance sheets of
the prior years? A. I did.

1795

1796

The Court: May we inquire here now, if
he had been in Touche-Niven's prior to this
1923 audit?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Q. Had you been with Touche, Niven & Co.
prior to this 1923 audit? Had you made other
audits for them? A. I had.
The Court:
matters.

I mean, relating to Stern's

Q. Had you ever audited Stern's books before?
A. No.
Q. Now, I show you a balance sheet as of 1920
and balance sheet as of 1921 of Stern & Company,
and ask you whether those are the balance sheets,
two of the prior balance sheets that you say you
refer to (handing to witness)? A. They are.
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Mr. Marshall: Now I offer those in evidence. I think the other balance sheet of
1922 had already been offered in evidence.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor allow me
an objection and exception to the admission
of those documents?
The Court: That is allowed, and you have
an exception, Mr. Podell.
(Received in evidence and marked respectively Defendants' Exhibits J and K.)
1799

Q. You did some work while you were at Stern's
office too, did you not? A. I did.
Q. I am going into that in a minute, but first I
ask you whether this Exhibit 1 is the balance sheet
which you prepared after your work at Stern's
office?
The Court:
exhibit, yes.

1800

That is conceded to be the

Q. Now, will you tell us, Mr. Towell, just what
you did in auditing these books? A. I first of all
had taken off a trial balance of the journal ledger,
drawing it up in the form of first the number of
the account, the name of the account in the general
ledger, the previous years' balance on that account
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, what is the
witness testifying from?
Mr. Marshall: Work sheets, I believe.
Mr. Podell: That is what paper he is
looking at?
Mr. Marshall: Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, his
work sheets.
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1801

Q. Mr. Towell, will you tell us what the general ledger is, what kind of a book it is and what
its purpose is in bookkeeping?
Mr. Podell: Will you pardon me? Mr.
Stenographer, will you read the answer as
far as it has gone?
(Record repeated.)
Q. What about the previous year's balance? A.
The previous year's closing balance.
Q. What did you do about that? A. I used it
for the purpose of comparison.
Q. Now, what is a general ledger? Will you
just tell the jurors, who are not accountants, what
the general ledger is, and its general purposes and
uses? A. The general ledger is a book of record,
original record, in which are kept all of the accounts
of a concern. In the form that that ledger had
in the office of Fred Stern & Company, some of
what would be in ordinary cases general ledger
accounts or ledger accounts, in any event were
kept in subsidiary ledgers. Therefore, in Stern's
general ledger we had a ledger which is really in
part a controlling ledger. To illustrate the general ledger in a better form, I could say that the
way the bookkeeping first was brought about was
to have one ledger, all of the accounts whether
to have one ledger, all of the accounts, whether
our customers—or whether accounts payable or
whether notes payable—all accounts appeared under separate headings in one ledger. That general
ledger in its original form has been modified and
to-day's use of it is to subdivide it in order to take
care of the great volume of work the modern business has. Therefore, we have to-day what is called
a general ledger to distinguish it from other ledgers only by name.

1802
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Q. Now, as I understand it, this general ledger
to-day is supposed to present a summary picture
of the whole business based on these subsidiary
books which are too voluminous to give a complete
picture of the company at any given time, is that
right? A. In part.
Q. Now, I would like to get this clear if I can,
so the jury will understand it even if I do not. A.
It is a summary ledger in part, certain detailed
information is to-day in a large business omitted
from the general ledger and recorded under a
specific caption, such as the "accounts receivable".
Q. Stern, for example, had an accounts receivable ledger, is that correct? A. That is correct.
Q. And that was summarized in the general
ledger? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you took off then in the first instance
a trial balance of this general ledger? A. Yes.
Q. And that was a picture that Stern's general
ledger gave of his business at that time?
(Question repeated as recorded.)

1806

Q. Will you tell us what the trial balance shows
and what you go on to do from there; what you
went on to do from there? A. The trial balance
of the general ledger, taken by itself, is nothing
more than a list of the balances as shown by the
books. If the two sides of it, the debits and the
credits, add up, it merely signifies that it is in
balance and on the face of it probably means that
the records have been correctly kept so far as debits
and credits are concerned. It means nothing more.
The names of the accounts in the trial balance
should indicate the nature of the asset or liability
or profit or loss account shown. The trial balance of Fred Stern & Company's general ledger
did so indicate, the nature of each account.
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Q. Now, will you go on and tell the jury as
clearly and as briefly as you can what you did?
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, to avoid confusion, I assume there is a trial balance
there. You have it.
The Witness: Yes.
Mr. Podell: If he is telling its contents,
let it be marked separately in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: It is in evidence.
Mr. Podell: Let it be marked separately.
It is in a mass of papers we cannot find.
I would like to see it.
The Court: All right. Mark that separately.

1808

(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-C.)
Q. Which is the trial balance, the first page?
A. The first page, Mr. Marshall, is not the trial
balance. The rest of it is. That is the trial balance (indicating).
Mr. Marshall: Three pages of trial balance (showing to jury). That is a trial balance of the books as of December 31st, 1923.
Q. Is that correct?

A. It is.

Mr. Podell: In the witness' handwriting,
Mr. Marshall?
Q. Is it in your handwriting, Mr. Towell? A.
The columns headed "Balance after adjustment"
are in my handwriting. Also the columns headed
"Adjustments."
Q. In whose handwriting is the balance? A.
Mr. Siess's handwriting, my assistant.
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Q. Do you need this to testify, or may I leave
it with the jury? A. All right, I can go ahead.
Mr. Podell: May I see it, Mr. Marshall?
(Handed to counsel.)

1811

Q. Will you go on, Mr. Towell? A. Upon examination of the trial balance of the general ledger, I found that there were certain ledger accounts
purporting to represent cash on hand or on deposit with bankers. I had already received from
Mr. Rea letters addressed to Touche, Niven & Co.,
which he had requested from banks and others
holding money on deposit confirming all of these
balances.
Mr. Podell: Are those letters here?
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence.

1812

Q. Will you go on, please? A. I used these letters to effect a reconciliation of the balance of
money recorded on the books of Fred Stern &
Company with that reported by the banks in their
letters; which is to say that I reconcile each and
every bank account, accounting for all outstanding checks and all deposits in transit. Deposits
in transit were further verified by reference to
bank statements and by deposits in transit, I mean
money held by Fred Stern at December 31st, which
he had not deposited on December 31st but was
in transit to a bank or other depositary. Such
deposits were confirmed by reference to a subsequent bank statement. Upon further examination
of the cash balances I found that certain of the
cash balances were hypotheticated, that is, they
were on deposit with banks but they were not subject to the general use to which Fred Stern &
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Company might wish to put its funds. They were
held by banks against obligations to the banks subsequently maturing.
Q. Explain that a little more simpler, if you
can? They were held, were they not, as deposits
against future drafts under letters of credit? A.
Fred Stern & Company gave acceptances and those
acceptances, I believe, were in most cases secured
by invoices. Upon collection of those invoices prior
to the date of maturity of the acceptance, the cash
would be held by the bank and they would await
the maturity of the acceptance before they made
the offset on their own books. In consequence, we
had a liability to certain of the banks and we had
an asset, cash, in their hands at the same time.
Q. In other words, it was a payment in advance
really of notes or obligations that were to become
due at a future day? A. Yes.
Q. And did you count the cash that Stern had
on hand? A. Yes, we did.
Q. And did you reconcile the bank balances?
Mr. Podell: How much was that cash ?
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, may I conduct
my examination?
The Court: Do not interrupt, Mr. Podell,
please, it only disconcerts counsel.
Mr. Podell: I just want to get that one
figure. I did not think it was disconcerting,
your Honor.
Q. Did you reconcile the bank balances shown
by the books of the corporation and these letters
received from the banks? A. We did.
Q. Did you make any tests of deposits and of
checks drawn with the bank statements? A. We
did.
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Q. Will you just explain what those tests mean,
what those tests are? A. In order to establish the
regularity of their manner of keeping track of their
bank accounts and their cash transactions, it is
necessary and it is usually done, and I did it in
this case, examined a number of their recent deposits, particularly at the close of the year, to
see that their money at the end of the year had
not in any way been manipulated.
Q. And did you also look at the cash entries in
the months of January and February, 1924, for
this purpose? You may refresh your recollection
from those work sheets there? A. I cannot recall
at this time that we took it up as a specific item.
That is, examination of cash transactions of January or February, 1924, to prove the bank balances
at December 31st.
Q. What did you do in that connection?
Mr. Podell: May I see that?
(Handed to counsel.)
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps I do not put the
questions right, not being a technical accountant.

1818

Q. Will you tell us anything else that you did
with respect to cash balances? A. I made inquiries with regard to the principal outstanding
checks. That is, checks that had been drawn prior
to or on December 31st, 1923, but had not been
cashed by the banks. Those checks in the largest
items were inquired into as to their regularity.
Q. Now, whom did you discuss these matters
with when you inquired? A. Principally with Mr.
Romberg.
Q. You understood him to be the cashier or
head bookkeeper of the concern? A. Yes, the cashier and office manager, as I recall him.
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Q. Now, will you go on to the next thing that
was considered? A. The next group of items taken
up were the notes and trade acceptances receivable.
Q. What did you do with respect to them? A.
I, first of all, made a summarizing schedule of
all accounts representing notes and trade acceptances receivable. I determined by examination of
the trial balance and by inquiring as to their
method of doing business, that some of the notes
or trade acceptances were discounted, and I determined also which accounts they were, and on
the schedule headed a column "discounted," and
proceeded to make a segregation of the total notes
and trade acceptances receivable into those discounted and those given as collateral to obligations of Fred Stern.
Q. Did you confirm the existence of these pledged
notes? A. I did. We next made up a schedule
from the records in Fred Stern's office, which would
give us the detail of all of the notes and trade acceptances. My first summary merely showed the
amount of notes and trade acceptances in the hands
of the creditor as collateral with each bank under
discount. My further schedule gave the detail of
all notes or trade acceptances by their makers. I
made up that list, showing the maturities, and any
that were past due, and I check from that to ascertain which had been confirmed. I further classified the notes and trade acceptances, to show which
were supposed to be on hand with Fred Stern, and
inspected those that were on hand.
Q. Did you trace into the books entries for notes
and trade acceptances collected since December
31st, 1923, up to the time of the audit? A. My
recollection is not good on that point, but I have
in my own handwriting on this same schedule
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proceeds not received until January, 1924, with
respect to two notes of the India Tire & Rubber
Company, which while it is not a recollection of
mine, leads me to believe that I examined the cash
records with regard to collection of notes.
Q. Those were true entries which you made at
that time? A. This was made at the time of the
examination.
Mr. Marshall: May we have this marked
also, your Honor, the sheet the witness has
been referring to?
1823

(Marked Exhibit 15-D.)
The Court: In the examination of this
particular section, notes and trade acceptances receivable, do I understand you to say
that your examination first separated those
held by the company and then separated
those pledged as collateral to acceptances?
Did I understand you to say that?
The Witness: Yes.
By the Court.

1824

Q. Now, then, after that separation, was there
a checkup as to the existence of those particular
notes and trade acceptances? A. Yes.
Q. How? A. Those that were on hand were inspected. Those that were under discount were
confirmed by correspondence. Those that were
pledged as collateral but not discounted, were also
confirmed by correspondence.
Mr. Marshall: The correspondence is annexed to Exhibit 15-D, is that right?
The Witness: The correspondence with
regard to the verification of notes does not
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all appear under this schedule, because that
correspondence includes verification of other
items and is filed in the most convenient
place.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Where is it, in your working sheets? A. Reference is made, however, on this schedule to the
place where the verification will be found, the
confirmation letter will be found.
Foreman of Jury: When you say that
the bank held certain money already for
security for money advanced, was this on
the books still shown as an asset?
The Witness: Yes.
The Juror: It has already been pledged
to the bank for security, the bank would
not give him back the money and no checks
would be issued until it was paid, and it still
was kept as an asset on the books?
The Witness: Are you referring to the
notes?
The Juror: You said something before
that the bank held certain moneys until
certain securities were paid.
The Witness: Cash.
The Juror: Cash, yes. If the man would
issue a check, the bank would not honor it
because they held that?
The Witness: Not on that account.
Mr. Marshall: You offset that by a liability, do you not?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: On the other side you will
find a liability for that. You will find the
liability on the other side.
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The Witness: You see, the liability was
still outstanding and good until discharged,
until it matured, and the bank also held
on the other hand cash in part to meet that
obligation when it would mature.
The Juror: The notification was sent
to the bank, not to the other party? The
bank has advanced money on it?
The Court: The bank has advanced
money. They have cash there as security for
that particular obligation, and when it is
paid by the obligor, they restore the cash
back to Mr.—whatever the name of this concern is.
Mr. Podell: Stern & Company. Your
Honor, I think your Honor is overlooking,
if I may suggest, that the witness testified—
I do not know whether the juror has that in
mind or not—that there were trade acceptances discounted.
The Court: That is not what the juror
is referring to.
The Juror: I am not referring to that.
Mr. Podell: If you read his answer,
where he said that the cash was tied up
by the bank, I think you will find——
The Court: I think a few questions by
counsel will clarify the whole situation. Go
back to that.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. As I understand that item, Mr. Towell, there
were acceptances that were to mature in the future
in favor of the banks, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there had been accounts receivable or
something pledged against these acceptances as security in favor of the bank? A. Right.

611
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Direct.

1831

Q. And some of these accounts receivable had
been collected by the bank and turned into cash
before the acceptance became due and payable? A.
Right.
Q. And therefore there was at the time, as of
December 31st, 1923, outstanding on the one side
an obligation of Stern to the bank, and on the other
side, cash which had been realized by the bank but
which it could not credit to the obligation until
the due date? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I do not think that is right,
your Honor.
The Witness: One or two of the banks
make the offset.
Mr. Podell: Why not? The juror was
perfectly right in asking why it should be
called an asset.
The Juror: They have held the money as
security already. The obligation has never
been sent to the bank yet.
The Witness: May I read a letter?
The Juror: I just want to get it clear.
The Court: Yes, you can clarify it.
The Witness: I think this will clarify
it. We addressed a letter to the Chemical
National Bank, asking for details of all open
items with their bank, and they replied as
of that date, December 31st, 1923, "The
above named company, Fred Stern & Company, is not indebted to us for any loans or
discounts. Our foreign department had total
acceptances outstanding in the amount of
$281,395.45, and total anticipated in the
amount of $94,994.65, as of December 31st,
1923, for this account."
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There were anticipations, that is, money
on deposit, with the Chemical National
Bank, which they intended to use to hold
for themselves in anticipation of maturity
of obligations due them from Fred Stern.
Mr. Marshall: But they had not used it
yet for that?
The Witness: No.
Mr. Podell: Which is it? Where is the
asset?
Mr. Marshall: There is a liability offsetting that.
Mr. Podell: Let us get it as an asset
first. What is included in it as an asset?
Q. What did you include as an asset in there,
Mr. Podell wants to know? A. The Chemical National Bank with regard to the item that they say
was anticipated and which I repeat again was
$94,994.65, with regard to that particular item
there appeared on the general ledger a balance
of $89,073. That item had to be reconciled, and
an accounting made of the difference. That was
done, and it was established that as of December
31st, 1923, it was correct to state the cash in the
hands of the Chemical National was $89,073.72, as
recorded on the books of Fred Stern.
Q. And against this, did you carry a liability?
The Court : Of $200,000?
Q. Of two hundred odd thousand dollars?
Yes.

A.

The Juror: If a bank has got cash on
hand, it must honor the check, unless that
money is taken off already. If it is pledged
and the bank has taken it off on certain
pledging, there is no balance there.
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Mr. Marshall: I do not think this was a
checking account.
The Witness: I do not think this was a
checking account.
The Court: Is it clarified now? If it is
not, ask any question you like.
Mr. Podell: There are a few questions I
would like to ask about that, your Honor,
but not at this point.
The Court: Not at this time.
The Juror: This is already pledged and
then it is a liability when it is pledged, and
until it is cleared off it should not be an
asset. It is neither an asset nor a liability.
The Court: As I understand it, slightly
as I know, there is a difference between the
cash of $89,000 and two hundred odd thousand, if that cash is deducted from the
$200,000 there is a liability between the
$200,000 and the $89,000.
Mr. Podell: No, your Honor, I am sorry.
The Court: That is not the fact?
Mr. Marshall: May I speak, your Honor?
This is my examination at this time.
The Court: Go ahead.
Mr. Marshall: I think what happened,
your Honor, they held this account in abeyance because obviously the Chemical Bank
could not apply this to the loan
The Court: For some reason.
Mr. Marshall: Because the loan was not
due. If they did that, they would lose interest.
Mr. Podell: Pardon me. I think counsel is going far beyond argument. He is
testifying.
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Mr. Marshall: That was my understanding.
The Court: Let him tell what that is, if
he knows.
Mr. Podell: I will ask that the witness
tell; that he put questions. Go ahead.
By Mr. Marshall.

1841

1842

Q. Will you try and explain it to us once more?
I thought you said that the acceptances were not
due yet? A. That is my recollection.
Q. One of the jurors suggest that the steamship
was not here. Does that suggestion help us any?
A. No. I can repeat the same remarks I have
already made; by referring to a further schedule in
the working papers, acceptances under letters of
credit dealing with the same item we have spoken
of, Chemical National Bank, I find that my papers
show that Fred Stern owed the Chemical National
Bank on dollar acceptances $249,642.59.
The Court: If you give us the anticipations, I think we will get it.
The Witness: The amount that they held
after reconciliation—cash in their hands was
$89,073.72. They would hold that cash and
continue to hold it until such time as they
should offset it against acceptances due to
them.
The Juror: The acceptances amount to
how much?
The Witness : $249,000 worth of acceptances. Evidently Fred Stern & Company
to secure those acceptances had given trust
receipts, assigned invoices, and some of the
invoices were collected before the accept-
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ances fell due, and they were holding $89,073
in their possession to offset against the acceptances when they did mature.
The Juror: Trade acceptances?
The Witness: Trade acceptances, payable
by Fred Stern.
Q. And that could not be anticipated any more
than a note payable, could it? It is like a note payable on a certain date, and an acceptance payable?
A. I believe that to be so.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, the next item
is this accounts receivable.
The Court: Does that clarify that, sir?
The Juror: That clears it up, yes, sir.
The Court: Have you got it cleared up in
your mind?
The Juror: Yes.
Seventh Juror: That 204,000
The Court: Why do you not wait and see
if the lawyers bring it out or not?
Mr. Marshall: Is it on this item? We
are going to leave that now.
Seventh Juror: He was speaking of those
liabilities, trade acceptances and cash on
hand. He states that the Chemical National
Bank people had 204,000 and some amount
of money in trade acceptances. Is that the
way I understand it?
The Witness: There was owing by Fred
Stern to the Chemical National Bank
$249,000.
Seventh Juror: And how much trade acceptances did he give them for it? $249,000
worth of trade acceptances?
The Witness: Yes.
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Seventh Juror: And the amount of cash
the Chemical National people held was only
$89,000?
The Witness: Yes.
Seventh Juror: That is what I want to
get clear, because I thought the way he expressed it, that they had $204,000 in cash and
only $89,000 acceptances, but they were holding the $89,000 against the $204,000 acceptances. That is what I wanted to see, why
the money couldn't be paid out.
Mr. Podell: The only difficulty is that
these acceptances were drafts against letters
of credit.
The Court: That can be brought out.
Mr. Podell: They were not what we ordinarily call trade acceptances. I think that
might be made a little clearer when we get to
bringing out a few questions. I think that
may be made a little clearer.
Mr. Marshall: Now that we have had the
benediction of Mr. Podell, I suggest, your
Honor, that we adjourn, because the accounts receivable is the next item, and that
will be quite a lengthy item.
The Court: Are you through with these
notes and trade acceptances?
Mr. Marshall: I think we are. Are we
not?
The Witness: I think we are.
Mr. Podell: While we are on this, may
I just ask or suggest, was not the obligation that Stern was to pay it off at any time
before the due date?
The Witness : That was not my understanding.
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Mr. Podell: Well, all right. I had better
reserve that. Is there any maturity in
London on those trade drafts?
The Court : He does not know.
Mr. Limburg: Yes, he does.
The Witness: I never heard of any.
Mr. Marshall: I think we had better wait
until the cross-examination for these additional questions.
The Court: Yes. Do not let us get this
confused now. Is there any other question
you want to ask on that, gentlemen? Have
you got it clarified now? We will take an
adjournment until to-morrow morning at 10
o'clock.

1849
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(Whereupon, at 4.30 o'clock P. M., an adjournment was taken until to-morrow, April
9th, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)

New York, April 9, 1929,
10 o'clock A. M.
Trial continued.
Same appearances.
1851
SYDNEY TOWELL, a witness on behalf of the defendant, resumed, further testified as follows:

Direct examination (continued)

by Mr. Marshall.

Q. Now, when we closed yesterday, Mr. Towell,
I believe we had covered the cash items and the
note items on the balance sheet? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, what did you do to determine the
amount of accounts receivable that Stern had? A.
I took off a trial balance of the accounts receivable
ledger, showing the name of each account and the
amount of each account.
Q. Did you compare that trial balance of the accounts receivable ledger with the trial balance of
the
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Mr. Podell: I object to counsel telling
him what he did. Why cannot the witness
answer the last question?
The Court: Yes. I think he would be better qualified than any of us, to tell us.
Mr. Marshall: I think I can shorten it,
your Honor.
Q. Had you finished your answer to the last question, or do you want to go on? A. I can go on. I
compared the total of the accounts receivable as
shown by the trial balance, with the controlling account in the general ledger.
Q. And what did you find? A. I found that they
were in agreement, and that the general ledger controlling account properly stated the total of accounts receivable.
Q. What else did you do? A. I then had the accounts that were overdue aged under a plan whereby I discovered which were less than three months
overdue, those three to six months, and those
six to twelve months.
Q. You noted that down, did you, on one of these
work sheets? A. I noted all of that information on
these work sheets.
Q. And that is exhibit— A. That is Plaintiff's
Exhibit 15-A.
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Q. These columns are the ones which indicate the
aging (indicating) ; is that correct? A. Yes.
(Shown to jury.)
Q. What was the next step you took in relation
to that? A. In examining each of the individual
accounts for the purpose of aging, I had my assistant examine them to see that they were made up as
specific items and were not old unadjusted balances.
Q. What do you mean by that, that the specific
items were not— A. Definite invoices.
Q. You mean to see that each account receivable
represented definite invoices? A. Yes.
Q. That they were not just claims or unpaid balances of some kind against the accounts? A. Yes.
Q. And then what did you do? A. I then took
the list up with the credit manager of Fred Stern,
Mr. Pam, and discussed the accounts with him, account by account, to determine what reserves were
necessary for those that were overdue.
Q. Now, just tell me, let me get this straight—
you took every account on that list up with the
credit man, is that correct? A. Yes.
Q. And when you speak of every account, for
example you— A. I mean each individual item.
Q. You took up this item, we will say, of Akron
Seamless Rubber Company (indicating)? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. And you discussed that with him? A. Yes.
Q. For the purpose of finding out what kind of a
reserve should be placed against that, if any? A.
Yes.
Q. And did you do that with every account on
that list? A. I did.
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Q. And did that list contain every account on
the books of the company, every account receivable
on the books of Stern? A. Except for a few accounts shown in the accounts payable ledger, which
were really accounts receivable.
Q. All of these other accounts receivable excepting those which we will take up later, you did take
up in this audit? A. Yes.
Q. Now, what else did you do? Let me ask you—
did you believe Mr. Pam, the credit manager, to be
an honest man? A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you go on and tell us the next step
that you took? A. Certain of the accounts Mr. Pam
was unable to pass on, and those I took up together with the recommendations and suggestions
made by Mr. Pam with Mr. Stern himself, and too
with Mr. Romberg.
Q. So that you discussed the list, this complete
list of accounts, with Mr. Stern and Mr. Romberg?
A. Yes.
Q. And they also helped you decide what
Mr. Podell: I object to that, what they
helped him to do. Let him tell us.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: All right. Withdrawn.
Mr. Podell: Are you talking about overdue accounts?
Mr. Marshall: I am talking about the
whole list of accounts receivable which he
discussed with Mr. Stern and with Mr. Pam
and with Mr. Romberg.
Q. Now, did you at that time believe that Mr.
Stern was an honest man? A. I did.
Q. And did you believe that Mr. Romberg was
an honest man? A. I did.
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Q. Now, did you take those accounts up with
any one else? A. I took the list in part up with a
Mr. Hayworth.
Q. And who was he? A. He was the sales manager.
Q. And you discussed some of the accounts with
the sales manager? A. Yes.
Q. And did you believe him to be an honest man?
A. I did.
Q. Did any of them at any time suggest to you
that there were any fake accounts in that list? A.
They did not.
Q. Now, what other steps did you take with respect to these accounts receivable? A. I had the
cash books examined to see whether any of the accounts had been paid in January, particularly those
that were overdue, January or the part of February of 1924 that I was in there. I then removed
from the accounts receivable those accounts which
upon investigation were shown to be in the nature
of investments in plants, such as the investment in
the Batavia Rubber Company's plant, at Batavia,
New York.
Q. And where did you put that? A. I put that,
under the head of investments.
Q. That appears later in the balance sheet? A.
It appears later in the balance sheets, but it was
an account in this ledger when I first saw it.
Q. What did you then do? Did you take— A.
Then, from their general business I knew that some
of their accounts were assigned, and I secured from
Mr. Romberg his record of assignment of accounts
and had noted on the trial balance those accounts
which were assigned.
Q. Now, some mention was made of some letters
which you had received from the banks. Had all
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the banks that were written to replied, stating just
what accounts receivable had been assigned to
them? A. They had not.
Q. Had the Chemical National Bank replied,
stating what accounts receivable had been assigned
to it? A. No, they had not.
Q. Now, will you tell us what your object was in
noting the accounts assigned? A. When I had completed the examination of accounts receivable, I
had determined that there was a total of $2,224,872.63 of accounts receivable. I knew that part of
them were pledged, and I wished to show on the
balance sheets the total amount of accounts that
were pledged. Examining the lists from the banks,
some banks did not reply, some did not give the detail of their accounts, some did give the detail. That
detail, where given, did not check with the records
in many cases, and it was impossible to make a complete follow-through on the whole thing, and I came
to the conclusion that the record given me by Mr.
Romberg, which was a day to day record used for
operating purposes was a complete record and correctly described the total amount of accounts receivable assigned.
Q. Now, was this record which Romberg gave
you—did that state accounts receivable assigned in
a greater or a lesser sum than that shown by the
returns by the banks which you had received? A.
Mr. Romberg's total showed a greater amount than
that reported by banks.
Q. And you took the greater sum of pledged accounts rather than the lesser sum? A. I did.
Q. And that showed a lesser sum of free assets
available to general creditors than it would have
shown if you had taken the lesser figures shown by
the banks? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, you regarded that, or did you regard
that as the correct thing to do under the circumstances? A. I did.
Q. And the more conservative thing to do? A.
I did.
Q. And did you make that application in good
faith and in the best exercise of your judgment? A.
I did.
Q. Now, did you take any other steps than those
that you have named to satisfy yourself as to the
regularity and genuineness of the accounts receivable? A. I made tests of invoices to the accounts
receivable. I made tests of returns
Q. What do you mean by tests of invoices to accounts receivable? A. Checking invoices, duplicate
copies of invoices on file, to the accounts receivable,
and from the accounts receivable back to the invoices. I checked in both directions.
Q. About how many invoices, if you have any
idea, did you take up in that way? A. I would say
not less than 200.
Q. Now, what did you do besides checking from
the accounts to the invoices? A. I checked from
the invoices back to the record of rubber received
by Fred Stern and proved that that same rubber
had been purchased by Fred Stern and a liability
raised therefor or payment made therefor.
Q. Now, what book did you use in connection
with that? A. I used a record of lots. I call it the
lot record.
Q. A lot record? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall:
here?

Have you such a book

Q. Now, let us see if I get that clearly: You
went then from the invoices to the lot record book,
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to test whether merchandise had been received and
delivered against invoices, is that correct? A. To
test whether they ever purchased the rubber, yes.
Q. And about how many instances of that kind,
how many tests of that kind, did you make? A. I
am a little afraid to mention the number. I worked
the greater part of two days, rapid work, from one
record to the other.
Q. If you cannot remember the number after
all these years, I do not want to ask you to guess.
A. No. I could not estimate at this time the number that I checked.
Q. Now, did you pick these invoices that you
checked at random, or did you have a particular
system? A. Just at random.
Q. And is that the customary way of making
tests? A. It is satisfactory.
Q. Now, is there anything else that you did in
connection with the accounts receivable? A. On
the accounts receivable I found certain balances
which were completely reserved against. That is.
there was an asset account which with the adjustments made after my investigation of the value of
the account was equal to the amount of the account,
and therefore, instead of showing an amount of accounts receivable on the balance sheet and a reserve to offset it of just as great an amount, I had a
transfer made offsetting the two, so that they
showed in neither one place nor the other. That
was in order to eliminate accounts which had been
completely reserved against.
Q. Now, you did set up a reserve, did you not?
A. Yes. The reserve set up comes under another
caption of the working papers, the reserve for
doubtful accounts. Shall I come to it now?
The Court: Yes. It is the next in line.
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Q. I think you had better. A. The reserve for
doubtful accounts as finally adjusted after by investigation, totaled $660,000.
Q. That was the reserve that was built up after
this conversation with these four men, is that correct? A. It was. After offsetting the accounts, I
just spoke of, amounting to $172,000, we reduced
the reserve finally to $427,000.
Q. That reserve is really a deduction from the
assets, is it not, from those accounts receivable?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you consider at all the necessity of
confirming these accounts receivable by correspondence with customers? A. I did not consider it because the matter had been already mentioned to me
by Mr. Rea before I proceeded with my work.
Q. And what did he say? A. He told me that it
had been decided not to.
Q. And did you find, in the course of your examination, anything to make you feel that you should
correspond with customers? A. No, I did not.
Q. Now, is there anything more you want to say
under the heading of accounts receivable, to explain
what you did? A. No.
Q. What is the next item? A. These are—the accounts we have just spoken of are the trade accounts receivable. There are some other accounts
receivable other than trade.
Q. What did you do about them? A. I made a
general inquiry as to their nature, and decided they
were proper assets and properly stated as other accounts receivable.
Q. And in general, what was their nature? A.
Claims for shortages and losses and a few minor
advances and accounts with employees and officers
of Fred Stern, the whole total of which was $27,693.
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Q. And did you make checks of some kind against
them? A. I inquired as to their nature at the time,
and satisfied myself that they were properly stated.
Q. Now, there has been some mention made of a
United Baltic account, Sterling deposit. I do not
know if this is the proper place to take that up,
but if it is, will you tell us what you did about
that?

1877

1878

The Court: That is the large item, is it
not, of $703,000?
Mr. Marshall: No, your Honor.
The Witness: It is $113,000. That comes
under the caption of accounts payable. The
trial balance of the accounts payable ledger
was taken off, and it disclosed the fact that
the greater part of the so-called accounts
payable were in fact accounts receivable or
their equivalent. That is, they were not
credit balances, not liabilities in the aggregate, but in the aggregate debit balances.
That is, whereas you usually expect to find a
credit balance in the controlling account of
accounts payable, in this case, in the case of
Fred Stern & Company, there was actually
a debit balance. It is quite customary, and
I did so in this case
Q. Now, a debit balance to accounts payable is
really a credit balance to Stern, is that correct? A.
Debit balance to accounts payable is an asset of
Stern's.
Q. An asset of Stern's. Now, will you explain
what you did to investigate that item? A. I had my
assistant go over the ledger and note for me the
nature of all of the debit balances. I then removed
the debit balances from the accounts payable, be-
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cause if I had left them there they would have reduced the liabilities of Fred Stern, but I removed
them from accounts payable and transferred them
to the asset side of the balance sheet. Among the
items was the item just referred to, the United Baltic Corporation. That was the largest item among
the accounts payable debit balances, and amounted
to $113,199.60. I inquired into that item, I looked
at the United Baltic account and
Q. In what ledger? A. In the accounts payable
ledger; and I took the matter up with the credit
manager.
Q. That is Mr. Pam? A. Mr. Pam, and with
Mr. Stern, and discussed it with Mr. Romberg.
Q. And what was the explanation that they gave
you? A. That the United Baltic had insisted on
them raising sterling deposits on their account;
they desired in their future business dealings to
have cash on their hands for the future purchases.
Q. In other words, the United Baltic, before it
would deal with Stern any more, wanted a cash
deposit in advance? A. Yes. And it had it. I
determined that the transactions raising the debit
balance were transactions involving cash; that cash
had gone to the United Baltic. I examined what
was available as the United Baltic file to see what
purchases had been made in January, whether any
of them were in liquidation of that amount, and
I found none.
Q. Was the explanation that was given to you
confirmed by the checking which you did? A. Yes.
Q. And did you believe the explanation that was
given to you at that time? A. I did.
Q. Now, have you concluded everything you did
under accounts receivable? A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Now, will you tell us what you did with respect to the inventory? A. I requested that the
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original sheets covering the inventory be handed
to me, and I received them from Mr. Romberg.
They were not made up by Mr. Romberg, but by
two individuals outside of his department.
Q. That is, employees of Stern? A. Employees
of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. Is it customary to receive the inventory from
some employee of the person whose accounts you
are auditing? A. It is.
Q. Now, what did you do to check up on this
inventory? A. I went down each of the items of
rubber in stock and checked to the purchase invoice register to see that it had been set up as
a liability. I then checked through the record
shown in the lot register to see as of what time
the rubber in the inventory had been sold, and
I corrected errors found in that examination.
Q. Now, did any of these errors cause you to
suspect that the inventory had been dishonestly
made up? A. No.
Q. Go ahead and tell us what else you did. A.
I discovered that the two sheets of the inventory
as handed to me by Fred Stern & Company contained a great many errors for the size of the
inventory, and, of course, I immediately made inquiry as to how such a thing could happen. I
was informed by Mr. Romberg that the principal
reason was that being behind with his records on
the general ledger he had not had opportunity
to check the inventory that had been made up
outside of his own department. It seemed a reasonable explanation to me, and I investigated in
the outside department, and the main reason for
the errors seemed to be that they had sickness in
the office and one man was trying to do another
man's work, and there seemed every reason why
and how errors could come into these sheets. All
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errors were corrected quite readily when I pointed
them out, and since the inventory was not large,
I checked the whole thing through myself instead
of handing back to them and telling them to check
it on their own account.
Q. Now, what books, if any, did you use in
checking this inventory back? A. I used the accounts receivable ledger, the record of acceptances
on the letters of credit, probably the accounts payable ledger.
Q. Did you use the lot book? A. And the lot
record as the principal record.
Q. Now, did you take steps to prove that any
part of the inventory had been sold? A. I did.
Q. And have you told us yet what you did in
that connection? A. Yes, I have.
Q. Did you ascertain whether the rubber was
free or was pledged? A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you determine in that connection?
A. In my own writing I noted the fact that all
of the inventory was pledged under trust receipts.
Q. That is the whole inventory of merchandise
that Stern had was pledged under trust receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you make any comparison with the
inventory of previous years to see whether there
was any discrepancy? A. I did. I compared it
with the previous year's inventory to see whether
it seemed a reasonable amount for an inventory,
and speaking from memory, I think I found that
there was a reduction of about $430,000 in the
inventory.
Q. So that there was a considerably smaller inventory in 1923 as against 1922? A. Yes.
Q. Now, was there anything else that you did
with respect to inventory? A. Yes. I obtained
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market quotations as at December 31, 1923, from
newspapers, and I priced out the whole of the
inventory to see how it checked up with the market
prices at the date of our balance sheet, and I found
that where I had a total inventory of $131,423.81,
the market value was $130,233, and I concluded
that the inventory had therefore been reasonably
priced.
Q. What else did you do with respect to the
inventory, if anything? A. Nothing recurs to me
at the moment, except that the inventory was kept
in mind when going through the commitment record
to see that commitments of December 31st were
not outstanding.
Q. You mean, to find out whether there were any
unclosed contracts? A. Yes.
Q:. Of Stem outstanding? A. Yes.
Q. And you had that in mind also when you
went through the inventory? A. I had the inventory in mind when I went through the commitment
record.
Q. When you searched the commitment record?
A. Yes.
By Mr. Marshall.

1890

Q. Mr. Towell, will you now tell us just as briefly
as you can what you did under the investment item?
A. I obtained a list of the investments and a description of their nature, and those that were held
in the office of Fred Stern were examined by me
and those that were pledged as collateral were confirmed by correspondence.
Q. Is that all that you did under that? A. I
secured, in so far as was possible, quotations on—
or I attempted to secure—quotations on two of the
investments, but could obtain none. In one case I
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valued the security at the price at which the bank
holding it valued it for its purposes.
Q. You finally fixed a value at which to carry
all of these? A. Yes. On the investments comprising participation in syndicates, I took them up
with Mr. Stern and made from what he thought
and that seemed to me reasonable reserves against
it.
Q. Now, will you come to the item of furniture
and fixtures? That item apparently you depreciated for the full book value, or had Stern done
that? A. Yes.
Q. And prepaid credit insurance was the only
prepayment insurance that you found? A. Yes,
that was all.
Q. That item is noted in your balance sheet?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you turn to liabilities? What
classes of liabilities did you find on the books? A.
Acceptances, trade accounts payable, and other
accounts, accounts payable.
Q. And what did you do with respect to those
items? A. The acceptances were confirmed by correspondence and reconciliations made with statements received.
Q. Did you make a list of the liabilities? A.
I did.
Q. And did you include in that list every liability that you found an entry of? A. I did.
Q. Is that the— A. These are all of the acceptances on the letters of credit.
Q. Now, what other liabilities were there? A.
Trade accounts payable——
Q. And how much did they amount to? A. And
they amounted to $67,244.
Q. What other items of accounts payable were
there, or liabilities? A. There was a liability to
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Fred Stern, the president of the company, and to
another employee.
Q. Now, were there any other liabilities? A. No.
Q. Did you make inquiry as to the nature of the
liabilities that were recorded? A. I did.
Q. And what
Mr. Podell:

1895

1896

Make inquiries of whom?

Q. Well, of whom, and how? What inquiries did
you make? A. On my own account through the records that were available through Mr. Romberg.
Q. Yes. A. Through Mr. Stern.
Q. Did you make any attempt to see whether a
liability had been set up for all the goods that had
been purchased? A. I did.
Q. What did you do in that connection? A. I
examined their lot record showing the merchandise
that had been received by them. I examined
Q. And did you make tests against that? A. I
had made tests against that.
Q. And did you make tests or compare that at
all with the ledger showing the accounts payable?
A. Yes.
Q. What else did you do to test these accounts
payable? A. I examined their invoice files, their
invoice register and their invoice files—that is, invoices coming from outsiders, charging them with
rubber purchases—to see that none of them should
have been set up by the end of December, 1923.
Q. Did you inquire whether there were any acceptances or any accounts not entered in the record,
or any unentered invoices? A. I did.
Q. And in that connection did you get these letters, or one of these letters, that is in evidence—
have you got it there? A. Yes, I did (handing to
counsel).
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1897

Q. I refer to Exhibit 27. A. Yes, I secured that
letter.
Mr. Marshall: That letter has been read
to the jury once before, your Honor. It is
the letter which Stern and Romberg signed,
stating that there were no liabilities or contingent liabilities unentered on the books.
The Court: Yes. You recall that letter,
gentlemen.
(Letter handed to jury.)
Q. Now, do you remember how that letter was
obtained or when? A. I have no distinct recollection about it. There was nothing to remember
about it. I wanted the letter. I asked for the
letter. I believe I indicated what I wanted. I
wanted them to give me a letter stating that to
their knowledge, their present knowledge, not a
letter signed by the corporation—I remember I
asked them not to sign it by the corporation, but
to give me their personal assurances that there
were no undisclosed liabilities. There was no particular significance to it at the time. There was
nothing to remember.
Q. That was the usual thing in an office routine,
in the routine of auditing at that time, was it? A.
Yes.
Q. There was some testimony by Mr. Romberg
that Mr. Rea asked him for these letters? A. That
is not true.
Q. Do you happen to know whether Mr. Rea was
there at that time? A. Mr. Rea could never have
seen those letters until I showed them to him at
the office of Touche, Niven & Co. in 80 Maiden Lane.
Q. Now, did you in connection with liabilities,
and also in connection with inventory, obtain this
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letter at the same time, signed by Romberg and
Stern (handing to witness)? A. I did.
Mr. Marshall: Referring to Exhibit 28.

1901

1902

Q. When these two letters, Exhibits 27 and 28,
were obtained by you, did you believe them to be
true? A. I did.
Q. Did you have any qualms or doubts of any
kind when you obtained these letters from Stern
or Romberg? A. None whatever.
Q. Did you obtain this other letter, Exhibit 28,
because it was part of your routine examination at
that time? A. I did.
Q. Now, is there anything else you did with respect to liabilities? A. Not that I recall now.
Q. Did you examine the letters from the banks
and check all liabilities? A. I did.
Q. Which may have mentioned their accounts
against Stern? A. I did.
Q. Now, what did you do with respect to capital
and surplus ? A. On the preferred stock I examined
the certificate book to see what certificates had been
issued and for how many shares the certificates
were. I examined the common stock certificate
book and went through the same procedure.
Q. Did you determine whether any changes in
capital had been made during the year? A. I am
just refreshing my memory on that point.
Q. By referring to one of your working papers
here? A. By referring to a schedule on preferred
capital stock. I found that during the year 1923
a further 850 shares of preferred stock had been
issued to Fred Stern. I investigated the reason for
that and found that it was an issue of preferred
stock in satisfaction of a contract entered into
when the company of Fred Stern & Company was
formed.
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Q. That was when the partnership was dissolved
and it was turned into a corporation? A. I believe so.
Q. Now, did you do anything else in respect to
the capital and surplus? A. I recorded the amount
of surplus at acquisition of Fred Stern & Company,
noted that the value of the 850 shares of preferred
stock issued to Fred Stern during the year had been
deducted from paid in surplus, or surplus at acquisition, rather. I carried forward the balance of
the surplus from the previous year and added to
it the profits shown by the records for the current
year.
Q. Now, did you take up the question of contingent liabilities—before I come to that, how many
stockholders did Stern & Company have, and will
you state who they were? A. There were four.
Fred Stern holding—do you want the number of
shares ?
Q. Yes. A. Holding fifty-one shares; Eric A.
Pam, holding twelve shares; Lawrence O. Hayward,
twelve shares; Paul Abogen, twenty-five shares;
a total of 100 shares.
Q. The preferred stock was held by whom? A.
All by Fred Stern.
Q. Will you tell me what you did in the item
of contingent liabilities? A. The contingent liabilities consisted of trade acceptances discounted,
commitments for sterling and a contingent liability
in connection with borrowed securities. The trade
acceptances discounted were confirmed by correspondence with the banks that did the discounting,
and proved to be in order. The commitments for
sterling were confirmed by correspondence and adjustments were made for losses sustained by Fred
Stern which had not been taken on to his of De-
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cember 31, 1923. That in cases where he had purchased sterling for December delivery, as I remember it, but had paid to extend the option, payments
were made in January, and my examination disclosed several of them, and we thereupon made an
adjustment as of December 31, 1923.
Q. Now, is that all you did in connection with
the contengent liabilities, as you recall? A. To
ascertain that there was no contingent liability
under commitments, I made a complete analysis
of all of the contracts entered into for the future
purchase or sale of rubber, which contains a great
many sheets; but the final result of it was that,
offsetting purchases against sales for future delivery, Fred Stern proved to have a short position
of about nine tons of rubber, which is practically
of no consequence. It was also determined in that
examination that, upon scrutiny of the prices at
which these contracts were entered into, there were
a great many of them, the average profit would be
between one-half and one cent per pound on all of
the rubber purchased—to be purchased.
Q. But actually not carried as an asset? A. That
was not shown by our balance sheet in any way
at all.
Q. Because it was still an open contract? A.
Yes.
Q. Is that all you have got to say on the question of contingent liabilities? A. On the matter
of borrowed securities, we substantially verified the
values at which the people holding the borrowed
securities as collateral were carrying them, and we
stated on our balance sheets the amount of those
borrowed securities.
Q. Now, as a result of your audit, did you prepare this balance sheet, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1?
A. I did.
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Q. And did you then discuss it with anybody?
A. I did.
Q. With whom? A. I discussed it with Mr. Rea.
Q. The staff manager of Touche, Niven & Co.?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you explain to him how you made out
the various items? A. Where necessary.
Q. And did you throughout this investigation
and preparation of this balance sheet in every instance use the best judgment that you had? A. I
did.
Q. Did you at any time distrust the honesty of
Mr. Stern? A. No.
Q. Or Mr. Romberg? A. No.
Q. Or Mr. Pam, the credit man? A. No.
Q. Or of the sales manager? A. No.
Q. Now, did you make in connection with your
audit, or cause to be made, all the adjustments in
the books of Stern which you believed to be necessary? A. I did.
Q. And did the making of those adjustments
make you suspect the honesty of Stern, or his concern, in any respect? A. No.
Q. Did you believe that after the adjustments
were made your balance sheet showed the true position of Stern? A. I did.
Q. And that it properly reflected the books of
Stern? A. Yes.
Q. And did you believe that the balance sheet
was in accordance with the books of Stern for the
year ended December 31, 1923, and with the information and explanations which had been given to
you? A. I did.
Q. And did you believe that, subject to provision
of Federal taxes on income, the statement presented
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a true and correct view of the financial condition
of Fred Stern & Company as at December 31, 1923?
A. Yes.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Have you had occasion since that date to
change
Mr. Marshall: I have forgotten to ask one
question.
By Mr. Marshall.
1913

Q. How many audits have you made since; the
books of how many companies have you been over
since you made this audit? A. They have run into
several hundred. I could not give you any better
estimate than to say more than 250.
Q. And have you any definite recollection of the
books of Stern & Company as they looked at thattime, the entries on them? A. No, I have not.
Q. And your testimony which you have given
to-day is the result of refreshing your recollection
from the work sheets? A. Yes.
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell.

1914

Q. Would it not be a very simple matter to check
back all that mass of figures in all these papers
and books and see whether the books contained
those figures, would it not? A. Not a very simple
matter.
Q. It could be done in this testing method that
you participated on, taking items at random. You
said it was so certain, taking items at random and
seeing whether or not they are still there. Could
it not be done that way? A. No.
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Q. That is not a sure way of doing it? A. Not
under those circumstances.
Q. Under what circumstances? A. The circumstance of my being here and being questioned as
to the accuracy of those figures. I could not now
take a set of books that I do not recognize——
Q. I am not asking you— A. And verify them
by testing them.
Q. You do not recognize those books? A. No, I
do not.
Q. All these books you have looked at, they are
totally strange to you, Mr. Towell? A. Yes, they
are.
Q. Every one of them? A. Yes.
Q. Not even your working sheets help you to
recognize any of those books? A. No.
Q. You did not find the items that you had on
your working sheets contained in any of those
books, did you? A. Yes. I found

1915
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Mr. Marshall: Let him finish his answer.
Mr. Podell: He answered it.
Q. When the lawyers handed those books to you
and asked you to look at their contents and compare
them with your working sheets, did you find that
the items were contained in those books? A. Yes,
I found a number of accounts so far as I went
that had the same name and the same balance.
Q. But the books are totally strange to you now?
A. They are.
Q. Did anyone suggest to you that the matter
of identifying these books was a matter that was
involved in this case? A. Nobody.
Q. Did anybody talk with you about the fact that
the plaintiff here must show that these books were
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in the same condition that they were at the time
that you looked them over? Did anybody talk that
over with you? A. They did not.
Q. But you still maintain that, despite the testimony that you have given here and the check-ups
you have made in the presence of Court and jury,
that these books are totally strange to you? A.
I do.
Q. Tell me, you have been sitting here every day
during this trial, have you not? A. No.
Q. Were there any days when you were not here?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you heard the bulk of the testimony that
has been given? A. I do not know what happened
while I was away.
Q. Did you hear Mr. Levy's testimony? A. Yes.
Q. All of it? A. Part of it.
Q. What part of it did you miss? A. I do not
know. He was on the stand when I came in.
Q. When did you come in? A. I came in at noon;
noon on Thursday or Friday, I do not recall.
Q. Don't you remember that when Mr. Levy took
the witness stand you moved your chair right behind Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: That is not so.
Mr. Podell: I have asked that question.
Mr. Marshall: That is an inaccurate statement.
Q. Do you remember that? A. I do not recall
that, I know I moved up. No, I do not deny anything.
Q. Did not you take the testimony of Mr. Levy
home with you over the week-end? A. No.
Q. Did you look at it at any time? A. Yes.
Q. When? A. I do not recall just the exact time
I looked at it. I looked at it Saturday, I remember.
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Q. When you certified to that balance sheet, you
stated and just testified that you believed it to be
an honest statement of the account? A. Yes.
Q. Has anything happened since then to change
your mind, or are you still of the same belief? A.
Well, I am doubtful, certainly, after all the investigation that is going on now, and knowing, or at
least assuming, that Fred Stern & Company are
bankrupt.
Q. Now you are doubtful? A. I feel quite sure
there must be something wrong somewhere.
Q. You are quite certain? A. Yes.
Q. And the thing that makes you certain is Mr.
Stern's bankruptcy? A. No, no. Everything that
has gone on since then.

1921

1922

Mr. Marshall: I insist the witness has the
right to finish his question.
Mr. Podell: I am entitled to an answer
yes or no.
The Court: Let him finish.
Mr. Podell: My question is, the thing that
made you certain is Mr. Stern's bankruptcy?
And he said no.
The Court: Let him finish his question
and have the answer, and it may be stricken
out.
Q. What else is there? A. Everything that went
on at the hearings before the representative of the
trustee. We all
Q. These hearings were examinations of yourself
and your associates, were they not? A. Yes; but
statements were made there, statements were made
there——
Q. By whom? A. By the representative of the
trustee, in the form of questions to me.
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Q. He just asked you questions? A. Yes.
Q. And you gave your answers? A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything which you told him that
indicated that you knew that these books were dishonest? A. No.
Q. Cannot you point to some specific instances
of dishonesty that you have found out since? A.
No.
Q. You cannot? A. No.
Q. You do not know one? A. No.
Q. And it is not because you are not familiar
with the situation? A. I am not familiar with
the claims that are made. I have not seen the
books since 1924—January of 1924. I have referred
to my working papers only on two or three occasions, and since then
Q. I see. A. And I am
Q, The answer that you have just given—I beg
your pardon—finish.
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, " I t
is not because you are not familiar," a statement, should be answered yes or no, and I
am not to be bound down to allow this witness, every time I ask him a question, to go
off and make a speech. That destroys every
purpose of cross-examination.
The Court: No, he is not bound to do that.
He is bound to be given a reasonable opportunity to give an answer.
Mr. Podell: Does your Honor consider—
The Court: I do, sir.
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except to your
Honor's direction to this witness to volunteer
all sorts of information in justification of
himself when it is not called for.
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1927

The Court: Now, the question, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: I suppose he has not finished
his answer, and I have got to stand by and
wait until he finishes. Will you read me the
last answer, please?
(Record repeated as recorded.)
Q. Go ahead and finish. A. What I know of
Stern & Company since January of 1924 has been
hearsay from a number of individuals, and what
I have heard in this court room.
Q. Were you here yesterday all day? A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear me read the deposition of the
1928
Ford Motor Company, that they had never bought
merchandise from Stern? A. Yes.
Q. Did you hear me offer
Mr. Marshall: I think that is an incorrect statement, Mr. Podell. It was not that
he never had, but that he had not bought
certain merchandise.
Mr. Podell: That a certain account was
fictitious.
Q. Did you hear that read? A. I heard you read
the deposition, yes.
Q. Did you hear me refer to other depositions?
A. Yes, I heard you.
Q. From people who claimed that they had never
bought merchandise that was listed as having been
sold to them? A. I do not know from whom they
were.
Q. How? A. I do not know from whom they
were.
Q. Did not you hear me read their names into this
record? A. Yes.
Q. Did you know that Stern is bankrupt, or was
bankrupt in 1925? A. I assumed that he is.
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Q. And from all that you have heard and all that
you know, you do not know yet that these books
were dishonest? A. No, I do not know of my own
knowledge.

1931

1932

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
think this has been pursued far enough, this
line. The question at issue is not what be
believes the books are now, but what he believed them to be at that time.
Mr. Podell: The question has been answered. There is nothing pending before
your Honor to make a speech about.
The Court: Nothing that I know of.
Mr. Marshall: Do not lose your temper,
David.
Mr. Podell: Please address the Court and
we will get along better. I have not lost my
temper at all.
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, did you examine these
sheets or statements prepared by Mr. Levy and
offered in evidence here, those typewritten schedules? A. I saw some in the hands of counsel. I
did not examine them.
Q. Just to hold them, and you observed them;
you did not look at them. Did you examine them?
A. I looked at one or two of them, but not very
carefully.
Q. Not very carefully? A. No.
Q. You did not know their contents? A. No. I
could not say that I do.
Q. Let me have them—the ones that went in
evidence.
Mr. Marshall:

What exhibit number?
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Q. Of course, you had, Mr. Towell, implicit faith
in the honesty of Stern & Company right from the
start and throughout? A. Yes.
Q. You did not suspect that they were going to
manipulate anything? A. No, I did not.
Q. Either at the beginning of the year, the middle
of the year, or at the end of the year? A. At no
time.
Q. At no time? A. No.
Q. Of course, if there were to be any manipulations of any kind, they would mostly center around
the end of the year? That has been your experience, has it not? A. I would not say that.
Q. Well, you had no suspicions about manipulations at the end of the year? A. No.
Q. Of either merchandise or cash or anything
else? A. Not of anything.
Q. I am going to read you something, and I want
you to tell the jury whether you recall who testified
to it, Mr. Towell.

1933

1934

Mr. Marshall: What page?
Q. Page 922 (reading) : "In order to establish
the regularity of their manner of keeping track of
their bank accounts and their cash transactions, it
is necessary and it is usually done, and I did it in
this case—examine a number of recent deposits,
particularly at the close of the year, to see that
their money at the end of the year had not been
in any way manipulated." Who testified to that?
A. I did. I did.
Q. Were you looking for any manipulations
there? A. No.
Q. Did not you say that you were examining to
see that it had not been manipulated? A. I was
not looking for that. I was carrying out the usual
duties of the auditor.
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Q. Did not you testify, if I remember right, that
you were examining to see whether there had been
manipulations?
Mr. Marshall: I appeal to your Honor
and Mr. Podell. There is no necessity for
him to roar. There are none of us deaf. He
can do it in a quiet manner.
The Court: He can emphasize it if he
likes.

1937

1938

A. I testified as you have read.
Q. And you were not looking for any manipulations? A. No, not particularly. That is the
language that I would use.
Q. Were you looking for them generally, not
particularly? Were you looking for them generally? A. I always have that in mind.
Q, Looking for manipulations? A. Always.
Q. Manipulations of cash? A. Anything; everything.
Q. In this instance you were talking about
manipulations of cash particularly at the close of
the year? A. Yes,
Q. Why particularly at the close of the year?
A. Because the cash manipulations during the year
would not interest me when I was preparing that
balance sheet at the end of the year.
Q. Do you mean that if anybody had purloined
and manipulated all sorts of cash transactions in
the middle of the year you would not be interested
in that? A. I was not making a detailed audit. I
was preparing a balance sheet of December 31 and
determining the cash on hand.
Q. Were you examining the books for the year
1923? A. We describe it as such.
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Q. Not what you describe. I asked you whether
you were examining the books for the year 1923.
A. Yes.
Q, Would not that involve any cash manipulations in the middle of the year? A. If it affected
the balance sheet,
Q. Would not an examination of the books for
the year 1923 involve cash manipulations in the
middle of the year 1923? A. If there were cash
manipulations, yes.
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, were you examining
the books for the year 1923? A. Yes.
Q. Did you examine the books for the year 1923?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you were not merely concerned with the
condition as at the end of the year, were you? A.
Absolutely, I was.
Q. Not alone that, were you? A. Not alone, but
for the final point alone

1939

1940

Mr. Marshall: Let him finish, please, Mr.
Podell.
Q. Not alone the condition at the end of the year,
but what else? A. In order to determine the position at the end of the year, I used some or all of
the period during the year. No result follows from
the use of the records during the year. The only
use is of the point of time, the end of the year,
December 31.
Mr. Podell: I move to strike that answer
out as not responsive, as purely gratuitious,
and not called for by my question.
The Court: I allow it.
Mr. Podell: And I except. Will you be
good enough to repeat my question? I in-
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sist, your Honor, upon an answer to my
question.
(Record repeated as recorded.)
Q. Were you interested only in the condition at
the end of the year? A. No.
Q. What else were you interested in? A. I was
interested in anything that would give me a better
picture of that position at the end of the year.
Q. Did you make an examination of the books
and records for the entire year 1923?
1943

Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
improper and misleading. This certificate
does not show that we did it for the entire
year. The word "entire" is not used.
The Court: I allow it.
A. No.
Q. Did you state in your certificate that you had
examined the books for the year 1923? A. I could
not answer that yes or no without qualification.
Q. You cannot answer that yes or no. Did you
state in your certificate—I read from the beginning: "We have examined the accounts of Fred
Stern & Company, Inc., for the year ended December 31, 1923."

1914

Mr. Marshall: The word "entire" is not
in there, is it?
Mr. Podell: May I put my question, your
Honor, without interruption from counsel?
The Court: Yes, you may.
Q. What is your answer? A. That is in the certificate.
Q. Now, when you made that statement did you
mean that some of the books for that or some parts
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of the year had not been examined by you? A. That
is generally understood.
Q. That is generally understood? A. Yes.
Q. That when you say that you have examined
the books for the year 1923, for the year ended 1923,
that in truth you have not examined all the books
for that year. Is that what you want this jury
to understand? A. Substantially so.
Q. Substantially what I say. You want the jury
to understand that? A. Yes.
Q. Did you make any qualifications of that character in this statement? A. That is understood.
Q. Without any qualifications? A. I think so.
Q. Then when you have examined them for the
year 1923, you have not really examined them all
for the year 1923? A. Not at all, not at all.
Mr. Podell:
the present.

1945

1946

We will let that stand for

Q. Now, then, we were interested in your searching for manipulations. How could cash be manipulated, particularly at the close of the year? A. They
could have received cash in the month of January
and recorded it as being on hand at the end of
December.
Q. That would have been deliberately dishonest,
would it not? A. It would be a deliberate manipulation.
Q. Would it have been deliberately dishonest?
A. I cannot say.
Q. You do not consider it dishonest when a person receives cash in January and records it as having been received in December preceding—you do
not consider that a dishonest act? A. I have seen
it done by the best companies.
Q. What? A. I have seen it done by the best
companies, when I did not consider it dishonest.
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Q. You overlooked that sort of thing. You did
not regard it as an indication of dishonesty when
that happens? A. I do not overlook anything. If
it came to my attention, I would decide for myself
whether there was dishonesty or whether there was
not.
Q. But, on the pure facts, where a man deliberately manipulates—you said it was deliberate
manipulation—deliberately manipulates, when he
receives cash which he received in January but
claims to have received it in December in making
up his final statement. Now, knowing all those
facts, would you consider that that is a dishonest
act? A. If he had no reason at all other than the
manipulation, I would say it is dishonest.
Q. It is dishonest? A. Yes.
Q. Now, of course, whether he receives it in cash
or whether he receives it in merchandise would not
make much difference; it would be just as dishonest,
would it not? A. It is about the same thing.
Q. Now, of course, a thing like that might well
happen by mistake, might it not? A. It could happen by mistake.
Q. And if it happens once or twice you might
consider that a mistake, an error? A. Not from
that point of view alone. If it merely happened
once or twice, that would have nothing to do with
it. If it happened once, it might still not be an
error, but a deliberate misstatement.
Q. I see. Supposing you saw that very thing
happening, not once, but ten times in ten separate
instances, would not that be pretty conclusive evidence to you that the man was manipulating deliberately? A. It all depends who is doing the
work.
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1951

Mr. Marshall: I cannot hear that.
The Witness: It all depends who is doing
the work.
Q. And what is your answer to my question, that
you would not or that you would consider it deliberate manipulation? A. I cannot answer yes or
no to it.
Q. Do you know what I am driving at, Mr.
Towell? A. I do. I know your question, that is.
Q. And you do not know what reference my question has to this case?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
immaterial.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Now, assuming that they received cash in
January and show it on hand as having been on
hand in December, but show absolutely no credit
in December to the person from whom that cash
was received, and show it not once, but several
times, would you infer that that is a dishonest
manipulation? A. It would sound so to me from
your description.
Q. Now, you were given a certain inventory sheet,
were you not, when you came to make your audit
of the books of Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes.
Q. Will you turn to that, please? What was the
amount of the inventory that was told to you by
that sheet that was given to you? A. There are
two sheets. The total amount of the two sheets
as it was handed to me by Fred Stern & Company
was $347,219.08,
Q. Now, then, you made a pretty close examination of that, didn't you? A. Yes.
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Q. Now, what did you find with regard to an
item No. 5 on your work sheet, aggregating the
sum of $8,426.30?
Mr. Marshall: I think you are referring
to a different sheet, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: He knows what I am referring to.

1955

1956

A. I see no such item here.
Q. Look at your journal sheets, your work sheets;
look at page 161, where the items relating to your
inventory are very carefully detailed by yourself.
First you included that item as part of the inventory? A. Did you refer to the figure of $8,426.30?
Q. Yes. A. Or $8,513.75?
Q. No, $8,426.30—both items. They are both in
the same? A. You asked me if they were in the
inventory?
Q. What was it that was in the inventory, Mr.
Towell? A. Part of the figure of $8,513.75 is in
the inventory.
Q. How much? A. $87.45.
Q. What about the balance? A. That is not in
the inventory.
Q. Well, now, will you explain what happened
there to that item? What did you do? What did
you find concerning $8,513.75? A. On a letter
received from J. B. Moores & Company, they
showed that as of December 31, 1923, there was an
acceptance due to them, or acceptances due to them.
I do not know which that is, one or the other, of
$8,513.75. I traced the rubber that was received
for that acceptance into the lot record, and I traced
the sale of that same rubber into the accounts
receivable.
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Q. What did you find, in plain English, had been
done with respect to this item on the records of
Fred Stern & Company? You can explain it to us.
A. It had not been entered.
Q. Had not what? A. It had not been entered.
Q. What does that mean? A. It meant that I
had to correct it.
Q. Well, was it that it had not been entered, or
that it had been omitted from the statement of
accounts and inventory furnished to you? A. It
had been omitted on all sides.
Q. And what happened in connection with it?
A. I do not recall whether anything happened.
Q. Did you take it off—now, we will just let
that item rest for a moment, Mr. Towell, and see
if we cannot refresh your recollection. What is
your explanation of that? A. My reference in the
journal entry shows me that the rubber concerned
with this $8,513.75 was recorded on Fred Stern's
books in the lot record, because I have a folio of
the lot record here and the number of the lot. I
have no explanation to-day as to why it was that
it had not been entered or not been recorded as
a liability as of December 31, 1923. Evidently it
had been entered on the books in some way, but
I cannot recall now what it was and what the full
explanation under it was.
Q. It should have been entered as a liability to
show a correct statement, but somehow or other,
without inability on your part to explain it, it had
been omitted? A. Not without any inability on my
part to explain it. I did have an explanation.
Q. How? A. In January and February of 1924.
Q. Now, at this moment, did not you say just a
moment ago that you did not know why it had
been entered into some lot record? A. I say I do
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not recall now why it was that it was in the lot
record and that I had to make an adjustment.
Those journal entries show that I made the adjustment.
Q. Now, we will let that rest for a moment, if
you will just keep it in mind.
Mr. Marshall: I think he ought to go
right through and finish it now.

1961

1962

Q. I will ask you to look at the item journal
entry No. 6, with regard to nineteen "thousand dollars odd, and tell us what you found about that with
relation to your inventory, and if you found any
manipulation, tell us what was the manipulation.
A. That $19,000 that you refer to was entered in
the inventory twice. It is a clerk's error, a clerk
of minor importance in Fred Stern's office, whose
work should have been checked.
Q. An error in favor of whom? A. It was not
in favor of anybody. It did not go that far.
Q. Whom did it favor? A. It did not favor anybody.
Q. Prior to your auditing it and adjusting it,
whom did it favor? Did it boost the inventory by
$19,000? A. Oh, yes.
Q. No doubt about that in your mind? A. No
doubt about it at all.
Q. Was it one item, or in twice? A. Four items
were put in the rubber afloat sheet and also put
in the rubber on hand, at different prices.
Q. Now, give us those four items. A. What detail
do you want?
Q. Just what those respective four items were.
A. The four shipments, comprising 133 cases—66
cases, 125 cases, and 50 cases, of rubber—the total
value of which in sterling was £4,381-7-9.
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Q. Tell me, Mr. Towell, in this matter of inventory, when had all those four shipments been
received? A. I could not tell you from my papers.
Q. Did you find that in the books of account
those items had been entered twice? A. I assume
that I did, because I made an adjustment.
Q. I did not ask you anything about any adjustment. I asked you simply whether you found that
those items in the books had been entered twice.
A. I assume that I did.
Q. You assume that you did? A. Yes.
Q. Now, then, take your item of No. 8— fourteen thousand eight hundred odd. What can you
tell us happened in that connection with relation
to your inventory? Also tell us whether there was
any sign, to your mind, of any manipulation, and
what it was. A. That was the lot that I discovered
had been sold to the Boston Woven Hose & Rubber
Company in December, 1923, but a clerk in Stern's
office had recorded it as being on hand and in the
inventory. I took it out.
Q. In other words, when it had been sold it had
been set up as an account receivable, had it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And when they made up their inventory they
had included it as merchandise in their possession?
A. Yes.
Q. Of course, you took it for granted that it was
purely a mistake? A. I did not take anything for
granted.
Q. You did not take anything for granted? A.
No.
Q. Did you consider at all whether that had been
done by way of deliberate manipulation to boost the
inventory? A. Yes.
Q. You did consider that? A. Yes.
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Q. The effect of it would have been, if you had
not taken that item out, that it would have boosted
that inventory by $14,000, would it not? A. Yes.
Q. Now will you be good enough to turn to the
item No. 9, for $18,728, and tell us what did you
find about that in Stern's statement of inventory?
A. That is made up of several items. In sterling
I found that £96-10-0 worth of rubber had been
sold in December and recorded as part of this
inventory.
Q. Recorded in two ways, as accounts receivable
and also as merchandise in hand. You found that
to be the fact, didn't you? A. Yes.
Q. How many items are there comprised in this
$18,728? A. Three.
Q. Was the manipulation the same in each instance? A. There was no manipulation.
Q. Was the condition the same in each instance?
A. No.
Q. Did not you have it noted that as to the three
instances, they presented instances where merchandise had been practically twice included, in that it
was included as an account receivable, and secondly, as merchandise on hand; didn't you find
that? A. I found that in one place.
Q. Was not your note with regard to that "to
eliminate the following lots from inventory, same
having been sold in December, 1923"? Is not that
your own note? A. That is part of my note.
Q. Have you got something else there? A. I
have not something else here, but it was always
here.
Q. Tell us about the second and third item contained in that $18,000.
Mr. Marshall: Let him read the whole
thing as long as counsel has asked him about
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it. I think we are entitled to have the whole
thing.
Mr. Podell: If Mr. Marshall will write
out the questions I should ask, I will follow
that faithfully. That is what I am here for—
just to ask questions that Mr. Marshall
wants and none others.
Mr. Marshall: I am very sorry, I have a
right to object.
Mr. Podell: I put my question.
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to ask that
we get the full statement, and Mr. Podell
was trying to keep him off from giving the
full statement.
The Court: You may make a memorandum accordingly, Mr. Marshall, and have
the question.
Mr. Marshall: I except.
Mr. Podell: I will reframe that.
Q. Did you want to answer the last question?
A. Yes, I will answer it. The second and third
items in that entry are adjustments to reduce the
value at which rubber was stated in the inventory.
It was not rubber that had been sold. It was rubber that had not been set down at the correct value.
Why that was, I do not know.
Q. You mean that they had under-estimated the
value? A. Over-estimated it; overstated the value
of the rubber.
Q. Now, just let us see, and follow these items.
Lot No. 7,519— A. Yes.
Q. They had sold? A. Yes.
Q. And they included it both as account receivable and as merchandise on hand? A. Yes.
Q. That amounted to how much? A. £96-10.
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Q, That is about $500 in round figures? A. Yes.
Q. And the other small item is $25 item of overstatement of valuation? A. Right.
Q. Then the next lot they overstated how much?
A. £4209-8-0.
Q. Is that pounds or dollars? A. That is pounds.
Q. £4,290 would make about $20,000, would it
not? A. Approximately, sterling.
Q. Didn't it strike you as being rather a sizable
over-statement? A. Yes, it did.
Q. It did not arouse your suspicion that such an
over-statement might have been made deliberately?
A. No.
Q. You had no suspicions about any of these
items that we have just been talking about? A.
No.
Q. None of them aroused your suspicion that
they were all in favor of Stern? A. No.
Q. And boosting his inventory, is that right? A.
Yes, they did.
Q. Do you happen to know how much of the
purchase that was upon which there was an overstatement of $20,000 of valuation? A. There were
18,533 pounds of rubber, so far as my record shows.
Q. Do you happen to know the purchase price?
A. No. I know the total. The total price should
be £1139.
Q. Now, then, these items $19,000 and $14,000
and $18,000 which you found they had increased
their inventory and you had to reduce them in the
way that you have indicated, those are the smaller
items, are they not, in which they did that? A.
They are not small in individual amount. They
are not the greater part of the adjustments taken
together, though.
Q. Was there $178,000 worth in addition to those
that I have spoken of? A. Yes.
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Q. Which boosted the inventory? A. $178,000
would reduce the inventory, according to my
papers.
Q. No. What I am talking about is that inventory that they gave you in addition to those that
they have mentioned they had increased. A. They
did not increase it. They gave it to me. They gave
me the inventory.
Q. Yes. Don't you consider when a man enters
an item of $10,000 both as an account receivable
and considers that the very same merchandise is on
his hands in inventory for that amount, that he is
increasing his inventory by $10,000? Don't you
consider that? A. Yes, as a general proposition.
Q. Well, as a specific proposition. Now, the
proposition to guide— A. Not in this case.
Q. Because you reduced it? A. Because I know
the circumstances under which these original sheets
were made up.
Q. I see. We will come to those circumstances
in a minute, Mr. Towell. First let us get clear
about this $178,000. Tell the jury what happened
in that connection and how many items were there?
A. I have already described, I believe, three or four
journal entries at adjustments of the inventory. In
1924, when I made the examination, I decided at
that time to check every item in the inventory, and
therefore, in the next
Q. Will you answer my question?
Mr. Marshall: I think he has.
The Court: That is going beyond the
limits of counsel's questions. Let us get an
answer right directly to that question.
Q. What did you find with regard to those items
aggregating $178,000 that you have been talking
of?
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Mr. Marshall: Now he is trying to tell
your Honor I insist that he has to have some
leeway in describing them.
The Court: No, describe them.
Mr. Podell: I reframe it and will make
my question a little more specific.
Q. Have you a memorandum which you made
on your own working sheets at that time with that
figure No. 10 to eliminate

1979

1980

Mr. Marshall: I object to his reading what
that memorandum is. He should either ask
him what memorandum he made, or the
memorandum is in evidence.
Mr. Podell: This is cross-examination.
The Court: Unless you read it in full.
Mr. Podell: Certainly. Why should your
Honor assume I would not?
Mr. Marshall: No. 9, you did not read
before.
The Court: There might be some particular part which would require the whole
thing to be re-read.
Mr. Podell: I will read the whole, your
Honor.
The Court: That is what I mean, and not
part.
Mr. Podell: I do not know why counsel
is interrupting in the middle of a question.
Mr. Marshall: I guess I learned the bad
habit from you.
Mr. Podell: Try and learn good habits
and don't take up the bad ones I have.
Q. No. 10 "to eliminate items taken into inventory which were not received till January and
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drafts of which are not reported by banks as having been accepted in December, 1923, and to set
up as liability, other items in the inventory which
were not put through books until January, the
drafts for which were accepted by Huth & Company
in December." And then you have a lot of figures
after that, have you not? A. Yes.
Q. That is in your own handwriting, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that first part mean—"to eliminate items taken into inventory which were not
received until January"? A. It means that they
were in the inventory sheets that I had received
and they should not have been.
Q. And they should not have been because your
inventory they knew perfectly well was to be of
December 31, 1923, was it not? A. Yes.
Q. And that they had no right to include merchandise that was not received until January? A.
That is right.
Q. Had that merchandise been entered up as
an account payable to anybody? A. I think not,
Q. Did not that convince you that it was a deliberate manipulation? A. No.
Q. Are you convinced now at this moment that
it was a deliberate manipulation? A. I am not.
Mr. Marshall: I object. That is an impression; what his personal conviction may
be is immaterial.
The Court: I will let the answer stand,
Mr. Marshall.
Q. Neither that item nor all of those other items
that we have been talking about even as much as
aroused suspicion in your mind? A. No.
Q. Let us see. We will go on with the rest of
your note, "Drafts for which are not reported by
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banks as having been accepted in December, 1923."
That meant that they had set up no liability or
there had been created no liability for that merchandise prior to the date of your inventory? A.
Yes.
Q, That is what it meant? A. Yes.
Q. Now, all that I have read relates to the $178,000 that I have spoken about. The rest of your
memorandum that I have read relates to other
items, does it not? A. Yes,
Q. How many items were in that $178,000, I
want you to tell the jury whether it was just one
item or many items in which that identical thing
was done—embraced in that $178,000? A. There
were fifteen items.
Q. Now, just what were those fifteen items? Did
it give the names of fifteen different people from
whom that merchandise had been received? A. I
cannot tell that from this entry. I may be able
to find it in the papers.
Q. The only question in your mind with regard
to that would be possibly two or three shipments
came from the same source, possibly one of those
shipments came from the same source; otherwise
you would say that they were separate transactions? A. Oh, yes.
Q. These fifteen items that you speak of were
fifteen separate transactions? A. Yes.
Q. It was you that grouped them into one and
totalled them to be $178,000? A. Yes, I did the
grouping.
Q. But so far as the books and the business transactions of Stern & Company, Stern did just that
thing in the course of each of fifteen separate instances, didn't he? A. Yes.
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Q. And each of those fifteen instances had the
effect of increasing his inventory by just that
amount? A. Yes.
Q. It was not one mistake, if it was a mistake at
all, now, was it? A. Yes, it was.
Q. Just one mistake? A. Yes.
Q. For all of those fifteen items? A. Yes.
Q. And even though it involved fifteen separate
transactions? A. Yes, it was one grand mistake.
Q. When you say it was one mistake, do you
mean that it was a mistake that was made under
exactly the same way in all instances? A. Yes.
Q. Nothing there that I have spoken of aroused
your suspicion of any possible manipulation or
wrongdoing? A. Nothing that you have spoken of.
Q. Nothing at all. And that nothing you have
spoken to me so far about these items totalled,
aroused your suspicion as to the honesty of these
people? A. No. The things that I knew of allayed
any suspicion.
The Court :
adjournment.

1987

1988

We will take five minutes'

(After a short recess.)
Q. Now, that was not the only way that the inventory was increased by them, was it?
Mr. Marshall:

What?

Q. The method that you have described with
regard to this $178,000 item? A. (No reply.)
Q. Now, let us take the rest of journal entry No.
10. You have written "to set up as liability other
items in the inventory which were not put through
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books until January, but drafts for which were
accepted by Huth & Company in December"? A.
Yes.
Q. That related to something other than the
1178,000? A. Yes.
Q. How much did that aggregate? A. It aggregated $47,361.94.
Q. How many items? A. Five items, part of
the fifteen already mentioned.
Q. And as to those five items, what did you find
had been done? A. I found that the drafts which
had been accepted by Huth & Company were not
recorded in the books in December, but in January.
Q. Did you not gather from that that there was
a manipulation both ways, that is to say, that goods
which had been received in January had been substantially entered as having been received in December, and liabilities that were due in December
had been entered as due in January? A. No, that is
not so.
Q. Well, state it in your own way. A. The liabilities were not due in December. They should
have been recorded in December. They were due
at some subsequent time.
Q. Those which should have been recorded in
December were recorded in January? A. Yes. And
as to whether the rubber represented in those liabilities was received in December, I cannot say.
It may have been afloat.
Q. It should have been recorded in December?
A. Yes, it should have been recorded in December.
Q. It should have been recorded rather in January—was recorded as an asset in December? A.
No. The draft was recorded in January and should
have been recorded in December.
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1993

Q. You are talking now about the draft which
is a liability? A. Yes.
Q. What I am talking about now is this: That
they increased this inventory by adding to assets—
Mr. Marshall: That is not a question.
That is a statement,
Mr. Podell: This is my question:
Q. Did they increase their inventory by adding
to the assets and by reducing their liabilities? A.
No, that is not so.
Q. Now, let us see if it is not so. You will admit
that the $178,000 added to the assets—were they
not? A. Yes,
Q. Made their assets look bigger than they really
were? A. Yes.
Q. And will you admit the $74,000 reduced their
liabilities? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the fact that in both directions the effect of what they did was to increase their inventory, to increase their assets, that did not arouse
any suspicion in your mind, either? A. No.
Q. Tell me what about the item of $6,439.64 that
you had made a note of, item No. 11—no, I beg
your pardon—item No. 29. Have you a note to this
effect under the head of
Mr. Marshall: I submit the witness
should be given a chance to answer the question that is standing.
Mr. Podell: I am continuing my question.
Mr. Marshall: Then, I ask that the question be withdrawn.
Mr. Podell: No. It is part of the question I have already put,
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Q. Purchase inventory #18,006—what is that
number? A. I think it is invoice.
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, now. Your
Honor sees, the question is now in an all
mixed-up state. I think he ought to state
his question anew and withdraw the previous question.
The Court: I think it is clear enough.
Mr. Marshall: I would like to hear the
whole question read, then, your Honor.

1997

1998

Q. Invoice 18006, sold in December, 1923, purchase not charged to the rubber purchases until
January, payment on proforma invoice of $6300
was charged to accounts receivable until finally received in January, purchase invoice No. 5245, H.
Muchlestein & Co., Inc. Note this was charged to
Mitsui & Company in December in error, transferred to Muchlestein in January. Now, will you
explain that note that you have with regard to that
item, just what its meaning is?
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the
record will show an unanswered question,
and I think we ought to have the question
that was unanswered stricken out.
The Court: Yes, strike out the other question and let us come to this question now,
the explanation of that note. In other words,
there were three or four
Mr. Podell: All right, your Honor, if it
will help to make it clearer, let us do it that
way.
Q. Will you explain the meaning? A. It means
that some rubber that was sold in December, 1923,
had not been charged to purchases until January.

667
Sydney Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

1999

*

Q. Well, of course, if rubber
Mr. Marshall:
finished?

Just a minute.

Has he

Q. All right. Finish your explanation. A. Evidently from the note, the rubber had been paid for
on a proforma invoice in the amount of $6300, and
for some reason the charge of the proforma invoice
went to accounts receivable pending the receipt of
a final invoice, which was received in January,
1924.
Q. Would you tell what that means in popular
language, so that we will all be sure to understand
it? Let me see if I cannot assist you to put it in
plain language. Now, let us see if this is what
happened: Merchandise had been purchased in
December? A. Yes.
Q. That, of course, created a liability to pay for
that merchandise? A. Yes.
Q. But that liability was not entered on their
books in December? A. The payment of the liability was entered.
Q. Wait a moment. Was the liability entered
on the books as of December? A. It evidently was.
Q. It was? A. From this note, it would appear
so.
Q. "Payment on proforma invoice of $6300 was
charged to accounts receivable." Is not that what
your note says? A. Yes. That is payment for the
rubber was entered on their books. They had actually paid for it. They put it in the wrong place.
They charged it to accounts receivable when they
should have charged their rubber purchases.
Q. Well, did the net effect of what they did
increase their assets by $6400? A. Yes.
Q. Now, what did they do to charging to that
accounts receivable; what do you mean by a pro-
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forma invoice? A. As far as my recollection goes,
I think that when they purchased rubber, the
vendor of the rubber, that is the person selling the
rubber, sends them a proforma invoice, which is
an invoice subject to correction as to weights, and
follows it up later with a corrected invoice, giving
the true weights after the rubber has been received
and weighed.
Q. And, of course, they can do that, there is
nothing irregular about waiting for a final invoice? A. No, nothing at all.
Q. Nothing irregular about charging up the entry when the final invoice comes? A. No.
Q. Nothing? A. No.
Q. But is it honest to include it as an asset without entering up the liability? A. It is a mistake
to do so.
Q. It is either a mistake or it is dishonest? A.
One or the other.
Q. One or the other. Did you attach any significance to the fact that it was charged to Mitsui
& Company in December in error, and transferred
to Muchelstein in January? A. No.
Q. That would not tend to cover up the transaction at all, would it? A. I don't think so.
Q. You do not think so? A. No.
Q. Well, now, then, take the item No. 30 for
$14,000. Have you a note with respect to that?
"Purchases accounts receivable to adjust the following accounts for invoices (at cost) paid for in
December and charged to accounts but invoices not
credited to creditors' accounts. All this merchandise was sold in December"; and then a series of
figures? A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell us in your own language what
that meant? A. My understanding of it is that
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Fred Stern & Company had purchased rubber and
paid for it and charged the payments to the accounts of the corporations they had purchased from,
but had not charged the purchases and credited
those accounts. That is, they carried on the books
an account with these individuals when the account
should have been cleared and charged to purchases.
Q. Do you happen to know what really happened
in the United Baltic transaction? A. No.
Q. Have you heard it testified to here in court?
A. I think I heard part of the testimony.
Q. Did you hear it stated yesterday that verification showed that United Baltic was a creditor
of Stern in the sum of three hundred thousand odd
dollars at the time when Stern claimed to be a
creditor of the United Baltic for $113,000? A.
Yes, I think I heard that,
Q. Would you not say that the same manipulation was evidenced by this very transaction? A.
No, I would not.
Q. Was it not a case where a vendor had sent
merchandise, there was money due him, and it was
not entered on the books as due him? A. Would
you repeat that, please?

2005

2006

(Question repeated as recorded.)
Q. Is not that what happened here? A. Not
exactly that.
Q. Did you not say that they had bought merchandise, that the merchandise had been shipped,
that they had received the merchandise, that they
had even sold the merchandise and had created an
account receivable out of the sale? A. Yes.
Q. Is not that right? A. Yes.
Q. And had not entered that they owed for the
merchandise? A. They had paid for it and entered it.
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Q. Well, wherein was there any increase of assets in such a transaction? A. Well, they should
have recorded another entry, transferred that payment to the purchase account, made the payments
and charged them to certain accounts, payments
for the rubber, and in the ordinary course of
events
Q. What accounts did they charge them to? A.
Mitsui & Company and Jaeger & Company and
Desmond & Company.
Q. Of whom had they bought the merchandise?
A. From my journal entry, I understand those three
people, those three firms.
Q. If they bought the merchandise and paid for
it and thereafter sold it and created an account
receivable, there is nothing wrong in that, is there?
A. No.
Q. What is that you found you had to correct
about this item? A. I just described it, that they
paid for it and charged those accounts. That they
should have set up an entry charging their purchases and crediting those accounts; that is, transferring the payment from the account of Mitsui,
Jaeger and Desmond to purchases.
Q. In other words, they claimed they had a credit
to that account ; that is to say they claimed they
had certain moneys due from that account, but
had failed to indicate the moneys that they owed
on that account? A. That is the way it was.
Q. Is not that what you understand to have
happened in the case of the United Baltic account?
A. From the testimony given here, yes.
Q. Well, now, Mr. Towell, you told us that when
they handed you that inventory statement, it
showed an inventory of three hundred and fortyseven odd thousand dollars? A. Yes.
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Q. When you make all these deductions that we
have been talking about, how much does it show
that inventory to be? A. $131,423.81.
Q. That is only a deduction with regard to actual
inventory. As a matter of fact, even that $131,000
is subject to certain deductions that you have indicated to be made in other accounts, is it not? A.
No. I believe the figure of $131,000 quoted you
is a final inventory.
Q. Let us see if we understand each other. What
is the total of all the items where they had received merchandise prior to the 1st of January and
had not entered up liabilities therefor? A. I don't
know that without making a calculation.
Q. Will you look at tabulation No. 2 and see if
that will help you to get the total?
Mr. Marshall:

2011

2012

Exhibit 80?

Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 80 (handing to witness).
Now, you just take down those figures. I will ask
you to— A. Do you want me to check this thing?
Q. You have got all of these items, have you
not? A. I am checking them off now.
Q. See if we cannot get at it in a little quicker
way, Mr. Towell. When you say that you reduced
the inventory down to $131,000, does that include
all of the reductions that you made as a result—
all of the reductions in the assets of the concern
that you made as a result of your adjustments of
the inventory? Just answer that yes or no, if you
understand my question? A. No.
Q. It does not? A. No.
Q. You had to make other reductions in the
assets of the concern in your adjustments of that
inventory? A. I believe so.
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Q. Now, take off $131,000 from $347,000, and
tell us what that figure is? I mean in round numbers. That would be about $215,000 or $216,000?
A. About $216,000.
Q. Now, then, what were the other reductions in
assets of the concern which you had to make in
your adjustment of the original inventory that they
gave you, of $347,000; you increase the accounts
payable by how much? A. I cannot tell that from
my papers.
Q. You gave us four items? A. I don't know
whether they are all the items in these journal
entries, if this is a summary that you handed to
me, this Exhibit 80.
Q. I have asked you about each one of those
items, have I not, and you have testified about
them? A. I didn't check this off.
Q. No. The first item you spoke of was $8,513.
Do you remember my questioning you about that?
A. Yes.
Q. Fifty-four hundred odd dollars was the next
one? A. The next is an item of $19,000.
Q. That goes into the inventory reduction? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. You eliminate that. I am talking now about
your increasing the accounts payable and in that
way further reducing the assets of the concern?
A. Further increasing the liabilities.
Q. And further increasing the liabilities? A.
Yes.
Q. The next item was $5,473, was it not? A.
Yes.
Q. And there is an item of forty-seven thousand
odd dollars? A. Yes.
Q. I am giving round numbers? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the last item under that head of $6200?
A. Yes.
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Q. Now, then, if you add these up, do you not
find as a result of your examination of that inventory, you not only reduce the inventory by about
$215,000, but you add to and increase the accounts
that were payable, that were due to other people,
by about $67,000? A. Not as a result of examination of the inventory only, but in conjunction with
the other examinations of other assets. That is
true.
Q. Well, now, wait a moment, Let us get that
entirely clear. You were given a statement showing an inventory of $347,000? A. Right.
Q. You find in it first that merchandise was
included which should not have been included? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. You find in it, second, that they had merchandise for which they had not made an entry that
they owed money? A. Yes.
Q. Well, now, that did not involve reducing the
inventory, did it? A. No.
Q. Because the merchandise was properly there.
In order to make a proper entry of that, you would
have to increase the accounts payable? A. Right,
Q. Is it not true that you had to in these instances therefore increase the accounts payable by
$67,000? A. Yes, that is true.
Q. Now, then, in addition to that, you found
that they had included accounts receivable, that is,
money due them from other people which they
should not have included? A. Yes.
Q. And that aggregated how much? A. Using
this summary, which I have not checked, $20,465.
Q. Now, will you tell us, please, what those three
totals aggregate in round numbers, the $215,000
that you spoke of, the $67,000, that makes $280,000
approximately, and $20,000? A. About $300,000.
Q. About $300,000? A. Yes.
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Q. And is it not true that you found from your
examination that in connection with the inventory
of $347,000, they had boosted their assets by $300,000? A. It is true that I had to make adjustments
of that amount.
Q. Well, that is not answering my question. My
question is whether you did not find and make a
record that in connection with the inventory that
they gave you of $347,000, they had boosted their
assets, their net worth by $300,000? A. Cannot my
answer stand?
Q. It is not answering my question, Mr. Towell.
You said that you had to make adjustments. Adjustments you sometimes make by adding assets.
In this case, you reduced assets. What I am asking
you is a very simple question: Whether you did
not find in connection with the inventory that they
gave you, where they claimed an inventory of $347,000, that they had boosted the assets, the net worth
of that concern, by $300,000? A. They had made
mistakes to that amount.
Q. Whether you call it a mistake or whether it
was dishonest, had they boosted their assets by
$300,000? A. I don't call it boosting their assets.
Q. Had they increased their assets by $300,000?
A. They had overstated them.
Q. Overstated their assets by $300,000? A. Yes.
Q, And that did not in anywise arouse your suspicion at all? A. No. May I amend that answer
to say that they—the effect was an overstatement
of assets of $300,000. In fact, it was partly an
understatement of liabilities of $67,000. You see,
we have added the three figures together.
Q. I have added the three figures together? A.
Yes.
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Q. And by understating liabilities you know, as
an accountant, that they overstate net assets? A.
Net assets, yes.
Q. If I make that net assets, will you admit that
they had overstated their net assets through the
medium of this inventory by $300,000? A. Not
through the medium of the inventory, either. Relating to the inventory.
Q. In relation to this inventory? A. Yes, relating to the inventory items.
Q. Now, in your examination you made adjustments, the effect of which adjustments was to reduce the net worth, the net assets by $300,000? A.
Yes.
Q. Now, you told us at the beginning of this examination that if a man enters up as cash received
in December when as a matter of fact it was not
received until January, that that would be at least
a strong ground for suspicion that it was manipulation of cash? A. I did not say that.
Q. You did not say that? A. I feel quite sure
that I did not.
Q. Would you regard it as a manipulation of
cash, if he does it, not in one instance, but in
twenty-five instances? A. It would depend on the
circumstances of the whole case.
Q. The circumstances of the whole case? A.
Yes,
Q. What general conclusion would you, as an
experienced accountant—I believe you stated that
you took a prize, did you not, a gold medal prize?
A. They awarded it to me, yes.
Q. You received it? A. Yes, I received it.
Q. So that you do not claim ignorance of these
tilings, do you? A. I do not.
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Q. And from all these documents and papers
and work that you did, you claim that you made a
very thorough examination, do you not? A. I think
I made a sufficient examination.
Q. I mean, you got a mass of figures there, have
you not, that took days and days and days to work
up, did you not? A. It took two weeks, yes.
Q. What would you, as an accountant, say of
any merchant who hands you an inventory that
overstates the assets of that concern by $300,000,
on an inventory of $347,000? A. I would say lie
was very lax in his methods, if I knew nothing
more about him than just the statement that you
make.
Q. That is what you would say, and that is all
that you would say, very lax? A. Yes. If I knew
nothing more about him.
Q. Very lax in his methods? A. Yes, very lax.
Q. In this statement that you furnished to the
creditors and certified to, did you say anything
about his being lax in his methods? A. No.
Q. Well, is this the only instance, the inventory, where you found irregularities, Mr. Towell?
Mr. Marshall: He has not testified he
found irregularities.

2028

Q. Do you not describe these as irregularities,
Mr. Towell? A. I describe them as ordinary errors.
Q. Ordinary errors? A. Yes.
Q. Can you name a single other concern whose
books you have audited where you found errors
aggregating $300,000 in the overstatement of net
worth in the inventory alone?
Mr. Marshall:

I object to that.
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Q. Can you name a single one?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, I think
it is improper.
The Witness: I cannot name it, but I
have——
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I think
it is improper to ask an accountant to
name
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: Does the accountant refuse
to disclose the name?
The Court: No. He wants to disclose it,
but counsel objects to it.
Mr. Podell: On the contrary, he said,
your Honor, he cannot state the name. That
was his answer.
The Court: He said he cannot?
Mr. Podell: He cannot.
The Court: Cannot or will not?
The Witness : Will not.
Mr. Podell: He cannot. What is his answer? Will you read his answer?
The Court: He said he will not. I asked
him what he meant by cannot, whether it
was cannot or will not, and I think he said
will not. Do I understand right, Mr.
Towell?
The Witness: Yes. I mean that I cannot
because I am bound by
Q. Is that what you mean to say now, that you
know the name of someone, but you do not want to
name them? A. Yes.
Q. I see.
Mr. Marshall:

I think, your Honor
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Mr. Podell: Now, may I have his previous
answer read?
(Record repeated.)
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Q. Now, your answer is that you had. Was it
quite a usual occurrence with a concern whose net
worth is about a million dollars, that in an inventory alone it should overstate its assets by onethird of its net worth? A. No, I wouldn't say that
was usual.
Q. At least, that was unusual to you, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with the principle of accounting that where you find unusual circumstances that it is your duty to be exceedingly cautious and make a very close examination? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Tell me, did Mr. Stern ever tell you that he
did not want you to communicate with his debtors
to find out if they owed him? A. No.
Q. Did he ever ask you not to communicate with
them? A. No.
Q. Did you communicate with them? A. No.
Q. In the inventory, the inventory is not the
only item in which you found these errors, as you
call them instead of irregularities?
The Court: Cannot we save time if you
specifically refer to them, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: I am going into a new item,
your Honor, and I thought since we are close
to recess, we might take the adjournment,
unless we can go on for ten or fifteen minutes. It does not make any difference to me
at all. W e are going on another item.
The Court: W e might as well go on.
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Mr. Podell: I understood your Honor's
question and tried to answer it by reframing
the question.
Q. Did you understand my question, sir? A.
Yes.
Q. Where else did you find these errors, if you
please? A. I would have to refresh myself by looking through these corrections I made.
Q. I cannot help you out on that, so we will get
along. You have stated that you first looked at
the general ledger in your audit? A. Yes.
Q. And that you examined all of the accounts
contained in the general ledger? A. Yes.
Q. Any kind of an audit would have required
that, would it not? A. Yes. You would have to
see every account.
Q. May I interrupt here, just divert your mind
a moment, to ask you one more question about inventory. This inventory business that we have been
talking about was all in your knowledge before
that statement was certified? A. Yes.
Q. Now, come on along to this ledger. Did you
look at the rubber sales account? A. I don't recall it.
Q. Did not you just tell us you examined every
account in the general ledger? A. Yes, I saw every
account. I don't recall specifically that I looked
at the rubber sales account.
Q. Did you not just tell us—please answer that
question—that you examined every account in the
general ledger? A. Yes.
Q. Is there any particular reason why you should
want this jury to think that you did not look at
the rubber sales account? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: I do not think he even
made the suggestion, your Honor.
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Q. Can you state, please, whether you did or did
not examine the rubber sales account? A. I did
not make an examination of the sales account. I
saw the account.
Q. You have told this jury that in a number of
instances you went to invoices and examined invoices, did you not? A. Yes, that is true.
Q. That when you examined the accounts payable, you looked at the invoices and checked them?
A. Yes.
Q. And made a detailed examination? A. No.
Q. Of the invoices? A. No.
Q. Is the examination of invoices in the ordinary
course of an examination, or is that a detailed examination? A. It comes in the ordinary course of
examination, but it is not a detailed examination.
Q. In the ordinary course of your examination
of the rubber sales account, did you look at the
invoices? A. I don't recall any particular detailed
examination on the rubber sales account.
Q. Did I ask you anything about a detailed examination? Did you not just tell this jury that
looking at invoices was not a detailed examination, but that it was an ordinary examination? Did
you not just say that? A. Yes.
Q. Now, I ask you whether—without any detailed examination in the ordinary examination of
that rubber sales account, did you look at invoices?
A. No, I think not.
Q. Did you examine the account as it appears
in the ledger?
Mr. Marshall: That is a double question,
your Honor, as it appears in the ledger.
Mr. Podell : In the general ledger.
The Court: In the general ledger. He
specifies it.
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Q. I don't recall it.
Mr. Marshall: As it appeared. I am objecting to the word "appears," as it appears.
The Court: Yes, did you examine the
account as it appears in the ledger?
Mr. Podell: That is my question, in the
general ledger.
Mr. Marshall: That is immaterial. I
move to strike it out.
The Court: I do not think that is a proper
question, as it appears in the ledger.
Mr. Podell: In the general ledger.
The Court: Do you mean by that, did he
make a detailed account of that particular
item as it appeared in the ledger? Because
there are two questions there, one of the
general examination and one of a detailed
examination made.
Mr. Marshall: There is also the question
of
Mr. Podell: I fail to understand, your
Honor, the necessity of this explanation to
the witness, and I fail to understand counsel's objection. There is an account in the
general ledger which is headed "rubber
sales."
The Court: Right.
Mr. Podell: And all I am asking him—
he has stated here in the presence of Court
and jury that he has examined every account
in this ledger, and in connection with that
I am asking him whether he looked at this
account, did he examine it, that is all.
Mr. Marshall: I am further objecting,
your Honor, to any question of an account
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as it appears now rather than as it appeared
at that time.
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, this is
nothing but an effort to post this witness in
advance of what he is going to be questioned
about on cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: I submit it is not, and I
submit it is very curious whenever Mr.
Podell feels nipped, he makes statements
like that, and I object to it.
The Court: You mean on your general
objection? Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Have we a question here
now?
The Court: Yes, we have a question, the
question originally put.
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Mr. Marshall: I object to that not only
on that ground but as immaterial whether
he examined it as it appears. The question
is as it appeared at that time. That does
not have relation to this particular book
now, but a question of the materiality of
that question. He was not supposed to examineThe Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: I will change "appears" to
"appeared."
The Court: All right, sir; that is quite
different.
Q. Now, will you answer that question, Mr.
Towell—did you examine that rubber sales account? Is there anything about that question that
I am asking you now, Mr. Towell, that you do not
understand?
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Mr. Marshall: I again object, your Honor.
The Court : Objection sustained.
The Witness: Yes, I did.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit the
answer to stand, because I understand the
witness must have understood the question
as I put it.
The Court: Go ahead.
By Mr. Podell.
Q, You look at that account, rubber sales account, and see if you can tell
Mr. Podell: I am going to cover what is
in your Honor's mind. I think I know what
it is.
Q. You tell the jury whether there is any difference in that account as it appears now and as
you saw it when you looked at it? A. I cannot tell
you now that I ever saw it.
Q. You cannot say that you ever saw it? A.
Not this account,
Q. Is your handwriting on it, is Siess' handwriting on it? A. I don't know.
Q. That is one of the accounts in the general
ledger, is it not? A. If this is the general ledger,
yes.
Q. Can you not tell us whether this is the general ledger ? A. No.
Q. Did you not tell Mr. Marshall that that was
the general ledger that you looked at? A. I did
not.
Q. Will you examine the book now and tell us
whether it is the general ledger that you looked
at? A. Do you want me to make another examination?
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Q. Yes. Look it over and compare it with any
work sheet or any paper that you have there on
which figures were taken from the general ledger.
Tell us whether that is the general ledger that you
took those figures from. Perhaps you had better
do that at lunch time, but before we adjourn, Mr.
Towell
Mr. Podell: Perhaps this may be a good
time to adjourn, your Honor.
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Q. You know that that rubber sales account contains $706,000 worth of fictitious accounts, do you
not? You know that now? A. I have heard testimony to that effect.
Q. That is the only way you know it, you have
heard testimony? A. That is the only way I know.
Q. That is in that rubber sales account? A. I
don't know.
Q. And you do not recognize it by looking at it,
can you? A. No.
Q. And you cannot even recognize the book by
looking at it? A. No.
Q. You want an opportunity to check up on the
work sheets with the book, to make sure that is
the book that you looked at, is that it? A. No, I
don't want any opportunity.
Q. Is there any way that you can make sure
whether that is the book you looked at? A. No.
Q. You mean to tell this jury that no matter
how you compare the figures on the work sheets
The Court: The book itself, not its entries. The book itself you are referring to?
Q. The book and the entries. No matter how
you compare your work sheets with the entries
contained in that book, you will be in no position
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to tell this jury whether that is the general ledger
you worked from, is that so? A. Yes.
Q. You mean that? A. Yes, I mean that.
Mr. Podell: All right. We will pursue
it further.
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.)

AFTER RECESS.
SYDNEY TOWELL

resumed the stand.

Cross-examination (continued)

by Mr. Podell.

Q. Now, Mr. Towell, have you made any further
effort to compare or examine this general ledger
so that you can tell us whether it is the book that
you looked over? A. No, I have not.
Q. You have not? A. No.
Q. Is there some way in which you can help us
out by examining it or examining your papers and
tell us whether that is the book? A. I do not
think so.
Q. Do you know or do you not know; we cannot
make any progress in examining you as to these
contents until we have identified this book; do
you know that?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
immaterial.
The Court: Sustained.
A.

No.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, this is crossexamination.
The Court: I understand that, Mr. Podell.
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Mr. Podell: I question the good faith of
the statement of the witness. I want to
show that that is the reason for taking that
position. Have I not the right to show, if
he knows, it is important to us to have him
identify the book?
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Will you turn to your work sheet, page 1 of
your work sheet; is that your trial balance, is it?
Mr. Marshall: Page 1 of your work sheet.
2057
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Q. Yes, trial balance of the general ledger. A.
Yes.
Q. Whose handwriting is the first page? A. Referring to the classification sheet?
Q. How? A. Referring to the classification
sheet?
Q. Yes, the classification sheet? A. That is my
handwriting.
Q. All of it? A. With one or two minor exceptions.
Q. What are the exceptions? A. Under the column headed with a letter C.
Q. Yes. A. There are two figures, $6,439, $14,025, and the total $2,224,872, they are not in my
handwriting.
Q. Where is that—up at the top? A. No. At
the bottom of the column headed C.
Q. Yes. I see. Those three items are in whose
handwriting? A. Mr. Siess' handwriting, I believe.
Q, Now, what about the next page?
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : The witness
has pointed out all these three items on this
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page. $6,439.64, $14,025.39, and $2,224,872.63.
Q. Everything else is in your handwriting? A.
Yes,
Q. But those three items are in Siess' handwriting? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: I just want to show to the
jury the three items that he says (to the
jury). Everything else is in the witness'
handwriting except those three items, these
three (indicating).
Q. How about the next page? A. The next three
pages are all in Mr. Siess' handwriting, with the
exception of the last four columns on the right,
Q. The next three pages; those three pages are
all in Mr. Siess' handwriting? A. Yes.
Q. None of yours on it at all? A. With the exception of the last four columns on the right.
Q. None of yours on this next page?
The Court:
that?

2060

Is there a page number to

Q. You have three pages; these are the three
pages; which of them is in your handwriting, all
but the four columns on the last page; is that
right, to the right? A. All but the four columns
on each of the pages.
Q. I see. On each of the three pages? A. Yes.
Q. So that the first few columns are in the handwriting of Mr. Seiss? A. Yes.
Q. And only four columns to the right of these
pages are in your handwriting? A. Yes.
Q. And that applies to the three pages? A. Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: May we have the headings
of those columns?
Mr. Podell: The headings of these columns I see them here, is, first, the name of
the account, the balance after closing January 1, 1923, and then a lot of figures, "Balance before closing December 31, 1923," and
to the right "Adjustments." "Debtor and
credit balance after adjustment."
And
then the figures underneath these various
columns.
Mr. Marshall: May we identify the headings of the columns to which the witness
referred?
Mr. Podell: Please let me go along with
the examination.
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please
Mr. Podell: Identify what? It has been
sufficiently identified. What is it you want
me to identify now?
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to say
what the heads of those are.
Mr. Podell: I have answered.
The Court: He has read them.
Mr. Marshall: He has not read all the
heads on the page.
Q. The last four I have read are the columns under which Mr. Towell wrote; is that right? A.
Not the last. The last two that you read. I mean
the two columns under each heading.
Q. Now, just open that ledger.
The Court:

Where?

Q. Open up to the rubber sales account. Do you
get the first page of the rubber sales account? A.
It is an account headed "Rubber Sales," yes.
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Q. Will you tell us what part of that is in Mr.
Seiss' handwriting? A. No, I cannot.
Q. You did not have any difficulty in recognizing
Mr. Siess' handwriting on your work sheets, did
you? A. No.
Q. Will you look through any part of that ledger
and tell us if you can find anywhere the handwriting of Mr. Siess?
The Court: You mean outside of that
account, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: Any account.
A. I see only the figures in this account. I am
afraid I cannot identify them.
Q. Did not you identify Mr. Siess' figures here
to this jury? A. Yes.
Q. A moment ago? A. Yes.
Q. Are you not familiar with his handwriting
and figures? A. Not particularly.
Q. How many years have you worked with Siess?
A. Only for two weeks that I remember.
Q. Two weeks on this audit? A. He was not
there the whole of the time. It would only probably be about—perhaps less than a week.
Q. Didn't you know, as the senior accountant,
or whatever your position was there, that Mr. Siess
wrote up the general ledger from March on, in
1923, didn't you know that? A. I understand that
he did.
Q. Not what you understand. Did you know
it at that time? A. I was told that he did.
Q. By whom? A. Mr. Rea.
Q. You did not see him write it? A. No.
Q. Is that the usual thing for an accountant to
do when he is making an audit, to post up the
general ledger for a period from March until the
end of the year?
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Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
object to that question, because there is nothing to show that that was done as part of
the audit. It was done, as the evidence
shows, before the audit commenced; so the
facts upon which Mr. Podell's questions are
based are improper.
The Court: Yes, that is true; it was done
before the audit commenced.
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Q. Did your concern have any work to do for
Mr. Stern, outside of the audit? Was your concern in the capacity of keeping books, of supplying
bookkeepers to Mr. Stern? A. I believe they did
do so.
Q. Supplied his bookkeepers; is that it? A. Not
a bookkeeper. They supplied an assistant for
Stern's bookkeeper.
Q. Was not that done in connection with the
audit that was had? A. No.
Q. Could you have made an audit unless that
ledger was written up? A. No.
Q. Didn't you have to have a ledger that was
posted for the purpose of making an audit? A.
Yes.
Q. And that as part of your effort to make the
right kind of audit did not you have to have the
ledger posted up? A. Yes.
Q. And who did that? A. I was told that Mr.
Siess helped to do it.
Q. Didn't you know that he has testified that
he wrote in that rubber sales account, and that
that was his handwriting from May 7, all of the
items, except the last? A. I believe he did so
testify.
Q. You don't doubt Mr. Siess' statement, do you?
A. I do not.
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Q. Now, then, does that help to refresh your
recollection that this rubber sales account, at least
in so far as that sheet is concerned, is the same
sheet that you saw when you audited that book?
A. It shows me that it probably is.
Q. Probably? A. Yes.
Q. Is there a doubt about Siess' statement? A.
I do not know.
Q. That he wrote that very account, all but the
last item; is that why you say "probably" ? A. That
is why I say "probably."
Q. Because there is a doubt in your mind about
Siess' statement that he wrote those items? A.
No, I just do not know.
Q. You do not know? A. No.
Q. Now, will you be good enough, Mr. Towell
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : I think, gentlemen, if I may be permitted, your Honor,
Mr. Siess testified that he wrote everything
beginning with 5/7 here down to the bottom of this page, and continued the account,
all but this last item that is Siess' handwriting anyway, from 5/7. Here every item
in ink Siess testified was his handwriting,
and every item in here, except this last item,
$706,000. The writing appears—let the record show on all of these days of the same
page.
Q. Now, will you be good enough to look at your
work sheet and tell us whether your work sheet
shows the total of sales for the year 1923 on the
rubber sales account? A. I have an item, "Rubber
Sales $10,492,387."
Q. And how many cents? A. 64 cents.
Q. Now, will you just repeat that item, $10,492,387.64; is that right? A. Yes.
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Q. Where did you get that figure from? A. From
the general ledger of Fred Stern & Company.
Q. Is that figure in your work sheets in your
handwriting? A. Once in Siess' handwriting, once
in mine.
Q. That figure appears twice, does it? A. Yes.
Q. And which one is yours and which one is
Siess'? A. The original record is Siess'.
Q. The one at the head of the page, is that Siess'
handwriting? A. Yes.
Q. At the head of the column? A. Yes.
Q. And the one below it at the foot is yours?
A. No. The one on the left is mine—the one on
the left is Siess', and the one on the right is mine.
Those are the two items (indicating).
Mr. Marshall: Under what columns?
The Witness: Under the column headed,
"Balance before closing, December 31, 1923."
That is Siess' handwriting, and this is in
my handwriting, copying his figure out balance after adjustment.
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Q. Have you any further tabulation of this item
anywhere in your work sheet referring to the $10,000,000 item? A. No.
Q. Is that the only tabulation that appears anywhere in your work sheet with regard to this $10,000,000 item? A. I believe so.
Q. Now, do I understand you correctly that when
you copied that item in your handwriting, you
copied it out of the general ledger of Stern & Company? A. No.
Q. Where did you copy it from? A. The item
in my handwriting is copied from the figure by
Siess.
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Q. Did you go over and check up on that item
at all? A. I do not believe so.
Q. You mean you took it for granted that that
item of $10,000,000 of sales for the year 1923 was
accurate without any check up? A. No, I would
not say that.
Q. Now, then, what did you do? A. I took off
the entire list of all credit balances which were
credits to the profits and loss account and all debit
balances, and concluded finally that the balance, the
credit balance remaining of $115,940.37 was a
proper credit to the surplus account.
Q. That would not check up your sales, would
it? A. No.
Q. What I am interested in having is, here was
a statement to you of over $10,000,000 worth of
actual sales. You knew that the sales created accounts receivable. You knew that the accounts receivable were included among the assets; did you
do anything to check up to see whether those assets
were there? A. Yes, to see that the assets were
there.
Q. What did you look at? A. I made tests of
the accounts receivable to the invoices.
Q. You did look at the invoices? A. Yes, some
of them.
Q. Did you look at the ledger? A. Yes, I looked
at the accounts receivable.
Q. Did you look at the general ledger? A. Yes.
Q. Now, in your examination of invoices, did
you come across any peculiarities or unusual items
at all? A. No,
Q. Nothing that struck you as unusual? A. Except any invoices that are in the adjustments already referred to in testimony this morning.
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Q. Well, now, so that we won't misunderstand
each other, Mr. Towell, did you ever see an invoice
like this (indicating)?
Mr. Marshall: Why don't you let him
see it instead of holding it a mile away?
Q. (Handing.) A. I cannot say.
Q. Do you recall seeing any invoice that was
different from the ordinary regular invoice? A.
No.
Mr. Podell:

2081

2082

Let me have the invoices.

Q. I think you have told us that you were particularly interested in any manipulations that
came at the close of the year; do you recall saying
that? A. No, I do not think I said that.
Q. Do you recall using the phrase "particularly
at the close of the year"? A. I believe I did use
that phrase, yes.
Q. Well, you know as an experienced accountant,
that what happened in relation to inventory on
December 31, 1923, is so close to January of 1924,
that items are apt even inadvertently to overlap;
don't you know that? A. That happens sometimes.
Q. And so that is why you use the phrase "particularly at the close of the year," is it not? A.
Yes, because of our balance sheet being at a point
of time.
Q. Point of time, December 31. Now, then, did
you by any chance, look at any of the invoices that
appeared in the invoice book toward the close of
the year, Mr. Towell, did you? A. Yes.
Q. You did? A. Yes.
Q. Will you be good enough to look at some
pages with me? Now, the very first invoice
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Mr. Marshall: What exhibit are you referring to, please?
Mr. Podell: December 7, 1923.
Mr. Marshall: What exhibit are you referring to, please?
Mr. Podell: Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.
Q. Did you notice it?

A. Yes.

Mr. Marshall: I make my same objection,
your Honor, as to any questions with respect
to book.
Mr. Podell: I object to any statement to
destroy the purpose of this cross-examination.
The Court: This is the original objection
which counsel has made continually throughout the trial.
Mr. Podell: I have no objection to that.
Mr. Marshall: I have a right to state the
grounds of my objection.
The Court: Yes,
Mr. Marshall: And I have a right to state
further that Mr. Podell is assuming even if
this were
Mr. Podell: I object to that statement as
intended to post this witness, and destroy
the rights of the cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: I object. It is not. I have
not made that break yet. I insist that I
have a right to state my objection.
Mr. Podell: I object to any statement as
to what the purpose of this is as an attempt
to post the witness in the midst of a crucial
point in the cross-examination.
Mr. Marshall: We will let the witness go
out of the room, if you want; but I insist
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that I have a right to put my objection on
the record.
Mr. Podell: If it is a general objection,
has he not stated it on the record 117 times?
The Court: Is it tending towards the admissibility because of lack of connection?
Mr. Marshall: Not only because of the
lack of connection of the book itself, but to
the order of the book, that is, assuming that
even if this book did exist at the time
Mr. Podell: What is the use of cross-examining him? He is telling him now that the
book did not exist; and I say it is highly improper to make that statement.
Mr. Marshall: Do not lose your temper.
You know I have made that part of my objection consistently throughout the trial, and
the witness has heard that before, so that
remark is uncalled for. I am adding the
further objection that the question of Mr.
Podell is based on the assumption that this
book was in the same order as now.
Mr. Podell: I have a perfect right to ask
the question in that form in cross-examination.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: I except.
Q. After that statement has been made by your
counsel, will you tell us then whether you recall
the book at all?
Mr. Marshall: I object to the remark and
the question in that form.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Do you recall that book, Mr. Towell?
No. I am afraid not,

A.
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2089

Q. No. Of course, you heard counsel say that
you didn't know or he does not know whether the
book existed at all at that time—you heard him
say that?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because
I did not make that remark.
Q. Did you hear him make a statement to that
effect? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: Wait a minute, please. I
made a remark, your Honor, as to the nature
of the proof up to this time. I made no
remark as to my own knowledge of the matter at all, and Mr. Podell has consistently
misquoted me, and I ask your Honor to
make a ruling.
The Court: I do not think, Mr. Podell,
there is any necessity whatever for the quotation, because counsel has consistently from
the start of this trial, objected to all entries
made in these books, placing the burden
upon you for the establishment of their identification, and he has consistently objected
right from the very start of the trial, on
that theory.
Mr. Podell: I have not objected to that,
but objected to his deliberate statement in
the midst of the inquiry, wherein he said
the book did not exist at that time. That is
what I objected to.
The Court: I do not know that he said
that.
Mr. Podell: Let us read it and see if he
did or not.
The Court : Let us see whether he did.
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Mr. Podell: His purpose is apparent by
the last answer of the witness. Read the
record.
The Court: Read the record.
(Here the preceding part of the record
was repeated as recorded.)
The Court: There was no question; the
only thing I remember was—look at this
book and follow me on it; which he apparently attempted to do.
Mr. Podell: "If it did not exist"—he did
not volunteer any such statement, It was
put sight into his mouth and head.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully ask your
Honor to state that I have a right to make
my objection.
The Court: I have ruled accordingly.
By Mr. Podell.

2094

Q. Now, you look at the last invoice for the year
1923, in this book that I show you now, and tell
me whether you saw any of those? A. I cannot
say that I did.
Q. You cannot say that you did? A. No.
Q. Have you got any of these invoices listed on
any of your work sheets? A. I do not know that.
Q. Can you look it up for us, please, and make
sure? Will you take any of those last invoices in
the month of December at the end of the year, and
will you examine particularly and closely?
The Court: Was that established or not
established as a fact in the plaintiff's case
that there was no such entry on the work
sheet?
Mr. Podell: Who said that?
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The Court: Was that or was it not so?
Mr. Podell: Oh, no.
The Court: I do not know. I am asking
whether there was or not to refresh my recollection.
Mr. Marshall: I do not like to help your
Honor by a remark, as I dare not do it because Mr. Podell will object,
Mr. Podell: What is that?
Mr. Marshall: I might make a suggestion
which will help your Honor at this point,
except that Mr. Podell will roar out that I
am posting the witness.
The Court: We will take the question.
Q. Mr. Towell, can you say to this jury whether
each one of those accounts respectively listed on
those invoices that you have looked at were included in the accounts receivable on your work
sheets? A. I cannot say that. I have recognized
some of the names here.
Q. Look at your customers' ledger and see if
that will help you out. Do you want to look at
the customers' ledger? A. I will look at anything
that you want me to look at.
Q. Mr. Towell, is it your position that you do
not recognize any of those books at all? A. Well,
I cannot—I do not recall.
Q. Is that your position? A. Yes, that is my
position.
Q. Did you say that once to the lawyer that was
questioning you, when he questioned you and you
looked at the books time and again?
Mr. Marshall: I object to the statement.
He did not look at the books time and again.
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Mr. Podell: We will let the jury decide
whether or not counsel handed up books and
used the books in connection with the work
sheets.
Q. Did you look at any books when Mr. Marshall
questioned you? A. No, not that I recall.
Q. You just testified from work sheets? A. Yes.
Q. Don't you remember Mr. Marshall handing
you the general ledger?
Mr. Marshall: You point out where I did,
the general ledger.

2099

2100

Q. Do you remember that? A. No, I do not
remember.
Q. You do not remember that. Will you say he
did not hand you the general ledger? A. I do not
recall that.
Q. Do you remember the discussion that arose
with regard to trade acceptances and withholding
cash by the banks? A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Do you remember in that connection you were
looking into any of the books?
Mr. Marshall: Point out the place in the
record, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: I am not taking orders from
you, Mr. Marshall.
A. I do not remember.
Q. Do you remember in that connection looking
at any books? A. I do not.
Q. You don't remember looking at a certain
book throughout the examination by Mr. Marshall?
A. Not that I now recall.
Q. Well, now, do I understand you correctly that
your present position now is that after all this
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work, and after all this figuring that you have got
there, over two weeks, and all these work sheets,
that you could not, no matter how long or how hard
you study these books, recognize a single one of
them? A. That is right.
Q. Now, then, we will assume that you did not
recognize them for the moment. Look at the rubber
sales account in the general ledger—I withdraw
that question. I want you to examine this invoice
that I show you now and compare it with any of
the other invoices in this book of the month preceding November, 1923. Do you understand my
question? Look at this invoice and the one next
to it, and others next to it for December, 1923,
and compare it with any of the invoices that are
in this book prior to November, 1923?
Mr. Marshall: The same general objection, your Honor.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: And now may I enter that
now to any books handed to this witness?
The Court: You may have a general exception.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Of course, we
have been over all this before, I think.
The Court: With this witness?
Mr. Marshall: Not with this witness.
Q. Have you got one of the regular invoices, any
one of them preceding October, preceding November, 1923, have you got one there? A. Preceding
November?
Q. Yes, any one of the preceding November? A.
Yes, I have.
Q. Now, compare the last invoices in that book
with that invoice preceding November; did you
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notice any difference? A. Yes, there is some difference.
Q. Now, tell us what that "some difference" consists of?

2105

2106

Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not being the best evidence.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
The Court: You mean the papers speak
for themselves?
Mr. Marshall: Certainly.
Mr. Podell: I am going to ask for certain conclusions of the witness in connection
with them.
The Court: I will allow it.
Q. Will you compare it with the invoices that
you selected, Mr. Towell, please; what is the difference? A. The difference between the invoice you
asked me to look at, dated November 16, 1923, and
the one I first looked at dated October 26, 1923, is
one of the purpose of the thing more than the difference in the invoice, so I shall have to turn to
another one.
Q. Let me see. Is this the sales invoice? A. I
feel sure that it is an adjustment of some kind,
so I will turn to another invoice.
Q. Well, then, take a sales invoice. Will you
tell this jury what is the difference between any
one of these last invoices—you will notice they are
more or less in the same form, and the invoice of
October, 1923? A. The invoice of November 16
merely is the statement of the number of cases;
the type of rubber and the description of its trade
name, and some reference figures as to weight and
the price per pound and an extension of the total
price.
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Q. Do you see the word "weight" mentioned
there on the invoice of November 16? A. No.
Q. Do you notice the date on the invoice of November 16?
Mr. Marshall: When its due date is?
A. Yes.
Q. When is it? A. March 1, 1924.
Q. The invoice dated November 16th, due March
1, 1924? A. Yes.
Q. What is the due date of this, October 23? A.
Cash thirty days from date of invoice.
Q. You have audited the account books of rubber concerns, have you not, before? A. No.
Q. Well, from this audit of the account books
of this rubber concern, did you become familiar
with the usual terms of dating? A. Yes, I made
inquiry along those lines.
Q. And what did you find to be the regular
terms? A. I do not recall that.
Q. Did you not find them to be more than thirty
days? A. I could not say now.
Q. But you knew it at that time? A. I believe
I did.
Q. You did? A. I believe I did.
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Mr. Marshall: A little louder, Mr. Podell.
2109
Q. What else did you find on this invoice of
October, 1923, which you do not find on the invoice of November 16; do you find any reference
to a rubber association fee on the invoice of November 16th? A. No.
Q. Is there a reference to such a fee on the invoice of October, 1923? A. There is.
Q. Do you happen to know, and can you tell
this jury, what those two typewritten numbers
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mean on the invoice of October, 1923, in the upper
right-hand corner? A. They are serial numbers of
some kind.
Q. Serial numbers of what? A. Serial numbers
of the invoices, probably.
Q. Do you find two typewritten numbers in the
upper right-hand corner of this invoice, November
16th? A. No.
Q. Do you find any reference—do you find on
the invoice of October, 1923, "weight slip herewith,
bill of lading herewith"? Do you find any such
thing on the invoice of November 16? A. No.
Q. Do you recall having observed these things
at all when you made your audit? A. I recall no
such differences in any invoices I ever saw there.
Q. You looked at how many invoices? A. I think
I said probably 200.
Q. 200 invoices. Now, assuming that you had
come across invoices such as I have pointed out
here, would that have aroused your suspicion? A.
It would have been cause for inquiry.
Q. Would it have aroused your suspicions as to
the genuineness of those last invoices coming in
the last part of the year? A. Not by itself.
Q. It would have occasioned inquiry on your
part? A. Yes.
Q. And the ground for inquiry would have been
that you would have thought that there was a possibility that this is not a genuine invoice, referring
to the one of November 16? A. No.
Q. That is not a reason for your inquiry? A.
No.
Q. What would have been reason for your inquiry? A. I would have wondered why it was that
they departed from what evidently was their practice.
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Q. Just a matter of curiosity, I assume? A. At
that point.
Q. I f you found a number of such invoices in
that from, toward the end of the year, all of them
in the wrong position in the file, in very large
amount, larger than usual, would that have aroused
your suspicion? A. Not by itself.
Q. Would it have occasioned cause for inquiry
on your part? A. Yes.
Q. And why? A. Because it would be a departure from their routine, or at least, I believe it
would.
Q. Something unusual in their routine, would it
not? A. I would so think.
Q. Then, I assume, you would ask Mr. Stern for
an explanation; is that right? A. Probably not
Mr. Stern.
Q. Probably Mr. Romberg? A. Yes.
Q. I see. Mr. Romberg was the man who had
charge of that very thing? A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that these things could not
have been done unless Mr. Romberg knew of them?
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Mr. Marshall: What things? I think we
ought to have it a little more definite.
Q. If these invoices were not genuine, that they
could not have been done without the knowledge
of Mr. Romberg? A. They could not.
Q. And you were going to take an explanation
from that gentleman, is that it? A. I saw nothing
irregular about the invoices.
Q. So you saw something you said was unusual?
Mr. Marshall:
A. I did not say that.

No, he did not say that.
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Q. You said you saw something that would have
occasioned inquiry? A. No, I did not.
Q. Did not you say that? A. No.
Q. Did not you find an invoice, a number of them,
in that form in large amount different from the
routine, the departure from the routine that you
say could not have been done without the knowledge of Mr. Romberg, you would have gone to Mr.
Romberg to get an explanation?

2117

The Court: "If" or "did not"—if or did
not?
Mr. Podell: If he found that.
The Court: If he found it. I will allow
the question—if he found it.
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the question
repeated, then.
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Q. Your Honor, the question has just been repeated. Does the witness want it to be repeated?
A. Yes.

2118

Mr. Podell: "If"
(The question was repeated as recorded:
"If you found an invoice, a number of them
in that form in large amount different from
the routine, the departure from the routine
that you say could not have been done without the knowledge of Mr. Romberg, you
would have gone to Mr. Romberg to get an
explanation?")
A. Yes.
Q. And you would have accepted any explanation that he gave you that seemed satisfactory? A.
Not necessarily.
Q. What else could you have done to verify
Romberg's statement? A. It would all depend on
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the circumstance of my questions and his answers,
as to what conclusion I came to, after hearing his
explanations,
Q. Would not your inquiry be to make certain
that this last invoice was a genuine invoice? A.
Yes,
Q, And is not there a very simple way of finding
that out? A. I could not tell you now.
Q. Did not you do it when you were checking up
on accounts payable?
Mr. Marshall:

What?

Q. Didn't you tell this jury that when you were
checking up on accounts payable you communicated
with the creditors?

2120

Mr. Marshall: The creditors?
A. Yes.
Q. It never occurred to you that you might communicate with the debtors to find out whether certain invoices were right? A. Yes, it did.
Q. It did occur to you? A. Yes.
Q. In all this audit did you communicate with
any debtor? A. Not trade debtors—other debtors.
Q. You left the trade debtors alone? A. Yes,
Q. The accounts receivable, you left them alone?
A. Yes.
Q. Just what did you do to find out whether those
sales had actually been made?
Mr. Marshall: What sales?
Q. Sales listed in the accounts receivable. A. I
tested the accounts receivable to the invoices to an
extent that I thought was sufficient.
Q. Did you give particular attention to the end
of the year? A. Not particularly.

2121

708
2122

2123

2124

Sydney

Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

Q. Was not that one of the instances which called
for particular attention in December? A. No, I do
not think so.
Q. Did you mean it when you told this jury that
a general ledger is a book of original entry? A. I
do not think that I so stated.
Q. If you did state it—did you state to this jury
that it was a book of original record? A. I may
have done.
Q. Now, just what is your distinction there?
Would you call a general ledger a book of original
record? A. No.
Q. You would not? A. No.
Q. Now, sir, in checking up on accounts payable
to find out whether Stern really owed all the money
that he said he owed, you went to the supporting
books, didn't you? A. Yes.
Q. You went to the accounts payable ledger? A.
Yes.
Q. You went to the invoices received? A. To
which?
Q. Invoices received by Stem & Company. Did
not you testify that you checked up the invoices
that had been sent in by the creditors? A. We
tested them, yes.
Q. And didn't you also look at the shipments
received record? A. Yes.
Q. And then, after taking all that precaution,
you communicated with the creditors? A. Yes.
Q. And you felt that you could not verify the
entries contained in the general ledger and make
certain that all the liabilities were listed until you
had done just that? A. No. That is not so.
Q. You did not do it for the purpose of idle
ceremony, did you? A. No.
Q. You did not do it because any suspicions were
aroused in your mind? A. No.
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Q. You did it in the ordinary course of your
audit? A. Yes.
Q. Now tell me, in the ordinary course of your
audit of accounts receivable, the sales ledger, did
you look at the books, the supporting books? A.
Yes.
Q. Did you look at any sales journal? A. I do
not recall that.
Q. You just told us that you did look at the supporting books? A. I looked at the supporting records. I think you were using the word to mean
books or records.
Q. Well, what is it that you mean to distinguish
here? You did not look at the sales journal? A.
Not necessarily.
Q. Now, which is it; are you in doubt in your
mind as to whether you looked into it, or don't you
remember whether you looked into it? A. No, I do
not remember, not necessarily.
Q. Or do you want to say that you did look into
it? "Not necessarily" does not mean anything. A.
I do not remember whether I did look or not.
Q. You mean you don't remember? A. Yes.
Q. Do you think you might recognize that sales
journal if I showed it to you? A. I do not think so.
Q. Do you think you might recognize what was
called the debit memo book if I showed it to you ?
A. I do not think so.
Q. Did you ever hear of that book, the debit
memo book? A. I do not recall it to-day.
Q. Have you got any entries on your work sheet
relating to the debit memo book? A. I do not
think so.
Q. Now, did you look at the shipping records as
you did on the accounts payable? A. A record of
shipments, yes.
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Q. What do you call a record of shipments? A.
The record in which all purchases were made also
recorded the sale of the same merchandise, and I
did look at that.
Q. Do you know that there were two sets of records there, one of them for shipments received,
which also gave the record of what was done with
those shipments, and another one for shipments
sent out? A. No, I do not recall that.
Q. You do not recall it? A. No.
Q. Where were the shipping records of the concern which was the basis of the accounts receivable?
A. I do not know.
Q. Have you got any list there in your work
sheets which would show the books that you examined in this audit? A. No.
Q. Is it in your time sheets? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: He already went over that,
your Honor, when he first went on the stand.
Mr. Podell: May I have the production of
those?
Mr. Marshall: You have had those before.
The time sheets are produced. I have no
objection to giving these to the attorneys,
but I do not think another accountant ought
to have them.
The Court: What is that?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think another accountant ought to go over our list of clients.
1 am quite willing to give them to Mr. Limburg.
Mr. Podell: It is purely accountants'
figures. I ask permission for Mr. Levy, who
was the accountant, an attorney assisting
me in the conduct of this trial, to give him
permission to look at that document.
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Mr. Marshall: Why should our customers
be shown to another accountant?
Mr. Podell: It is an exhibit in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Not the part with other
accountants.
Mr. Podell: I am entitled to look at what
is in evidence and I am entitled to look at
it with the eyes of an accountant.
The Court: I allow it.
Mr. Marshall: I except to having another
accountant look at our customers, other customers on that list.
The Court: You know what the rule is,
Mr. Podell. The Court has not got that
discrimination if it has other customers.
Mr. Podell: But this document is in evidence.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: And if counsel does not want
these other customers to be looked at, what
does that mean? It means that we cannot
look at it at all?
The Court: No; that counsel and this jury
may look at it, but there is no reason why
another accountant should have the occasion
to find out what their business is or who their
customers are.
Mr. Podell: We are not looking at any
other items but those in evidence.
Mr. Marshall: Only part was in evidence,
and the accountant is an attorney.
Mr. Podell: Why should you assume the
accountant was an attorney in this case?
How do you assume that he will violate your
rules?
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The Court: I do not, but I think counsel
is within the line of propriety in objecting
to exposing this particular thing to another
accountant.
Mr. Podell: He is not doing it. I am
doing it.
The Court: You cannot give it to him
either.
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor instruct Mr.
Marshall, who said at the time when he offered this document in evidence that he was
going to take out from these sheets the extracts, to let us have an extract of this
exhibit?
The Court: I think he did.
Mr. Podell: He has not done it, and it
seems to me he is the one that ought to take
the penalty of having failed to do what he
promised. Why should I be barred from examining this document and now taking up
the time of the Court and the jury?
The Court: I say you may examine that
document and show this to your accountant,
relative to this particular account.
Mr. Podell: I will give the accountant the
instructions that the only matter of fact is
that this sheet contains no entries except
Fred Stern & Company.
The Court: Give him that sheet,
Mr. Podell: That is the one (handing
paper to Mr. Levy). There is nothing mysterious about these other accounts. They do
not say a blessed thing about them. There
is nothing here at all.
The Court: Do not say that.
Mr. Podell: There is nothing but a name
on them.
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The Court: That is just what he does not
want him to know.
Mr. Marshall: Even though he is an attorney in this ease, he is also an accountant.
Mr. Podell: Let us have that copy which
he promised to give us. Now, what is my
last question?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, can you explain to this jury
at all why it is that you are so certain, absolutely
certain and sure, that in checking up on the accounts payable you looked at the accounts payable
ledger, you looked at the supporting books, the
shipping records, you communicated with the customers to verify them, and in checking up on accounts receivable you do not know whether you
looked at the invoices, the sales journal, and certainly did not communicate with the customer.
Why is that?
Mr. Marshall: I object. That is not a
proper statement of the witness' statement.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: What is the objection?
The Court: You said he did not look at
the invoices.
Mr. Podell: He said he looked at 200
invoices.
The Court: He said he did not look at
these.
Mr. Marshall: And could not say which
of the 200.
Q. I am asking why it is in connection with
the accounts payable he looked at all those things
and then communicated with the creditors, and why
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it is in regard to the accounts receivable you did
not look at the sales accounts and you did not look
at the shipping records and you did not communicate with the debtors? A. Because I thought that
what I had done in connection with the accounts
receivable was as much as I could do under the
circumstances, and was equivalent to what had been
done in connection with the accounts payable.
Q. Was it as much as you could do that you did
not look at the sales journal? A. That was left
entirely to my judgment, and I did not say that
I did not look at it.
Q. I am asking you not what was left entirely
to your judgment at that time, but the sales journal was available there, was it not? A. I suppose so.
Q. Don't you know? A. I do not remember the
book.
Q. Was there a single book that you asked for
that those people did not produce? A. I do not
think there was.
Q. Then you know that the sales journal must
have been there? A. I do not recall the book.
Q. Now, I ask you again whether there was a
single book that you asked for that was not produced? A. No, I don't think there was.
Q. Do you mean to sit there, an accountant, and
tell this jury that you made an audit entailing all
this work and that you cannot even say to this
jury whether they had a complete set of books? A.
They had a complete set,
Q. I f they had a complete set of books, then you
know, do you not, that there must have been a
sales journal? A. There would be a record of some
sort.
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Q. Is a sales journal a record of some sort? A.
Yes.
Q. Would that have satisfied you, any kind of a
record or a sales journal? A. It didn't necessarily
have to be in any particular form, Mr. Podell.
Q. You mean to say that if there was no sales
journal at all, but if they kept a lot of loose invoices
around the office somewhere, that that would have
satisfied you? A. It might have been a book. They
could have made a summary sheet of the sales. I t
would serve the same purpose.
Q. A summary sheet in the way of a book of
original entry? A. It might not have been a book
at all. They could have summarized their invoices.
Q. You would have been satisfied with a summary sheet of their invoices instead of a sales journal in a situation such as this, would you?
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Mr. Marshall: Just a second. I think this
is going a little far afield, your Honor.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. Would you? A. Yes.
Q. Did you find any such? A. I don't recall the
form of their sales summary.
Q. Would you recall it if you saw it? A. I am
afraid not now.
Q. Could you check it up with your working
sheets and identify it if you saw it? A. I think not.
Q. Let me have it, so we will dispel any doubt in
your mind and make certain that you cannot recall
it. Now, look at it and examine it (handing book
to witness). Tell us now definitely—not what you
think, but tell us definitely, do you recall it—referring to Exhibit 5. A. No, I don't recall it.
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Q. You do not recall it. Now, you are sure about
it, now? I mean, it is not that you do not think
you recall it, but you are sure you do not recall it?
A. I am quite sure I do not.
Q. Now, then, Mr. Towell, will you tell this jury,
please, what would have been your conclusion if
you had asked for the sales journal and you had
found that these invoices, which are a departure
from the usual invoices as you have described it,
was not at all entered as sales and were not contained in the sales journal. What would have been
your conclusion as an accountant? A. I would have
concluded that such a state of affairs was a subject
for further inquiry.
Q. If you find a number of them, all in large
amounts, entered on an invoice that was a departure in many essentials from the regular invoice, and
no sign of them anywhere in the sales journal, what
would have been your inference? A. I would have—
what would have been my inference?
Q. Your inference, yes. A. I cannot say what it
would have been.
Q. Your mind would be a blank, or is it a blank
on that subject? I mean, you draw no inference
at all? Suppose I add to that that these invoices
were all towards the end of the year? A. I would
have inferred first of all that they departed from
their regular practice. What the final inference
would have been I cannot say.
Q. There would not have been any suspicion at
all in your mind? A. I don't think at that point
it would have been suspicion.
Q. Even if there was no entry in the regular
course in the sales journal, the book that should
have contained an entry, you would not have been
suspicious at all? A. Not through that alone.
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Q. Well, now, assume then that you knew all
about this inventory with which you had to reduce
the net assets of the concern by $300,000, that you
had seen that form of invoice and that it was all
toward the end of the year, in December; would
that have made any difference to you? Would that
have occasioned you any suspicion at all? A. Not
immediately. It would have occasioned inquiry.
Q. Whether immediately or at any other time,
would it have occasioned suspicion after you had
given it thought? A. It might have been the cause
of later suspicion.
Q. I see. Well, now, of course, you as an accountant will admit that finding such a condition
of affairs with regard to the sales journal, with regard to the invoices, it was your duty then to look
at the shipping records to see whether the goods
had actually been shipped? Do you not admit that,
that if you find such a condition, that that would
have been your duty?
Mr. Marshall: I object to this line of
questioning.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: It is assuming facts which
have not been proven.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. What is your answer? A. I did not get what
you added to that question.
Q. I will repeat it. Finding that accounts receivable entered in the ledger find no support in
the sales journal, and that the invoices coming at
the end of the year are a departure from the usual
invoice in the form which you have stated, the differences between that invoice and the regular in-
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voice—now, finding that condition, assuming that
you find such a condition, would it have been your
duty to look at the shipping records to see whether
the goods were shipped? A. Not necessarily.
Q. You mean that if Mr. Romberg in this case, or
Mr. Stern, gave you an explanation of some kind,
you would not even have bothered looking at the
shipping records? A. I mean no such thing.
Q. You do not mean that? A. No.
Q. Would you have communicated with the people to whom that invoice was made out? A. No.
Q. How would you pursue your further inquiry?
You said it would create cause for inquiry. How
could you pursue your further inquiry? A. I cannot recall now how I would have pursued it.
Q. I am not asking you now about what you did
at that time, because you cannot even remember the
book you looked at. I am asking you now, take
these facts and assume these facts that you find
such a condition; tell me as an accountant would
not you have regarded it as your bounden duty to
look to see whether those shipments had been made?
A. I think I might have gone to that step.
Q. Well, what else could you have done to satisfy
that inquiry that you said you had cause for? A.
I do not know.
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. He did not
say he had cause for inquiry. It is based on
a hypothetical question.
The Court: On an assumed state of facts.
Mr. Podell: I am assuming now, we all
understand it. We know that this witness
is not testifying now to what his frame of
mind was. I am giving certain hypothesis
to him.
The Court: I understand.
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Q. You assume these things in making the audit:
That you find the accounts receivable is not supported by a sales journal, and you find the invoices
are a departure from the usual thing, and it is toward the end of the year, and you have said, I think,
it would give you cause for inquiry. Now, what
else could you have done in the way of inquiry
other than one of two things—either communicate
with the debtor or look to the shipping records to
see whether the goods had been shipped, or both?
A. Nothing else occurs to me at the moment than
that.
Q. Well, now, Mr. Towell, will you be good
enough to tell this jury why it is that you did all
these things with regard to the accounts payable
and that now you do not know whether you did
them with regard to the accounts receivable? A.
I did not say I did not know whether I had done
them.
Q. Do you say now that you looked at the shipping records at any time? A. No, I don't say that.
Q. Of the accounts receivable now, goods shipped
out? A. No, I do not say I did, except in the form
that there was a record of shipment in the—what
I now call the lot record. I traced invoices from
the file of invoices.
Q. Is a lot record a shipping record? A. It is
a record of shipments.
Q. Certain shipments? A. I understand in Fred
Stern's office to be all shipments.
Q. All shipments? A. Yes.
Q. All right, Now, in this lot record did you find
any of the shipments for those invoices that appeared toward the end of the year? A. Not that
I have any recollection of.
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Q. You mean by that that you do not remember
whether you find them there or not? A. I mean
that I have no specific recollection of different invoices being checked.
Mr. Marshall: That record book is not
in evidence. I think, your Honor, the record
should show.
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Q. Is there any possible chance, Mr. Towell, of
your examining these three books as closely as you
like and comparing them with any of your work
sheets or any data or information you have? You
notice these are not loose leaf books. The three
books I hand you are the books I—that you have
just referred to, the shipping record of shipments
received on purchases
Mr. Marshall: May we have the books
identified?
Mr. Podell: They may be identified.
Mr. Marshall: What exhibit numbers?
The Court: Are they in evidence?
Mr. Podell: I do not think so.
Mr. Limburg: I think they are.
The Court: They do not appear to be in
evidence.
Mr. Podell: I do not think they have been
marked.
Q. Well, can you identify them for us?
Mr. Marshall: Is the next book also not
marked?
The Witness: There is no mark on it.
Q. Do you need to take all of this time, Mr.
Towell?
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Mr. Marshall: Your Honor asked him to
identify them. Let him try.
Mr. Podell: All right.
The Witness: There is nothing here that
I recognize so far.
Q. You do not recognize it? A. No.
Q. They are in the same position that all the
other books are, they are totally strange to you, you
do not recognize them at all, is that right? A.
That is right.
Q. Now, let us assume, Mr. Towell, that you
could not find in these books that we are talking
about, these shipping records, both in books relating to shipments received any books relating to
shipments made to customers, that you could not
find any trace of those shipments that had this invoice that was a departure and that was not referred to in the sales journal; now, would you then
have had any suspicion about that account, all of
it at the end of the year when you examined things
particularly closely? Do you understand my question? A. Yes, I think I do.
Q. You understand it? A. Yes.
Q. Now, what is your answer? A. I think it
would have been a subject for inquiry.
Q. You would still not be suspicious? A. Not
on that basis alone.
Q. If you found a number of such instances aggregating large amounts, would you have been suspicious? A. I can not say.
Q. You could not say? A. No.
Q. If the Ford Motor Company, to whom you
wrote on one of those accounts, and the Goodyear
Rubber Company, and the Goodrich Rubber & Tire
Company, and other large companies wrote you
over their signatures that those accounts are fictitious, would you then have been suspicious?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because
there is no basis in the evidence for that
hypothesis.
The Court: There is no basis for that
hypothesis.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if he had asked
for them, there is not the slightest doubt
those are the answers he would have gotten,
because that is their deposition.
The Court: I understand.
Mr. Podell: I have the right to ask the
hypothetical question.
I am assuming,
purely hypothetically. This man is an accountant and has attempted to give certain
opinions and conclusions.
Mr. Marshall: You can not rest an hypothesis on an hypothesis.
Mr. Podell: He has given a blanket statement here. He believed in the honesty of
this concern. Why cannot I test what he
would have regarded as suspicious?
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: I except.
Q. Now, if Mr. Stern told you in explanation
that these accounts were fictitious, would you then
have been suspicious? A. More than that.
Q. More than suspicious? A. I would have been
on my way home.
Q. That is the time you would have reached the
suspicious frame of mind? A. I would not have
been suspicious. I would have been on my way
home.
Q. You would? A. Yes.
Q. Did anything of those things that I asked you,
the absence, or assuming you could not find it in the
sales journal, assuming you could not find it in a
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regular invoice, and assuming that you could not
find in the shipping records, because of these things
—none of these things nor all of those things taken
together would have made you suspicious of that
account? A. I don't know about all of these things
taken together.
Q. Well, what is your statement with regard to
all of the things taken together? A. I don't know
what you meant by all of the things taken together.
Q. All of the three things taken together that I
have just mentioned? A. I think it would have a
cause for inquiry.
Q. It would have been a cause for inquiry? A.
Perhaps leading to suspicion.
Q. I believe you have already stated that you did
not communicate with any of the debtors at all?
A. Not of the accounts receivable debtors, no.
Q. Now, supposing in addition to all that I have
stated you found a situation such as appears on
this rubber sales account in the general ledger; just
let us assume you found in addition to what I have
stated
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Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the
question.
The Court: I will allow it,
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. That in the rubber sales account, there is one
summary of the sales for the month, as to all
months of 1923 and all months of 1922, just one
summary for that month. Now, assume that is
what you find in the rubber sales account, and then
in the month of December there are two summaries,
both for over six and seven hundred thousand
dollars respectively, would that have created any
suspicion in your mind?
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Mr. Marshall: Of course, my objection to
the books applies also, I assume, to these
hypothetical questions?
The Court: Yes. Your general objection
is there.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

2171

A. Not by itself.
Q. But taken together with the other things I
have spoken of, the fact that the very last item for
$706,000, the second item for the month of December, 1923, finds no support in the sales journal, and
is made up of these invoices that are a departure
from the usual invoice, and finds no support in the
shipping record, that it is not in the same handwriting as the previous entries in that general ledger,
would all of those things have created a suspicion
in your mind as to the genuineness of those accounts receivable?
Mr. Marshall: This is a hypothetical question, is it?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: Based on a supposed or assumed state of facts.
Mr. Podell: On a supposed state of facts.

2172

Q. What do you say, Mr. Towell? A. That they
would not have occasioned suspicion in themselves.
Q. Even all of those items taken together? A.
No.
Q. I take it from what you say, Mr. Towell, that
you are not of a suspecting nature?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
unfair and improper.
A. I do not think you should say that.
Q. You say you are not?
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Mr. Marshall: Wait a moment, I object
to that question.
Mr. Podell: Have not I a right, your
Honor
The Court: No, sir, because I do not think
that the law requires that an accountant be
of a suspecting nature, as I understand it.
Mr. Podell: Then I have the right to ask
the question.
The Court: You may get his general disposition.
Mr. Podell: That is what I am trying to
get.
The Court: But as a legal proposition it
is quite a different thing.
Mr. Podell: Have I said, your Honor, that
the law requires him to have it?
The Court: No, you have not.
Mr. Podell: But he has said himself that
where there are unusual circumstances the
accountant's rules require him to take unusual precautions.
The Court: That is quite true.
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, is it due to the fact, do
you regard yourself as a credulous or gullible person?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, your
Honor, because it is immaterial, under your
Honor's own statement of the law.
The Court: I think under my statement
of the law it is immaterial.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if they put some
one in there that cannot be aroused to any
suspicion until he finds the thief, we have a
right to show that.
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The Court: What is it that Lord Lopez
says? " I think he is supposed to be a watch
dog but not a blood hound."
Mr. Marshall: Correct.
Mr. Podell: And what does that mean,
your Honor, in this case?
The Court: As to whether or not an accountant is bound to be suspicious.
Mr. Podell: Who has said, your Honor,
that an accountant is bound to be suspicious?
The Court: Nobody.
Mr. Podell: Why should your Honor
begin to lecture on that subject, along those
lines, now?
The Court: For this reason, that I do not
see now the materiality of it. That is the
reason why. Under the objection made by
counsel.
Mr. Podell: I have asked him the question as to whether he regarded himself as a
gullible person.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: Does your Honor think that
is material or immaterial?
The Court: I do not think it is material
and I will so rule.
Mr. Podell: All right. Then I will take
an exception.
The Court: Certainly, sir.
Mr. Podell: I submit your Honor's remarks with regard to Lord Lopez and what
he had to say on the subject are decidedly
prejudicial and I respectfully except to them.
The Court: If they are
Mr. Podell: Because it implies to the
minds of the jury that I require that this
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man should be not a watch dog but a blood
hound. I have made no such requirement.
The Court: I do not think you did, and
if they are, I would very gladly recall them.
Mr. Podell: I do not expect any accountant or any man to be a blood hound. I do
expect him to use ordinary common sense.
The Court: And common care and ordinary care.
Mr. Podell: And that is all the law requires.
The Court: Yes, whether he is suspicious
or not does not make a particle of difference,
and the Court so rules and stands on that
ruling.
Mr. Podell: All right, sir. I think we
have reached the stage where I feel compelled to ask your Honor to withdraw a
juror.
The Court: I decline to do so.
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor's last
remark is decidedly prejudicial.
The Court: I decline to do so.
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except,
Mr. Marshall: I think that Mr. Podell's
remarks to your Honor are exceedingly
prejudicial, also.
The Court: Proceed.
Mr. Marshall: I take exception to Mr.
Podell's lecturing the Court.
Mr. Podell : Do you want to withdraw a
juror?
Mr. Marshall: No. I take an exception.
The Court: Do you join in that request?
Mr. Marshall: No, your Honor. I took
an exception to Mr. Podell's statements to
your Honor, because I thought that they
were improper statements.

2179

2180

2181

728
2182

Sydney

Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

The Court: Now, his Honor will take care
of himself, don't you let that worry you.
I will take care of myself and I will take
care of my record.
Mr. Podell: Y o u r Honor does not mean to
require this or any other man to be a watch
dog and not a blood hound?
The Court: I do not, and if you feel it is
prejudicial the Court willingly withdraws it.
By Mr.

Podell,

Q. Now, Mr. Towell

2183
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Mr. Podell: Coming back to the same
question, does your Honor exclude my question relating to his gullibility?
The Court: Yes, sir. I have already done
so.
Q. Mr. Towell, did you check up on the assigned
accounts? A. I determined the total amount of the
assigned accounts.
Q. Is that all that you did? A. Yes.
Q. Did you communicate to check up as to assigned notes which were pledged as collateral? A .
Not specifically for that purpose.
Q. I did not ask you for any purpose. I asked
you whether you communicated with the holders
of notes that had been assigned as collateral, notes
receivable? A. Yes, I believe we did.
Q. Every one of them? A. Every one that we
had a record of, I believe.
Q. Did you communicate with the people to whom
accounts receivable had been assigned as collateral?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you receive answer from them? A. From
some of them.
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Q. You have stated that the accounts receivable
ledger did not contain any entries showing to whom
those accounts had been assigned? A. I don't remember so stating.
Q. Well, is that a fact? A. I don't know whether
it is or not.
Q. As you recall that ledger, that accounts receivable ledger, did it or did it not contain any
entry showing to whom those accounts have been
assigned? A. I don't recall that.
Q. I do not suppose it will be any help to you,
Mr. Towell, if I show you the accounts receivable
ledger? Would it? A. Probably not.
Q. You could not recognize that either, could
you? A. I don't think so.
Q. You do not think so? A. No.
Q. Do you remember comparing the accounts receivable ledger that was produced with your working sheets and find that eighty of those accounts
were exactly the same on your working sheets and
on the accounts receivable ledger? A. I recall
making a check here on the stand of certain names
and balances of accounts to about that number.
Q. "We found"—I am reading from page 1279
of Mr. Towell's testimony under 21-A: "We found
that the accounts receivable themselves as I remember now, contained no record of assignments."
Do you recall making that statement? A. The record shows I made it.
Q. Do you recall making that statement? A. No,
not distinctly.
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated that he
made that statement?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
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Q. Well now, do you say now whether that statement was true or not? A. Yes, I believe it was true.
Q. You believe it was true? A. Yes.
Q. Do your work sheets contain any records of
assignments——

2189

Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to have
the full sentence though, Mr. Podell, do you
not think so?
Mr. Podell: That is in the accounts receivable ledger. That is what I am talking
about. I will give you the full sentence.
"We found that the accounts receivables
themselves as I remember now contained no
record of assignments. That is in the accounts receivable ledger."
Q. Now, in your work sheets does that purport
to be a record of assignments of accounts which
was taken from the accounts receivable ledger? A.
No.
Q. Have you got that particular working sheet?
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Mr. Marshall: I did not realize what the
next question was going to be. I think it is
only fair then for Mr. Podell to read the
next sentence of the witness' testimony in
that other matter.
The Court: You may read it, Mr. Marshall, when the time comes. This is his crossexamination.
Mr. Marshall: Excepting that I think, in
all fairness he should not read part of a
statement to the witness and cross-examine
him on it where the rest explains the former
part.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr, Marshall: Exception.
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Q. Now, the sheet that you produced is what, Mr.
Towell? A. The list of accounts receivable of Fred
Stern & Company as at December 31st, 1923.
Mr. Marshall: I think it is marked in evidence, fifteen something or other.
The Witness: 15-A.
Q. You understand the things that are contained
in these papers, do you not? A. Yes.
Q. They are part of your working sheets in this
audit? A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell this jury what this No. 8 in
parenthesis is? A. The No. 8 is to indicate the
Metropolitan Trust Company, I believe.
Q. The "8" in parenthesis indicates it stands for
the Metropolitan Trust Company? A. Yes.
Q. And how do you arrive at that, how do you
know that No. 8 represents the Metropolitan Trust
Company? A. Because there is an index of the
numbers used.
Q. And that index is at the top of the page? A.
Yes.
Q. And opposite that No. 8 is the word "Metropolitan Trust Company"? A. Yes.
Q. And opposite the particular account of $12,476.97 is the No. 8? A. Yes.
Q. And that leads you to infer that that account
was assigned to the Metropolitan Trust Company?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that is right, is it? A. Yes.
Q. You have got other numbers in this index that
we speak of. 7 stands for the Chemical National
Bank, does it not? A. Yes.
Q. 4 stands for Huth & Company, does it not?
A. Yes.

2192

2193

732
2194

2195

Sydney Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

Q. 9 stands for the Central Trust Company? A.
Yes.
Q. And 14 stands for J. B. Moores? A. Yes.
Q. And 16 stands for Bank of New York? A.
Yes.
Q. And along these accounts receivable you have
got respective numbers 8, 16, 8, 16 and 7? A. Yes.
Q. Opposite the different accounts? A. Yes.
Q. Notice that some of them have several numbers? A. Yes.
Q. That did not mean that the same account had
been assigned to several different parties, did it?
A. I don't think so.
Q. What did it mean? A. I don't know.
The Court: A little louder, Mr. Witness.
I cannot hear you.
The Witness: I don't know.
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Q. You do not know what it means? A. No.
Q. Did you not tell this jury a moment ago that
you understood everything on these sheets? A. I
didn't mean that literally with regard to every abbreviation, every reference mark and everything
put down here as the result of my thought on the
subject five years ago.
Q. I see. In other words— A. I understand
Q. When it comes to an account which according
to that number which seemed to indicate that it
was assigned to four different parties, then of
course you cannot understand it?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a conclusion that does not follow. That is not a
question but a statement.
Q. Can you?
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The Court: Is that a question, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: I think it is a fair question,
your Honor. I have asked him as to whether
that number opposite the account indicates
an assignment to a particular party which
has that number. Now he has an account
here with four different numbers, and I am
asking him whether that would not indicate
to him that there were four different assignments of the same account.
The Court: I will allow it in the form
that you have just asked it.
Mr. Podell: I will reframe it.
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection in the
form you have asked it now.
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Q. Would that indicate that to you or are you
in a frame of mind where you do not understand it?
The Court: I beg your pardon?
Mr. Podell: In the alternative. I am adding to the question, with your Honor's permission.
Q. Would that mean that it has been assigned to
four different parties or are you in a frame of mind
where you do not understand that item?
Mr. Marshall: I object to the frame of
mind. If he wants to see if he does not understand it, all right.
Mr. Podell: All right, I will cut out the
frame of mind and say, or don't you understand it?
The Witness: I do not understand it, the
significance of the four numbers to-day.
Q. Opposite the same account?

A. Yes.
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Q. All right, now, we will find out something
about it. By the way, those numbers are in your
own handwriting, are they not, Mr. Towell? A. No.
Q. In whose handwriting are they? A. In Mr.
Siess'.
Q. Is it on a sheet that contains your handwriting, is it not? A. Yes.
Q. Pardon me just one moment, I want to be
sure that I have got the right book. I want to show
you, Mr. Towell—I do not suppose you recall this
book that I am going to show you now at all, do
you (handing to witness)? You have no recollection of this book? A. No.
Mr. Podell: We are speaking of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 in evidence, which purports
to be—you will admit that this purports to
be the accounts receivable ledger, is that
right ? It seems to be an accounts receivable
ledger?
The Witness: Yes, sir.

2202

Q. Now, we talked about No. 8 at the top of your
work sheets. Do you see that No. 8 in the same
kind of a circle or parenthesis in the accounts receivable ledger? A. I see the No. 8 there, yes.
Q. Now, we talked about a No. 16, 14 and 16. Do
you see it opposite certain accounts here, 14 and
16? A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall these numbers at all opposite
these accounts in the accounts receivable ledger?
A. No.
Q. Where was this key gotten from? This is a
key, is it not, of the numbers and opposite the numbers the names of bank assignees? A. Yes,
Q, Where was it gotten from? A. From Mr.
Romberg.
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Q. From his mind? A. No. From a record that
he kept in his office, in Fred Stern's office.
Q. W e l l now, won't yon be good enough to look
through as many of these accounts receivable as
you please, and tell this jury whether it is not true
that every one of them—I am speaking now not of
every account but every one of the general accounts,
not of every item in the account—contains parenthesis with numbers opposite to them which are
similar to the key numbers? Just look it through
and see if that is not so? A . Here is an account
that does not seem to have key numbers in parenthesis (indicating).
Q. Whose account is that? A . E. G. Curry &
Company.
Q. E. G. Curry & Company. W e will make a
note of that. H o w about the others? I want to
be sure that you have not overlooked some of these
parentheses. Turn to the Ceylon Produce Manufacturing Company and you have the numbers in
parenthesis in a number of these items? A. On a
number of items but not on all of them. Cordux
Company, that does not appear
Q. W a i t a moment. A. That does not appear to
have any numbers in parenthesis.
Q. Do you happen to know what " C D " and " P
R " and " C R " — w h a t they mean? A. They are
reference marks probably to other books.
Q. Now, you take the account of Cooper Corporation, and you find numbers 7, 9, 4, 8 all along the
line? A . Cooper Company; some of them are designated with a number in parenthesis. Some of them
are not.
Q. W i l l you turn to the account of International
Shoe Company, and you will find a number of accounts with these small key numbers opposite them?
A. And some without.

2203

2204

2205

736
2206

2207

Sydney Towell—For

Q. And some without. You say a number without, Mr. Towell. Just analyze that for a moment.
Here is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15 with numbers
opposite them? A. Yes.
Q. And 1, 2—that is also one? A. Yes.
Q. 1, 2, 3—three without numbers? A. Yes.
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, have we gone far enough so
you could tell this jury whether you have any recollection at all of seeing these numbers in the accounts receivable ledger at the time and using them
in connection with your work sheets? A. I have no
recollection of so doing.
Q. I t has gone out of your mind altogether? A .
I don't think that I did that.
Q. Well, whether you personally did it or not,
have you any recollection of having discussed it
with anybody at any time?
Mr. Marshall:
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Discussed what?

Q. Have you discussed this matter of having
numbers opposite the accounts that were key numbers to whom the accounts had been assigned? A .
No.
Q. Did Mr. Siess tell you anything about that?
A. No.
Q. Now, what book was it that you made up your
statement of accounts receivable from? A. From
the accounts receivable ledger.
Q. Look at this book and tell us—I know you
cannot identify it as the particular accounts receivable ledger, but just look at it and tell us
whether it purports to be an accounts receivable
ledger for the year 1923? A. It appears to be an
accounts receivable ledger for more than the year
1923.
Q. That is, at least it includes at least the year
1923? A. I t seems to.
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Q. And is not that the book in connection with
which you identified every one of your accounts,
found them in that book, found them in the order
in which you have them; do you remember that, at
the beginning of the trial? A. No, I don't remember
identifying the accounts.
Q. W e do not want to keep the Judge and jury
waiting while you are doing it, but will you please,
between now and to-morrow morning, check up that
book and answer us whether you can find—and tell
us where your sheets contain exactly the accounts
receivable as they are set forth in this accounts receivable ledger, and in the order in which they are
set forth in the accounts receivable ledger? Will
you make a note of that and do that for us between
now and to-morrow morning, please, Mr. Towell?
You know what I want? A. I did about 50 per cent.
of the accounts receivable for you.
Q. And did you find from the 50 per cent. that
you did, that it tallied exactly, that is, the order
was exactly the same? A. The order and the balance.
Q. And the name of the balance and the amounts,
the amounts? A. The balance.
Q. The balance of each account? A. Yes. The
balance of each account.
Q. That is what I call amounts, the balance of
each account? A. Yes.
Q. Tallied exactly with this book? A. Yes.
Q. But you have no recollection of those numbers
opposite the accounts? A. No.
Q. Now, Mr. Towell, I want you to tell the Judge
and the jury, please—I am going to put the question
just as plainly as I can—did you find in your investigation that a number of accounts receivable
had been assigned, the same account, as of a speci-

2209

2210

2211

738
2212

2213

Sydney Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

fled date, had been assigned to different people? A.
I saw a number of cases where that had occurred.
Q. Now, is that a usual thing? A. I would not
say so.
Q. Is it an honest thing for a creditor who has
somebody owing him money to assign that account
to several people at the same time? A. I don't
know that they did do that.
Q. But assuming now that you find that state of
affairs that you have described, and assuming that
they did it, would you consider it an honest thing?
A. No.
Q. Now, have you taken the position previously
that you cannot explain that situation as you found
it? A. I don't think that I have.
Q. Don't you know that your superior took that
position? A. No, I do not.
Q. I will read from pages 1392 and 1393 of the
testimony of Mr. Rea, in the bankruptcy proceeding
Mr. Marshall: I object to reading what
Mr. Rea may have known or may not have
known, as immaterial.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.

2214

Q. Mr. Rea was your superior in this audit, was
he not? A. Yes, he was.
Q. "The fact that we have a letter from Bingham
& Company stating that the accounts assigned to
them and no statement on our work sheets that
Frederick Stern & Company had reported accounts
as having been assigned to them, would call for
some memorandum at least as to what was the reason for that. There is none there. I cannot explain it." Did you know that Mr. Rea had made
such a statement as that?
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being
immaterial, what Mr. Rea may have known.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. What is your answer? A. I don't recall that
he made the statement. I don't remember whether
I was present or not.
Q. I read you the exact part of it as it appears
in this book: "Well"
Mr. Marshall: What page?
Mr. Podell: Page 1392, examination of
Mr. Rea.
Mr. Marshall: He has already read it,
your Honor. He is going to read it over
again.
Mr. Podell: I want to read it right from
the book, your Honor, and ask this witness
whether he knew of the existence of this
statement by his superior.
Mr. Marshall: But he has already asked
him that.
The Court: Is that different from the extract you were reading from?
Mr. Podell: It may be a little different,
because I think my extract was condensed.
It omitted the question. I only had the answer.
The 'Court: Would that make the answer
any different now, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: No. If your Honor thinks
I ought not to read it again, I will not read
it.
The Court: He has answered it.
Q. Now, do you agree with this, Mr. Towell: "If
more than one account had been assigned doubly,
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the more they found the worse it would have looked.
It would be his, the accountant's duty to go into
it to the fullest extent and find out what the real
facts are." Do you agree with that statement? A.
Yes, substantially.
Q. Do you know that statement was made by
your superior, Mr. Rea? A. No, I do not know that.
Q. Page 1391 of the record.
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Mr. Marshall: This record or the bankruptcy record?
Mr. Podell: The bankruptcy record.
Mr. Marshall:
What page was that,
please?
Mr. Podell: 1391. I may have done the
same thing, Mr. Marshall, and that is why
I prefer to read from the record itself. I
may have omitted or briefed some parts of
it,
Mr. Marshall: If you give us the page
number so we can follow, it will be all right.
Mr. Podell: The top of the page:
"Q. Suppose, Mr. Rea, that your examination
discovered that there had been one account so assigned to two or three different banks, what would
have been the ordinary result or what effect would
that have had on you? A. Why, a single account
would not necessarily have meant anything. W e
would have inquired about it and the probable answer would have been, 'Well, that is a mistake; in
listing that account for the bank we got this to the
other bank; that should have been to somebody
else.' I am answering now if there had been only
one account.
"Q. Well, if there had been more than one account? A. The more they had found, the worse it
would have looked.
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"Q. What would the accountant do in such a
situation? A. I t would be his duty to go into it
to the fullest extent and find out what the real facts
are."
Q. Now, you agree with that, do you? A. Substantially, yes.
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, you told this jury
that you were quite satisfied with the explanation
that Romberg gave. Is not that what you said to
this jury, that you were satisfied with the explanation that Romberg gave? A. I don't remember so
stating.
Q. With reference to the assigned accounts? A.
2222
With reference to the assigned accounts?
Q. Yes. A. I don't recall the explanation referred to.
Q. Did you not testify that Mr. Romberg kept a
private memorandum, that he gave you his list
of assigned accounts, that it was larger than any
other list you could find, and that you thought it
was the fair thing to take his list because it was
the largest; did you not say that? A. Not all of
that.
Q. Well, what part of it did you not say? A.
Substantially all of it, but not that he Kept a
private account.
Q. Was that one of the regular books of account
that Mr. Romberg had in that connection? A. It 2223
was a book kept by him as an employee of the corporation.
Q. Was it one of the regular books of account?
A. I would say so.
Q. What would you call it? Was it a journal
or a ledger, or anything that had a scientific name,
an accountant's name? A. No. It was in the nature
of a memorandum record.
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Q. A little black book of his own, is what you
called it, is it not? A. No.
Q. A little private book of his own? A. No, it
was not of his own.
Q. Is not that how you characterized it? A. No.
Q. Did you find that out in the examination? Of
course, the inquiries that you made did not satisfy
you, did it? A. Yes.
Q. Y o u did write inquiries to the banks and
other concerns, to find out whether they held any
of these accounts as collateral? A. Yes.
Q. Did you not tell this jury that the responses
that you got satisfied you? A. No.
Q. Your answer is that they were anything but
satisfying, is not that right? A. It did not disclose what we thought they might disclose had they
all replied.
Q. Without using a general phrase, did those responses give you a satisfactory explanation as to
why single accounts should be assigned to different
people at a certain specified time? A. No.
Q. They did not, As a matter of fact, did they
not all the more arouse your suspicion of something
dishonest? A. No.
Q. Well, the transaction itself, I believe, you
have stated is a dishonest one, that is, for a creditor
to assign the same account as collateral to different
people at the same time; that is a dishonest thing,
is it not? A. Yes, if that is a fact, it is dishonest.
Q. So we will all understand each other, is it
not one of the primary functions of an accountant
when he audits a set of books and examines them
for a year, to determine whether he is dealing with
an honest set of books or a crooked set of books;
is not that one of the prime functions that an accountant performs? A. It is not a prime function.
I t is something that he would in the natural course
of events decide for himself, not primarily.
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Q. Well, I am not now—I am not now saying
what in the course of time he might decide. You
know how easy it is to be deceived, do you not?
You know how easy it is to be deceived, do you not,
in figures at times, with reference to specific items?
Do you not know how easy it is at times to be deceived with reference to specific items? A. No.
Q. You do not know? A. No, I don't know how
easy it is.
Q. You do not know how easy it is to be deceived? A. No.
Q. In any event, in the performance of your duty
as an accountant, do you not regard it as one of
the main objects of your job, when you are auditing,
to find out whether you are dealing with an honest
man, that is, in the keeping of the books, an honest
man or a dishonest man? A. That is not the main
object of auditing.
Q. I did not say it was the main object. Is it
not one of the main objects? A. It is not one of
the objects.
Q. Is it not one of the main functions then, is it
not one of the main considerations, if you want it
that way? A. Yes, a main consideration, I would
say.
Q. You would not certify to the honesty of a
financial statement .as of a certain time if you believed that the man and his books were dishonest,
would you? A. I would not,
Q. You would not give such a certification where
you had a strong suspicion as to his honesty? A.
No.
Q. Or any suspicion reasonably founded as to the
man's honesty, would you? A. No.
Q. An accountant should not do those things,
should he? A. I don't think so.
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Q. Now, then, do tell us, please, whether if it is
true that in the very letters that were written to
Touche, Niven & Co., by Huth & Company and
Bingham & Company, there was not in writing,
direct evidence to you, that Stern & Company was
keeping a dishonest set of books at least in the assignment of accounts? A. I don't think that there
was.
Q. Do you recall on many accounts appears from
those two letters when you compare them with the
black book or the little book or whatever memorandum book that you call it, that you believed in
from Mr. Romberg—how many of those accounts
appeared to be assigned to more than one concern
at the same time? A. I don't know that.
Q. You never checked it? A. No.
Q. You did know that there were a number?
A. I knew that several differences cropped up
either between the letters or the list of assigned
accounts that I obtained.
Q. Some of the banks that you made inquiry of
wrote you that they would not give you the information, but if you will give them a list of the assigned
accounts, purporting to be assigned to that bank,
they would check it up for you; do you remember
that? A. I haven't the recollection of it. It may
be in the working papers.
Q. Well, do you not remember that? Who else
besides Huth & Company and Bingham & Company
answered, giving a list of the accounts that had
been assigned to them? A. I don't know, not offhand. That is shown by the working papers.
Q. Now, you saw the letter of Bingham & Company, did you not? You saw that letter, did you
not? A. Yes, if it is one of the letters on my
papers here.
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Q. Will you be good enough to take that letter
and look over your list on your working sheets and
tell us whether a single account that Bingham &
Company claim to have assigned to them as of December 31st, appears in your working sheets as belonging to Bingham & Company, a single one? Now,
to facilitate you, Mr. Towell—it is getting a little
late and we want to get through—I am going to
read you from the letter of Bingham & Company.
The Court: He has it there in the working sheets, has he not?
Mr. Podell: I am going to read from a
copy.
Q. Mr. Towell, perhaps that will help us get at
the fact a little quicker. Letter of January 12th,
from Bingham & Company, says: "In accordance
with your letter of the 3rd inst., we enclose herewith"—this is a letter addressed to Touche-Niven
—"statement of account of Messrs. Fred Stern &
Company of New York and Messrs. William
Brandt's Sons & Company, of London, as of December 31, 1923. Very truly yours, Bingham &
Company."
Bingham & Company, your Honor, were the
agents here for Brandt & Sons. Now, first, we will
take the collateral account, in the middle of the
page. Have you got that before you? A. Yes, I
have.
Q. Now, will you turn to your work sheets, the
first one that they claimed belonged to them was an
item of $3,255.71, an account receivable from the
Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Company, for fifty
cases of rubber, November 20, 1923. Have you got
that on your work sheets, and tell us, if you have
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it, to whom is that account assigned according to
your work sheets? A. I don't see the account on
my work sheets.
Q. As a matter of fact, there is a credit balance
to that account of $8.99. Does that help you any?
A. No.
Q. As a matter of fact, is that very first account
contained in the accounts receivable ledger at all,
do you know, or was it? A. Not from what I see
here.
Q. So that your statement is that you could not
find the account in the books at all, according to
your work sheet. Now, will you look at your work
sheet, page 64, fourth item, under "S", Safety Insulating Wire & Cable Company, 114 Liberty
Street. Have you got that? A. Page 104?
Q. Page 64 of your work sheets, Mr. Towell,
please. A. Yes.
Q. Do you notice the Safety Insulating Wire &
Cable Company? A. Yes.
Q. Did Stern owe them money or do they owe
Stern money, which, according to your work sheets?
A. According to my work sheets, Stern owed the
Safety Insulating Wire & Cable Company $8.99.
Q. As of December 31st? A. Yes.
Q. Now, this is the very first item in Bingham's
letter, and Bingham's claim is that he held an account that had been assigned to him, where the
Safety Insulating Wire & Cable Company owed
Stern $3,255.71. You notice that, do you not? A.
Yes.
Q. You could find no such account in Stern's
books, could you? A. I don't know.
Q. What do your work sheets show? A. My
work sheets show what you have recited, that
Bingham & Company reported that they held an
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invoice $3,255.71; they give the name of the account as the Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Company. I have no such item in the trial balance of
accounts receivable.
Q. In fact, the only item that there was in the
trial balance was that Stern owed $8.99 to this
Safety Company? A. Yes.
Q. Have you any explanation to furnish for that,
Mr. Towell? A. Only that possibly Bingham &
Company are not right.
Q. Possibly Bingham & Company? A. Yes.
Q. Romberg is right? A. No, I don't say that he
was.
Q. But Romberg told you, did he not—what did
you do to investigate? A. I was trying to find out
what the total amount of accounts receivable assigned was, and he indicated the total accounts that
were assigned.
Q. Pardon me, but you did more than that—you
asked for a detailed statement from Bingham &
Company of the accounts they were holding? A. I
thought they would report the total.
Q. But your inquiry, your letter—you read your
letter? A. Yes.
Q. Your letter called for a detailed statement of
the accounts assigned, did it not? A. Yes.
Q. And you got what you asked for? A. In that
case, yes.
Q. Did you communicate with Bingham & Company and tell them that they were not right in making that statement? A. No.
Q. Did you put into the financial statement that
you issued a note or qualification that claims were
being made by people as holding accounts receivable as collateral, and that those claims were not
well founded? A. No.
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Q. Did you put any qualifying statement in your
financial statement? A. I think the certificate
speaks for itself.
Q. Of that character? A. No, not of that character.
Q. Now, of course, we will always assume that if
you find one instance that is not regular or does
not accord with the books, which might be a mistake— A. No, I don't agree with that.
Q. Well, you said that here, as in this instance,
Bingham & Company were not right? A. Yes.
Q. And it may be that Bingham & Company had
made a mistake? A. It may be.
Q. Sure. Well now, here you take that next
item, Guttapercha & Rubber Manufacturing Company account for $1,857.23, that Bingham & Company claim; now, what did your work sheets taken
from Romberg's little black book, show on that?
Mr. Marshall: I do not see why Mr.
Podell should limit the size of that black
book.
Mr. Podell: That is what he called it in
his examination under 21-A and I will show
that to him.
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Q. What is your answer? A. That the account
was assigned.
Q. To whom? A, Using the reference marks as
they are recorded here, it was assigned to the
Chemical National.
Q. Well, using Romberg's book?
The Court: Using Romberg's book, what?
Q. Using Romberg's book, whom would it appear
to have been assigned to, that Guttapercha and
Mfg. Company account? A. The Chemical National,
I believe.
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Q. The Chemical National. Now here you found
a situation—by the way, do you know Bingham &
Company? A. No.
Q. Do you know Brandt & Sons? A. No.
Q. Did you look up the invoice, a copy invoice
of that assigned account? A. No.
Q. You know, did you not, that the usual practice
and procedure is that when an account is assigned
that you send a copy of that assigned account with
an assignment endorsed on the face thereof, to the
person to whom you are assigning the account; you
knew that, did you not? A. I believe they sent both
that and the original invoice to the person that received the assigned account.
Q. Now, here was a situation where Bingham &
Company was claiming that it was the holder of the
account as collateral $1,857.23. Your records or
Romberg's records or the little key number showed
it belonged to the Chemical National Bank? A.
No, they do not.
Q. Don't they? A. No, they show there is an
assignment, which I cannot tell from here, of an
account totalling $4,249. The assignment you are
speaking of to the Guttapercha Rubber Company's
invoice of $1,857 is to Bingham & Company.
Q. Is not that included in the $4,249.22? A.
Yes, but I don't know whether it was possible for
there to have been a division of the two items. The
two items are not the same.
Q. Now, my dear sir, you were in there to find
out. You were there at that time to find out, were
you not? A. No, I was not there to find that out.
Q. To find out if any of these items that you say
appeared to have been assigned to two different
people, would be evidence of dishonesty—can you
not tell this jury whether the $1857 is included in
the $4249? A. Yes, it Avas included in it,
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Q. It was included? A. Yes, no doubt.
Q. In other words, all that the Guttapercha Rubber Manufacturing Company owed for this was, a
genuine account of $4,249.22? A. Yes.
Q. And yet you stated, have you not, that your
records, your work sheets, show that it had all been
assigned as collateral to the Chemical National
Bank? A. No, they don't show that the whole
amount had been assigned to the Chemical National
at all. The key merely indicates that the account
or part of it is assigned.
Q. Part of it is assigned? A. The account or part
of it is assigned to the Chemical National. Whether there are any errors in taking off this key, I
brought no particular examination on to that point,
knowing at the start off that it was impossible for
me to check out assigned accounts.
Q. Now, let us go along and get the information
first, and then you can make these arguments, but
will you please turn
Mr. Marshall: I object to his qualifying
the witness' statements as arguments when
he just answers a question Mr. Podell puts.
Mr. Podell: All I ask him was a simple
question. I asked him whether it is not so,
that the full account had been assigned to
the Chemical National and he said
Q. And your answer was that it is not so but only
a part had been assigned? A. That is not my answer at all.
Q. What is your answer, that you do not know?
A. My answer is that you cannot tell from this
sheet whether all of it or part of it was assigned to
the Chemical National but you can tell that all of
the account was assigned to somebody.
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Q. Yes. Now, will you turn over to the very next
page of your work sheet and tell us whether it is
not true that where one account is partly assigned
to one institution and partly to another, that your
work sheets have so indicated? Will you look at
the item of an account of $128,789 that you have
there split up into two parts, having two separate
numbers opposite those parts, Mishawaka Rubber
Manufacturing Company, the first item under "M"?
A. Yes, I have it.
Q. You have it separated there, have you not?
A. Out of a total of the account of $167,000.
Q. Part was assigned to one and part to another, 2252
and the rest did not appear to be assigned, and have
you so indicated on there? A. Yes, I have indicated
that.
Q. Now, have you got anything on your work
sheets that shows that this Guttapercha Rubber account for at least $1,857 of it had been assigned to
Bingham? Is there anything on your work sheets
that indicates that? A. Only the letter that we have
been referring to, which is part of the work sheets.
Q. I am not talking about the letters. The letter is the thing that came from Bingham, that made
the claim of that assignment to Bingham? A. Yes.
Q. I am talking now about the work sheets that
you have, where there is a list of assigned accounts?
A. No. I have nothing other than the letter, which 2253
is part of the work sheets.
Q. Now, according to that letter, and according
to your work sheet records, the two are inconsistent, are they not? A. I cannot say that.
Q. You mean to say that part of that $4200
might have been assigned to Bingham without there
being any record of it on your work sheets? A. It
may have.
Q. It still may have? A. I think so.
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Q. Then your work sheets would not be correct,
would they? A. Not if that were the case.
Q. If that were the case then your work sheets
would not be correct? Then either Bingham was
wrong again or your work sheets were wrong? A.
One or the other.
Q. One or the other? A. Yes.
Q. And you concluded Bingham was wrong, did
you not? A. No. I didn't conclude anything.
Q. You came to no conclusion at all on the subject? A. No, except I couldn't check them up.
Q. Could not check them up, is that the statement? A. The total.
Q. You have frequently said that you tried to
check them up in total. Do your work sheets indicate any efforts on your part to check them up in
total? Just point it out if it does. A. The attempt
was not recorded on the working papers. The decision was recorded on the working papers.
Q. The what? A. The decision of what to do is
recorded on the working papers, and shows on the
sheets we have been discussing.
Q. What was Romberg's total? A. I beg your
pardon?
Q. What was Romberg's total of assigned accounts? A. This $903,285.
Q. What was the banks' total? A. I don't remember that figure.
Q. Have you got it anywhere on your working
sheets? A. No, I don't think so.
Q. You told this jury that Romberg's total exceeded the banks' total? A. Yes.
Q. And that is why you took Romberg's figure;
is that right; is that what you said? A. That is not
the only reason, just because it exceeded.
Q. That was one of the reasons? A. Yes.
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Q. You have got nothing among your work sheets
to show that you ever computed the banks' totals,
have you? A. I don't think so.
Q. And your work sheets are supposed to be complete, are they not? A. Oh, no, not by any means.
Q. Have you destroyed any of them? A. No, I
have not, I would destroy any scraps of paper I
might make a calculation on during the progress
of the work. I do not record everything on the
work sheets.
Q. Then is it your intention to have the jury understand that you did make a calculation of the
banks' claims? A. Yes, I would like them to understand that.
Q. You knew at the same time that a number of
the banks did not give you the information? A.
Yes.
Q. And you did not have the figures supplied by,
the banks? A. I didn't have all of them. The calculation
Q. Let me read you one letter that a bank wrote,
and ask you a question about that, Do you remember the response from the Central Trust & Savings
Company, January 11th, saying: "Yours of the
3rd received and at the close of business as of December 31, 1923, Fred Stern & Company owed us
$165,714.72, secured by customers' acceptances and
assigned accounts for us, valued at $209,246.17. It
is rather difficult for us to give you the details of
this obligation, and if you will make up a list of
the acceptances and accounts, we will endeavor to
check them on our books and certify to the correctness of the same. Yours very truly," signed by the
vice-president. You know this is not an unusual
letter to get from a bank in that connection, is it?
A. It is unusual in my experience.
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Q. Do you not know that banks very frequently
give you totals and refuse you—or rather ask you
to submit details ? Do you not know that happens
very often in this connection? A. It is not frequent.
Q. But it does happen? A. It does happen, yes.
Q. Now, ordinary courtesy requires that an answer be sent on to this bank, does it not?
Mr. Marshall: Is Mr. Podell posing as an,
expert on courtesy now?
Mr. Podell: I am assuming that your
client is, Mr. Marshall.
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Q. Do you not think, just as a matter of courtesy,
even, that you should have written to that bank, giving them a detailed statement, as you had it? A.
I don't think on the basis of courtesy they should
have had a reply.
Q. On what basis? On what basis should you
have done it? A. On no basis that I know of.
Q. You mean you should not have done it at all,
is that it? A. That is it.
Q. In spite of the fact that in this Bingham letter you find a number of items claimed by Bingham
which even according to Romberg's records were
not right, conflicting claims to the same account; in
spite of that fact, you still think that you were not
at all required to respond to this letter of the bank
and give them the details? A. Yes, I think that is
so.
Q. You think that? A. Yes.
Q. The fact of the matter is that you never responded; is not that so?
The Court: To the bank.
Q. That you never did respond to this letter of
the bank asking for a detailed statement, did you?
A. I don't recall responding.
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Q. You would have a copy of such a letter, would
you not, in your files? A. I wouldn't have it with
the working papers. At least I think not.
Mr. Marshall: There was no response.
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated there was no
response? Is that right?
Mr. Marshall: Yes. This witness has been
on the stand five and a half hours to-day
The Court: We will be finished in a little
while.
Q. Did you not say this morning that there was
no way you could follow up this inquiry further?
A. I didn't get one of those words.
Q. Did you not state this morning there was no
way you could follow up these inquiries as to assigned accounts any further? A. Any further than
I did.
Q. Any further than you did? A. Than I did.
Q. Here was an invitation by the bank, to let
them have a detailed statement of the accounts that
had been assigned. They stated they will certify
to the correctness of it; written by the Vice President of the Central Trust & Savings Company.
Why did you not regard this as a further opportunity to check up on the accounts assigned? A.
Because I didn't think at the time that it was
necessary.
Q. You believed in Romberg? A. And in all the
records that were kept by him.
Q. And all the records that you found? A. Yes.
Q. Including the records of inventory that you
had found? A. Yes,
Q. Now then, just so that we might save time,
can you say to this jury whether a single one of
these numerous accounts that Bingham & Company
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claimed as collateral, appear on your working
sheets as having been assigned to Brandt & Sons
or Bingham? The number are twenty-one of accounts receivable, invoices, assigned invoices of
merchandise. Can you state whether there is a
single one of them that appears in your working
sheets to have been assigned either to Brandt or to
Bingham? A. I cannot say that offhand. I would
have to check through.
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Mr. Podell: That is something, I take it,
your Honor, we will do over night. I do not
know how long your Honor intends to sit.
The Court: Do I remember that other request you made regarding those other items?
Mr. Podell: I think, your Honor
The Court: Because it is understood that
he examined fifty per cent. Was that sufficient for you?
Mr. Podell: I think the witness said he
checked up on fifty per cent. and that was
sufficient for my purposes. As an added precaution, I will ask him to check up on the
other fifty per cent, I am glad your Honor
suggested it. Mr. Towell, will you be good
enough to check up the other fifty per cent.?
Mr. Marshall: I think the witness would
like a little time to do his work.
The Court: Was the answer he gave as
to the fifty per cent, satisfactory to you?
Mr. Podell: I t was satisfactory to me,
but I think undoubtedly it would be more
satisfactory if he checked up as to the other
fifty per cent.
Mr. Marshall: The witness has to attend
to some business, I believe, some time during
the day.
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Mr. Podell: If they will take our statement for these, we will be glad to check it
up ourselves and save him that. We have
no desire to annoy this witness.
The Court: I just want to have that
clarified, so when you meet the situation in
the morning, we will know where we stand.
I do not care whether he checks it up or not,
and neither do you, Mr. Podell, I suppose,
but I just want the situation clarified so he
understands what we are about,
Mr. Podell: Mr. Towell, if you will do
. that? Can you do it between now and tomorrow morning? You said you checked up
fifty per cent, for me. Will you check up
the other fifty per cent. and make it 100
per cent. I will offer in that connection
to do it either myself or by an accountant,
if they will accept my statement that they
tally.
Mr. Marshall: If you do it yourself, I
will accept it.
Mr. Podell: That is a statement, that you
are going to accept my word for it.
Mr. Marshall: If you do it yourself.
The Court: Tomorrow morning, gentlemen, at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon at 4:30 o'clock P. M., adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, April 10, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.)
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New York, April 10, 1929,
10 o'clock A. M.
EIGHTH DAY.

Trial
Same Continued.
appearances.
SYDNEY TOWELL, witness on behalf of the defendant, resumed, further testified as follows:

Cross-examination (continued) by Mr. Podell.
2273
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Q. Have you been able to check those things,
Mr. Towell? I mean the letter from Bingham? A.
I have looked over the items you asked me to,
yesterday.
Q. How many are there altogether under collateral, in the way of accounts receivable that Bingham claimed that were assigned to Brandt? A.
Their letter gives a list of twenty-one invoices.
Q. On your working sheets, did you give Bingham or Brandt credit for a single one of those invoices? Do you note on your work sheets that they
were the owners or held as collateral a single one
of those invoices? A. No, I do not.
Q. NOW, there appears at the head of the letter
from Bingham a list of notes or acceptances assigned to them, is that right? Have you the letter
or did I keep it, Mr. Towell? A. Yes, I have the
letter.
Q. You have the original? A. Yes, that is right;
there is a list of drafts due them, stated in Sterling.
Q. Just what were they, just so that the jury and
his Honor will understand, Mr. Towell, in the
schedule of collateral that you received from Bing-
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ham & Company there are two sections; one section
deals with these twenty-one accounts that you
speak of? A. Yes.
Q. That they claimed was assigned to them as
collateral? A. Yes.
Q. Now, the other section deals with what?
Gives a list of what? A. A list of amounts owing
by Fred Stern to William Brandt Sons & Company.
Q. Was that merely the list of advances made by
Brandt Sons to Stern & Company on Letters of
Credit? A. Yes.
Q. And it is not a list of collateral of any kind?
A. No.
Q. The first is the draft account, is not that
right? A. Yes.
Q. And the second is the collateral account? A.
Yes.
Mr. Podell (to the jury) : This is a photostat. Here is the letter that Bingham &
Company wrote, saying that, "In accordance
with your letter of the third we enclose herewith statement of account of Messrs. Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., New York, to Messrs.
Brandt & Sons of London as of December
31, 1923." This is the schedule enclosed.
At the head is draft account, giving a list
of the drafts, and underneath is the statement of accounts with the amounts that they
claim to have assigned. The witness says
there are twenty-one of these.
Q. Now, we will just try and cover briefly, Mr.
Towell, if you will help us a little—the letter received from Huth & Company. Have you got that?
Two letters I am told, from Huth & Company. A.
Do you know the pages?
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Q. Pages 6 to 11 inclusive, Mr. Towell. Have
you located it? A. Yes, I have it.
Q. Do they also give a list of accounts receivable, pledged with them by Stern & Company or assigned to them as collateral? A. Yes, they do.
Q. Now, under Schedule No. 3, Mr. Towell——
Mr. Podell: I am asking this question
with your Honor's permission, to save a
little time if we can, rather than go through
twenty-two separate items under this.

2279

2280

Q. Under Schedule 3, Exhibit 84, we have
checked the collateral accounts that Huth & Company claimed, and we find there are twenty-two of
them, and we find after checking the accounts receivable that Huth & Company claims were assigned
to him, with your working sheets, that out of
the twenty-two, three out of the twenty-two, were
on your working sheets as having been assigned to
Huth & Company, and the balance of nineteen appear, according to your own working sheets, to have
been assigned to some other institutions. Now,
do you deny that statement? A. Not entirely, but
I do say
Q. Do you want to correct it? A. Yes; I do say
this
Q. Just let us have any correction or explanation that you want to make of it? A. This working sheet is not necessarily an assignment of invoices. This indicates, although it is headed "Assigned," this is a working sheet.
Q. Yes.
Q. And it indicates that the account was payable
according to the ways these notations were made.
That is, it does not preclude the possibility of an
invoice being assigned in one of these accounts and
at the direction of the person to whom it was assigned being payable to one of these banks.
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Q. I am not sure that I follow.
The Court: That is a little confusing.
Mr. Podell: I do not suppose we understood that.
Q. I want you to be perfectly clear about it, Mr.
Towell; if I am doing you any injustice in this, I
want you to explain it. You have on your working
sheets, numbers, little checks and numbers? A.
Yes.
Mr. Podell: I do not think the jury or
your Honor has seen it, I think it would be
perhaps well if you did (showing).
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Q. At the head of the working sheet you have
certain numbers in parentheses and opposite each
number you state the name of the particular bank
or concern, a particular bank or a concern? A.
Yes.
Q. Is not that a statement of a key to the number? A. Yes.
Mr. Podell: May I just show it to your
Honor. It is just at the head. These are
the numbers and the names I am speaking of
up above there (indicating).
The Court: And the numbers are the key
which represents the particular bank?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: I see.
Q. Now, on the working sheet proper, opposite
certain accounts, you have these numbers in parentheses, have you not? Do you know what I mean?
A. Yes.
Q. These numbers being pratically the same numbers as you have up above in the key? A. Yes.
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Q. And you understood, did you not, or rather
it is correct to say that wherever you have a number
in parentheses opposite any account, that that
means that it has been assigned to the particular institution that is named opposite the number in the
key? A. No. It means the account has been assigned; it is payable to that bank.
Q. That is what I mean. A. Yes, but I don't
know whether it is assigned to that bank for their
interest.
Q. You do not know whether it is assigned to
that bank for their interest ? A. Or for one of their
customers.
Q. Oh, I see. You think that it is possible that
the bank may have acted in behalf of some customer? A. Yes.
Q. Well, did you not look into that? Did you
not know that all of these institutions were themselves creditors of Stern? A. I recognize the names
of most of them to-day. My recollection does not
go back so clearly as that on the subject,
Q. Naturally, I do not expect you to remember
every detail, but you do remember, or you would
have as an accountant—you would have known
whether these institutions were creditors? A. Yes.
Q. Now then, assuming at least now for the purpose of my question, that these banks that are
listed in these key numbers were themselves creditors? A. Yes.
Q. And that these assignments were to them.
Then by comparing the claims of Huth & Company
with your records on your working sheets, you will
not deny—I am doing this to save time—that only
three of the Huth & Company accounts claimed by
Huth & Company appear to be assigned to them, on
your working sheet? A. On that assumption I will
not deny that.
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Q. The assumption being that these banks that
are listed in key numbers are themselves creditors
and are not acting for other people? A. No. The
assumption being that the numeral designating the
bank means that the account is assigned to that
bank for its own account.
Q. For its own account, That is what I mean.
A. For its own account, yes.
Q. And that it was not assigned to the bank for
somebody else's account? A. Yes.
Q. As far as your working sheets show, however,
the head of the column has the word "assigned"?
A. Yes.
Q. And your working sheets, looking at them now
and reading them now as they appear, would indicate that those accounts were assigned to those particular banks; in other words, there is nothing—
A. I wouldn't say that.
Q. There is nothing on the face of your working
sheets that would indicate that those banks held
them for anybody else? A. No, that is true.
Q. Now, you do not mean to imply that Huth &
Company might have been represented by any one
of these banks, do you? A. No, I am not implying
anything at all.
Q. And your inquiries, such as they were, did not
lead you to find any such situation, that the banks
did not hold it as creditors but held it as trustees
for somebody else? A. I don't recall at this time.
Q. Well, you have nothing that would indicate
that, have you, in the way of any working sheets or
papers of any kind? A. No. The only indication
I have is that I was satisfied.
Q. You were satisfied? A. Yes.
Q. You said that before? A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe that in making comparison
between the Huth & Company letter and the Bing-
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ham letter, there were at least two accounts that
were being claimed by both Huth and Bingham, two
invoices? A. I did not make that comparison.
Q. Who did? A. Until I saw your sheet, I didn't
know that it had ever been made.
Q. Nobody compared these two letters? A. Not
to my present knowledge.
Q. You testified you did make such a comparison
on the assignments of notes receivable, did you not?
A. I do not think so.
Q. Look at your record B, page 51. Do you see
on page 51 that you have separate columns, relating
to these notes receivable headed "Huth," then comes
a list of them; three or four of them; Berger or
Praeger, and another list; Central Trust, a list;
and Mechanics—no, nothing under Mechanics—
confirmed; and then over above at the head of the
column you have "confirmed except $28,836.03," and
then you have got Berger confirmed. A. That is
something written in there by somebody else.
Q. Which? A. That word "confirmed."
Q. Who did the confirming? A. I received letters. I didn't write that on the sheet though.
Q. Well, that was written by somebody in your
employ, in the employ of Touche-Niven, but not by
us. Those are your work sheets? A. I don't identify the handwriting.
Q. You do not claim, Mr. Towell, that we ever
had possession of your original work sheets so that
we wrote on them? A. No, I claim nothing.
Q. You do not claim that? A. No, I don't. I
don't identify the handwriting. That is all.
Q. You just do not identify it, but the prospects
are at least that it was written by someone that
was working on these things with you or in your
office, Touche, Niven & Co.? A. It might have been
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in the office. Somebody else can probably tell you.
Q. That would merely involve a comparison of
certain documents, would it not, certain letters received, confirmations received? A. Yes.
Q. And if two merchants claimed the same notes
receivable as assigned to them, this comparison
would immediately disclose it, would it not? A.
Yes.
Q. That was not done with respect to accounts
receivable, was it? A. No.
Q. Now, if you will look at your Exhibit 1,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, that is the certificate, you will
observe that in your statement of assets, you have 2294
the item "Pledged as collateral to acceptances $ 155,914.53"? A. Yes.
Q. "Notes and trade acceptances receivable held
by the company $52,818.38, pledged as collateral to
acceptances $155,944.53"? A. Yes.
Q. Now then, you have "Trade accounts receivable and sundry debtors held by the company $1,349,280.43. Pledged as collateral to acceptances
$903,285.83." Do you observe those two items? A.
Yes.
Q. Now, your statement is that while your firm
confirmed and compared the matter of the assignments of the $155,000 item, your firm did not make
such comparison and confirmation with regard to
2295
the item of $903,285 pledged as collateral, is that
right? A. By comparison do you mean comparing
one account with another, classifying all of the invoices?
Q. Comparing all of the matter that I have just
indicated to the jury, separate accounts which each
creditor claims were assigned to him to see whether
or not they overlap? A. No. We did not do that
specific thing.
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Q. Now, just a question or two and we will be
through, Mr. Towell. Do you know Mr. Couchman,
the author of a work on accountancy? A. I know
of him.
Q. Generally recognized as an authority? A. I
believe he is.
Q. Now, do you question this statement
Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading
from?
Mr. Podell: I am reading from "Certification of balance sheet," page 235 of Couchman's work.
2297
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Q. "Sometimes the accountant does not fully
verify all the items in the balance sheet, and he
must qualify his certificate accordingly." Is that
correct? A. I do not subscribe to that.
Q. You do not subscribe to that? A. No.
Q. "Any item of vital importance in the balance
sheet which for any reason has not been investigated to the satisfaction of the accountant, must be
mentioned in a qualifying phrase and statement."
Do you question or dispute that? A. I do not.
Q. You say you admit that? A. Yes, I agree with
it.
Q. "Inventories and accounts receivable are typiitems of this kind."
Mr. Marshall: What is the date of this
book, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: 1924. Just about the time
the work was being done.
Q. The latest book on the subject, apparently, at
the time when you were preparing this audit?
Mr, Marshall: He is expressing hopes like
Mr. Djorup, I suppose.
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"If his test discloses discrepan-

Mr. Marshall: I object to his reading
from this book, your Honor.
Mr. Podell: I am asking a question on it.
I am asking the same way as Mr. Marshall
did, that Mr. Marshall set the example for.
Mr. Marshall: I was not permitted to do
it that way, Mr. Podell.
The Court: Yes, you were permitted to
do it.
Mr. Marshall: I had to put it in evidence,
I think.
- Mr. Podell: Your Honor permitted it.
Mr. Marshall: I had to put it in evidence
though.
The Court: Put what in evidence?
Mr. Marshall: The book.
The Court: The book?
Mr. Marshall: The thing I was reading
from, upon objection.
Mr. Podell: There was an article that he
read and he refused to tell me who wrote it
and I insisted, and your Honor said he must
put it in evidence.
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. See if you agree with this: "If his test discloses discrepanies a more thorough investigation
must be made, and if any evidence of fraud or intentional misstatement is found, the accountant
must not sign even a qualifying certificate until he
has made a complete verification and is satisfied of
the accuracy of every amount and classification."
Do you question that? A. Would you give me the
first phrase again—if his test?

2300

2301

768
2302

Sydney Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

Q. "If his test discloses discrepanies a more
thorough investigation must be made." A. I agree
with the statement.
Q. You do agree with that entire statement? A.
Yes.
Mr. Marshall: May I have that book?
Mr. Podell: Yes (handing to counsel).
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Q. I want to ask you, and this too in the interest
of time saving, but if there is any correction you
have to make, make it, please, as I read you your
testimony. We were talking and you were being
questioned about this item
Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading
from?
Mr. Podell: (Page 3223). The $113,000
stood as a debit balance in accounts payable,
did it not? First, you remember you told
this jury that you were very careful to check
up thoroughly on the accounts payable; do
you remember that?
The Witness: I don't remember making a
specific point of the care I took over accounts
payable.
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Q. Well now, did you not tell this jury that in
the case of accounts payable, you communicated
with the creditors; did you not say that? A. No.
Q. And did you not say that in the case of the
accounts payable you looked into the supporting
records; you looked at the ledger, you looked at
the accounts payable ledger and you looked at the
invoices and you looked at the shipments that were
received ; do you not remember saying that to the
jury yesterday? A. Yes.

769
Sydney Towell—For

Defendants—Cross.

Q. Did you not also say that you communicated
with the creditors? A. I did with regard to acceptances payable. Perhaps you refer to that.
Q. They were acceptances payable, not all accounts payable? A. No, not all accounts payable.
Acceptances.
Q. Now, is this true: "Q. When you found this
particular item of $113,199.60, what did you do,
step by step?" That was the question. "A. Well,
in the first place I would have scrutinized this
schedule which I believed to have been prepared
by my assistant. I would have scrutinized it and
I would have noticed particularly that there was an
item of as much as $113,000 which I would see
even now is larger than any other item on the
sheet. I would have noted that it was a debit balance. I would also have noted mentally at that
time that it was an item into which I must inquire.
Just exactly the nature of my inquiry I cannot say
at this time. I would have asked questions in the
first place. I would possibly have asked the accountant. I might have inquired from the credit
man, or I might have had conversations with Mr.
Stern. I might have asked him whether he was going to make any arrangements in connection with
purchasing rubber through the United Baltic or
just exactly what was the nature of his present
dealings with them." Now, was that a true statement as you made it at that time? A. I agree with
it to-day.
Q. Yes. That is, at the time you were being questioned, which was in 1925?
Mr. Shamos: 1926.
Mr. Podell: Was it 1926?
Mr. Shamos : March 23rd.
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Q. March 23, 1926. You stated "just exactly the
nature of my inquiry I cannot say at this time."
That was within a year after you had made the
audit?
Mr. Marshall: Two years.
Mr. Podell: 1926.
Mr. Marshall: Two years.
Q. Two years after you had made the audit? A.
Yes.
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Mr. Marshall: Over two years. Two and
a half years.
Mr. Podell: Two and a half years. I
stand corrected.
Q. Where you could not recall the nature of your
inquiry at the time? A. No more than I can to-day.
Q. Well, you know that you recalled it very clearly yesterday in answer to your counsel? A. Not
very clearly. I have the note in my working papers,
and I read from my working papers, with very little
elaboration of it.
Q. Do your working papers on that item show
any explanations by either Stern or Romberg? A.
They show that I wrote in my own hand that
Q. No. Please answer the question and then I
will let you tell what they show. Do they show any
explanations by either Romberg or Stern? A. They
don't mention the names. They show explanations.
Q. Now, let us see how much explanations they
do show. Let us have that working sheet that deals
with the United Baltic account.
The Court: The question is what explanations do they show.
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Q. Is this your statement, "They show" a line
written by you, "Sterling deposits for future purchases"? A. Yes.
Q. That is the only explanation that this paper
shows? A. Yes.
Q. Now before that you had when you came to
the account, "Sterling deposits for future purchases," you had on page 171, "United Baltic
debtor"; what is the rest of that—balance? A.
"Balce"—balance "in accounts payable."
Q. Question mark, is that it? A. Yes.
Q. And what happened was that you after haying
had this occasion for inquiry and having had cause,
as you testified, for scrutinizing it very closely, you
asked either Mr. Romberg or Mr. Stern, and they
told you that it was sterling deposits for future
purchases, advance deposits for future purchases,
is that it? A. I don't know whether it is or not,
I don't think that is entirely it. I would not merely take the statement of Fred Stern or Romberg
that they were sterling deposits for future purchases without some confirmatory information.
Q. Then we agree
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Mr. Marshall: Let him finish his answer.
Mr. Podell: Certainly, I want him to finish. I did not mean to interrupt him.
Q. Then we agree—did you finish, Mr. Towell?
You would not have taken the statement of Romberg and Stern that this was sterling deposit for
future advances? Do we agree to this extent; that
a careful accountant should not under the circumstances have been satisfied with the mere explanation of Romberg and Stern of such a large item in
the debit balance as against an account payable?
A. Not of that, no. He shouldn't have been satisfied with such an explanation of this item.
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Q. Now, can you tell this jury what independent
source you went to to satisfy yourself about this
item ? A. The ledger account in all probability, but
my recollection is not clear as to what other information I received.
Q. My dear sir, the ledger account would show
you nothing more than what you knew, and that
was that in the ledger account there was an entry
under "accounts payable" that the creditor—rather
the account owed Stern $113,000; that is all that
would show? A. That is not all that would show.
Q. What else would that show? A. From that
account I would be able to discover whether that
debit balance arose from cash or whether it did not
arise from cash.
Q. Would you have done that without going to
supporting books? A. I don't know. I think the
ledger account would show of itself whether it was
cash, but I may have gone to supporting books. I
cannot recall that. Or I may have gone to supporting data.
Q. With all you know now, you said you would
not have been satisfied with Romberg's statement;
you would not have been satisfied, you should not
have been satisfied with Stern's statement. Did
you not know that Romberg was the man under
whose supervision these entries in the ledger account were being made; did you not know that ? A.
Under his supervision, yes.
Q. And you wanted some independent outside
verification, did you not? A. Do you mean outside
of Romberg's department?
Q. You wanted something outside of Romberg?
A. I wanted more than his word.
Q. More than his word? A. Yes.
Q. It was nothing new to you to communicate
with creditors even as to accounts that were not
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suspicious or that gave no occasion for scrutiny,
you had done that with reference to notes and acceptances? A. This was not a creditor.
Q. With reference to acceptances. He was in the
accounts payable ledger, was he not? A. He was
one of many that were in the accounts payable
ledger with debit balances.
Q. You never looked very closely into some of
the other debit balances, had you? A. Yes, sir, I
had investigation of all of them.
Q. You had? A. I had investigation of all of
them.
Q. Can you tell the jury whether it is not true
that as to a number besides United Baltic instead
of having debit balances there should have been
credit balances? A. To my knowledge that is not
true of any of the debit balances.
Q. Is it not true of United Baltic? A. Not to
my knowledge.
Q. You are not satisfied with that yet. A. Nobody has offered satisfaction to me on the point.
Q. You do not know that invoices for shipments that were sent on here were never entered in
December, in the United Baltic account for which
moneys were due? A. No, I do not know that.
Q. That would be something to you in an examination of these books, would it not? You did not
find that to be the case in a number of instances in
an examination of the inventory, for instance? A.
It would be something new to me.
Q. You did not find that to be true in the examination of the adjustments made on that?
Mr. Marshall: Can we find out what is
true?
The Court: He has laid a basis right
straight along for the question.
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Mr. Podell: I think the witness understands.
The Court: He has come down from a
long line of questions.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except.

2321

Q. If there is anything in my question that you
do not understand, say so, and do not be reluctant
about it? A. When you switch from accounts payable debit balances to inventory and you say you
did not find it to be true with regard to the inventory, I do not quite understand.
Q. You are not clear about the question? A. No.
Q. I thought we covered that very fully yesterday, but I will take only a minute with you on
that, so that we will get that entirely clear. Do you
remember in my question to you about the inventory, I asked you on one occasion whether that was
not exactly an instance similar to the United Baltic
instance, do you remember that, or have you forgotten that for the moment? A. I have forgotten
for the moment,
Q. In discussing inventory you say that you
found in these books that merchandise which should
have been entered in December, that is the liability
therefor, the money that was due therefor, was not
entered prior to December, was not entered at all,
whereas the accounts receivable from the sale of
that merchandise, were entered as an asset? A.
Yes.
Q. And the cash really paid for that merchandise
was carried as an asset, the cash received, cash paid
by these customers were carried by these customers? A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Don't you know at this moment that that is
exactly what happened in the United Baltic account? A. No, I do not know it.
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Q. At least if that is what happened, the instance would not be new to you, it had happened
before in inventory? A. Not in that way.
Q. Not in what way? A. Not in the way of having a debit balance on the accounts payable with
no record whatever of purchases that should also
have been in that account.
Q. Did you really believe at that time that this
concern pledged as it was on almost everything,
having given collateral to almost every bank, with
a good many creditors, was really taking money
and putting $113,000 as an advance payment for
merchandise to be purchased in the future, did you
believe that at that time? A. I did believe it.
Q. You knew that the United Baltic was abroad,
you knew that that was a foreign institution? A.
I believed they—that seems to me my recollection
that they are a foreign concern.
Q. You testified on your direct examination that
the United Baltic had demanded in November that
Stern make payment to them; do you remember
such testimony? A. No.
Q. Did you not say that the explanation furnished to you by Stern and Romberg was that they
made these advance payments because United Baltic had demanded it, was not that your explanation? A. Not in the sense that you put it. It was
not a demand in that sense.
Q. They asked for it; it was a request? A. It
was an arrangement made between the two parties,
Q. Would not that necessarily have to be in writing if the United Baltic was abroad, and you knew
it to be abroad and Stern was here, would not that
have to be in the form of a letter? A. It might have
been an understanding with their agent.
Q. Whose agent? A. The United Baltic, if they
had one.
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Q. Who is their agent? A. I do not know.
Q. Was there an agent here, do you mean, so
that we did not have to write from aboard; is that
what you mean? A. I do not know that.
Q. What put the idea of an agent in your mind?
Did you know at that time that the United Baltic
had an agency here in New York? A. I cannot recall.
Q. Did you inquire whether it had or not? A. I
do not remember that.
Q. Don't you know that just a two cent stamp
with a letter of inquiry to the agent or the United
Baltic would have gotten you independent reliable
creditors information of the kind that you sought
with regard to notes receivable, did you know that?
On this very item which you say you should have
scrutinized closely? A. Yes, I know the power of
a two cent stamp.
Q. I asked you if it is not true that an inquiry
sent to them by way of a letter would have gotten
you independent and reliable information at least
as to what the creditor claimed on that item of the
account which you say you should have scrutinized
closely; did you know that? A. I knew that it could
be done.
Q. Did you do it? A. No.
Q. I will ask you whether you agree with this:
By the way, do you regard Mr. Montgomery as a
reliable authority in matters of accountancy? A.
I do.
Q. Is he not generally referred to and his book
generally referred to as the Bible of Accountants?
A. I do not recall ever using the expression or hearing it.
Q. You have heard it used? A. Perhaps it
amounts to that.
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Q. I am reading from page 81 of balance sheet
audit: "One important point to be kept in mind
in the balance sheet audit is that an entry on the
books which purports to record an asset is nothing
more than a book record and there could be no good
excuse for accepting such an entry as final. The
data supporting the entry may be in order, but it
is the auditor's duty to verify independently as far
as possible the fact that the asset still exists or did
exist at the date of the balance sheet, and that it is
valued correctly." Do you agree with that? A.
Yes.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Under the heading, page 119, fictitious accounts receivable: "In many balance sheets accounts receivable from customers are mingled with
other debit balances. The latter may include advances to salesmen and others, overdrafts of officers, claims against railroads, creditors, or the
government for alleged overcharge of duties, prepayments on purchase contracts, guarantees, etc.
Not infrequently considerable amounts which represent charges to vendors for goods returned are
included. Such balances are rarely settled in cash.
Where the open items consist of cash debits"—in
the vendor's account, in this United Baltic account,
that was a cash debit, was it not? A. I believe so.
Q. It was claimed that that was a cash debit? A.
I believe so.
Q. — " I t may be assumed that purchase invoices
exist which have not yet been credited to the account." Do you question that? A. I do not question that it could be assumed, no.
Q. You do not question that there may be assumed that purchase invoices, "Where the open
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items consist of cash debits," and you have a cash
debit of an open item against the vendor, " I t may
be assumed that purchase invoices exist and which
have not yet been credited to the account. The
distinction to be drawn here is that instead of dealing with the accounts in groups, each individual account must be scrutinized and valued on its merits."
Do you question or dispute that? A. I do not question it at all.
Q. And that is, as a matter of fact, why you said
that you should have scrutinized that particular
account? A. That is why I say I did.
Q. You say in your examination, " I would have
scrutinized this schedule, I would have scrutinized
it and I would have noticed particularly that there
was an item of as much as $113,000 which I see
even now is larger than any other item on the sheet,
and I would have noted that it was a debit balance."
That is the statement you say is correct? A. Yes.
Q. "Irregular items." I will read you another
part of Mr. Montgomery: "The open accounts on
the ledger should be compared with the schedule of
accounts payable and it should be ascertained that
the balances represent specific and recent items
only
"
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Mr. Marshall: Where are you reading
from now?
Mr. Podell: Page 268.
Q. "If not the auditor should find out why not.
If any account does not look regular in every
way, the creditor's statement should be procured,"
Do you question that? A. No, I do not question
that.
Q. You certainly did not procure any creditor's
statement from the United Baltic? A. They were
not creditors.
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Q. Did you communicate with the United Baltic
at all? A. No.
Q. And they were in the list of accounts payable,
were they not? A. Technically, yes.
Q. Were not they people from whom he had
always bought merchandise to your knowledge? A.
I believe to my knowledge at that time.
Q. That they had sold merchandise to Stern, did
you not know that from the very fact that they were
in the accounts payable ledger? A. I believe that
is so.
Mr. Podell: That is all. I have spoken
with Mr. Marshall and I do not intend to say
that in any spirit of criticism of the stenographer, but there are some stenographic
errors all through this record. They are not
really substantial, but I think that we ought
to make a note of it, Mr. Marshall and I
will get together and check them up. They
do not amount to anything particularly.
Mr. Marshall:
There are some dates
wrong in a couple of places.
Mr. Podell: I am having a list made up
of the items and we will pass on them together.
Mr. Marshall: We have not read the record
over word for word but we have come across
quite a number of such errors.
The Court: You may agree upon that between yourselves and it will be perfectly
agreeable to me.
Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. Who prepared, as far as you know, the inventory that was handed to you when you came to
Stern's office? A. Two of the employees in a de-
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partment that took care of the records covering
inventories of all descriptions.
Q. And when you discovered these various things
in connection with the inventory which you thought
should be adjusted, what explanations were given
to you to explain these apparent discrepancies?
A. The first error in the inventory coming to my
attention caused me to take the matter up with
Mr. Romberg. The first question I asked was
whether Romberg had checked the inventory or
had any of his employees check it. He told me that
he had been too busy to do it and at the moment
I was rather annoyed to find that the inventory
had been handed to me without being checked. I
made personal inquiry as to who did make the inventory up and personally spoke to the two employees responsible for making it up. I found that
their work had not been co-ordinated, that they had
merely taken a record off of a book without checking back to verify it, and while under ordinary circumstances I would have turned the inventory back
to their hands to be checked, the inventory was not
so large and I decided to do it myself.

By Mr. Marshall.
2340

Q. Why did you not examine and make tests of
the sales vouchers in connection with the rubber
sales account which Mr. Podell asked you about
yesterday? A. Because I was not interested in the
profit and loss account.
Q. That was one of the profit and loss accounts?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you find that the profit and loss accounts
were in balance sheet? A. Yes.
Q. In connection with what accounts did you
make tests against invoices? A. In connection with
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the inventory, the accounts receivable. I believe
that is all.
Q. And you made no statement and there was no
statement made in your balance sheet or in the
certificate that there was a profit and loss account
accompanying it, was there? A. No.
Q. Mr. Podell made some point yesterday about
your recognizing Mr. Siess's handwriting in work
sheets which are pages 1 to 4 and not recognizing
it in the general ledger. How does it happen that
you recognize Siess's handwriting in your work
sheets? A. Because I only had one assistant, and
he was Mr. Siess.
Q. So that you know that the only other man
who wrote in those work sheets was Mr. Siess besides yourself? A. On these particular sheets, yes.
Q. You had said that your decision with respect
to the assigned accounts receivable was shown in
the work sheets. What decision were you referring
to there, do you remember that? I think there was
some question about it. I think it was with respect
to the bank letters. Those letters written to the
bank by Touche-Niven were sent out before the
audit commenced? A. Yes.
Q. That is the usual course? A. Yes.
Q. What decision did you make with respect to
checking up these letters that came in in answer to
your letters? A. I decided that what I wanted to
do was to obtain the total amount of the accounts
assigned in order that I could put that collateral
information, supplementary information on the
balance sheet we were to produce. I decided that
the method of doing this was to take the company's
record and no other record, giving me a figure that
would indicate what the total assigned accounts
would be.
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Q. Did you consider this as a necessary item in
the balance sheet, the item of accounts assigned?
A. No, I did not.
Q. What was your purpose in putting in an item
of accounts assigned at all? A. I thought it added
supplementary information of interest to anybody
looking at the balance sheet.
Q. You were inclined to check up on the validity
of the security which was held by the banks, were
you? A. Not in any way.
Q. All you wanted to do was to show
2345

2346

Mr. Podell: Let us have the witness testify instead of your telling him what he
wanted to do.
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the question.
Q. You knew, did you not, that Stern made a
practice of substituting accounts from time to time?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the nature and purpose, so far as
you understood it of this book that Romberg had
which you said gave you the figures of the accounts
pledged among other things. What was its purpose
so far as you know? A. Its purpose was to keep a
running record showing current maturities on invoices which would be paid to Stern and obligations owing by Stern; also to keep track of his position on letters of credit and all current working
information of that character; that is, of a character dealing with the happenings from day to day
and matters which he had to take care of having
to do with finance or things of that sort.
Q. Did it also include information about the accounts that were assigned? A. Yes.
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Q. And could you describe that book fairly as
the book which Romberg used in keeping track of
the financial condition of the company from day to
day?
Mr. Podell: Counsel is still describing
things for the witness. Why can it not be
asked how he would describe the book.
Mr. Marshall: I am trying to shorten it.
Mr. Podell: It does not describe it.
The Court: How he would describe this
book would be a better question.
Mr. Marshall : I am glad to take your
Honor's suggestion.

2348

By Mr. Marshall.
Q, How would you describe this book further as
to its purpose or uses? A. That is its full purpose,
to keep track of the current happenings, current
financial happenings of the company and to provide
a ready reference as to those things that were supposed to happen the next day, and so on, so that
without looking through all of the individual accounts in the accounts receivable ledger he could
tell whot invoices were to be collected the next day
and each day and to whom they had to be paid.
Q. How many books of account have you dealt
with as an accountant in the last year, roughly?
A. I would say over 150 sets of books.
Q. Does that mean over 150 different concerns?
A. 150 different corporations or enterprises of
some character.
Q. And can you carry in mind now the picture
of any book or pages in books that you audited as
much as a year ago? A. I am afraid not,
Q. Before Stern's bankruptcy, was there anything about this particular audit to cause you to
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place any particular emphasis on it or to remember
it as different from the general run of audits?
Mr. Podell: I object to that. The question is one of conclusion for the Court and
jury to draw upon all the evidence. There
are a great many things there that he admitted there were occasions for special inquiry.
Mr. Marshall: Whether this made any
special impression on his mind at that time,
I think I have a right to ask.
The Court: I will allow that.
2351

A. No.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. In almost every audit are there not things
that arise that require special inquiry of one kind
or another? A. On every audit.
Q. And what the particular inquiry required may
be depends on the particular circumstances of that
particular audit; is that so?
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Mr. Podell: I submit that counsel has
been testifying all morning.
The Court: I will sustain the objection
to that because his mental attitude on that
does not strike the Court as being a subject
that would be applicable here because you
now have laid your basis for showing 100 or
200 books that he examined and the fact that
there is nothing particular in this one that
made an impression on his mind to enable
him to identify these sheets. I think that is
sufficient.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. That
is all.
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Re-cross-examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. Mr. Towell, you say you examined 150 different sets of books in 200 working days of the year?
Mr. Marshall: How does he get 200 working days?
Mr. Podell: Does he work Sundays, too?
The Witness: I am afraid I have worked
a great many.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. We will call it 365 days, if you want to. You
have examined then on an average of a set of books
every two days? A. No, Mr. Podell. You have restated the question. You stated that I examined
the books. I think the question said dealt with the
books as an accountant,
Q. Dealt with them as an accountant? A. Yes.
I am answerable for the condition of affairs of 150
different enterprises.
Q. You do not seriously mean to say that you
could not by looking at your work sheets and making tests and comparisons with books at any time
identify the books you worked on? A. There may
be a few of the books of these 150 different organizations that I have touched upon in the past year
and there may be a few books that I would recognize.
Q. I am not asking you to describe the color or
shape or anything else. I am asking you when you
take all of these working sheets, here is an instance
where you work for two weeks, you take all of these
work sheets with all that mass of figures and you
find that every figure that you have on your working sheets, checks up with the contents of those
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books; would not that satisfy you that that is the
set of books that you worked on? A. No.
Q. It would not? A. No.
Q. I just want to ask you whether you agree with
just this: Page 111, under the head of balance
sheet audit. You have stated to this jury that all
you were concerned with was to get the total of the
accounts assigned? A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with this, talking about a balance sheet audit, "The auditor must ascertain what
accounts are pledged or assigned as is frequently
done without any record appearing in the books"?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that the auditor was not obliged to
do that and that was purely a supplementary checkup on your part, this matter of accounts assigned?
A. I did not say that.
Q. You did not say that? A. No.
Q. You agree that the auditor must ascertain
what accounts are pledged or assigned in a balance
sheet audit? A. Is that a complete statement?
Q. The rest of it is just as I have read it; "As is
frequently done without any record appearing in
the books." That means by independent investigation, does it not? A. I do not know what it means.
Q. Look at it here, and read the sentence before
it and the sentence after it, and any other part that
you like, and tell us if that does not mean exactly
what it says, that you must ascertain as part of
your balance sheet audit, what accounts have been
assigned? A. Understanding that "what accounts"
means what total of accounts, how much of the accounts are assigned, I agree with the statement.
Q. Did you not say that it did not have to be
done, and that it was purely supplementary on your
part? A. I did not say that. I said that it was
supplementary information in the balance sheet.
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Q. You did state yesterday, I think, and I do
not want to go over anything that we have covered,
that if you found that the same account had been
assigned twice, or several times, and you found several instances of such character, that that would be
evidence of dishonesty, did you say that? A. I do
not think so.
Q. You do not think so? A. No. I think your
question on that subject was framed as a hypothetical question.
Q. I am asking the same hypothetical question
now, if you find that a merchant in the conduct of
his business makes it a habit to assign a number
of accounts several times to several different people, would not that be an evidence of dishonesty to
you? A. Assuming that he had done so, yes.
Q. Certainly; and one of the main considerations
was to determine whether you are dealing with an
honest merchant is if he keeps an honest set of
books, and that you have never denied. You were
the one that used the word "consideration," and
said that one of the main considerations in an
audit was to determine whether a man is an honest
merchant and keeping an honest set of books? A.
I do not think I said that at all.
Q. You do not agree with that?
The Court: Are you not repeating just
what we had.
Mr. Podell: I think the record is complete
on that.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Just one more question, Mr. Towell. You
said you were told that two clerks had gotten overcareless in this inventory and that they had not
been checked up and that Romberg told you that
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as an explanation of the inventory. A. He said he
did not check it up or had anybody else do it because of overburden of other work.
Q. Do you not know that the trouble with the
major part of that inventory was that the books
themselves were wrong? A. No, I do not know
that.
Q. You do not know that? A. No.
Q. Did you not make journal entries correcting
the books themselves? A. I understood you to be
referring to something other than the inventory. I
corrected the inventory. We have it all in the
record.
Q. Please do not try to confuse me. I am not
talking about correcting the inventory. I am talking now about your making corrections in the books
themselves, making journal entries to correct false
and improper entries in the books? A. I made no
such entries in the books.
Q. Did you instruct or did you on your work
sheets indicate that entries must be made in correction of the books in order to adjust that inventory? A. No, I believe on my work sheets I copied
the entries that were made in the book.
Q. I know you did that. A. I gave the information and that is probably true.
Q. You have the information? A. I gave the information of an error.
Q. To do what? A. I gave the information which
would form the basis of a correction.
Q. Correction of what? A. The correction of the
inventory.
Q. As it appeared where? A. As it appeared in
the general ledger.
Q. In the general ledger? A. Yes.
Q. How about supporting books? A. I think
some of the journal entries that I made and that
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I recorded in my papers, concerned supporting
ledgers.
Q. In other words, in instances where entries
had not been made in the books showing that there
was money due for merchandise in December, you
directed that appropriate entries in the books
should be made showing that there was liability for
merchandise as of December. 31, did you not? A.
I did not get all of that one.
(The last question repeated as recorded.)
Q. In other words, is it not true if there was an
error
Mr. Marshall:
over this.
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I think we have been all

Q. Answer the question if you understand the
question. Do you understand the question? A.
No.
Q. I wanted to explain it, but your counsel objected.
Mr. Marshall: I was objecting on the
ground that we have been all over this.
The Court: He said he does not understand the question.
Mr. Marshall: We had all this yesterday.
The Court: I thought so. What is the
object of repetition?
Mr. Podell: Simply what I told your
Honor that counsel began the repetition in
his redirect examination and I wanted to go
into it. I did not invite this.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: The last question is withdrawn. The witness said he did not understand it,
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By Mr. Podell.
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Q. Is it not true that the errors that you discovered, if we call them errors, were not the errors
of the clerks who had made the inventory, but were
errors that were right in the books of account,
errors and omissions in the books of account themselves? A. Resulting from the clerk's incorrect
compilation of the inventory.
Q. Only that? A. Only that.
Q. How about the omissions of liabilities for
merchandise from the books and records; did that
happen after the clerks had made their inventory or
before? A. That is hard to say. The corrections
were made after the inventory was set on the books.
Q. Corrections were made? A. The corrections
disclosed by checking the inventory. May I clear
that up?
Q. I would be very happy to have you do that.
What I am asking is this
Mr. Marshall:
it up?

2370

Do you want him to clear

Q. So that I can clear it up, what I am asking
is this, before these clerks ever began making up
an inventory, were those books correct with regard
to liabilities and with regard to assets which would
go into that inventory, yes or no; can you answer
that ? A. No, I cannot answer that.
Q. Do you want to explain that; just explain anything you want with regard to that? A. I thought
there was a little misunderstanding as to how the
inventory came to be on the books. The inventory
came to be on the books as a result of taking the
sheets already made up by the two clerks outside
of Romberg's office. Romberg used their figures

791
Sydney Towell—For Defendants—Recross.
to enter on his books. The error in that figure was
the direct result of the clerk's making up the inventory sheets.
Q. Where did the clerks make the inventory
sheets from? This was not an inventory of merchandise in the premises, was it, or in storage warehouse; was it an inventory which required looking
at merchandise at all? A. I think not.
Q. It was an inventory of book entries, was it
not? It was an inventory of records? A. I believe
so.
Q. The clerks in making up their sheets, did they
have to go to the books? A. Their own books,
yes.
Q. Don't you find that the books to which they
went were wrong when they went to them to make
up their sheets, in that they had a number of omissions of liabilities? A. The books that they worked
on did not record any liabilities at all for anything
at any time. They are records of inventories.
Q. I am not saying that the books they worked
on had anything to do; I am asking you now when
they made up those sheets that you speak of from
those books, did they not then have to list liabilities for merchandise? A. Have we departed now
from the persons making up the inventory?
Q. I am talking now about the clerks who were
making up this inventory? A. They did not have
to do that. They had nothing to do with it,
Q. What did they make up their sheet from? A.
From their records of inventory.
Q. What records? A. I referred to the record
yesterday.
Q. What are they? A. I called it a record of lots
received.
Q. Is that the only book they used? A. The only
ones that I knew of.
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Q. Were you there when they did it? A. Not in
their presence.
Q. Were you there when they did it? A. I do
not know.
Q. You did not see them do it? A. No.
Q. You do not know how they did it? A. Yes.
Q. By what Romberg told you? A. No, by what
the men told me that made up those sheets.
Q. And they had nothing to do with making up
those sheets with the liabilities? A. No, they had
nothing to do with it.
Q. Then if there was any error in liabilities, if
certain liabilities were omitted, it was not their
error? A. No.
Q. It was the error of some one who omitted
them from the books? A. Yes, I would consider it
so.
Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. It was their error in including it in inventory
when it should not have been included in inventory? A. Yes.
(Witness excused.)
The Court: Call your next witness.
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H E N R Y E. MENDES, of 24 Glen Eagles Drive,
Larchmont, New York, was called as a witness on
behalf of the defendants and being first duly sworn,
testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. Mr. Mendes, you are one of the defendants in
this action, are you not? A. I am.
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Q. A partner of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Yes.
Q. Will you state briefly what your accounting
experience has been? A. I have been engaged in
Public Accounting since the beginning of 1910 and
I have been in all that time continually associated
with Touche, Niven & Co., and for the past ten
years a member of the firm.
Q. You hold some office with the Board of Regents with respect to accountancy? A. I do, yes.
Q. What is that office? A. I am a member of the
State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners.
Q. And that Board prepares the examinations
for Certified Public Accountants? A. It does.
Q. You signed, I believe, the first twenty-four
copies of this balance sheet, Exhibit 1? A. Yes.
Q. Did you make some investigation before you
signed it to see that the audit had been made properly? A. I did.
Q. Did you believe at that time that the balance
sheet was correct?
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: Allowed.
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except. May
I in that connection call your Honor's attention to the proposition that the mere fact
that some—I would rather talk before your
Honor.
The Court: Come up.
Mr. Podell: If you want me to talk out
loud, I will.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Court: I will allow the question.
Five minute recess.
(After a short recess.)
(Question repeated as recorded.)
A. Yes.
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By Mr. Marshall.

2381

2382

Q. Did you believe that your firm had examined
the accounts of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., for
the year ending December 31, 1923? A. Yes.
Q. And did you believe that the balance sheet
that was annexed to your certificate was in accordance with the accounts of Fred Stern for the year
ending December 31, 1923, and with the information and explanations given to your representatives ? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe at that time that subject to
provision for Federal Taxes on Income, the statement annexed to your certificate represented a true
and correct view of the financial condition of Fred
Stern & Company as of December 31, 1923? A. Yes.
Q, That was your opinion? A. That was our
opinion.
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Siess was a competent junior accountant? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Towell was a competent senior accountant? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that Mr. Rea was competent
as staff manager to supervise the work of Mr.
Towell? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that Stern was honest? A.
Yes.
Mr. Marshall: That is all.
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. And of course believing in these men, you, as
a member of the firm, were perfectly willing to assume responsibility for their work? A. Yes, after
asking them whether they covered the work properly.
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2383

Q. And I suppose they did not tell you about any
irregularities that they had found, did they? A.
No, they did not.
Q. Tell me, have you found, and I want to read
to you some of the testimony which you gave, and
see if you want to change any part of it, and if you
recall having given it?
Mr. Marshall: Will you give me the page,
please.
Mr. Podell: Page 1607.
Q. "You may assume that Mr. Towell testified
at page 61 which is before you, and the following
pages contain an account"—and you were shown
certain papers—"contain an account and the list
of accounts receivable, some of which at least had
been assigned, and that he got the information as
to the banks to which the particular accounts had
been assigned from a memorandum book kept by
Romberg. You may assume that and you may assume also that a letter that your firm received from
Brandt Sons, indicating that at least one account
had been assigned to them whereas Romberg's
memorandum book indicated that the same account
had been assigned to J. B. Moores & Company.
Well, I would say, generally speaking, that that
would indicate to me that the memorandum book
from this schedule had been prepared was not correct. There were errors in it. As to what extent
it would be incorrect, I do not know. I am not
able to tell from this information, from this schedule." Is that a statement that you made at that
time? A. Yes.
Q. And you do not want to change it. You would
assume that? A. Yes.
Q. "Q. Having found that there was at least one
error in it, what would you do as an auditor in
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passing on a situation of this kind? Would you
for example just mark it down as an error and let
it go at that? A. No. If I found errors of that
character in this record, I would be inclined to
ignore that memorandum record altogether as being of any value." Do you remember that? A. Yes.
Q. You knew, of course, you were referring to a
memorandum record kept by Romberg upon which
your accountant relied? A. Yes.
Q. You do not want to change any part of that
answer? A. No.
Q. You do not agree with Mr. Rea in the statement you heard me read where he said that the
more of these accounts that he found assigned to
several people, the worse it would look?
Mr. Marshall: Is this proper cross-examination? I do not believe so.
The Court: I think we are somewhat out
of the pale of cross-examination, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: If you limit me to the direct
questions asked, perhaps I am going a little
beyond it, but I do believe, he being a member of the firm, that I ought to be given a
little more latitude.
The Court: For all purposes I think I
will allow it. Yes, I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Do you understand my question? A. No, I
do not exactly.
Q. Then I will read you some more of your testimony here and see whether you want to change
any part of i t : "Q. A half dozen errors? A. Why.
I do not think that would be material in my decision in the matter although it might indicate to
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me that we should perhaps look into the balance of
the items. Q. And if you found half a dozen errors,
you mean to say that you still would be willing to
accept the memorandum of Romberg? A. No, I
would not accept the memorandum of Romberg. I
would take the letters from the banks as being the
information which would guide me in my determination or in my decision." You do not wish to
change any part of that? A. No, I do not.
Q. Did you make this statement, Mr. Mendes, I
am reading from page 1610: "If an account had
even been assigned a half dozen times, it would not
affect at all the total of the accounts receivable or
whatever choses in action would be disclosed in the
balance sheet. Q. So do you say you would or
would not pay any attention to that? A. I would
not pay any attention to that figuring that we
would be interested in the balance sheet or directing attention in the balance sheet to the fact that
certain accounts had been assigned. Q. You mean
assigned to more than one bank? A. No, it would
make no difference in my judgment as to whether
it had been assigned to half a dozen banks." Do
you mean that? A. Yes.
Q. That would mean nothing to you when a man
assigns the same accounts to a half a dozen different
banks? A. It might indicate something to me.
Q. Is not that, if it becomes a habit and it is not
merely a mistake, and you see it is a habit on the
part of the merchant, is not that a dishonest act?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. You mean it might be a mistake? A. There
may be some explanation for it.
Q. Do you know of any explanation for it in
this case?
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Mr. Marshall: I think this is going f a r
afield.
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Podell: The witness has said that he
made some investigation and I have a right
to inquire as to the extent of his investigation.
The Court: I will permit you to do that,
Mr. Podell: It is on that line.
Mr. Marshall: I do not think so.
The Court: Objection sustained.
2393

By Mr. Podell.
Q. Is it not indicative to you that a man must
be in financial extremes if he resorts to that
method? A. No.
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: He has answeerd.
Q. You were asked, "Don't you think it would
make considerable difference to the banks if they
know that your customer was assigning the same
account to two or three different banks," and your
answer was, " I do not know. I would have to leave
the banks answer that." Don't you know whether
that would make a difference to the banks?

2394

Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Podell: Exception. Your Honor, if
I may be permitted, this man says that he
considered the audit, and believed it to be
honest, and is it not proper for me to show
that he accepted the situation such as I have
just described as honest, as to what his notion of honesty is. He was asked directly,
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"Did you believe it to be an honest audit,"
and if he accepts a situation like that as
honest, have I not the right to point it out
to a jury of merchants? That is the purport
of my inquiry.
The Court: What is disturbing me is the
sphere of the cross-examination.
Mr. Podell: I think it is within that
sphere because you will remember, your
Honor, that counsel asked him did he believe it to be honest.
The Court: I do.
Mr. Podell: That opens up the avenue to
inquire what his notions and what his standards of honesty are.
The Court: Yes, I am inclined to think
it does, based on the fact that these answers
are given familiar with the examination that
was previously made.
Mr. Podell: Certainly.
The Court: I will allow that,
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand the
last part of your Honor's statement.
The Court: These answers are based on
familiarity with the examination which heretofore took place, considering his answers
to-day; in other words, as being read from
the record.
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands
that we had no chance to cross-examine him
on that point or to bring out any points
which might explain any answers which the
witness there made.
The Court: I appreciate that.
Mr. Podell: I do not think that is quite
an accurate statement, Mr. Marshall, if you
will pardon my correcting you.
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The Court: I will allow the question.
Mr. Marshall: W e had no opportunity
because the law does not allow that, and as
a matter of fact
Mr. Podell: I am surprised to hear a good
lawyer like you say that. Under 21-A you
have every right to ask questions.
Mr. Marshall: Under 21-A I have not and
I was threatened to be put out.
Mr. Podell: You threatened to put them
out and you went before the Judge before
you allowed them to answer. You refused
to let them answer.
Mr. Marshall: And we were overruled and
when we made objections subsequently we
were threatened to be put out.
Mr. Podell: There is no such thing in
this record.
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I think Mr.
Podell should not make statements like that.
Mr. Podell: You began by making them.
The Court: Both of you stop or there
will be more.
By Mr. Podell.

2400

Q. Mr. Mendes, to boil it all down to one question, do you really believe that where a merchant
makes it a habit in a number of instances to assign
the identical accounts to many different people,
knowingly, and you see a number of such instances
that he is doing an honest thing?
Mr. Marshall: Same objection.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. I do not know what you mean by habit.
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2401

Q. If you see a number of such instances?
The Court: Assuming them.
Mr. Podell: Assuming that there are a
series of such instances.
A. Unless there were some reasons that could
be reasonably brought forth to explain the circumstances, I would have to conclude it was dishonest.
Q. You are assuming, in answering my question,
that these are assignments as of the same date; not
of substitutions but as of the same date, say as of
December 31st, 1923, there were assignments to a
number of different individuals of the same accounts; you are assuming that in answering? A.
Yes, I am assuming that.
Q. Would you not also as accountant, draw the
inference that the man must bave been in financial
stress, in the absence of some satisfactory explanation as to why that was done? A. That would be
a reasonable conclusion.
Q. Because if he had ample good assets, he is
not going to do that sort of thing, would he? A.
I hardly think so.

2402

Mr. Podell: I think that is all.
The Court: All right, sir. That is all.
(Witness excused.)
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L e s l i e M . S i e s s , recalled on behalf of the defendants, haying been heretofore duly sworn, further
testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Marshall.

2405

Q. I think when you were here before I asked you
almost all the questions I want to ask you. Did
you at the time you made this audit, assisted rather
Towell in making this audit, believe Mr. Stern to
be honest? A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe Mr. Romberg to be honest?
A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall:

That is all.

Cross-examination by Mr. Podell.

2406

Q. Now, what I am going to ask you, Mr. Siess,
if you are in doubt about it as to recollection, I
want you to tell us, because I would like to know
it. I want you to answer it yes or no or, if you do
not remember and are doubtful, say so, please. Is
this item in your handwriting (indicating) ? A.
No.
Q. Now, there is no doubt about that in your
mind? A. No.
Q. None? A. No doubt.
The
Mr.
Mr.
fied to
Mr.
The

Court: Is that the $706,000 item?
Podell: $706,843.07.
Marshall: I think the witness testithat the last time.
Podell: Now, please.
Court: Yes, he did.
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2407

Q. The items immediately above that and running along here on this account until 5-7 are in
your handwriting? A. Yes, they appear to be mine.
Q. Are you in doubt? A. Yes, they are.
Q. They are. You are definitely certain about
that? A. Beginning with 6-10 to 12-8.
Q. Is this 12-28 in your handwriting? A. No.
Q. Are these two 12's in your handwriting? A.
Just this one here (indicating).
Q. Which one? A. 12-8.
Q. And how about 12-29? A. No.
Q. And how about 3061.92? A. No.
The Court: All of this referring to page
what, Mr. Podell?
Mr. Podell: Referring to the figures, the
items under the rubber sales account.
The Court: Is that an exhibit ?
Mr. Podell: In Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, referred to as the general ledger.

2408

Q. Now, after——
Mr. Limburg: Is that page marked separately?
Mr. Podell: I would like to have it
marked separately.
Mr. Marshall: Mark it for identification.
Mr. Podell: Yes, mark it separately. It
is in evidence, but it is a separate exhibit
for identification.
The Court: That is in evidence, is it not?
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence, but the
particular page I would like to have identified.
Mr. Marshall: My only point was, I have
no objection if it is marked for identification, but I register my former objection if
it is marked in evidence.
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The Court: You may have an exception
based on the broad general principle.
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-A.)
Q. Now, Mr. Seiss
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit him
to step around and watch me as I point out
the items as I question him?
The Court: Yes. You may step around.

2411

Q. You state to this jury that this 12 is your
handwriting (indicating)? A. Yes.
Q. And this 12 is not in your handwriting? A.
No.
Q. 12-8 is yours? A. Yes.
Q. 12-29 is not yours? A. No.
Q. That this 12 is yours? A. Yes.
Q. That 12 is not? A. No.
Q. And all of those figures are yours but this
figure is not, the last figure $706,843.07, is not? A.
No.
Mr. Marshall: That has been testified to
before. I do not know
Mr. Podell: I know it has. Now, will you
take the stand a moment, please?

2412

Q. Mr. Siess, it is rather important, there is not
any item of doubt in your mind as to what you
have just testified to, is there? A. No, I don't think
so.
Q. You do not want to change or correct it?
You say " I don't think so". I am asking you
whether it is merely an item of doubt or recollection or whether you are certain of it. You may
look at those items again and if there is anything
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2413

you want to change about your answer, change it
now, please? A. No. I am quite certain I posted
them.
Q. You are quite certain about that? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you looked at this total after it was entered, did you not? A total of $10,492,387.64. You
looked at it after it was entered, did you not?
Mr. Marshall: Can I have an objection
that this is not proper cross-examination?
The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Q. What is your answer? A. I imagine I did.
Q. You imagine that you did. Do you not know
that you did?

2414

The Court: Counsel predicated his question on the fact that if you do not remember,
to say so, or to say yes or no, whichever it
is. Do not let us waste so much time, please.
A. I don't remember.
Q. You have no recollection of having looked at
that total? A. No.
Q. Do you think you could recognize your own
handwriting? A. Yes.
Q. You have done it as to all these items, have
you not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. In whose handwriting is this figure (indicating) ? A. That is mine.
Q. No doubt about that, is there? A. No, sir.
Q. Read this figure? A. 10,492,387.64.
Q. Now, read this total? A. 10,492,387.64.
Q. Where did you copy this figure from? A.
The general ledger.
Q. And is this figure in the general ledger? A.
Yes.
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Q. So now are you certain that you saw it? A.
Yes.
Q. All right. We have got that much. Now, you
are the man who wrote up that general ledger for
each of the months April, May, June, July, August,
September, October, November and December—or
rather, I beg your pardon, I am wrong. You wrote
up from 6-10, did you not? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall:

June 10th.

Q. That is July 10th?
2417

2418

Mr. Limburg:

June.

Q. June 10th. You wrote up this very general
ledger, did you not?
Q. Now, what did you write it up from? A.
If I can recall correctly, journal vouchers.
Q. And what does each of those figures represent? You notice that you have one each month,
have you not? A. Yes.
Q. You have one for the sixth, and you have one
for the seventh month and one for the eighth month
and one for the ninth month and one for the tenth
month, have you not? A. Yes.
Q. Just one total, is not that right? A. Yes.
Q. And what does that total represent? A. Sales.
Q. Does it represent the total of sales for that
month? A. Yes, with the credit against it.
Q. You have got some credit against it or debit
against it? A. Debit against it.
Q. We are not concerned with those debits right
now. What you mean by debits are that when you
got the total of sales, then you put down the
record of returns on those sales showing a debit
against it or adjustments of those sales showing a
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debit against it, is that right? A. That appears
to me to be what the account shows now here.
Q. Is there any doubt about it in your mind?
A. No.
Q. No doubt. Now, you did that also for the
eleventh month, did you not? A. Yes.
Q. And you did it for the twelfth month, did
you not? A. Yes.
Q. And that figure for the twelfth month that
you found was $644,758 plus some cents? A. Yes.
Q. And that represented the total of sales for
the month of December? A. Apparently so.
Q. Any doubt about that in your mind? Let me
ask you, before I ask you that question, when did
you do this posting? Was it after December? A.
I thought it was during December, but my time
sheets that were shown to be before said it was
sometime in January.
Q. You know perfectly well from your own time
sheets that it was sometime in February, as a matter of fact?
Mr. Marshall: I do not see why Mr. Podell should speak to him that way. He said
he thought so but corrected it after looking
at his time sheets.
Mr. Podell: I did not ask him What he
thought. He has probably had a great many
thoughts. I am asking for specific things.
Mr. Marshall: I submit, your Honor, that
is improper language.
The Witness: In January.
Q. What time in January? A. January 26th.
Q. Well, all the sales for the month of December
had certainly been made by January 26th, had they
not? A. Can I correct my statement?
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Q. Certainly. Correct any statement you like.
Correct any statement you have made. A. 28th.
Q. 28th of January? A. Instead of 26th.
Q. Well, now, by the 28th of January, surely all
the sales for the month of December had already
been made, had they not? A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And so when you got the total of
$644,000 and entered it up, you knew that that was
an entry of all of the sales for the month of December, did you not?

2423

2424

Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I
object to the question as not being proper
cross-examination.
The Court: I do not know if it is proper
cross-examination, Mr. Podell, but under the
same sphere that I permitted in the first instance, as an adverse witness, I will allow
this to go on just for the purpose of getting
the full scope of the inquiry.
Mr. Marshall He is not a defendant and
not in our employ even.
The Court: I know he is not, but he was
one connected at the time. I will allow it.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
Mr. Podell: Will you read my question,
please?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question.
The witness has not been shown to be in a
proper position to know any such thing.
The Court: Let him say so if he is not.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
A. No, I didn't know.
Q. Now, when you came to take that total off,
did you not know that there was this item for
$706,000 added there?
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Mr. Marshall: May my objection be entered to all of these questions as improper
cross-examination, and furthermore as an attempt to discredit a man, his own witness?
The Court: You may have an exception.
Mr. Podell: He was not my witness.
Mr. Marshall: You called him in the first
instance.
Mr. Podell: It is very sad when I have
to call an accountant who is in your employ
to make him my witness in a case of this
character.
Mr. Marshall: You might consider it sad.
Mr. Podell: He called him now. I did
not call him now.
The Witness: What I did, is to take off
the trial balance. I didn't notice what was
in each account.

2425
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Q. You did not pay any attention to each account, is that it? A. I paid attention to it, but
I wasn't auditing it at the time.
Q. If you had paid attention to it could you help
noticing an item of $706,000 added right after your
final figure?
The Court: Which is it now? It is so or
it is not so or you do not know. We have
to get along. A. I don't know.
Mr. Podell: That is quite enough.
Mr. Marshall: Are you finished?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I have no questions. That
is all.
(Witness excused.)
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FRANCIS J . CLOWES, one of the defendants, called
as a witness on behalf of the defendants, being
first duly sworn and stating his address to be
104 East 40th Street, New York City, testified as
follows:

Direct examination by Mr. Marshall.

2429
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Q. Mr. Clowes, you are one of the defendants
in this action, are you not? A. I am.
Q. A member of the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.?
A. I am.
Q. Now, will you talk up so these gentlemen
can hear you? Will you tell us something about
your accounting experience? A. Well, I am a certified public accountant of the State of New York
and twenty-two other states. I am a chartered accountant of the Institute of—chartered accountant
of Ontario. I am a member of the New York State
Society of Certified Public Accountants.
Q. A little louder. A. And of the American Institute of Accountants. The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Ontario and the Dominion Association Chartered Accountants.
Q. And what experience have you had as an accountant? A. I have been with Touche, Niven &
Co. for nearly fourteen years, the last ten of which
I have been a member of the firm. Before that I
was for three and a half years head of the accounting department of Hart, Schaffner & Marx, the
largest manufacturers of men's clothing in the United States. I had charge of all branches of the
accounting there.
Q. You will have to talk a little louder. A. I
am surprised to find that my voice does not carry.
I thought I was talking pretty loudly. I have

811
Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Direct.
charge of all branches of the accounting, various
sub-departments with several hundred people, directly or indirectly under my control. Before that
I was for about four years a senior accountant with
Price, Waterhouse & Co., public accountants, in
Chicago. Before that I was about four years with
a firm of chartered accountants in Toronto, Canada.
Before that I was about three years in the Canadian Bank of Commerce. I have had one or two
—two or three minor positions, but I have been
dealing with accounts and accounting in one form
or another since about 1898.
Q. Now, when did you first know Mr. Romberg?
A. In 1917, shortly after I came to New York.
Q. Under what circumstances did you happen to
come in contact with him, and what happened at
that time? A. I had been asked to install certain
factory methods in a clothing factory outside of
the city.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that goes way
back to
The Court: What is the materiality of
that, Mr. Marshall?
Mr. Marshall: I want to show, your
Honor, that these people had known Romberg, for example, for some time; Romberg
had every reason to be faithful to these people ; that he was the man who then brought
them into the Stern audit the first time, and
that consequently they had a right to believe that he would not bite the hand that
fed him.
The Court: Let us go right into the fact
then, that he was.
Mr. Podell: It opens up their relations
for the year 1920, for the year 1921, for the
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year 1922; and we have been talking all this
time about 1923. Are we going to begin to
try 1921 and 1922 and 1920?
The Court: No. The introductory facts
are all right, but I would not go back to the
original history. If Mr. Romberg was a
friend and personal associate, all right, bring
that out; but not the historical facts.
Mr. Podell: I would be very much interested to know about that, your Honor. That
is all right, if that is the purpose of the inquiry, I will withdraw the objection.
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Q. Will you please answer the question? A. I
placed Romberg in a position in 1917 when he
was out of work, looking for a job. He had been
recommended to me by a former member of our
firm, as a very smart young man.
Q. And you found him to be reliable at that
time? A. So far as I was able to ascertain, I
heard nothing to the contrary.
Q. The first audit I think you said of the books
of Stern was as of December 31st, 1920? A. 1920.
Q. And who called you in to make that audit?
A. Romberg called me by telephone, and I asked
him about the business, the nature of the business,
and he told me something about it, and I arranged
for Mr. Rea to go up and see him and complete
the arrangements about the audit.
Q. Now, what kind of an audit did you make
during those years 1920 on, for Stern; balance
sheet audit or what? A. Each of our audits was a
balance sheet audit.
Q. And what is the nature of a balance sheet
audit as compared to a detailed audit? A. A balance sheet audit is a verification of the general financial condition, showing the assets and liabilities
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properly classified, and the net worth of the concern. A detailed audit—it is rather an elastic
term and it may
Q. A balance sheet audit is as of a definite date
though? A. Yes. It is always as of a date, a fixed
date. The detailed audit may be to any extent. It
may include detailed analysis of profit and loss,
statistical information and examination of vouchers, the checking up of whether the employees are
doing their duties properly, and all that kind.
Q. Now, the usual practice in making a balance
sheet audit is to do it by tests and samples, is it
not? A. Yes, that is the recognized method.
Q. And will you explain what the method of testing and sampling it—and talk to the jury so that
they can hear you, please, Mr. Clowes? A. Well,
you begin by drawing off a list of the general ledger
accounts and then by analyzing them, to see what
their contents are and verifying them by such methods as you may find appropriate. The tests are—
I do not know that I can describe them in a few
words. They are variable, depending upon the conditions, the kind of audit, the kind of concern.
Q. You do not go through every item in the books
by that method, do you? A. No. It is recognized
that you do not.
Q. Now, why is this method of testing and sampling used by accountants? A. It is recognized
quite impossible in modern business with the scale
that it now has, to conduct every audit in a detailed way. You have got to get the general picture more quickly and less expensively than would
be done if you tried to go into every detail.
Q. Now, has your general experience shown that
this method of auditing by testing and sampling
is effective? A. It is effective and successful. It
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is the best method of auditing for the purpose for
which it is intended.
Q. You have prepared, I believe, this statement
of the balance sheets prepared by Touche, Niven
& Co. for the years 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923, of
Fred Stern? A. This is a condensed

2441

Mr. Podell: I object to it, your Honor.
I am not prepared to go into these.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: May I have it marked for
identification, please, and I take an exception.
The Court: Certainly.
(Marked Defendants' Exhibit N for Identification.)
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Now, have you compared the balance sheet
for the years 1922 and 1923? A. Yes.
Q. Will you state what the net worth of the concern of Stern & Company was as shown by the balance sheet of 1922?
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor.
The Court: I will allow it.
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A. $974,304.89.
Q. And what was the net worth as of 1923?
A. $1,070,715.26.
Q. That shows an increase in net worth of approximately how much? A. Of about $100,000.
Q. Now, did you also prepare a tabulation of
interest, commissions and the rate of return on
advances made by Ultramares to Stern? A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence.
Your Honor said I might prepare some kind
of a chart, and I have prepared it.
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Mr. Podell:
Let me see it, please.
(Handed to counsel.) Chart of what?
Mr. Marshall: Of interest and commission charges made by Ultramares to Stern.
Mr. Podell: I object to this, your Honor.
All you need to do is to look at it to see
the purpose of it—intended to prejudice the
jury.
Mr. Marshall: It states the fact graphically. I did not intend to prejudice anybody.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Podell: I except.
A Juror: Are these charges legal or illegal?
Mr. Marshall: We are making no claim
that the charges are illegal.
Mr. Podell: That is just exactly the danger of offering such charge. The jurors are
apt to get a notion there is something wrong.
I am glad the juror asked that question, and
I ask your Honor to instruct this jury there
is nothing illegal about the charges as
proven.
The Court: No, there is not, not one scintilla of evidence which shows it is illegal.
Mr. Marshall: Nor is there any claim
on our part; nor is there any claim on the
defendants' part it is illegal.
Mr. Podell: What is the purpose of it?
Mr. Marshall: To show that Ultramares
Corporation had a very great interest in
making these loans, because it was a very
profitable affair that they were getting.
Mr. Podell: Certainly, but do you seriously claim if the man told him he was broke,
we would have made them for 25 or 75 per
cent?
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Mr. Marshall: No. If we thought these
people were broke, we would never have
made any balance sheet at all.
Mr. Podell: That is for the jury to say.
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Q. Mr. Clowes, you signed eight of these copies
of original balance sheets? A. I think it was six.
It may have been eight.
Q. And did you at that time believe that Stern
was honest? A. I did.
Q. And did you believe that Romberg was honest? A. I did.
Q. And did you believe that Mr. Towell was a
competent and honest senior accountant? A. Absolutely.
Q. And that Mr. Siess was a competent and honest junior accountant? A. Yes.
Q. And that Mr. Rea was a competent and honest
staff manager? A. Yes. I felt sure of all of them.
Q. And before your concern employs any one,
they make some investigation, do they not, as to
their prior experience? A. Oh, yes.
Q. And honesty? A. Oh, yes.
Q. And you satisfy yourselves on those points
before engaging them? A. Oh, yes, certainly.
Q. When you signed that balance sheet, did you
believe that your agents had examined the accounts
of Fred Stern & Company for the year ended December 31st, 1923? A. I did.
Q. Did you believe that the balance sheet annexed to your certificate was in accordance with
the accounts of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., for the
year ended December 31st, 1923, and with the information and explanations given to you? A. I
did.
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Q. Did you believe that subject to provision for
federal taxes and income, the balance sheet annexed
to the certificates presented a true and correct view
of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., as at December 31st, 1923? A. I did.
Mr. Podell: That is all subject to my
general objection and exception to this line
of testimony?
The Court: Yes.
Q. And did that represent your opinion? A.
It did.
Q. Now, had you ever been told that any bank
or other concern was under contract to lend money
to Stern if the balance sheet was satisfactory? A.
No, I had not been so told.
Q. Had you ever been told that Stern had any
agreement with any bank upon which a bank would
lend money to Stern upon receipt of your balance
sheet? A. No.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that is assuming facts, which are not in evidence. Your
Honor excluded just such a condition earlier
in the case. That is not in issue here. Nobody claims there was an outstanding agreement with Stern to lend him money if he
furnished a satisfactory statement.
The Court: I will allow it on the question of knowledge.
Mr. Podell: Exception.
The Court: And on the question of negligence, as to whether or not there was a duty
owing; on both issues.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor allows me an
exception?
The Court: Certainly.

2450

2451

818
2452

Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Direct.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor understands
the point of my objection?
The Court: I do, sir.
Q. By the way, you knew Mr. Von Goeben, did
you not, for some time? A. Yes. I knew him
as president of the Ultramares Corporation.
Q. And you had been at his office? A. Yes. We
used to be auditors for Ultramares Corporation.
I knew him in that connection.
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Mr. Podell: Just state the dates, please,
will you state that.
The Witness: The dates of our
Mr. Podell: Of your audit of Ultramares.
The Witness: We were auditors from the
time the corporation was organized, about
June 30th, 1919, until the close of 1922.
Q. And how many audits did you make for them?
A. We made four annual audits and one semiannual audit at June 30th, 1920. Four annual
audits at December 31st, each year, and one in the
middle of the year.
Q. And you did not discontinue to be accountants because they were not satisfied?
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Mr. Podell: On the contrary, we were
very well satisfied, if you want that stipulation, with Touche-Niven. We had everyconfidence in them.
Mr. Marshall: All right. That suits me
perfectly.
Q. Now, what was the compensation of ToucheNiven for this audit?
Mr. Podell: I object to that as immaterial to these issues. It cannot change
the rule as to reasonable care.
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The Court: I will allow it.
Mr. Podell: If your Honor allows it, I
must ask your Honor to instruct the jury
that in so far as—regardless of what the compensation was, they were bound to use the
reasonable care.
Mr. Marshall: I will ask your Honor to
reserve your instructions to the jury.
Mr. Podell: At this time.
The Court: If the question is presented
as a fact to the jury, then it will be absolutely immaterial what the compensation is,
as to the duty that is owing, arising out of
the relationship. I will allow the evidence
based on other considerations which come
in as a matter that I am not going to discuss now, but which I will discuss when the
proper time arrives.
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection to that,
of course.
The Court: Yes. At least I think I will
be able to discuss it,
A Juror: What kind of audit did Touche,
Niven & Co. make for Ultramares Corporation? Was it a balance sheet audit? What
kind of audit did you make for the Ultramares Corporation?
The Witness: It was a balance sheet
audit supplemented by an analysis of the
profits and a report on the conditions we
found resulting from the audit.
Q. You accompanied it with a profit and loss
statement? A. We gave them a certified balance
sheet as we did to Stern. We also gave them later
supplementary, a report consisting of several pages
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of comments with detailed accounts including not
only the balance sheet but profit and loss accounts
and so on.
Q. Did not the balance sheet also contain a
profit and loss account? A. I think it usually contained a condensed profit and loss account. It was
more extensive than the audit of Stern & Company.
Q. The difference was you did not give Stern a
profit and loss statement? A. No. Our audit of
Ultramares was more extensive by arrangement
with Mr. Von Goeben and Mr. Deetjen, when we
first made the arrangements.
The Court:
what he wants.
The J u r o r :
The Court:

Let us see if the juror has
Is that what you want, sir?
Yes.
All right.

By Mr. Marshall.
Q. NOW, will you tell us what you received for
the audit, as compensation for your audit for 1923 ?
A. Of Fred Stern & Company?
Q. Yes? A. $1138.
Mr. Podell:
exception.
2460

That is taken subject to my

Q. That included your disbursements, I suppose?
A. If there were any, yes.
Q. And how many hours of work was done on
the audit? A. My recollection is that it was about
300 hours.
Q. That included not only the work of Siess,
Towell and Rea, Mendes and yourself, but of the
stenographers and typists? A. The stenographers
and typists, writing the balance sheets and so
on, everything.
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Q. It it usual to find that substantial adjustments are made in balance sheet audits? A. It
is quite usual. We make adjustments in practically every audit. It would be unusual if we did
not. If an accountant came back to me with a
finished audit and no adjustments, I would want
to know what was the matter.
Q. Now, what is the importance of the assigned
accounts receivable item in the balance sheet as
far as you understand it, and how can it be expressed ?
Mr. Podell: What is that question?
(Question repeated as recorded.)
Mr. Podell: I do not understand that
question.
Mr. Marshall: It is really two questions.
I will reframe it.
Q. What is the significance of the item of accounts receivable assigned, which appears in the
balance sheet? A. The object of showing assigned
accounts receivable in the balance sheet is to indicate that not all of the assets are available for general creditors; that some of them are pledged for
specific liabilities, and we usually show in some
way the extent—indicate the extent to which those
accounts are pledged.
Q. Now, can you express it in a different way
than is expressed in that balance sheet? A. There
are different ways of expressing it. We have expressed it in different ways in the balance sheets,
in the successive balance sheets of Fred Stern &
Company.
Q. Can you point out as an example another way
of expressing it as expressed in the Stern balance
sheet? A. In the 1920 balance sheet
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Q. What exhibit number is that, please? A. It
is Defendants' Exhibit J. In the 1920 balance
sheet we showed an item of notes, acceptances and
accounts receivable, and then as a notation under
that caption in parenthesis we stated, "the majority of which are pledged to secure bank loans
and foreign credits". That was all we did in the
way of indicating the assigned accounts on the
assets side of the balance sheet. On the liabilities
side, we show under bank loans as a notation,
"secured by assigned notes and accounts receivable
and stock of crude rubber"; and under the acceptances payable on sterling credits we show, "secured by assigned notes and accounts receivable
and stock of crude rubber." That is one way of
showing it.
Q. In other words, without giving the actual figure? A. Yes.
Q. Of the amount assigned at all? A. But that
form of expression does carry out what we are
trying to express, what we are trying to do when
we deal with assigned accounts in the balance
sheet.
The Court: Did I understand you to say
that that was the 1922 report?
The Witness: 1920.
Mr. Marshall: That was the 1920 report.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I must move to
strike out these 1920, 1921 and 1922 reports
as tending to confuse the issue and having
no relevancy or materiality to this case. We
have not had an opportunity to test them,
we have had no opportunity to look through
those records of that period. They are not
involved in this case and they are only confusing.
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The Court: That I will decline at this
time.
Mr. Podell: And I respectfully except.
Are you through?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Cross-examination by Mr. Podell.
Q. Why did you not, Mr. Clowes, put the same
form regarding the assigned accounts into the 1923
report? A. I don't know. I don't remember. I
don't remember that I had anything to do with
deciding
Q. All you state in that report that is before
the jury is that the majority of these acounts had
been assigned? A. Yes.
Q. Did not that tend to put the person that
read it on notice so he would make inquiry as to
the amount assigned if he wanted to? A. If he
wanted to, yes.
Q. And then he could determine what free assets
there were? A. Yes.
Q. Whereas in the present report there is a very
definite statement of how much has been pledged,
is there not? A. Yes.
Q. Now, you would expect, would you not, Mr.
Clowes, that having known your firm and having
engaged your firm, that if such a statement were
presented to Stern, that he would all the more
rely on it—to Ultramares?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, because
there is nothing to show that they ever had
any idea that Ultramares was in the picture.
Mr. Podell: I am asking him now. Assuming such a statement.
The Court: Assume it.
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The Witness: I hope that the Ultramares
Corporation continued to have confidence in
us.
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Q. Now, it stands to reason with you, does it
not, that if you were the accountant for a certain
concern for a few years, and had made extensive
audits for them, and they were quite satisfied with
it, that any statement that your concern would
make would all the more be relied on, just because
they knew you? You would expect that, would you
not? A. I don't know that I would. I hope that
they would continue to confide—to have confidence
in us.
Q. You had no friction with Ultramares at any
time? A. Not at all.
Q. When you audited their accounts, you did a
thorough job for them, did you not? A. We did.
Q. And they were satisfied and believed you to
be reliable accountants? A. They expressed great
satisfaction with our work.
Q. At that time? A. Yes.
Q. So at least from those things you would expect that your statement, your certification, would
receive more added weight than if it came from a
strange firm?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Same ruling.
Q. What is your answer?
The Court: No. Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: Exception.
Q. Now, you talked about taking accountings by
tests and samples
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The Court: I think before you start on
that we had better adjourn for lunch.
(Recess until 2 o'clock.)

AFTER RECESS,
FRANCIS

By Mr.

J. CLOWES, resumed.

Podell.

Q. You spoke of certain auditing by tests. You
described what you meant by tests and samples.
Do you recall that part of your testimony? A.
Yes.
Q. And you also spoke of what is embraced by
a balance sheet audit. First, as to the tests, is it
not the purpose of these tests to discover whether
there are any irregularities or errors or omissions
or dishonest acts? A. Substantially that would be
true. The tests are for the purpose of satisfying
the auditor that the books of original entry are
being regularly kept,
Q. If these tests indicate irregularities, is it not
the duty of the auditor then to follow those things
through and investigate them until he is satisfied?
A. If he finds what he believes to be irregularities,
it is.
Q. And that regardless of the kind of an audit
he is making? A. Oh, yes.
Q. Quite regardless of that? A . Oh, yes. If the
auditor finds what he knows or believes to be irregularities he should go further.
Q. If there is a test made, for instance, on the
sales account and it is found that there is no record
in the books of original entry of any such sales,
and that that happens in a number of instances,
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would it not be his duty then to pursue the inquiry
until he is satisfied of such a condition? A. If that
were definitely found the inquiry should be pursued, yes.
Q. And that quite regardless of the kind of an
audit that is being made? A. That is true.
Q. With regard to assigned accounts did I understand you correctly that it did not make any
difference how many were assigned in proportion
to the total or did it make a difference? A. I have
not been asked a question on that point.
Q. Does it make a difference as to just what proportion of the total accounts receivable have been
assigned?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that on the
ground that it is not part of the proper
cross-examination.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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A. It does make a difference. That is just what
we are trying to show, what proportion of the
accounts are assigned. That is why we show it or
make a notation and express it in some form.
Q. That difference would indicate the extent of
free assets available? A. Yes.
Q. And the extent of assets that are tied up?
A. That is the object of making such notations.
Q. It is of extreme importance to an unsecured
creditor, is it not ? A. Yes.
Q. Because it would follow that he can only have
claims asserted, if anything happened to that concern, against free assets? A. Yes. That is what
we had in mind in touching upon assigned accounts
Q. Where you have a situation like this, quite
aside from the honesty or dishonesty, where you
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have a situation where several accounts are assigned at the same time, or appear to have been
assigned at the same time to several people, if those
books were regular, and if the conduct of the business were honest, and if those books were properly
adjusted in an honest way, it would tie up a great
deal more of the assets, would it not; do you understand what I mean? A. The more accounts
there were assigned, of course the less there would
be free.
Q. For instance, on receiving a letter from a
bank claiming that it held certain accounts aggregating $50,000 and the accountant discovers that
these identical accounts have been assigned to
somebody else, on a readjustment, if that bank were
given other collateral in the place of what it has,
in the way of accounts receivable, that would reduce the free assets by just that amount? A. Yes.
Q. What would you say of a situation where
the auditor discovers, and it is presented to his
notice, that many of the accounts receivable have
been assigned to several people for the same period
at the same time, what would you say of a situation
like that, is it an indication of honesty or dishonesty?
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Mr. Marshall: Is that a hypothetical
question?
The Court: I suppose it is intended as
a hypothetical question.
Mr. Podell: Oh, yes, certainly, that is the
way I put it.
The Court: Assuming that to be the fact.
Mr. Marshall: I think it is improper as
not being based upon facts of evidence in this
case.
The Court: Overruled.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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A. The question was a little long and I would
like to have it read.
(Last question repeated as recorded.)
A. It need not necessarily indicate either honesty or dishonesty. It might be clerical error or
confusion in the records. If the auditor had become aware that this condition was being carried
on in such a way that he believed there was dishonesty, of course he should go further.
By Mr. Podell.
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Q. In the absence of any explanation, would that
be regarded as a dishonest state of affairs by you?
A. It would depend a good deal on the circumstances.
Q. Do you mean if a man could not satisfactorily
explain it to you as to why he did that, and if it
was not the result of error, but if it was numerous,
a number of them, even then you would not consider it a dishonest act? A. If inquiry had been
made from the man and his explanations were
evasive or unsatisfactory, I do not think that would
be a situation that the auditor would accept without going further.
Q. Until you were satisfied whether or not there
was
a general condition of inaccuracy—perhaps in
-2484
fairness to you I shall tell you that I am reading
from your own testimony at page 1599, and see if
you have any occasion to change this—and you
were discussing this very same question: "Q. At
what point, Mr. Clowes, would you have deemed
it necessary to have made a more searching examination? A. I can only answer that in general
terms and say until I was satisfied whether or not
there was a general condition of inaccuracy and
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unreliabilities and if I had found the latter condition I would probably have had everything confirmed, everything possible confirmed by correspondence." A. I stand on that answer.
Q. "Q. And unless it was satisfactorily confirmed, of course you would have not certified the
account? A. Oh, no. That almost goes without
saying, I hope." That is right? A. Yes, I give
the same answer now.
Q. You, too, would have preferred letters from
bankers where you had a statement from the bankers saying that they claimed certain accounts had
been assigned to them and you had the book of
Romberg showing a different condition, you would
have preferred to rely on the letters from the bankers, would you not? A. If I had them complete
and believed their information was more reliable
than Romberg's—did you use Romberg's name.
Q. Yes. A. I think this is a hypothetical question.
Q. I am talking about the distinct question about
Mr. Romberg.
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that because
it was not part of this witness's duty to use
his discretion in that matter.
Mr. Podell: All right, I will reframe it.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Assume that you were auditing this account
in person and that there were presented to you
letters from a concern such as Bingham and Ruth
& Company, who made claim to certain accounts
as having been assigned to them, and on the other
hand, Romberg and his memorandum book showed
those accounts to have been assigned to somebody
else as of a certain time, which would you have
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relied upon? A. That would depend upon whether
I was trying to check up the details of the assigned
accounts or not. Whereas if I was checking them
up only in total and did not have replies from all
the banks, I think it might be very reasonable to
use a record of the company.
Q. You did not have any doubts about that question when you were asked it in your examination
in 21-A, did you? A. I do not remember everything that was asked me, I do not remember being
asked just that question.
Q. You have heard Mr. Towell's explanation on
the witness stand; you were here when he testified?
A. Yes.
Q. Page 1598: "Q. In other words, you would
have accepted the statement of the banker in preference to Romberg's memorandum book? A. Yes.
"Q. Is that all you would have done? A. On
the strength of the information as it has been
brought out here, I think that is probably all I
would have done.
"Q. Now, suppose there was more than one account receivable which on the face of the returns
was claimed by two banks. Would you have done
anything more than that ? A. Possibly, but I cannot say definitely.
"Q. Assume that it was the situation where you
would have determined to do something more, what
would you have done? A. I probably would have
asked Romberg to explain the discrepancy and
would have followed it up by any leads that might
have resulted from that inquiry if it showed need
of further search.
"Q. And if there were half a dozen items, what
course would you have pursued ? A. If they seemed
to be just inadvertent errors in the record, it would
not have caused any serious extension of the in-
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quiries. If that showed a general condition of inaccuracy and unreliabilities, I would have undoubtedly caused a more searching audit to be made."
Q. Would you change any part of those answers?
A. I do not think so. I think that is right.
Q. Now, reading from page 1596: "Q. If such
a situation is discovered by an accountant, what
should he do with regard to it?" I am more concerned with the answer: "A. I think that would
depend altogether upon the circumstances of the
case, what work he had done, how satisfied he was
with the results of his audit and the whole atmosphere of the audit," A. I cannot improve upon
that statement now.
Q. In other words, before there is a certification
to a statement, a financial statement, the accountant must take into account the whole atmosphere
of the audit? A. That is right,
Q. If the atmosphere is not a healthy one, he
should not certify it? A. That is true.
Q. Mr. Clowes, you stated here that you believed
that statement to be honest; that is your testimony?
A. I believed it.
Q. And you say that you had good men working
there? A. Yes.
Q. Of course, your firm chose those men to work
on that job? A. Yes.
Q. You knew them well? A. Yes, all of them.
Q. And at the time when you sent them there,
and at the time when you certified the statement,
you were perfectly willing to assume full responsibility for whatever they did? A. Yes.
Q. And you still claim that you will be fully
responsible or are fully responsible for whatever
they have done? A. We stand back of anything
they have done.
Mr. Podell:

That is all.
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by Mr.

Marshall.

Q. As I understand it, Mr. Clowes, you still believe that the essential thing for the auditor to do
is to satisfy himself on the correctness of the balance sheet which he is preparing? A. That is right.
He must be satisfied in his own mind.
Q. And the mere fact that you made substantial
corrections in the books or find errors, does not
of itself indicate necessarily that there is fraudulent bookkeeping?
Mr. Podell: I object.
2495
A. Not in the least.
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The Court: I think we have been going
over that. I think that is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff.
Mr. Marshall: If it is conceded——
Mr. Podell: I do not know what counsel
implies by his general statement and I am
not quite willing to concede it, but I think
it has been fully covered.
The Court: I think so.
Mr. Marshall: If Mr. Podell does not copcede now
Mr. Podell: I am not obligated to concede.
The Court: Of course not, not because
I say so.
Mr. Podell: I always am happy to take
a suggestion from your Honor, but I do not
feel this statement is sufficiently definite.
The Court: I think we have covered the
subject and I think every witness consistently has.

833
Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Redirect.

2497

Mr. Marshall: If I have an answer, I
will not pursue that further.
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. You were asked whether your audit of the
books of the Ultramares Corporation was found to
be acceptable by them?
Mr. Podell: I could not put it any stronger than I did on the direct examination. I
submit he is opening the same thing all over
again, and it will only necessitate further
examination.
The Court: I do not know what the question will be yet.
(Last question repeated as recorded.)
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By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Did you in the course of your audits of their
books, make considerable corrections and changes
in their accounts?
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I merely want to show
your Honor that these people know that corrections are very often made.
Mr. Podell: I object to that. If counsel
wants to produce a statement of the adjustments, I will have no objections. Let us
have your statement of the adjustments.
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Marshall.

Q. Will you produce them, Mr. Clowes?
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The Court: That will open up the door
which will be very wide, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Podell: If he shows that we reduced
inventory six-sevenths of what we gave him,
I am quite willing to have the jury know it,
Mr. Marshall: We cannot show that same
percentage, but we can show a large reduction.
The Court: That opens up the contents
of the other companies.
Mr. Podell: Counsel is doing it and I
am not.
The Court: What is the question again?
(Last question repeated as recorded.)
The Court: Objection sustained. That is
a broad question.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Have you with you your work sheets showing the corrections if any or adjustments made by
you in the audit of the Ultramares Corporation
for the six months ending December 31, 1920?
Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I am merely asking him
if he has the documents.
The Court: I do not think it is material
whether he has or not.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Will you state whether in the course of your
audit of Ultramares Corporation you had occasion
to reduce the inventory of Ultramares Corporation?
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Mr. Podell: I object to that.
The Court: I will allow that.
A. We did.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Did you supervise the audit of those books?
A. I supervised this audit directly with the senior
accountant and reviewed all his papers and passed
on all of his adjustments and passed on the statements we rendered to them on the report.
Q. That is, to Ultramares? A. Yes.
Q. Will you state what inventory adjustments
you made for the six months ended December 31,
1920?
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Mr. Podell: I object to that unless the
work sheets are produced.
Q. Have you got the work sheets showing the
adjustments? A. I have the principal working papers here, the working papers which show the adjusting entries we made and the trial balance sheet
and the connection of those papers with the balance sheet we rendered.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Will you tell us what adjustment you made
for the six months ended December 31, 1920?
Mr. Podell:
now.

You are going back to 1920

A. Is the question what adjustments were made
in inventory or what adjustments were made?
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By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Begin with inventory or any order that you
want? A. We reduced the inventory at December
31, 1920, by $210,116.33.
Q. From what figure? A. The final inventory
as set up in the balance sheet for goods on stock
and on consignment held for sale was $206,461.26.
That was after the reduction of $210,116.33.
Q. What was it before?
Mr. Podell:

2507

2508

That is only goods on hand.

A. It would have been the total of those two,
or about $416,000.
Mr. Podell: What was the total inventory?
Mr. Marshall: That is what he is coming
to.
Mr. Podell: He is giving me the goods on
hand. What about goods in transit and
goods elsewhere and under contract?
Mr. Marshall: May I conduct this examination?
The Court: I think it would be fair to
have the total amount of the inventory.
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am asking
the witness and he is trying to give it and
Mr. Podell injects an objection every five
seconds and it is disconcerting to the witness.
The Witness: The final inventory
The Court: The total before correction
is what we want on the sheet originally given
before it was reduced.
The Witness: It was not given in that
form. I have to insert it that way. I know
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what the final inventory was and what the
reduction was and therefore what it should
have been.
Mr. Podell: There is no evidence that we
gave them any inventory. There is no evidence before the Court that we gave that
inventory.
The Court: I assume that, but I do not
know whether that is so or not.
Mr. Podell: The witness has not testified
that we ever gave him any.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Did you have an inventory from either the
books or given to you by Ultramares? A. I did
not see it personally.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, these were reductions in market value of merchandise in
existence after the war when prices fell and
this man instead of taking them at book
value as they were entered at cost, reduced
the inventory and he knows that is what
they did.
Mr. Marshall: They took them at a higher
value——
Mr. Podell: We had not taken them at
all.
Mr. Marshall: They are on your books.
Mr. Podell: Of course, and we took a
loss, and that is what they came to, and he
knows it better than anybody else. He will
tell you that that is what it is.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Did you go into the question of the nature
of inventory reductions? A. These inventories
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which were reduced were on the books in two forms,
part of it in accounts representing inventory, and
part of it in accounts representing accounts receivable. I use that term in a broad sense. They
were accounts current with foreign correspondence.
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Mr. Podell: He is talking now about accounts and not inventory.
The Court: That is what he is making
up the inventory from.
Mr. Podell: He does not say yet that we
gave him any inventory of merchandise.
The Court: He said he does not know that
of his own knowledge.
Mr. Podell: Does he know it of anybody
else's knowledge?
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the adjustments that were acceptable to you.
The Witness: We found that the accounts
current included a considerable amount
Mr. Podell: I object to this general statement. This is entirely misleading and confusing and does not lead us anywhere.
The Court: Objection sustained: I have
no objection, Mr. Marshall, to the general
proposition of the adjustment of accounts.
If we can get that, get a figure, then we may
have what it is based on.
Mr. Marshall: All right.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Will you state what total adjustment of accounts for the six months ended December 31,
1920, were, from what the books showed and the
amount you reduced them by, and what the result
was? A. The total adjustments we made on December 31, 1920, in the nature of assets of Ultramares Corporation, were $253,059.17.
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By Mr. Marshall.
Q. And what did the books show as profits of
the company before you made the adjustments for
this six months period? A. Before making those
adjustments the books would have shown a profit
of $119,000.
Q. Did they show that before the adjustments
were made?
Mr. Podell: Nobody figured it on that
that basis. It was not closed.
A. They would have shown that if the books had
been closed. That was the condition- of the books
as they were submitted to us.
Q. And was there a profit or a loss after the
adjustments were made?
Mr.
The
Mr.
tion.
The
Mr.
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Podell: I object to that.
Court: Sustained.
Marshall: That is a mere calculaCourt: Objection sustained.
Marshall: Exception.

Recross eamination. by Mr. Podell.
Q. Mr. Clowes, can you tell the Court and jury
that you found on the books of the Ultramares at
any time that they had assigned their accounts to
more than one person at the same time?
Mr. Marshall: I do not think that is
proper.
Mr. Podell: What can be the value
of all these? Our claim is that it is not what
you reduce as it is in the nature of the thing
that you find. If you find that a man has
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included in inventory twice the same merchandise, then that is either a mistake or a
dishonest thing. If you find that the total
assets had to be reduced
Mr. Marshall: There is no occasion for
Mr. Podell's summing up now.
The Court: I asked the question.
Mr. Podell: It all depends on the nature
of the thing that he corrects. He can go on
and correct errors of assignments of accounts and they would not show any dishonesty; but if he takes a series of accounts
and sees that they have been assigned to different people at the same time
The Court: That is assuming that he
does.
Mr. Podell: Yes, then that is an item
that would mean something, but the mere increase or reduction, unless it is exceptionally
high, would not mean anything. For instance, you had a great fall in the market;
during that period 1920 was one of the worst
years we had. Here are books that we put
down the purchases and the price. Our books
were not closed and we had not made up
inventory. He does not claim that there was
even an inventory account in those books.
All he says is that had he figured up those
costs on that merchandise as they stood in
the books, we would have shown, had we
closed the books, a certain worth. What he
did, and probably did it at our instance and
upon conferring and consulting with us, and
upon our suggestion that he
Mr. Marshall: You are going into fiction
now.

841
Francis J. Clowes—For Defendants—Recross.
Mr. Podell: What does every merchant
do when he pays income taxes? What will
he do as a prudent man? What has he got
to do in fairness to himself? Must he not
write off his loss?
Mr. Marshall: Here we have a situation
of the books showing a profit for the year
of
Mr. Podell: Just let me ask one more
question.
The Court: Just what is your object in
this testimony?
Mr. Marshall: My object is to show that
large corrections of various kinds may be
made in the books of a concern and the auditor may still believe that the concern is a
perfectly honest, upright concern. The
next point is that Ultramares themselves
know that large corrections can be made in
the books of an honorable concern without
in the least bit suggesting or requiring the
conclusion that the concern is dishonest.
The Court: I do not see any complaint
in that at all.
Mr. Podell: If you take that subject to
the proposition that it depends entirely on
the nature of what he finds and the character of these things.
The Court: Yes, you will have to find out
whether the same thing is applicable.
Mr. Podell: Then the amount becomes
very important.
The Court: Then I say, is there any objection on the part of counsel for the plaintiff for saying that in the history of accountancy and in accounting, that these
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large reductions sometimes are made and
sometimes are not made, depending entirely
upon the particular situation as it presents
itself at that particular time?
Mr. Podell: Certainly.
The Court: If that be conceded as a fact,
that that may take place in the ordinary
work of accountancy, what is the object of
this testimony?
Mr. Podell: I will concede it gladly, but
I want permission from your Honor now
that this whole question has been touched
upon and you are investigating Ultramares
instead of Stern & Company. I want permission to ask just three or four questions,
and I assure your Honor will consider them
fair.
The Court: Under that concession, does
that mean the object that you have in mind?
Mr. Marshall: If he also concedes that
they knew that large corrections were
made
The Court: It would be a natural thing
that in their business, if they had any familiarity with it, that its officers must have
known if it is changed from one account
and it was reduced, it must be to their knowledge. I cannot see how you could avoid such
an admission. That is admitted. What else
is the question?
Mr. Marshall: I think it should also be
admitted that it does not necessarily spell
dishonesty of the concern.
The Court: That I cannot ask him to do.
Nor does his statement or conclusions, as far
as this trial is concerned, certify to the fact
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that it was dishonest. That is for the twelve
gentlemen over here to decide. We are
agreed on that, Mr. Podell.
Mr. Podell: Certainly.
Mr. Marshall: Then I will not take up
any more time of the Court.
Mr. Podell: Just a couple of questions.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Mr. Clowes, do you want to say to this jury
that in your examination of these Ultramares books
you found that they had included in their inventory merchandise as of December which had not
come in until January?
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Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether
it is proper to ask this question
The Court: What do you do?
Mr. Marshall: I object,
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Podell: Exception.
By Mr. Podell.
Q. Did you find any such thing in our books?
Did you have to make corrections that we included
merchandise that we did not have at all? A. Not
merchandise, but accounts receivable.
Q. That we did not have? A. That were not
accounts receivable.
Q. What do you mean, they were not accounts
receivable? A. I mean that they were charged to
their customers or correspondents and were carried
as amounts due by them to the Ultramares Corporation when as a matter of fact the customers had
refused to take the merchandise, and, instead of
being carried in the accounts receivable at a profit.
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they should have been carried as second-hand merchandise.
Q. But they did not do both, they did not carry
them both as accounts receivable and as merchandise? A. They did not.
Q. You mean there was a dispute between the
company and the customer rejecting the merchandise, and instead of carrying it as merchandise, we
carried it as an account receivable? A. At a profit,
instead of at a loss.
Q. Then you took that out? A. Yes, we corrected
that.
Q. You are not prepared to say whether that
merchant who refused it was quite right in refusing it?
Mr. Marshall: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Are you prepared to pass judgment on that?
The Court: The objection was sustained.
Q. Did you find that we had fake invoices of
any kind?
Mr. Marshall: Objection.
The Court: Allowed.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
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A. No, I did not find anything fake about the
Ultramares Corporation accounts.
Mr. Podell: That is all.
(Witness excused.)

845
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CARL J. V O N GOEBEN, of 138 C o r d o n h u r s t A v e -

nue, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, was called as
a witness on behalf of the defendants and, being
first duly sworn, testified as follows:
Direct examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. Where do you reside? A. 138 Cordonhurst
Avenue, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.
Q. Mr. Von Goeben, you are the son of Alexander Von Goeben, who was formerly the president
of the Ultramares Corporation? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You were also employed by the Ultramares
Corporation, were you not? A. I was.
Q. In what capacity? A. Secretary and salesman.
Q. Did you know whether your father's desk
was—whether he had a desk in a room alone, or
was there anybody else in the room with him? A.
There was somebody else in the room with him.
Q. Who was that? A. Mr. Deetjen.
Q, Do you know how often Mr. Stern used to
come into the office of the Ultramares Corporation
during the year 1924? A. It would be pretty hard
to say. I should say about two or three times,
or four times, a month.
Q. Did he talk to your father on those occasions?
A. I believe he did, yes, sir.
Q. You and your father resigned from Ultramares some time in the fall of 1924, did you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Podell: Do not get this confused, if
the resignations at that time to take effect
when?
Q. About when did you give your resignations?
A. 12th or 13th of November, 1924.
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Q. Your resignations? A. Yes.
Q. And when were they to take effect? A. December 31, 1924.
Q. Did you thereafter, you and your father,
discuss with Stern the question of entering into
his employ? A. Yes, sir, we did.
Q. And when was that? A. The latter part of
November.
Q. 1924? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was there subsequently a written agreement entered into between you and your father
and Stern? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you looked for that agreement? A. I
have.
Q. Have you found that agreement, or a copy
of it? A. I have found a copy of it.
Q. Will you produce it? A. Do you want mine
or my father's?
Q. Your father's, please. A. Here it is.
Mr. Marshall: May we mark it for identification at this time?
(The same was thereupon marked Defendants' Exhibit P for Identification.)
By Mr. Marshall.
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Q. Do you know when the agreement was signed?
A. The agreement was signed December 31, 1924.
Q. Had there been any previous discussion between your father and Mr. Stern with respect to
your father entering the business of Mr. Stern?
A. Do you mean prior to
Q. Prior to November, 1924. A. Yes.
Q. When was that? A. I could not give you the
exact date.
Q. Approximately. A. Early in 1924.
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Q. Would you say about January and February?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had your father been invited by Stern to
enter his business prior to that even? A. I understood he had, yes.
Q. How long had your father known Mr. Stern?
A. I should say since 1915.
Q. And he had at one time been associated with
him in business, had he not? A. With Mr. Stern?
Q. Yes. A. No, sir.
Q. He had done business with him before? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. That was before Stern had organized Fred
Stern & Company? A. That I could not say.
Q. It was around 1915 that he began doing business with him? A. Yes, I think so.
Q. When Stern came into the office of Ultramares, did he discuss with you or your father the
business he was doing in 1924, whether it was good
or bad?
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Mr. Podell: Who is this?
Mr. Marshall: Stern.
Mr. Podell: Does he know anything
about it?
A. He did not discuss it with me.
Q. Did he discuss it with your father in your
presence at any time? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say with respect to it? A. That
he was doing a good business and had made money.
Q. Do you remember whether he used words such
as his business was a wonder or a world-beater?
A. That I could not say.
Q;. When you and your fathehr discussed with
Stern in November the question of joining him in
his business after December 31, 1924, did your
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father say anything in your presence to Stern with
respect to a balance sheet? A. Do you mean in
connection with our going into the firm?
Q. Yes. A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say in that respect? A. I will
have to answer that in my own way, Mr. Marshall.
Q. That is all right. A. I cannot answer that
by yes or no.
Q. Answer it at length. A. After my father resigned from the Ultramares, he was made a proposition by Stern. In negotiating in connection with
that proposition, my father insisted upon Stern
giving him a statement as of November 30.
Q. 1924? A. 1924.
Mr. Podell: Statement by whom?
The Witness: Statement of Fred Stern;
that is, the condition of Fred Stern as of
November 30, 1924.
By Mr. Marshall.
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Q. And it was to be an audit made by ToucheNiven? A. So I understood, yes, sir.
Q. And he said that before he would go into
business with Stern he wanted such an audit, is
that correct? A. That is right.
Q. Can you tell us what kind of a man Stern
was, if you recollect, how he looked, how old a
man was he?
Mr. Podell: I never met the gentleman.
What do you say his age was?
A. Describe Mr. Stern?
The Court: How old a man was he? What
is the object of that?
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Mr. Marshall: I just wanted to show that
he was apparently a man of substance and
had been in business a long while.
Mr. Podell: How can you prove it that
way, by what he thinks what kind of a
man he was?
The Court: If he was dressed well, it
would not say he was a good business man.
Mr. Marshall: I have not inquired about
his dress. I want to know how old he was.
Mr. Podell: That is objected to as immaterial.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: Exception.
By Mr.
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Marshall.

Q. Do you know whether he was a married man?
The Court: I see what you mean now.
I will allow that.
Mr. Podell: If counsel will tell me whether
he was married or single, I will stipulate
to it.
The Court: You know what is in your
mind, and I am supposed to consume them
in a second.
By Mr.

Marshall.

Q. Do you know whether Stern was a married
man? A. I understood he was.
Q. And he had two children? A. I believe he
did.
Q. And how old was he? A. Mr. Stern?
Q. Yes. A. I do not know. I should imagine
Mr. Stern was about fifty-five, or something like
that.
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Q. Have you got your contract with Stern?
Yes.

A.

Mr. Marshall: I offer in evidence first the
contract of Alexander Von Goeben, and also
the contract of Carl Von Goeben.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Your contract was also signed on the 31st of
December, 1924? A. Yes, sir, it was.
Mr. Podell:
2549

There is no objection.

(The same were received in evidence and
respectively marked Defendants' Exhibit P
and Q, and they were read to the jury.)
Q. As I understand it, Mr. Von Goeben, you
actually were in the employ of Stern just one day?
A. Not exactly. While the contracts were signed
about 5.30 or 6 o'clock Wednesday, December 31,
1924, we were both to have a meeting which would
take us in. The directors, in other words, of the
company were to pass on the contracts. The first
action was the signing of the actual contracts. My
father at that particular time
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Mr. Podell: You say directors of the company. What company?
The Witness: Of Stern & Company.
Mr. Podell: Ultramares had nothing to
do with this.
The Witness: Oh, no. The directors of
the Fred Stern Company were to pass on
the contracts and take us in. For some reason or another my father refused to go on
with the deal and consequently destroyed
these two contracts and called off further
negotations.
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By Mr. Marshall.
Q. You and your father were actually in Stern's
office on the 2nd of January, were you not? A.
Yes.
Q. Do you not remember that your father was
very indignant because Stern never gave him the
balance sheet that he had promised? A. I believe
that was the one reason why we did not go further
with the meeting as of December 31st, 1924.
Q. Because you did not get the balance sheet as
of November 30, 1924? A. I believe that was the
reason.
Mr. Marshall:

Your

Cross-examination by Mr.

witness.

Podell.

Q. If you had known and your father had known,
that Stern was a bankrupt even in December, you
certainly would not have thought of holding any
meetings with him to discuss this matter on December 31? A. Absolutely not.
Q. You would not have given up the good jobs
that you had with Ultramares, would you? A. I
do not think that had anything to do with the
proposition on hand.
Q. You believed that Stern really was a man
worth, as his statement showed, over a million
dollars? A. Absolutely.
Q. And that is why you were willing to sign
these contracts and go through with the employment if the subsequent statements were furnished?
A. Yes.
Mr. Podell:
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That is all.
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Redirect examination by Mr. Marshall.
Q. You had intermediate information—you had
information from Stern in the fall of 1924 about
his profits for the year 1924, had you not?
Mr. Podell: W e have not disputed that.
It is in Von Goeben's testimony and in this
man's testimony.
The Court : This man testified to that.
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Q. Why did you resign and your father resign
from Ultramares?
Mr. Podell: I submit that that has been
covered. It is quite immaterial.
Mr. Marshall: He did not say the reason
why and you opened the door by asking him
whether he would have done it if he had
known certain facts.
The Court: I will allow it.
By Mr. Marshall.
Q. Will you tell us as nearly as you can recollect why you and your father resigned from Ultramares?
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Mr. Podell: I object to that. I do not
know what there is in it.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I think the internal affairs of Ultramares are very much in issue
here.
The Court: Objection sustained.
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except.
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw the objection
if you want to go into that.
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Case.
The Court: No.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Marshall: Defendants rest.
Mr. Podell: Defendant sort of intimated
that he will take up until noon to-morrow.
Mr. Marshall: I had an idea that we
would.
Mr. Podell: I am very happy that you
rested. I should like to consider whether
there is any rebuttal; and if there is, it
would be very brief.
The Court: You want to consider it further?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: The jury may retire until
to-morrow morning.
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(Whereupon an adjournment was taken
until to morrow, April 11, 1929, at 10 o'clock
A. M.)

New York, April 11, 1929.
Trial

Continued.

(Same appearances.)
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, we omitted to mark in 2559
evidence the other time sheets of Mr. Rea. I would
like to offer those now.
Mr. Marshall: May we have the copies of the
time sheets which were made with Mr. Rea's time
on them put in instead of the originals which have
notations concerning other engagements and so
forth?
The Court: Yes. Those are the time sheets applicable to this?
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Mr. Podell: I would like these to be marked
and we can use the copies.
The Court: All right,
(Received in evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 95.)
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Mr. Podell: We rest, your Honor.
The Court: And the defendants rest, too?
Mr. Marshall: And the defendants rest, your
Honor.
The Court: Gentlemen, we are going to argue
some motions that are applicable to this situation,
and I think the legal proposition will be a matter
of considerable discussion, so we are going to let
you go until 2 o'clock, and then you will return
here; and if the situation is so created, we will have
summation and I will charge you in the morning,
so I will not have you locked in the jury room
during the evening to-night and I think that will
work out the proposition the best way. So if you
will come back at 2 o'clock, gentlemen, we will be
ready then to go ahead with summations.
(Jury excused from court room.)
Mr. Louis Marshall: May it please the Court,
in the first place, I move that the plaintiff elect between the two causes of action. The first cause of
action is for negligence; the second is for fraud
and deceit. There is an inconsistency between those
two causes of action. An act cannot at the same
time be fraudulent and negligent, and to go to the
jury with such a confused state of the pleadings
would certainly lead to confusion on their part and
to an inability to understand just exactly what is
to be decided. I think a statement of that proposition is sufficient without further argument to indicate that in fairness and justice to the parties
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concerned the case should not be tried before a juryon such two inconsistencies.
The Court: And for that reason you now ask
that they elect?
Mr. Marshall: That they elect, yes.
The Court: What does counsel for the plaintiff
think on that subject?
Mr. Limburg: We respectfully decline so to do,
and there is not the slightest inconsistency. If
your Honor wishes me to argue it, I will be glad to.
The Court: Does counsel decline to do so?
Mr. Limburg: We do decline, sir.
The Court: All right. I will wait further on
that.
Mr. Marshall: You will not decide it now?
The Court: Not at this point.
Mr. Marshall: I next move that the second
cause of action so-called be dismissed on the ground
that it does not state facts and no facts have been
proven on the trial sufficient to constitute a cause
of action against the defendant based on fraud.
Mr. Louis Marshall: Now I move generally to
dismiss the complaint, first, on the ground there
is no contractual relation between the plaintiff and
the defendants upon which a cause of action has
accrued. There has been no fraud on the part of
the defendant. I repeat that in this connection.
Third, that there is no proof of negligence on the
part of the defendants, not sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action on that ground. Next,
that there is no guarantee or insurance on the part
of the defendants with respect to any acts which
they did as to the plaintiff. Next, that the defendants were under no duty to the plaintiff, and
that they delivered the certificate and balance sheet
to their employer, Fred Stern & Company, and that
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the plaintiff is a total stranger to the transaction
and has no right of action growing out of that
transaction even if there was negligence on the part
of the defendants in the preparation of the balance
sheet and of the certificate.
We claim further that the defendants were not
negligent in the preparation of the balance sheet
and that the work of preparing it was performed
by men who were competent, in a competent manner, and that the defendants acted in accordance
with the proper practice.
Next, that the representations claimed in the
defendants' balance sheet, namely, that it was in
accordance with the books and with the information
and explanations given to the defendants and in
their opinion presented a true and correct view of
the financial condition of Fred Stern & Company,
Inc., on December 31, 1923, was true. Therefore,
no cause of action has been established.
Next, that the plaintiff did not rely on the balance sheet prepared and certified by the defendants,
but that they relied upon their previous dealings
with Fred Stern & Company, Inc., on the personal
reputation of Stern, its president, on the security
received by the plaintiff in the form of trust receipts covering specific rubber and of accounts receivable representing proceeds of the sale of the
rubber, and that they also relied upon the fact that
this account was a profitable one from which large
profits accrued to them. There is, therefore, failure
to show reliance in this case upon this certificate.
There is also no legal proof showing the actual
condition of the books of Stern & Company at the
time of the audit.
Next, on the ground that if the plaintiff did rely
upon the balance sheet, it was negligent in doing
so, because at the time of the transactions which
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are the subject-matter of this particular transaction and as to which it is claimed that loss was
sustained, the balance sheet was nearly a year old
and could not accurately represent the true state
of affairs of Fred Stern & Company, Inc., at the
time when the advances were made.
Next, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to inquire into the existence or character of the security mentioned in the
trust receipts, in failing to inspect the purchase
and sales contract of Fred Stern & Company, Inc.,
in making loans when Fred Stern & Company were
in default in the payment of prior loans and in 2570
the delivery of security covering prior loans.
Next, that the plaintiff's damage was caused by
the intervening fraud and criminal acts of Fred
Stern, consisting of his failure to enter all the liabilities of the concern on its books, his entering
first false assets upon his books, his submitting to
the plaintiff a balance sheet known by him to be
false for the purpose of procuring credit; of his
giving to the plaintiff trust receipts purporting to
describe non-existing merchandise, and his failure
to deliver to the plaintiff accounts receivable which
he had promised to deliver; and the fact also that
he had made later definite false representations as
to his financial standing, months after the delivery
of this balance sheet, and likewise had made false 2571
statements as to the profits made by him at the
time, of the balance sheet. I will also add that he
was guilty of fraudulent and criminal acts in diverting the money which he received from the
plaintiff to purposes other than those for which
the money was given to him.
Next, that, the plaintiff's loss and damage was
caused by the breach of contract on the part of
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Fred Stern & Company due to its failure to deliver
to the plaintiff assigned accounts receivable equal
to the amount of the loans.
The Court: On the first cause of action, the
Court will not ask any discussion from counsel
for the plaintiff, because the Court has determined
to reserve decision on the first cause of action.
In relation to the second cause of action, the
motion of counsel for the defendants to dismiss is
granted, with an exception, given to counsel for the
plaintiff.
Mr. Podell : Before your Honor decides that,
would you not like to hear further from us?
The Court: No. I have made up my mind on
that, Mr. Podell. That I have passed on. I considered and thought well on that, and have passed
on it.
Mr. Podell: That is a very, very serious matter.
The Court: I appreciate that, and I appreciate
it that to me it is serious and that it is serious
to you and to all involved.
Mr. Podell: I would like very much, if you care
to. to give me an idea what particular proposition
it is on which you are granting this motion.
The Court: Upon what ground?
Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: On the ground that the Court fails
to find anything in the evidence or from the testimony by which scienter can be found, and that
is my pure ground and only ground.
Mr. Podell: Really, your Honor, I firmly am
satisfied that that to my mind is so clearly error—
and I say it with greatest deference to your
Honor
The Court: I know you do.
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Mr. Podell: That I would like to have an opportunity to persuade you of that, and I would like
to refer first to the testimony.
The Court : The Court has made up its mind
on that and I stand on that as ruled, so we will
now have summation, gentlemen, at 2 o'clock, on
the issue of negligence.
Mr. James Marshall: And may I call your
Honor's attention to two facts of intervening fraud
which I do not think have been brought out yet?
Mr. Louis Marshall: What is the use of talking
on that?
The Court: On the first cause of action?
Mr. James Marshall: On the first cause of
action.
The Court: No. That I am going to send to
the jury as an issue of fact.
Mr. Louis Marshall: Your Honor says you reserve until some future time the determination of
that motion?
The Court: I will entertain the motion after
the completion of the jury's deliberations, because
I have the power to make such reservation.
Mr. Marshall: For prudential reasons, of course,
I would like to have an exception to the nongranting of that motion now.
The Court: Certainly.
Mr. James Marshall: May we also make a motion at the same time for a directed verdict, which
I do not think was made?
The Court: You may have that motion.
Mr. Marshall: On the various grounds we have
stated?
The Court: That motion is denied.
Mr. Marshall: And we respectfully except.
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.)
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AFTER RECESS.

(Mr. Marshall summed up to the jury on behalf
of the defendants.)
(Mr. Podell summed up to the jury on behalf of
the plaintiff.)

(Whereupon, at 4.45 o'clock P. M., adjournment
was taken until to-morrow, April 12th, 1929, at 10
o'clock A. M.)
2579
TENTH

DAY.

New York, April 12, 1929.
(Trial continued.)
(Same appearances).
The Court charged the jury as follows:
Charge to the Jury.

2580

WALSH, J . :
Now, gentlemen of the jury, we
have arrived at the point of the trial where you
become a very important factor because up to this
point you have been the spectators of the testimony
that has been presented in order to sustain or
overcome this particular cause of action; and I
am quite sure that you must realize the tremendous
amount of work that has been done in preparation
for this trial and the labors through which counsel
representing the plaintiff and the defendants must
necessarily have passed in order to present these
facts to you.
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I call that to your attention so that you may have
a realization of the seriousness of your responsibility and therefore the necessity of following closely
the statement of the law that becomes applicable
to this situation.
You will recall that at the end of the plaintiff's
case, counsel for defendants moved for the dismissal
of the complaint, at which time the Court reserved
its decision on the motion. At the conclusion of
the entire case, in the jury's absence, the Court
granted the motion of the defendants' attorney to
dismiss the second cause of action, which is the one
founded on fraud, so that there is only left for
consideration and determination by you the issues
in the cause of action predicated on negligence.
You are to understand that the failure of the Court
to dismiss the complaint so far as the cause of
action founded on negligence is concerned is not
to be taken by you as any indication as to the opinion of the Court as to the merits of this cause of
action, but is merely indicative of the fact that the
Court deems that as a matter of law there are questions of fact for your determination.
The function of the Court is to state the law of
the case for the purposes of the trial and to rule
upon the admission and exclusion of evidence. If
the Court in so ruling is guilty of error, such error
will be remedied by the Appellate Court. That is
something with which you have nothing to do. You
are the sole judges of the facts. That is your responsibility. You are not bound by the statement
of facts made by counsel or by the Court and if,
in my charge, I refer to the facts, you will understand that it is simply for the purpose of endeavoring to convey to you what I believe has been presented, but that it is not my intention to invade
your province as sole judges of the facts.
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Plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants the
sum of $187,000. It is plaintiff's contention that
the defendants, who are public accountants and
who were employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in
1924 to audit Stern's books and prepare a balance
sheet showing the financial condition of Stern as
of December 31, 1923, improperly performed the
work they were hired to do. That as a result the
balance sheet prepared by and certified to by them
incorrectly represented Stern's financial condition
in that it showed Stern to be a going concern with
assets largely in excess of liabilities, whereas, as
a matter of fact had the defendants properly done
the work the balance sheet would have shown that
Stern was insolvent with liabilities greatly in excess of assets. It is plaintiff's further contention
that defendants when they undertook to audit
Stern's books and prepare the balance sheet were
informed and knew that the same would be used
by Stern in dealings with its creditors and prospective creditors for the purpose of showing its financial condition and that such creditors would rely
upon the same as indicating the financial standing
of Stern. That thereafter Stern, for the purpose
of borrowing money from the plaintiff, exhibited to
them Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which included the certificate and balance sheet and that plaintiff, in reliance upon the truth of the same, extended credit
to and loaned Stern large sums of money. That
Stern was thereafter adjudged a bankrupt and
failed to repay to plaintiff the moneys so loaned.
Plaintiff claims that the said loss so sustained by
it was caused by the negligence, carelessness and
unskillfulness of defendants in making said audit.
The defendants admit that they are public accountants and that they audited Stern's books and
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that the balance sheet prepared by them might be
submitted by Stern to some of its bankers; in all
other respects they deny the allegations upon which
plaintiff relies to establish its cause of action.
You have heard the proof and it will be unnecessary for me to again fully detail the facts to you.
It will, however, be necessary for me to instruct
you with reference to the law so that when passing
upon the facts you may be guided by the rules as
laid down. These rules you are bound to apply in
order to render such verdict as will upon the state
of facts proved upon the trial establish the rights
of the parties to this suit.
Plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the
ground of negligence.
By negligence is meant the failure or omission
to use reasonable and ordinary care in the performance of a duty which one owes to another. Negligence is the want of ordinary care, the failure to
exercise the care required under the circumstances.
It is the omission to do that which one is under
duty bound to do.
The first question for your consideration is
whether or not the defendants were under any
duty to the plaintiff, for, if there was no duty
owing by them to plaintiff, then there can be no
negligence. Defendants concededly were under no
contractual liability to plaintiff. But, even though
such a liability did not exist, it may still be that
defendants, when they undertook the task of auditing Stern's books, knew or ought to have known
that the result of such audit would be used by Stern
to represent its financial condition to persons from
whom Stern might seek to borrow money; that
the end and aim of such transaction was to enable
Stern to show its financial condition to persons
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with whom it had transactions and who were to
be governed by such financial condition. If the
defendants knew or ought to have known that the
balance sheet as made and certified to by them
would be so used and would be relied upon by such
persons as indicating the financial condition of
Stern as disclosed by their audit, then I instruct
you that defendants were under a duty to plaintiff
to exercise due care in the making of said audit
and balance sheet. If, on the other hand, you find
that the defendants neither knew nor should have
known that the audit was or might be so used, then
they owed plaintiff no duty, in which event it will
be unnecessary for you to proceed further with the
consideration of this case, for your verdict must
then be for the defendants. On the other hand, if
you find that there was such duty, then you will
pass on to the consideration of whether or not the
defendants were guilty of negligence in the making
of their audit and preparation of their balance
sheet.
When a person holds himself out as an accountant and assumes to exercise this duty in behalf of
another for hire, he must be understood as promising to exercise reasonable care and skill in the
performance of such duty, and if injury results to
him to whom he owes a duty, such accountant, even
though acting through his servants within the scope
of their employment, may be held to respond in
damages to the extent of the injury caused. Auditors and accountants are not insurers of the correctness of their work. They neither guarantee
nor are they called upon to guarantee the correctness of their audit. They are not bound to do more
than to exercise reasonable care and skill in making
inquiries and investigations. An auditor must not
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certify what he does not believe to be true and he
must exercise reasonable care and skill before he
believes that which he certifies is true. But no
man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that
the task he assumes shall be performed without
error. He undertakes for good faith and integrity,
but not infallibility, and he is liable to one to whom
he owes a duty for negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for the erroneous consequences of
mere error of judgment. It is for you to determine whether or not the defendants, in exercising
their calling as auditors, exercised the skill and
care required of them, and in the event you find
that they did not, but instead acted in a negligent
and careless manner, as a consequence of which
the balance sheet made by them was incorrect, then
their negligence will have been established. Such
negligence, however, even though established, is
not sufficient of itself to predicate liability on the
defendants unless it be further shown such negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained
by the plaintiff. The proximate cause is the one
that is in clear sequence with the result and unless
it could have been reasonably anticipated that the
consequences complained of would result from the
alleged act, then such act is not the proximate
cause; if the consequences were only made possible by the intervening act of a third party which
could not reasonably have been anticipated, then
the sequential relation between act and results
would not be regarded as so established as to come
within the rule of proximate cause. To establish,
therefore, that the defendants' acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss, it is necessary for
plaintiff to show that had it not been for the presentation to it of the balance sheet certified by
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the defendants, it would not have made the loans
to Stern which it did. For instance, if you find
that the defendants, irrespective of the balance
sheet and the presentation thereof to them, would
nevertheless have loaned to Stern in November and
December, 1924, the moneys which it did, and that
said balance sheet was not the inducing cause of
the making of such loans, then in such event I
instruct you to find that the negligence of the defendants was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
subsequent loss. If, on the other hand, one of the
inducing causes of the making of the loans was the
presentation by Stern to plaintiff of the incorrect
balance sheet and the plaintiff relied thereon in
making said loans, then, even if such reliance was
not the sole ground upon which plaintiff based its
actions, nevertheless the defendants would still be
liable. But, in the event the plaintiff's action in
loaning Stern money was induced not by the balance sheet, but by the fact that it had deposited
collateral to secure plaintiff for the amount of said
loans or by any other reason shown by the evidence,
then in that event the inducing cause of the dealings between Stern and the plaintiff was not the
presentation of the balance sheet and hence there
would not be any liability on the part of these
defendants.
As I have heretofore stated, plaintiff must not
only establish a duty upon the part of the defendants to it, but also a violation of that duty by
failure to exercise the degree of skill and care that
the situation called for. Also that the violation
of duty, if any, was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff making the loans to Stern, and that plaintiff's loss was occasioned thereby. If you do not
find all of the elements have been established, then
your verdict must be for the defendants.
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In addition to the matters required to be shown
by plaintiff in order to enable it to establish its
cause of action, the additional duty rests upon
plaintiff to establish that it was free from contributory negligence. In other words, whether or not
it exercised that degree of care that was incumbent
on it in the circumstances. Thus, if the plaintiff
knew or should have known that the financial condition of Stern was not as represented by the balance sheet and ignored the knowledge it had or
should have had, then I charge you that it cannot
recover herein, for, in such case, its want of care
contributed to its loss and as a consequence it is
precluded from recovering notwithstanding the fact
that you find the defendants were negligent.
These are the general principles which should
guide you in making your finding.
In determining the question of whether or not
the defendants were negligent you will of course
consider the entire testimony in the case, but, by
way of illustration, I shall present to you the main
contentions of the plaintiff upon which it seeks
to show that the defendants were negligent, and
also the contentions of defendants to the effect that
they exercised due care.

2600

Plaintiff has shown that after the defendants undertook their task of auditing Stern's books they
discovered:

2601

That though the books indicated that the inventory was stated to show goods on hand of the value
of $347,000, the actual value thereof was but $131,000. That the account books of Stern contained
an overstatement of accounts receivable of some
$20,000 and of acceptances payable of approximately $67,000.
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That in the ledger sales account of Stern there
appeared that there had been sales made in the
month of December, 1923, of a total of $644,000
and $706,000, making in all some $1,300,000. That
said sum was greatly in excess of the total sales
made by Stern in any other month; also that the
entries of the sales for this month were made by
two separate entries, whereas, in all previous
months, such sales were represented by but one
entry. Also that the invoices alleged to represent
the transactions upon which these entries were
based were a different type of invoice than those
at any time theretofore used by Stern.
2603
That the accounts of Stern showed that the
United Baltic Company, which had always been a
seller of rubber to Stern, was indebted to Stern
in the sum of approximately $113,000, whereas in
fact Stern was in reality indebted to said Baltic
Company in the sum of $250,000.
That the books of Stern showed that various
shipments of rubber had been pledged by Stern to
different banks. In other words, that the same
shipment had been pledged to different banks. In
this respect, it was shown that, out of a total of
some forty-one invoices, six had been pledged once,
twenty-seven twice, seven three times and one four
times.
2604
It is claimed by the plaintiff that, in view of these
irregularities appearing on the books of Stern,
which irregularities were discovered by defendants,
it was their duty to exercise a greater degree of
care than would ordinarily be required of them,
and it was their duty, in view of these circumstances, to exercise greater caution than if such
irregularities had not been discovered by them.
In this respect, I charge you that if, in connection with their examination of Stern's accounts,
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there were any circumstances which indicated or
should have indicated that the books were not correctly kept, then, in such event, it was the duty of
defendants to exercise a greater degree of care than
would ordinarily be required of them in making
their audit.
The defendants, on the other hand, claim that,
when they discovered the overstatements of the inventory value and of accounts receivable and acceptances payable, they immediately called the attention of Stern to such errors and corrected the
books accordingly. That they were assured that
the errors were due to inadvertence and consequently were entitled to believe that this was so.
With respect to the ledger sales account, the
defendants assert that they noticed the difference
in sales between the month of December and prior
months. That upon discovering same they made
examination of the invoices and found same corresponding with the other entry in the books and
as they had no suspicion that the same invoices
were not correct and true, they were justified in
relying upon the same.
So far as the Baltic account is concerned, defendants assert that it was not their duty to verify
each account appearing on Stern's books. That
they had verified a number of accounts on the books,
and, having ascertained same to be correct, were
under no obligation nor was it their duty to assume
that other accounts were incorrect and that they
needed verification.
As to the same shipments of rubber being pledged
with different banks, defendants state that, though
they had information which indicated this fact,
they inquired of Stern and Romberg relative to
the matter and relied upon the explanation given
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to them and also received from them the certificates which have been marked in evidence.
It thus appears that there concededly were irregularities in Stern's accounts. I charge you that,
if you find that these irregularities were of such a
character that they should have indicated to defendants that Stern was not keeping its books honestly and correctly and to arouse suspicion in defendants' mind that the entries in Stern's accounts
were not honestly made, then it was the duty of
defendants to exercise a greater degree of care
than they would be required to use ordinarily, and,
in the event they failed to use the care commensurate with the circumstances, as a result of which
they failed to discover Stern's true financial condition, then they are guilty of negligence. On the
other hand, if you find that, even though there were
mistakes found in the accounts of Stern, which mistakes were not of such a nature as to indicate that
the errors were other than inadvertent ones, and
defendants were justified, after inquiry of Stern,
in believing that the facts were as stated by him,
then it was not their duty to make any further
investigation to ascertain whether such statements
were true, but they were entitled to rely upon the
information so given to them.

2610

You will, therefore, upon all the facts as they
have been shown by the evidence, determine
whether or not the defendants used that degree of
skill and care commensurate with the duty of a
careful and prudent accountant under the circumstances, and, if you determine that they did not,
it is your duty to find that they were guilty of
negligence.
I desire to call your attention to the fact that
the loss sustained by plaintiff was in connection
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2611

with loans made to Stern in November and December, 1924, about seven months after the presentation to plaintiff of the audit made by the defendants. If you find that this loss of plaintiff was
caused either by reason of a change in the financial condition of Stern since the time of the presentation of the audit to plaintiff or to the fact
that plaintiff, at such time, was extending credit
to Stern, not in reliance upon such statement but
upon any other intervening cause, then I charge
you that the presentation of the account to plaintiff in April, 1924, was not the proximate cause
of the loss sustained by the plaintiff. Further, if
plaintiff, in November and December, 1924, had
knowledge that there had been a change in the
financial condition of Stern between the time of
the audit and the time it made its loans in November and December, it was not entitled to rely on
such statement without also taking in consideration the facts which had come to its knowledge of
the change in Stern's financial condition. Nor if,
in November and December, the plaintiff no longer
relied on the financial statement, but instead made
its loans on the strength of Stern's statements to
it or any other information, then the defendants
are not chargeable with negligence.

2612

One who asserts a claim is entitled to no greater
consideration than the one against whom the claim
is asserted. In fact, the law places a greater burden
upon him who makes the assertion. The law puts
upon the plaintiff the duty of establishing by a
preponderance of credible evidence all of the facts
which he relies on as a basis for his claim. Upon
him also rests the further duty of establishing his
own freedom from contributory negligence. Preponderating evidence is not the number of witnesses
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that are called by one side or the other. I t is the
quality of the testimony rather than the quantity.
The requirement in relation to the burden of proof
is a substantial one and must be borne by the party
charged therewith. If you find that the evidence
is evenly balanced in relation to the alleged acts of
negligence and contributory negligence, you must
find against the person having the burden.
In deciding this cause you must take into consideration the interest that each witness has in
the result of the trial and the probability of the
story told by him and then to his testimony give
such credence as you believe it is entitled to because you are not only the sole judges of the facts
but you are also the judges of the credibility of
the witnesses. And where there is an irreconcilable
conflict of testimony it is your duty to determine
where the true facts in the case are. That is the
purpose of your being here, and if in your examination you find that a witness has deliberately and
intentionally sworn falsely to a material fact you
may disregard the testimony of the witness as to
this statement or you may disregard his entire
testimony, and as to his whole statement you may
give such credence to any part which you in your
good judgment determine to do.

2616

Now, gentlemen, you realize the importance of
this litigation to both of these parties. You too
realize that you and myself have no interests whatsoever in the ultimate determinations of our deliberations; so therefore our duty comes only from
the sphere in which we find ourselves. You pass
without prejudice, without sympathy and without
bias on the facts presented, me to give you the law
as best my mentality can present it, so if after a
determination of these facts you resolve in favor
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of the plaintiff, you will then come to the consideration of the damages.
There is before you an exhibit which covers these
particular items that have been placed in evidence,
and to that exhibit you may direct your attention
in your final determinations.
Are there any requests?
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor inadvertently
made an error in a statement of fact, which I am
sure was inadvertent, and I am sure you will want
to correct it.
The Court : I will, if I did.
Mr. Podell: You stated to the jury that the
claim of the defendants was that they made an
examination of the invoices supporting the $706,000
item. That was included in your charge. Our
complaint is that they did not make an examination
of those invoices; so I think to that extent you at
least want to either correct it or perhaps your
Honor would want to say to the jury that as regards that or any other facts, their recollection is
to govern.
The Court: Yes. If, in any reference I made
to a fact, human as I am and as counsel for both
plaintiff and defendants are, if your recollection is
at variance with any statement made by the Court
or counsel, use your own recollection.
Mr. Podell: Now, is your Honor going to cover
our requests or as many of them
The Court: I am going to recite them one after
the other.
Mr. Podell: I did not want you to do that.
The Court: I will tell you the ones I charge
and the ones I decline to charge.
Mr. Podell: That applies to both sides, I assume?
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The 'Court: Yes. Both sides will have the same
opportunity.
Mr. Podell: I wonder if there would be any
objection to my having a copy of their requests?
The Court: No. 1, I charge. The plaintiff was
at liberty to contract with Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
upon such terms as they mutually agreed upon
and it was not required by any rule of law to ask
for any security other than such as was offered
and was satisfactory to the plaintiff.
No. 2, refused, except as charged.
2621

(Plaintiff's request No. 2 read as follows:
" I t is not necessary for plaintiff to prove t h a t
it relied solely upon the certified balance sheet prepared by the defendants. It is sufficient for plaintiff to show that it relied upon the balance sheet
and would not have made the loans but for such
balance sheet.")
The Court: No. 3, refused, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 3 read as follows:
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"The plaintiff had a right to rely upon a number
of things in making advances to Stern, in addition
to the financial statement certified by defendants.
They had a right to rely upon any security that
was given them, such as trust receipts and accounts
receivable, in addition to such statement.")
Mr. Podell: I take it, we may have an exception
to this?
The Court: On all general refusals.
Mr. Podell: But will your Honor be good enough
to note
Mr. Louis Marshall: Let us have an understanding on that, as to both sides.
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Mr. Podell: Yes.
The Court: Certainly.
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, when you refuse some
of these requests, there is not occasion for me taking an exception to all of them, because some of
them are the same things reworded.
The Court: On all requests refused, counsel for
plaintiff and defendants may have a general exception.
Mr. Louis Marshall: May it please the Court,
I do not want a general exception. I think the
proper way would be that as to each request of
the plaintiff that is charged, we are to have an
independent separate exception; as to each request
of the defendants which is refused, we are to have
a separate and independent exception.
The Court: And the same to counsel for the
plaintiff?
Mr. Podell: That applies to us.
Mr. Louis Marshall: That applies to both. I
do not want to have anything you cannot have.
Mr. Podell: I would like to have a copy. I
would be very happy to give a copy of mine to you.
Mr. Marshall: I have only this copy.
The Court: I will go so fast you will not be
able to follow.
Mr. Podell: The only concern I have, your
Honor, is that sometimes we may consent.
The Court: I appreciate that, and you may consent to all of them, but I have had them, you know,
at 10 o'clock last night.
Mr. Podell: I know.
The Court: No. 4, refused, except as charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 4 read as follows:
"If you come to the conclusion that under all
the facts and circumstances Ultramares Corpora-
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tion would not have done business at all with Stern
if the financial statement had accurately disclosed
Stern as being insolvent, then, of course, you may
find therefrom that Ultramares Corporation relied
upon that financial statement.")
The Court: No. 4a, the mere fact that Stern
was dishonest and that Stern was the one who
delivered the statement to Ultramares Corporation,
would not bar plaintiff from recovery if you find
that it is otherwise entitled to recovery, under the
rules as I have expressed them.
No. 5. Upon this trial the defendants expressly
admitted the fact that they knew generally that
these reports would be used as financial statements
to banks or to creditors, or to stockholders or to
purchasers or sellers.
No. 5a, declined, except as charged.
(Plaintiff's request 5a read as follows:
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"If the defendants knew that their certified balance sheet was going to be used by Stern for the
purpose of procuring credit thereon, they are
chargeable with the knowledge of the normal consequences that would ensue from such use of the
balance sheet.")
The Court: No. 6, granted, with the exception
which I will refuse to read. In determining whether
Touche, Niven & Co. knew that their certified
balance sheet would be used by Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., to procure loans upon the faith thereof, you
may consider that Touche, Niven & Co. furnished
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., thirty-two counterparts
of this balance sheet, each bearing the defendants'
original signature to the certificate; that to their
knowledge Stern's business was conducted through
borrowing large sums of money.
The balance is refused.
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2629

(Balance of plaintiff's request No. 6 read as follows :
"And you may further consider whether defendants knew that large sums of money are not ordinarily loaned unless a certified financial statement
is presented to the lender.")
The Court: No. 7, refused.
(Plaintiff's request No. 7 read as follows:
"You may also consider whether to defendants'
knowledge there was or could have been any purpose in furnishing thirty-two original certified balance sheets other than to permit their use to procure loans upon the faith of such balance sheets.")
The Court: No, 8, refused.

2630

(Plaintiff's request No. 8 read as follows:
"It was not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove
by direct evidence that defendants knew that the
balance sheet would be used by Stern for the purpose of procuring loans on the faith thereof, but
such knowledge may be found by you from circumstantial evidence.")
The Court: No. 10. If the defendants knew that
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., intended to use the balance
sheets prepared and certified by defendants in order to procure loans upon the face thereof, it is
wholly immaterial that defendants did not know
the names of the particular parties to whom Stern
intended to apply for such loans.
No. 11. The amount of compensation which the
defendants may have agreed upon with Stern for
their work does not in anywise affect the rule of
law that such work as they did undertake they
were bound to do prudently and with reasonable
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care. If the defendants were not satisfied with
the compensation they were to receive, they were
at liberty not to undertake the audit, but, having
undertaken it, for whatever compensation they
agreed upon, they were bound to make that audit
in a reasonably careful manner and not in a negligent manner.
No. 12, declined, except as already charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 12 read as follows:

2633

2634

"The law requires that where any person or
concern hold themselves out to the public as skilled
professional men—in this case, accountants—that
they exercise their profession with reasonable prudence and care. That is a duty which the law imposes and the failure on the part of professional
men to exercise that degree of care and prudence
which the law requires, constitutes a breach of
that duty.")
The Court: There is not any 13.
Mr. Podell: That was stricken out.
Mr. Marshall: They were superstitious.
Mr. Podell: We made up for it by 14a and 16a.
The Court: No. 14, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 14 read as follows:
"While an accountant is not a guarantor of the
correctness of his work, he is obliged to have reasonable skill and is required to exercise such prudence and care as is ordinarily exercised by accountants in making audits.")
The Court: No. 15, declined, except as already
charged.
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2635

(Plaintiff's request No. 15 read as follows:
"No accountant is required to certify to a balance sheet unless he has fully satisfied himself of
its correctness. His signature constitutes a representation that he has made an examination with
the degree of care which a reasonably prudent accountant would employ and that the balance sheet
has been prepared as the result of an examination
conducted with such care.")
The Court: No. 16, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 16 read as follows:

2636

"While an accountant is not required to approach
his audit of any set of books with any suspicion
that they have been falsified, nevertheless if during
his audit he discovers apparent irregularities, it
is his duty to take every precaution to ascertain
the true state of facts. If, under such circumstances, an accountant fails to examine available
books and records which would have disclosed such
irregularities, which, in the exercise of reasonable
care, he should have examined, you may conclude
that he has not performed his full duty and was
negligent,")
The Court:

No. 16a, refused.

(Plaintiff's request No. 16a read as follows:
"The evidence shows that Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc.'s, books were audited by the defendants only
once a year and as of December 31st, in such year.
The balance sheet as of December 31st, 1923, prepared by the defendants, was the last one prepared
by them prior to plaintiff's loans to Fred Stern &
Co., Inc.")
The Court: No. 17, declined, except as charged.

2637
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(Plaintiff's request No. 17 read as follows:

2639

"While it is true that the defendants were not
obligated to approach or begin the audit of the
books of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with any suspicion, I charge you that if in the course of their
audit circumstances developed which would have
shown to any reasonably careful man that irregularities existed in the books of account, that it then
became the duty of the defendants to make a thorough investigation and a thorough inquiry until
they were genuinely satisfied of the correctness and
honesty of the records.")
The Court: No. 18, declined, except as charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 18 read as follows:
"If you believe from the testimony that it was
customary since a number of years prior to 1924,
in auditing the accounts of rubber concerns, to
communicate with the customers whose accounts
receivable were held in order to ascertain the
amounts which such customers admitted to be due,
then you may find that it was negligent on the
part of the defendants not to make such communication." )
The Court: No. 19, declined, except as charged.

2640

(Plaintiff's request No. 19 read as follows:
"Irrespective of whether there was at the beginning of the audit any obligation existing on the
part of the accountants to communicate with the
customers whose accounts receivable were held,
nevertheless if in the course of the audit the accountants discovered irregularities which made or
should have made them suspicious of the correctness and honesty of the records kept by Fred Stern
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2641

& Co., Inc., then you may find that they were negligent in not taking every reasonable precaution to
ascertain the true facts, including communication
with the customers.")
The Court: No. 20, refused.
(Plaintiff's request No. 20 read as follows:
"The jury are not bound to accept the statement of the defendants' employees that they
received satisfactory explanations of apparent irregularities, in the absence of evidence as to what
the explanations were, and whether the explanations were such as should have satisfied a reasonably prudent accountant without further independent examination and verification of the facts.")
The Court: No. 21, declined, except as charged.

2642

(Plaintiff's request No. 21 read as follows:
"An accountant may not close his eyes to irregularities discovered in his audit, nor accept without
independent verification a statement made to him
by those in charge of the books if a reasonably prudent accountant would make such independent examination." )
The Court: No. 22. In determining whether
these accountants were negligent, you may consider
not only the records that they actually had examined, but such other available records as in the
exercise of reasonable care they ought to have
examined.
No. 23, declined.
(Plaintiff's request No. 23 read as follows:
"There is no evidence that any book, document
or record of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was withheld
or concealed from the accountants in their audit.")
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2645

2646

The Court: No. 24. A mere statement, whether
verbal or written, given to the accountants either
by Stern or his bookkeepers certifying to the correctness, honesty or accuracy of the books and
records or explaining irregularities will not protect
the accountant if at the same time he knew or had
good reason to believe that the books were not accurate or honest and that an accountant in the
exercise of reasonable care would have made further investigation of the facts.
No. 25, certain letters, the exhibit numbers of
which I have forgotten, but more in relation to
the two letters which were signed by Stern and
Romberg, the two certificates which you will recall,
gentlemen, Towell had signed by Mr. Romberg and
Mr. Stern, have been offered in evidence by the
defendants, which were signed by Stern and Romberg. I charge you that these letters will not protect the accountants if from the facts and circumstances of the case you find that, at the time these
letters were given, the accountants knew or had
strong reason to believe that the books and records
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., were either dishonest
or inaccurate, and made no further investigation
of the truth of the statements contained in those
letters.
Mr. James Marshall:
Those exhibits, your
Honor, were offered by the plaintiff.
The Court: Marked by the plaintiff.
Mr. Limburg: We offered the entire working
sheets and they were connected with them.
The Court: They are before the jury. That is
immaterial.
No. 26. If you find that at the time when these
accountants issued their certificate and the statement annexed, they knew or had good reason to
know that the books and records of Fred Stern &
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2647

Co., Inc., had been falsified, and that knowing such
a condition to exist they failed to make such examinations and adjustments as would truly reflect the
actual financial condition of the business, then they
violated their duty and were guilty of negligence.
No. 27, declined, except as already charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 27 read as follows:
" I charge that if you find from all of the facts
and circumstances that had these accountants been
prudently careful in their audit they would have
or should have discovered the irregularities or inaccuracies which existed in the books of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., that then they violated their duty and
are guilty of negligence.")
The Court: No. 28, declined, except as already
charged.

2648

(Plaintiff's request No. 28 read as follows:
"If you find from all of the facts and circumstances that these defendants shut their eyes to
irregularities and failed and neglected to properly
investigate them and failed and neglected to include the results of such investigation in the financial statement which they prepared, they committed
a breach of their duty and are guilty of negligence." )
2649
The Court: No. 29, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 29 read as follows:
"The defendants in this case admit that they
were engaged to make an audit of the books of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and admit further that they
made what is known as a balance sheet audit and
that they issued a statement certifying to that
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audit, which is before you as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
I charge you that if you find from all of the facts
and circumstances of the case these defendants
were negligent in the making of that audit, that
they did not exercise reasonable prudent care in
the making of that audit, that then they committed
a breach of the duty which the law imposes upon
them.")
The Court: No. 30, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 30 read as follows:

2651

"The liability of the defendants is exactly the
same if the negligent acts were those of their
subordinates, as it would be if they were personally guilty of negligence.")
The Court: No. 31, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 31 read as follows:

2652

"The defendants, having selected their own
agents to make the audit, are responsible for the
acts of their agents in the course of that audit,
and any neglect by such agents in the course of
their work.")
The Court: No. 32, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 32 read as follows:
"In making loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
plaintiff was called upon to exercise such care
only as a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised under all the conditions presented.")
The Court: No. 33, declined.
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2653

(Plaintiff's request No. 33 read as follows:
"In determining whether plaintiff exercised reasonable care in making the loans which were not
repaid, you may consider the facts that large previous loans had been repaid, that plaintiff was receiving assignments of valid accounts receivable
every few days and collecting upon the accounts
previously assigned to it; that the accounts receivable previously assigned to the plaintiff were
regularly and punctually paid at maturity, and
that plaintiff had defendants' certificate as to the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of
December 31, 1923.")
The Court: 33a, declined, except as already
charged.

2654

(Plaintiff's request No. 33a read as follows:
"In considering the question of contributory negligence, you should bear in mind that the law does
not require any extraordinary care or caution on
the part of merchants doing business. The law
did not require plaintiff to make an examination
of the books of Stern in order to determine the
correctness of the financial statement submitted
to them. If you find that they believed in Touche,
Niven & Co. and if you find further that they believed the contents of the financial statement to
be true, then you may find that plaintiff had a
right to rely upon the financial statement.")
The Court: No. 34, declined.
(Plaintiff's request No. 34 read as follows:
"If you gentlemen find that the Ultramares Corporation or its officers believed the representations
made in the financial statement and certificate sent
by Touche, Niven & Co. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1),
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to wit: that Stern had total assets of $2,550,671.88,
and that he had liabilities of $1,479,956.62, leaving
a net worth of $1,070,715.26, then I charge you as
a matter of law that you may find that they had
a right to rely on the truthfulness of that statement and that it would not be negligence on the
part of the Ultramares Corporation if in such reliance they extended credit to Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., with or without security.")
The Court: No. 35, declined.
(Plaintiff's request No. 35 read as follows:

2657

"You have a right to exercise your business experience in determining whether or not the Ultramares Corporation was guilty of contributory negligence if in reliance upon the statement of Touche,
Niven & Co. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) it extended
credit to Stern with or without security. In other
words, if you find that Ultramares Corporation believed in the truthfulness and accuracy of the
financial statement and knew nothing to be contrary, you may from that find that Ultramares
Corporation was justified in making the loans in
question with or without any security.")
The Court: No. 36, declined.

2658

(Plaintiff's request No. 36 read as follows:
" I charge you that the law does not impose upon
any lender the requirement that he must get security for a loan that he makes. In a proper case
he may make loans without security. There is
nothing in the law which compelled Ultramares
Corporation to exact security for any loans that
it made.")
The Court: No. 37, declined, except as already
charged.
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2659

(Plaintiff's request No. 37 read as follows:
"When you come to consider the question of
whether or not Ultramares Corporation was guilty
of any contributory negligence, then the law simply exacts of the Ultramares Corporation ordinary
reasonable care in making the loan.")
The Court: No. 38, declined.
(Plaintiff's request No. 38 read as follows:
"The Ultramares Corporation was not obligated
to use any extraordinary precautions in making the
loan to Fred Stern. It was not obligated to do
anything more in connection with making such a
loan except what you would expect of any person
or concern that acted with ordinary care. If you
find that any concern or person acting with ordinary business prudence and care would have on
the strength of the financial statement furnished
by Touche, Niven & Co. made the loans in question even without security, then you may conclude
from that that the Ultramares Corporation were
justified in making such loans even without security, and in such an event they would not on
those facts be guilty of any contributory negligence. The test is what did ordinary usual care
require them to do.")
The Court:

No. 39, declined.

(Plaintiff's request No. 39 read as follows:
"The evidence shows that certain so-called trust
receipts were given at the very same time that
the advances were made. I charge you there is no
law which obligated the Ultramares Corporation
to record such instruments.")

2660
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The Court: No. 40. I charge you further that
you cannot predicate a finding that the Ultramares
Corporation was contributorily negligent simply
because they charged certain commissions that have
been referred to during the trial. That evidence
was not admitted in connection with any claim of
contributory negligence. The Ultramares Corporation had a perfect right to charge such commissions as the parties agreed upon, and there is
nothing illegal or improper in those charges.
41, declined.

2663

(Plaintiff's request No. 41 read as follows:
"There is no evidence in the case that the Ultramares Corporation charged commission of 25%.
The evidence is that the commission charged by
them was at first half a cent per pound of rubber,
and thereafter 1% of the amount of the loan in
each case wholly irrespective of the length of time
that the loan would be outstanding. Such charge
of commission was in every respect lawful and
proper.")
No. 42, declined.
(Plaintiff's request No. 42 read as follows:

2664

"Of course, gentlemen, where there is a running
account established between two parties, it is not
unusual that the losses incurred will be incurred
toward the end of the running account, That in
itself would not be a bar to plaintiff's recovery if
otherwise you find it is entitled to it.")
The Court: No. 43, declined, except as already
charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 43 read as follows:
"The plaintiff's position in this case is that had
it known that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was insol-
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2665

vent or kept, dishonest books, it would never have
done any business with Fred Stern & Co., Inc. If
you find that to be the fact, then you may find that
the loss incurred by plaintiff resulted from the
negligence of the defendants certifying the statement, if you find they were negligent.")
The Court: No. 44, declined, except as charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 44 read as follows:
"The mere span of time between delivery of the
financial statement and the time when any loan
was made will not bar the plaintiff from recovering
if you find that the plaintiff relied upon the
statement and would not have done any business
at all with Stern had plaintiff known the true condition of Stern's finances.")
The Court: No. 45, declined, except as charged.

2666

(Plaintiff's request No. 45 read as follows:
" A financial statement certified in February,
1924, and delivered toward the end of March, 1924,
may still be relied upon in December, 1924, if, in
the meantime, plaintiff had received no information that such financial statement was untrue, and
if, on the contrary, you find that the plaintiff had
received information that Stern's financial condition had improved upon that shown in the statement.")
The Court: No. 46, declined, except as charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 46 read as follows:
"If the accountants when making their audit
either discovered, or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have discovered that the books of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., were dishonestly kept, and if
thereafter they issued a statement which in their
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opinion certified the books to be accurate, then
YOU may find from that that the defendants were
negligent both in their audit and in the statement
which they furnished.")
The Court: And 47, I have already charged.
(Plaintiff's request No. 47 read as follows:

2669

2670

"If you conclude that any witness has wilfully
testified falsely, upon any material matter, you
are at liberty to disregard his entire testimony.")
Mr. Podell: Now, may I add just one request,
your Honor?
The Court: I hope our jury will not be confused
now.
Mr. Podell: No. I am going to try to make it
just as simple as I can. I am going to ask your
Honor to instruct the jury, if the jury believe or
find from the facts and circumstances presented
to them in this case that the Ultramares Corporation would never have done any business at all
with Stern if these accountants had presented an
accurate statement reflecting the true condition of
Stern, then that they may find that the damage or
loss was a result of the negligence.
The Court: So charged, with the addition, however, that in relation to that request the jury must
take into consideration all other facts.
Mr. Podell: Yes.
Mr. James Marshall: Exception.
Mr. Podell: I think your Honor would want to
correct one charge of your own. You spoke of
changes in the financial condition of Stern. I assume that you meant changes for the worse and
not for the better.
The Court: Changes of any kind which the jury
may find the fact to be. The evidence refers to
worse and not better.
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Mr. Louis Marshall: May it be considered—I
do not know whether our first statement covers
it—that we take an exception to every one of the
requests that your Honor has granted?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Louis Marshall: Separately and independently?
The Court: I will say that the requests of the
defendants being at variance with the theory of
the law the Court has taken, I decline all of these
requests.
Mr. Louis Marshall: Then, we will take an
exception as to each.
The Court: Let me state them separately:
No. 1. declined, except as already charged.

2671

2672

(Defendants' request No. 1 read as follows:)
"There was no contractual relation between the
plaintiff and the defendants.")
The Court: No. 2, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 2 read as follows:
"This action is brought on the theory that the
defendants were negligent in preparing the balance
sheet of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which was annexed to the certificate of February 26, 1924, and
the burden rests upon the plaintiff not only to prove
the allegations of negligence, but also to prove an
absence of contributory negligence on its part and
a breach of duty on the defendants' part and that
the damage claimed to have been sustained by the
plaintiff was proximately caused solely in consequence of a breach of duty and of negligence on
the part of the defendants.")
The Court: No. 3, declined.
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(Defendants' request No. 3 read as follows:
"The defendants having made the audit of the
balance sheet of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, under a contract between them
and Fred Stern & Co., Inc., they were under no
duty to the plaintiff in respect to the preparation
of the audit.")
The Court: No. 4, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 4 read as follows:

2675

"The plaintiff being in the eye of the law a
stranger to the defendants in respect to the preparation of the audit and of the certificate, no duty
rested upon the defendants to the plaintiff in the
making of such audit and such certificate.)
The Court: No. 5, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 5 read as follows:

"An accountant who makes a balance sheet audit
on the books of a commercial concern is not an
insurer as to the accuracy of the audit; nor does
he guarantee that the books audited correctly show
the true position of the affairs of the person or
corporation whose books are the subject of the
audit.")
2676
The Court: No. 6, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 6 read as follows:
"When there is nothing to excite the suspicion
of an accountant engaged in making a balance sheet
audit of a business concern, the accountant is not
called upon to make a minute investigation and
inquiry, but is justified in selecting at random
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various accounts for the purpose of ascertaining
whether they are correct and may assume that
others like them are also correct.")
The Court: No. 7, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 7 read as follows:
"There being nothing in this case to indicate to
the defendants that Fred Stern, the president of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., whose balance sheet was
the subject of the audit, or Romberg, who had
charge of the company books, had falsified them
for the purposes of their own, the defendants were
not called upon to act as detectives or to approach
their work with suspicion against the owner of the
business or with the foregone conclusion that there
was something wrong about the accounts. They
were justified in believing Stern and Romberg, in
assuming that they were honest, and in relying
upon their representations.")
The Court:
charged.

2678

No. 8, declined, except as already

(Defendants' request No. 8 read as follows:
"The defendants are not liable for failing to
discover ingenious and carefully laid schemes of
fraud on the part of Stern, the president of the
company whose books were being audited, when
there was nothing to arouse their suspicions as to
the existence of such schemes.")
The Court: No. 9, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 9 read as follows:
"The defendants did not undertake to perform
the task of auditing the balance sheet of Fred Sten
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& Co., Inc., without fault or error. All that they
undertook, even as to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was
to act in good faith and with integrity, but not
infallibly.")
The Court: No. 10, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 10 read as follows:

2681

"The fact that the defendants, at the request of
Stern, prepared duplicates of the balance sheet and
certificate, and that they knew or inferred that
Stern might supply such copies to those with whom
his company had business relations, did not impose
any special obligation on the part of the defendants to the persons to whom such balance sheet
and certificate might subsequently be delivered by
Stern.")
The Court: No. 11, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 11 read as follows:

2682

"The defendants, having the right reasonably
to assume the honesty of Stern and of Romberg,
could not be expected to anticipate that the balance sheet prepared from the books of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., was known to Stern to be incorrect,
and that he, with knowledge of its incorrectness,
would show such balance sheet and certificate to
the creditors of his company.")
The Court: No. 12, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 12 read as follows:
"The certificate prepared by the defendants bearing date February 26, 1924, as of December 31,
1923, merely stated that they had examined the
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year
ending December 31, 1923, and that they certified
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that the annexed balance sheet was in accordance
therewith and with the information and explanations given to them in their opinion presented a
true and correct view of the financial condition of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923.
This did not constitute a representation that such
statement in fact presented a true and correct view
of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
but was a mere statement of an opinion based upon
the accounts presented to the accountants and in
accordance with the information and explanations
given to the defendants by Stern and Romberg and
by others connected with the business of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc.")
The Court: No. 13, declined, except as already
charged.

2683

2684

(Defendants' request No. 13 read as follows:
"The defendants had the right to rely upon the
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as presented
to them and upon the information and explanations
given by Stern and Romberg, and were not bound
to suspect that the very person who had employed
them, who was the principal owner of the business,
was engaged in fraudulently representing to them
the facts pertaining to such business.")
The Court: No. 14, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 14 read as follows:
"When Stern delivered to the plaintiff a copy of
the balance sheet and certificate as of December
31, 1923, and on the various occasions when he
obtained advances from the plaintiff, he in legal,
effect fraudulently and feloniously represented to
the plaintiff that the statements contained in the
balance sheet of December 31, 1923, were true, and
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his act in thus obtaining from the plaintiff the advances specified in the complaint in this action was
the efficient cause of the loss, if any, sustained by
the plaintiff and for which it seeks recovery in this
action.")
The Court: No. 15, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 15 read as follows:

2687

"If the act of Stern in presenting to the plaintiff
for action the balance sheet of December 31, 1923,
and any other representations made to the plaintiff
at that time or subsequently for the purposes of
obtaining advances, influenced the plaintiff in making such advances, then, even if it should be found
that there was negligence on the part of the defendants or their employees in making the audit,
the intervening act of Stern was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff and
the defendants would be entitled to a verdict.")
The Court: No. 16, declined, as except as already charged.
(Defendants' request No. 16 read as follows:

2688

"To constitute actionable negligence the injury
claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff
must be the natural consequence of the alleged negligent act or one which might reasonably have been
anticipated, and the neglect complained of must be
the proximate cause of the injury, otherwise there
can be no recovery."
The Court: No. 17, declined, except as already
charged.
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2689

(Defendants' request No. 17 read as follows:
"The test for determining proximate cause is
whether there is an unbroken connection between
the alleged negligent act and the injury complained
of. Even natural and probable consequences of
a wrongful act or omission are not chargeable to
the person claimed to have been negligent if a sufficient independent cause intervenes between the alleged wrong and the injury.")
The Court: No. 18, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 18 read as follows:

2690

"Where it is claimed that there has been negligence on the part of a defendant the law regards
those consequences as remote and, therefore, not
actionable which are produced by the intervention
of a human agency other than the defendant, or the
voluntary act of a person over whom the defendant
has no control.")
The Court: No. 19, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 19 read as follows:
"The act of a party sought to be charged with
liability for negligence is not to be regarded as a
proximate cause unless the injury is in clear and
unbroken sequence with the alleged negligent act,
and unless it could have been reasonably anticipated that the consequence complained of would
result from the alleged negligent act. If the consequences were only made possible by the intervening act of a third party, in this case Stern,
"inch could not reasonably have been anticipated,
then the relation between the alleged negligent act
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and the injury claimed to have resulted will not
be regarded as so established as to bring the case
within the rule of proximate cause.")
The Court: No. 20, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 20 read as follows:

2693

"If the injury for which recovery is sought may
have been caused by the wilful and tortious act of
Stern intervening between the preparation of the
balance sheet and certificate and the damage, there
can be no recovery here even if the jury should
find that there had been negligence in the preparation of the balance sheet.")
The Court: No. 21, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 21 read as follows:

2694

"Even if the alleged negligence of the defendants afforded Stern an opportunity to commit
frauds upon the plaintiff, the defendants are nevertheless free from legal liability for the loss sustained by the plaintiff in view of Stern's intervening unlawful and fraudulent misconduct in using
the balance sheet and certificate to carry out his
criminal purposes.")
The Court: No. 22, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' Request No. 22 read as follows:
"When Stern received the certificate of the auditors and the balance sheet he knew that through
his contrivance the balance sheet did not truthfully
and correctly represent the financial condition of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923.
When he thereupon made use of the certificate and

899
Charge and Requests to Charge.
balance sheet and secured from the plaintiff the
advances for which a recovery is now sought
against the defendants, he consciously committed
a crime. But for the interposition of his wrongful act the defendants' negligence, if any, would
have produced no injury. The casual connection
between such alleged negligence and the injury
complained of was due to the intervening criminal act of Stern, for which the defendants are not
legally liable.")
The Court: No. 23, declined, except as already
charged.
(Defendants' request No. 23 read as follows:

2696

"Even if the jury should find that the defendants
were guilty of negligence and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the damages sustained,
nevertheless if the plaintiff was likewise guilty of
negligence which contributed to the loss, there can
be no recovery.")
The Court: Declined.
(Defendants' request No. 24 read as follows:
"The plaintiff, by failing to inquire of the defendants as to the nature of the information and
explanations given to them and referred to in the
certificate of February 26, 1924, was guilty of contributory negligence.")
The Court: No. 25, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 25 read as follows:
" I f the plaintiff, by making inquiry as to the
information and explanations given to the defendants referred to in the certificate of February 26th,
1924, would have questioned the correctness of the
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balance sheet as setting forth the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31,
1923, its failure to make such inquiry constitutes
contributory negligence and debars a recovery.")
The Court: No. 26, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 26 read as follows:

2699

"The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to inquire into the existence or
character of the security purporting to be given
to it by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in failing to inspect the purchase and sales contracts of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., in making advances to Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., at times when that corporation
was in default in the payment of earlier loans and
in the delivery of security to cover prior loans, and,
therefore, cannot recover.")
The Court: No. 27, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 27 read as follows:

2700

"If the plaintiff by making a diligent inquiry as
to the existence or character of the security purporting to have been given to it by Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., in the form of trust receipts, or by inspecting
the purchase and sales contracts of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., or by declining to make advances to it
when Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was in default in the
payment of prior loans and in delivering the security covering prior loans, could have prevented the
losses which it subsequently sustained, and the
plaintiff failed to make such inquiry, it was guilty
of contributory negligence and cannot recover.")
The Court:

No. 28, declined.

(Defendants' request No. 28 read as follows:
"If at the time of making advances of money
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in November and De-
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cember, 1924, and at the time when Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., was in default in the payment of prior
loans and in the delivery of security covering such
prior loans, the plaintiff relied upon the balance
sheet of December 31, 1923, knowing that it could
not correctly represent the true state of the business of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. at the time when
the advances were made, it was guilty of contributory negligence.")
The Court: No. 29, declined.
(Defendants' request No. 29 read as follows:
" I f the plaintiff in making pecuniary advances
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc. relied upon the personal
reputation of Fred Stern, the president of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., and upon his oral representations
as to the profitable character of his business during
the year 1924, or on the security received by it in
the form of trust receipts covering specific merchandise, or on the security of accounts receivable
representing the proceeds of the sale of rubber
purporting to be covered by such trust receipts, or
upon the profit accruing to it from interest and
commissions received in connection with its transactions with Fred Stern & Co., Inc., the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover.")
The Court:
charged.

No. 30, declined, except as already

(Defendants' request No. 30 read as follows:
"There is no claim that the defendants or any
of their employees were guilty of fraud or dishonesty, in connection with the audit.")
Mr. Louis Marshall: Now, your Honor understands that as extending to each modification that
your Honor charged in each of the various requests
which have been presented.
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The Court: Yes, sir. I will include that, and
upon that you may have an exception.
I guess, gentlemen, that is the finish of our part
of the deliberations.
Now, when you go to your jury-room, gentlemen,
if you are desirous of an exhibit, notify the officer.
In the meantime counsel will prepare as best they
can this tremendous amount of exhibits and any
particular one that you want, ask for and we will
have it sent to you, or any amount of them you
wish, ask for and we will have them sent to you.
Mr. James Marshall: Why not give them all the
exhibits now?
Mr. Podell: I think it would be better that if
the jury wants any exhibits, that they specify just
what they want, and we will pick it out, because
there are so many of them.
Does your Honor mean to give these figures?
The Court: Not unless they ask for them.
(Whereupon at 10:55 o'clock A. M. the jury retired. )
Mr. Limburg. The plaintiff respectively excepts
to that portion of the charge in which the Court
stated in substance that if the defendants knew
that the audit might be used by Stern, they were
under no duty to the plaintiff.
I further except to that portion of the charge
in which the Court defined and left to the jury the
question of proximate cause; and the question
whether the loans might reasonably have been anticipated and likewise that portion in which the
Court submitted to the jury whether there was any
intervening act of a third party which could not
reasonably have been anticipated.
I except to that portion in which the Court submitted the question of inducing cause, and to the
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submission of the question of contributory negligence.
I particularly except to that portion of the
charge in which the Court said that if the plaintiff
knew or should have known that Stern's financial
condition was not as shown by the balance sheet,
they cannot recover; on the ground that it is contrary to law and that there is no evidence in support of it.
I except to that portion of the charge in which
the Court said that the defendants' claim is that
they discovered the two entries of the December,
1923, sales which are in the rubber sales account.
The Court: You mean on the question of fact?
Mr. Limburg: For the jury. I do not think
there was any such claim. The testimony was that
they did not know whether they noticed it or not.
The Court: That is purely a question of fact.
Mr. Limburg: To that portion in which the
Court said that under the facts outlined by it,
there was no duty to verify the United Baltic account.
To that portion in which the Court stated that
if Stern's mistakes were only inadvertent and if
the defendants so concluded after inquiry, there
was no further duty on its part to investigate and
that they had a right to rely on the information
given.
And to that portion where the Court said there
could be no recovery in case the loss was caused
by a change of financial condition on Stern's part
or intervening causes; that in that event there was
no proximate cause.
And to that portion in which the Court submitted to the jury the question whether the plaintiff
had knowledge of a change of Stern's financial con-
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dition and stated that in that event the plaintiff
was not entitled to rely on the balance sheet.
Mr. Louis Marshall: The defendants except to
so much of the Court's charge as submitted to the
jury the question of the duty owing by the defendants to the plaintiff, or that there was any
duty which the defendants owed to the plaintiff.
The defendants except to so much of the charge
in which it is said in substance that if the defendants knew of the use that would be made by
Stern of the balance sheet and the certificate of
the defendants, that the defendants came under a
duty to the plaintiff to exercise due care in the
making of the balance sheet and audit.
Also, I except to that part of the charge in which
the Court lays down the duty which an accountant owes as applicable to the facts in this case
and as applicable to any duty which the defendants
claim to have owed to the plaintiff in this case.
I also except to so much of the Court's charge in
which it said in substance that if the balance sheet
and certificate of defendants was one of the inducing causes which led the plaintiff to make the
loan to the defendants, that the plaintiff may recover in this action, if the jury comes to the conclusion that it is negligence and that the plaintiff
is free from contributory negligence.
I
except to so much of the Court's charge in
which it has said in substance that if on examination of Stem's books there would have been disclosed any circumstances that would have shown
that the books were correctly kept, the defendants
were bound to exercise greater care than they ordinarily would, and that a failure to exercise such
increased care would constitute negligence.
I also except to that portion of the Court's charge
in which it has said in substance that if on inves-
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tigation of Stern's books by the defendants it was
shown that they were not honestly kept, it was
incumbent on the defendants to exercise great care,
and if they did not, then the jury may find that
the defendants were guilty of negligence.
(The jury returned at 12:10 o'clock P. M. and
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants in the sum of $187,576.32.)
Mr. James Marshall: I move to set aside the
verdict, on all the grounds stated in Section 549
of the Civil Practice Act, except the ground of inadequacy of the verdict.
The Court: Decision reserved.
(Briefs to be submitted by May 10th, 1929; the
defendants to serve their brief upon the plaintiff
within two weeks, and the plaintiff to answer within two weeks thereafter.)
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
This exhibit consists of the balance sheet of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923,
and the certificate dated February 26, 1924, signed
by the defendants, attached thereto, both of which
are printed in this record at pages 15-17 as exhibits
attached to the complaint (designated in the complaint as Exhibits A and B ) .

2717

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
wasADMITTEDAS
This exhibit is the general control ledger for the
years 1921 to 1923, inclusive, of Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-A.
The following words and figures on the second
page were added by one of the accountants for the
Trustee in Bankruptcy of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
and are not to be considered a part of this exhibit:
2718

615007.63 O.K.
in Debit
250474.00—fictitious
Memo Book.
Fictitious—not in Debit Memo Book.

Form

31

Sheet No.

/

1
Account No.

Account No

Sheet N o .
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.
This exhibit was admitted as the book in which
are bound carbon copies of invoices of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., for sales of rubber, including December
31, 1923.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.
This exhibit was admitted as the accounts receivable ledger of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the years
1922 to 1924, inclusive.
2723
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.
This exhibit was admitted as the debit memo
book (sales journal) of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for
the period from July, 1923, to December 31, 1924,
inclusive.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-A.
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This exhibit was admitted as page 33 of the debit
memo book (sales journal) of Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc. (Exhibit 5).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.
This exhibit was admitted as the book of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., containing the shipping record
of United Baltic Corporation.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.
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This exhibit was admitted as the book in which
are bound the shipping and delivery records of
merchandise sold by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which
bear numbers 10001 to 10500 and cover the period
from October 5, 1923, to December 19, 1923.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.
This exhibit was admitted as the book in which
are bound the shipping and delivery records of
merchandise sold by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which
bear numbers 10501 to 11000 and cover the period
from December 18, 1923, to March 5, 1924.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.
This exhibit was admitted as the ledger of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., for notes and trade acceptances
receivable for the years-4922 to 1925.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 10.
This exhibit was admitted as the book containing
the trial balances of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for
accounts payable for the years 1923 and 1924.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11.
This exhibit was admitted as the book containing
the trial balances of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for
accounts receivable for the years 1923 and 1924.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 12.
This exhibit was admitted as the debit memo
book or sales journal of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for
the period from September, 1922, to July, 1923.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 13.
This exhibit was admitted as the credit memo
book or purchase journal of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
for the period from January, 1922, to January,
1925.
2729
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14.
This exhibit was admitted as the ledger of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., for accounts with banks and for
letters of credit for the period from January, 1923,
to December 31, 1923.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 15.
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This exhibit consists of the work sheets prepared
by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection with their
audit, which was the basis of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
A photostatic copy of this exhibit is to be handed
to the Court.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-A.
These are the accounts receivable work sheets
prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection
with said audit, being part of Exhibit 15.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-B.
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These are the accounts payable work sheets prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. in connection with
said audit, being part of Exhibit 15.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-C.
This is the trial balance prepared by Touche,
Niven & Co. in connection with said audit, being
part of Exhibit 15.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 15-D.
This is the schedule prepared by Touche, Niven
& Co. in connection with said audit, and lists notes
and trade acceptances receivable, being part of
Exhibit 15.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 16.
COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of L. M. Seiss
Prom January 26 to January 31 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme

Hours
Per
Item

SATURDAY
*

2735

*

*
*
SUNDAY

*

*

*

*
MONDAY
Fred A. Stern & Co.

Balancing Gen. Ledger & Trial
Bal. for April

4

TUESDAY
Fred Stern & Co.

Posting May, June & ½ of July

Fred Stern & Co.

Posting ½ of July & Trial Bal.
at end of July

WEDNESDAY
7

THURSDAY
Posting Aug. Sept. & Oct.

Fred Stern & Co.

7

FRIDAY

2736

*

TOTAL

EXPENSE

23 ½

REPORT

From January 26 to January 31 1924 inclusive
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Plaintiff's Exhibits.
SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Chargeable to
Fred Stern & Co.

Time (Hours)
Regular

Overtime

23½

TOTALS

Total

Expenses

23½

23½

23½

NOTE—
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

Time and expense reports must be written up D A I L Y
and approved by senior in charge.
Reports must reach the office on Saturday morning each
week to the previous day, and on the first of each month
to the end of the previous month.
Seven hours constitute a working day, i. e., seven hours
exclusive of time taken for meals.
To enable the statements of the Firm to its clients to be
substantiated, if necessary in detail, the exact time of
arrival each morning, departure to lunch, return from
lunch, departure to supper, return from supper and final
departure must be stated in the spaces provided for that
information.
Overtime is only chargeable after forty-two hours per
week have been worked and must not be charged between the hours of 9:00 a. m. and 5:30 p. m. (except
on holidays) or for periods less than one hour. The
maximum overtime chargeable for traveling after 5 :30
p. m. is four hours, no charge extending beyond midnight.
A charge for supper money is not allowed unless at least
two hours overtime has been worked.
Signature

L. M. SEISS
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COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of L. M. Seiss
From February 1 to February 1 1924 inclusive
SATURDAY

SUNDAY

2738
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Plaintiff's Exhibits.
MONDAY
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

TUESDAY
*

WEDNESDAY
*

THURSDAY
*

*

*

*

FRIDAY
Fred Stern & Co.
2741

Posted Nov. & Trial Bal. at end
of November

7

TOTAL

7

EXPENSE
*

*

*

REPORT
*

*

*

S U M M A R Y OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)

Chargeable to

Regular

Fred Stern & Co.
*

*

Overtime

Total

7

7

7

7

Expenses

*

TOTALS
2742
*

*

*

*

*

*

Signature

L. M. SEISS
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COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of L. M. Seiss
From Feb. 2 to Feb. 8 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme

Hours
Per
Item

SATURDAY
Fred Stern & Co.

Trial Bal. at Nov.

7

Fred Stern & Co.

SUNDAY
Posting Dec. & Dec. Trial Bal.

3½

Fred Stern & Co.

MONDAY
Trial Bal. Dec.

7

TUESDAY
Checking assets & liabilities Dec.
trial Bal.

7

Fred Stern & Co.
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WEDNESDAY
Comparative Trial Bal. 1/1/23
12/31/23 Reconcilement of banks

7

Fred Stern & Co.

THURSDAY
Reconcilement of banks

7

Fred Stern & Co.

FRIDAY
General

7

Fred Stern & Co.

TOTAL

EXPENSE

*

*

REPORT

*

*

*

2745

S U M M A R Y OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)

Chargeable to

Regular

Fred Stern & Co.
*

*

Overtime

42

3½

42

3

Total

Expenses

45½

*

TOTALS

½45½

Signature

L. M. SEISS
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Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of L. M. Seiss
Prom Feb. 9 to Feb. 15 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme
SATURDAY
Ck. notes & Trade Accept. Rec.

Fred Stern & Co.

Hours
Per
Item
4

SUNDAY
*

2747

MONDAY
Accts. Rec. Petty Cash Count &
General

Fred Stern & Co.

7

TUESDAY
*

Fred Stern & Co.
Fred Stern & Co.

Fred Stern & Co.

WEDNESDAY
Accts. Rec. Acct. Pay. & General

7

THURSDAY
Acct. Rec. Notes & Trade Accp.
Rec. & General

7

FRIDAY
General

7
TOTAL

EXPENSE

2748

32

REPORT

S U M M A R Y OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)
Chargeable to
Fred Stern & Co.
*
*
*
TOTALS

Regular

Overtime

Expenses
Total

32

32

32

32

Signature

L. M. SElSS
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Plaintiff's
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Exhibits.

COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of L. M. Seiss
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

Hours
Per
Item

SATURDAY
L. of C. Anticipations, etc.

7

SUNDAY

*****

*

MONDAY
Stocks & bonds, Borrowed securities, collateral schedules and
general

7

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

TUESDAY
General

8

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

WEDNESDAY
Future commitments

8

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

THURSDAY
General

7½

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
•
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FRIDAY
*

*

*

*

*

*

TOTAL
EXPENSE

REPORT

From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive
2751
S U M M A R Y OF T I M E AND E X P E N S E S
Time (Hours)
Chargeable to
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
*

*

Regular

Overtime

Total

37½

37½

37½

37½

Expenses

*

TOTALS

Signature

L. M. SEISS
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 17.
This exhibit was admitted as the accounts payable ledger of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the years
1921 to 1924.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 18.
COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of Sydney Towell
2753

From February 9 to 15 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme
*

*

* S A T* U R D
* AY *
*

SUNDAY
*
*

*

Hours
Per
Item

*

*

MONDAY
*

*

TUESDAY
*

*

Fred Stern & Co.

WEDNESDAY
Audit December 31, 1923

8

Fred Stern & Co.

THURSDAY
Audit December 31, 1923

8

Fred Stern & Co.

FRIDAY
Audit December 31, 1923

10

2754

TOTAL

EXPENSE REPORT

From February 9 to 14 1924 inclusive
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Exhibits.

S U M M A R Y OF T I M E ANd E X P E N S E S
Time (Hours)

Chargeable to

Regular

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
*

*

Overtime

Total

26

Expenses

26

1.50

*

TOTALS

**SignatureS Y D N E Y T O W E L L

*

2756

COPY

TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of Sydney Towell
From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

SATURDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

Hours
Per
Item
7

SUNDAY
*

*

*

*

*

*

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

MONDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

TUESDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

11

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

WEDNESDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

8

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

THURSDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

12

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

FRIDAY
Audit Dec. 31, 1923

7

9

2757

TOTAL
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Plaintiff's Exhibits.
EXPENSE

REPORT

From February 16 to February 22 1924 inclusive
State Daily Disbursements
Not Accruals

Tuesday

Thursday

1.50

1.50

Total

Subsistence:

Room
Meals
Sundries:

3.00

TOTALS
S U M M A R Y OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)

Chargeable to

Regular

2759
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
TOTALS
*

*

*

Overtime

Expenses

54

54

3.00

54

54

3.00

*

*

Signature

2760

Total

*

SYDNEY TOWELL
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Plaintiff's Exhibits.
COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of Sydney Towell
From February 23 to February 29 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
*

Hours
Per
Item

SATURDAY
Balance sheet as Dec. 31, 1923
*

SUNDAY
*
*
*

9

*

Fred Stern & Co.

MONDAY
Minutes etc.

2

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

TUESDAY
Sundry & Report

5

*

*

*

2762

WEDNESDAY
*
*
*
*
*
*

THURSDAY
*
*
*

*

*

F*R I D* A Y *

*
TOTAL

16

EXPENSE REPORT

From February 23 to February 29 1924 inclusive
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SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)
-—
Regular Overtime Total

Chargeable to
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
*

*

16

16

16

16

Expenses

*

TOTALS
*

*

Signature

*

*

SYDNEY T O W E L L

922
Plaintiff's

2764

Exhibits.

COPY

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.

Office—New York

Time Report of Sydney Towell
From March 1 to 7 1924 inclusive
Details of Work

Engagement

State Briefly Items of Programme
*

*

SATURDAY

*

*

*

*

SU
* NDA
*Y

*

*

*

*

MONDAY

*

2765

*

*

TUESDAY
WEDNESDAY

****

*

*

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

Hours
Per
Item

*

THURSDAY
Report

3

FRIDAY
*

*

*

*

TOTAL

3

EXPENSE REPORT

From March 1 to 7 1924 inclusive
** * * *

2766

SUMMARY OF T I M E AND EXPENSES
Time (Hours)

Chargeable to

Regular

Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
*

*

Overtime

Total

3

3

3

3

Expenses

*

TOTALS
*

*

*

*

Signature

*

*

SYDNEY T O W E L L
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twentyfive in number, for the month of October, 1923.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twentyfive in number, for the month of November, 1923.
2768

Plaintiff's Exhibit 21.
This exhibit was admitted as numerous journal
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., about twentyfive in number, for the month of December, 1923.

2769
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1923

No. 12-28
JOURNAL VOUCHER
Closing entries by Touche Niven

Debit
38.23
50.40
15,000.00

2771

2772

45.00
.51
.03
1,262.50
.09
30.—
11,500.00
1,876,755.84
347,219.08
5,416.00
1,690.39
1,000.00
551.52
17,441.14
23,782.72
1.40
2,301,784.85

Acct. P S
A-70
A-34
A-34
A-31

A-31

D-2-5
D-9
C-5
D-11
D-33
D-13
A-42
A-112
A-113
A-88
A-94
B-50
D-20
A-16-1

D-1-9
D-9
D-9
A-29
A-42
D-13
A-46
A-47
D-30
C-5
C-9
D-1-1
D-2-5
Total

SCredit
P
15,000.00
45.00
.51
.03
38.23
50.40
1,262.50
.09
30.00
11,500.00
1,876,755.84
347,219.08
5,416.00
1,690.39
1,000.00
551.52
17,441.14
23,782.72
1.40
2,301,784.85

Plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 22-A.
These exhibits were admitted as the journal
vouchers of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., showing the
adjustment entries suggested by Touche, Niven &
Co. in connection with their audit.

Acct.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 for Identification.

2773

This exhibit was admitted as a book containing
records of shipments received from the United
Baltic Corporation by Fred Stern & Co., Inc.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 24.
This exhibit was admitted as the invoices contained in a book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in which
are bound copies of trust receipts executed by Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., to the United Baltic Corporation
and invoices made by United Baltic Corporation to
Fred Stern & Co., Inc. Only the invoices are in
evidence.

2774

Plaintiff's Exhibit 25.
This exhibit was admitted as the common stock
certificate book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.

2775

Plaintiff's Exhibit 26.
This exhibit was admitted as the preferred stock
certificate book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.

926
2776

Plaintiff's Exhibit 27.
(Letterhead of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.)
New York, Feb. 21st, 1924.
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co.,
80 Maiden Lane,
New York.
Dear Sirs:

2777

We hereby certify, each for ourselves, that all
the liabilities of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. at Dec. 31st,
1923 are shown on the books of the Corporation at
that date and there are no contingent liabilities or
claims pending against the Corporation other than
those shown on the company's records under the
items Trade Accounts Discounted $159,682.28 and
certain borrowed securities, memorandum of which
has been handed to you.
Yours very truly,
F R E D STERN,
Pres. of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.
H. W .

ROMBERG,

Cashier.
2778

927
Plaintiff's Exhibit 28.

2779

(Letterhead of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.)
New York, Feb. 21st, 1924.
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co.,
80 Maiden Lane,
New York.
Dear Sirs:
I hereby certify that the Inventory of Crude
Rubber afloat or in stock amounting to 495,051 lbs.
on Dec. 31st, 1923 as compiled from the stock records of Fred Stern & Co. Inc. was taken under my
general supervision and direction and all items
contained therein were properly supported by
Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, or other
proper evidences of ownership.
All purchases for dollars are priced at cost and
all purchases for Sterling at sterling cost converted
at 4.343/8,the rate prevailing at Dec. 31st, 1923,
the total value being $131,423.81 which is within
a few dollars of market prices at Dec. 31st, 1923.
All liabilities to Creditors, Banks, or Bankers
in respect to this Inventory are shown on the books
of the company.
I further certify that the Corporation had no
speculative contracts for the purchase or sale of
Crude Rubber open at Dec. 31st, 1923 and that
future contracts for the purchase of Crude Rubber
and the Inventory of Rubber, as stated above, are
fully covered by sales contracts at a marginal
profit.
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN,
Pres. of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.
H . W . ROMBERG,

Cashier.

2780

2781

928

2782

Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 for Identification.
This exhibit is a portion of the examination of
Romberg under Section 21-A before the Referee in
the Matter of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., Bankrupt,
and printed herein at pages 243-246.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 30.
FRED

2783

Codes:

STERN

& CO.,

INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 4th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
25 South William St.,
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Att. Mr. von Goeben

2784

We beg to refer to arrangements completed in
regard to financing approximately $100,000 value
of Ribbed Smoked Sheets by your company, for
which you will charge us 6% p. a. on the various
amounts advanced and ½¢ per lb. commission on
every transaction.
The above arrangement is agreeable and we herewith confirm same.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
HR :CF

929
2785

Plaintiff's Exhibit 31.
April 5th, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc.
277 Broadway
New York City
Dear Sirs:
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of
even date in which you enclose three trust receipts
covering 85 tons of Rubber, and we accordingly
hand you herewith our check for $43,680.00.
It is understood that your invoices to the buyers
are to be sent to us for mailing to the respective
parties and that the invoices will be assigned and
made payable to us.

2786

Very truly yours,
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION
HM:x
Encl.

President.

2787

930
2788

Plaintiff's Exhibit 32.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.

Codes:

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 4th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
25 South William St.,
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Att. Mr. von Goeben
2789

This afternoon we expect the presentation of the
following Proforma Invoices:
Andean Trading Co
10 Tons $ 5040.—
to be shipped: to the Goodyear T
& R Co., Akron, Ohio
American Trading Co
25 Tons 15960.—
to be shipped to the Miller Rubber
Co., Akron, Ohio
Anglo Eastern Trading Co.. 50 Tons 25760.—
to be shipped to the Goodyear T
& R Co., Akron, Ohio
$46760.—

2790

In anticipation of the above we would appreciate
if you would put us in funds so that payment can
be effected.
W e would appreciate if you would hand bearer
some Trust Receipt forms.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
(Enc)
H R :CF

931
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 33.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO., INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 5th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipts as follows:

2792

#1—10 Tons $ 5040.—sold to Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio
#2—25 Tons 12880.—sold to Miller Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio
#3—50 Tons 25760.—sold to Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio
Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be
forwarded to you within a few days.
We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds in cover of the above.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

2793

& CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
(Enc)
H R :CF

932
2794

Plaintiff's Exhibit 34,
ULTRAMARES

CORPORATION

25 South William Street
New York, Apr 5 1924

No. 1789

T H E MECHANICS & M E T A L S N A T I O N A L

BANK

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$43680.00 Forty Three Thousand Six Hundred
Eighty Dollars.
ULTRAMARES

2795

CORPORATION

H. MANNING

A . VON GOEBEN

Cashier

President
(Endorsed)

Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or Order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

2796

Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Apr 7 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

933

Plaintiff's Exhibit 35.
TRUST

2797

RECEIPT

New York, N. Y., April 5th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
William St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:

Marks
T. F.

No.
S.S. 'M. S. Dollar'
Pier 16 Stapleton

Commodity
50 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under sales contracts, and to deliver as
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to
hold the same separate and apart for account and
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its
security for due provision for the payment of the
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot,
and as its security for the payment of any other
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares
Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 3
$25,760.—
Sold to
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Akron, Ohio.

2798

2799

934
2800

Plaintiff's Exhibit 36.
TRUST

RECEIPT

New York, N. Y., April 4, 1924.
from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
William St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows;
RECEIVED

Marks
E A
C

2801

2802

No.
S.S. M. S, Dollar
Pier 16 Stapleton

Commodity
25 Tons
R. ss.

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under sales contracts, and to deliver as
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to
hold the same separate and apart for account and
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its
security for due provision for the payment of the
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot,
and as its security for the payment of any other
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares
Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 2
$12880.—
Sold to
Miller R. Co.
Akron, Ohio

935
2803

Plaintiff's Exhibit 37.
TRUST

RECEIPT

New York, N. Y., April 5th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
William St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:

Marks.
S

No.
S/S 'Heffron'

F

Commodity
10 Tons
# 3 Amber Crepe

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. hereby agree to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under sales contracts, and to deliver as
soon as received the full net proceeds thereof direct
to the Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to
hold the same separate and apart for account and
as the property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its
security for due provision for the payment of the
Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot,
and as its security for the payment of any other
indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares
Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
thereon, hereby waiving any lien which we might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 1
$5040.—
Sold to
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio.

2804

2S05

936
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 38.
#18618

#11165

FRED STERN & CO. INC.
277 Broadway
New York, April 2nd, 1924.
Messrs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio.
Payable to Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
25 South William St., New York.
Terms: Payment due April 20th, 1924.
2807

All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers.

Payable in New York Funds
Your Order No. G 2644
Date of Sales #14970 10/31/23
S/S " H E F F R O N "
397/470

To No. 3 Amber Gristly Crepe Rubber

1297/1370
F S 191
F S 193

74 c/s G 13181½ T 1951½ N 11230 lbs.
74 "
13118½
1870½
11248 "

F

148 c/s G 26300

T 3822

N 22478 lbs.

Net 22478 lbs. @
per lb.
Rubber Association Fee

$5563.31
6.74
$5570.05

2808

Weight slip herewith
Deld to your Representative.
D/O #12593 #12605
(7793 7795)

Trust Receipt No. 1
Pd 4/22/24

937
2809

Plaintiff's Exhibits.
April 7, 1924.
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio.
Dear Sirs:
We hand you herewith invoice in duplicate of
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., for $5570.05, together with weighers certificates and executed assignments of this account in our favor.
Trusting to be favored with your check to our
order at the maturity of this invoice. We are,

2810

Yours very truly,
Cashier.
HM/MK.
encl.

April 25, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
277 Broadway,
New York City.
Dear Sirs :
Confirming our telephone conversation of this
A. M., we beg to advise having received on April
22nd, check for $5570.05 from the Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., in payment of your invoice for like
amount relating to trust receipt No. 1.
Very truly yours,
Cashier.
HM/MK.

2811

938
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 39.

#18661

#11202

FRED STERN & CO. INC.
277 Broadway
New York, April 8th, 1924.
Messrs. Miller Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio.
Payable to Ultramares Corp.
25 So. William St., New York.
Terms: Net cash 30 days from date of invoice.
2813

All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers.

Payable in New York Funds
Your Order No. 27272
Date of Sales #14981 11/2/23
S/S "M. S. D O L L A R "
E

C

A

27272

To 390 c/s # 4 Amber Crepe,
G-78201 T 10480 N 67721 lbs. @

per lb. $16760.95

Rubber Association Fee,

20.32
$16781.27

Weight slip herewith
Bill of Lading to follow
(7680)

2814

This invoice is assigned and made payable to the
Ultramares Corp., New York.
FRED STERN & C o . I N C .

President.
Pd 5/16/24

939
Plaintiff's
FRED

Codes:

2815

Exhibits.

STERN

& CO.,

INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 10th, 1924.
The Miller Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio
Dear Sirs:
We are enclosing herewith invoice covering
390 c/s Rubber amounting to

2816

$16,781.27

You will note that this invoice bears a notation
that same is assigned and made payable to the
Ultramares Corp., 25 So. William St. and we would
appreciate if you would remit the above amount to
the Ultramares Corp. on the due date.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO.,

INC.,

FRED STERN,

President.
(Enc)
CF—

2S17

940
2818

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.
April 11, 1924.

Miller Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio.
Dear Sirs:
We hand you herewith invoice in duplicate of
the Fred Stern & Co. Inc., for $16,781.27 accompanied by weighers certificate and a letter advising
the assignment on this account to this Corporation.
Trusting to be favored with your check to our
order at the maturity of this invoice, we are,
Very truly yours,

2819

Cashier.
HM/MK.
encl.

May 16, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:

2820

W e beg to advise having to-day received from
the Miller Rubber Co., check for $16,781.27 in payment of invoice, which amount we have placed to
the credit of your account.
Very truly yours,
Cashier.
HM/MK.

941
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 40.
#18707

#11250

FRED STERN & CO. INC.
277 Broadway
New York, April 17th, 1924.
Messrs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.
Payable to Ultramares Corp.
25 S. William St., New York.
Terms: Payment due 5/5/24.
All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers.

2822

Payable in New York Funds
Your Order No. 15018
Date of Sales #2705 11/15/23
T &F
F S
196

To Prime Ribbed Smoked Sheets
6 c/s G 1334½
133 "
25387½
308 "
42212
247 "
51959½

T

112½
2479
2802
3041½

694 c/s G 120893½T 8435

N 1222
22908½
39410
48918

lbs.
"

N 112458½ lbs.

Net 112458½ lbs. @27¾¢per lb.
Rubber Association Fee,

$31207.23
33.74
$31240.94

Weight slip herewith
Deld to your Representative.
D/O #12631
(7839 6 7863 688)

2823

This invoice is assigned and made payable to
Ultramares Corp., 25 S. William St., New York.
FRED STERN & Co., INC.,
FRED STERN,

Pres.
Pd 5/5

942
2824

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.
April 21, 1924.

The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
Akron, Ohio.
Dear Sirs :
We hand you herewith invoices in duplicate of
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. for $31,240.94
12,529.35
3,135.54

2825

together with weigher's certificate also three assignments duly executed.
Trusting to be favored with your check to our
order at the maturity of these invoices, we are,
Very truly yours,
Cashier.
HM/MK.
encl.

2826

943
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 41.
1919
11/21
20
21
20
20

Terms

1

case Rubber

6

19
13
4

Cash 10
10
Cash
Cash 10
"

20

12/16
19
1920
1/30
2/18
3/4
10/8

1921
4/21
6/30
9/30
10/7
10/5
1922
2/27
3/15
3/27
7/1
9/11
12/30
1923
3/1
3/24
4/10

10

10
10
10

26
4

10

"
"

92
"
22 bales Balata
10 bales
35
"
60 cases
55 bales
156 pkges

Balata

10
10
Cash
Cash

Amount

$ 86.29
609.15
1576.25
1800.90
651.31
328.82
819.36
8012.42

2207.26
354.62
15852.18
1023.86

Rubber
Balata
Rubber

643.66
2029.26
3520.92
3219.00
4818.69

20 bales Balata
83
2
5
Rubber
5
Balata
32
Rubber

1101.84
4432.61
125.25
88.32
235.68
2681.46

Cash 10
10

Cash

87 cases Rubber

6

"

6/20

13
25

"
"

6/29

6

6500.53
657.28
1431.37
2247.05
467.58

Broker
Direct

Earle Bros.
E. G. Curry

Crude Rubber Brok.

2828
"""

Earl Bros.
Crude Rubber Brok.
W. Hammersdorf

M. Rothschild
Direct
R. Badenhop
Direct
Crude Rubber Brok.

C. A. Morse & Co.
Crude Rubber Brok.
Earle Bros.

2829

1924
2/6
5/1
5/14
6/24
6/27
7/12
7/24

7 cases Rubber
11

385.77

"

5
56 bales Rubber
27 eases Rubber
6
"
Balata

6

Cash

"

30
60

60

637.86
344.35
918.54
1029.76
705.20
711.85

Diamond Rubber
Brok.
Direct
Earle Bros.
Direct

"

944
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 42.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO.,

INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 7th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
2831

Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipts as follows:
#4—40 Tons $21,056.—sold to General Electric
Co., Schenectady, N. Y.
#5—30 Tons 15,792.—sold to Boston Woven
H & R Co., Cambridge,
Mass.
#6—15 Tons
7,728.—sold to Michelin Tire
Co., Milltown, N. J.
#7—20 Tons
9,856.—sold to Acme Rubber
Mfg. Co., Trenton, N. J.

2832

Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be
forwarded to you within a few days.
We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds in cover of the above.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO.,

INC.,

FRED STERN,

President.
(Enc)
HR :CF

945
Plaintiff's

2833

Exhibits.
April 7, 1924.

Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
277 Broadway,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:
We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of
even date, in which you enclose three receipts covering 105 tons of Rubber, and we accordingly hand
you herewith our checks for $54,432.00.
It is understood that your invoices to the buyers
are to be sent to us for mailing to the respective
parties and that the invoices will be assigned and
made payable to us.

2834

Very truly yours,
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,
President.
HM/MK
encl.

2835

946
Plaintiff's Exhibit 43

2836

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
New York, Apr 7 1924

No. 1792

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$24432.00 Twenty Four Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty Two Dollars.
U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION
2837

A . VON GOEBEN

H . MANNING

President

Cashier
(Endorsed)
Pay to the order of
The Chemical Nat'l Bank
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

2838

Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Endorsements Guaranteed
Rack Department
Apr 9 1924
The Chemical National Bank
of New York
No. 12

947
2839

Plaintiff's Exhibit 44.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25-31 South William Street
B A N K OF N E W Y O R K AND TRUST C O M P A N Y

Banking Office—48 Wall St.
New York, Apr 7 1924

No. 6981

Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$30000.00 Thirty Thousand Dollars.
U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION
H.

A . VON GOEBEN

MANNING

President

Cashier

2840

(Endorsed)
Pay to the order of
The Chemical Nat'l Bank
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Endorsements Guaranteed
Rack Department
Apr 9 1924
The Chemical National Bank
of New York
No. 12

2841

948
2842

Plaintiff's Exhibits 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50.
These exhibits are the invoices and accompanying
letters relating to Trust Receipts (loans) 4, 5, 6
and 7. They are in the same form and follow the
same practice as under the earlier trust receipts,
as shown by Plaintiff's Exhibits 38, 39 and 40,
supra.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 51, 52, 53 and 54.

2843

These are Trust Receipts Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7, which
are referred to in Plaintiff's Exhibit 42, supra, and
which are in the same form as the earlier trust receipts, Plaintiff's Exhibits 35, 36 and 37, supra.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 55.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO.,

INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 9th, 1924.
2844

Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
25 So. William St.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
The present serves to advise you that we expect
to have an invoice tomorrow for the Miller Rubber
Co. but we do not expect any more invoices for at
least 3 or 4 days after that.

949
Plaintiff's

2845

Exhibits.

We expect the presentation of invoices within
the forth-coming 3 or 4 days for Crude Rubber
which is to be shipped to the following Manufacturers:
Miller Rubber Co
Mishawaka Woolen & R
Mfg. Co
General Tire & Rubber
Co
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co
Ford Motor Co
General Tire & Rubber
Co

34 Tons $18848.-30 days
50

"

28000.—15

"

25

"

13720.—15

"

25
25

"
"

15120.—5/25
12880.—10 "

25

"

12320.—15

Total

2846

"

$100888.00

Kindly advise us if you care to arrange the
financing of the above lots or part of same for us.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& C O . , INC.,
FRED STERN,

President,
F S :CF

2847

950
2848

Plaintiff's Exhibit 56.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO.,

INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 10th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipts as follows:
2849

2850

#8—34 Tons—sold to Miller Rubber
Co., Akron, Ohio
$18848.—
#9—50 " —sold to M i s h a w a k a
Woolen & R Mfg. Co.,
Mishawaka, Ind
28000.—
#10—25 " —sold to General Tire
& Rubber Co., Akron,
Ohio
13720.—
#11—25 " —sold to Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Akron,
Ohio . . . . . : . . . .
15120.—
#12—25 " —sold to Ford Motor Co.,
Detroit, Mich
12880.—
#13—25 " —sold to General Tire
& Rubber Co., Akron,
Ohio
12320.—
$100888.—
Assigned invoices in cover of the above will be
forwarded to you within a few days.
We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds in cover of the above.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO., INC.,

H . W . ROMBERG.

(Enc)
F S :CF

951
Plaintiff's
FRED

STERN
NEW

Codes:

2851

Exhibits.
& CO., INC.

YORK

Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, April 10th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:
Will you kindly give Bearer the necessary funds
to finance the following lots. Trust Receipts for
which have already been sent down to your goodselves.

2852

Miller Rubber Co
34 Tons $18848. 30 days
General Tire & Rubber
Co
25 "
13720. 15 "
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co
25 "
15120. Payable
May 25th
Total...

.....$47688.

Thanking you for your kind attention, we remain,
2853
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.

952
2854

Plaintiff's Exhibit 57.
April 11, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
New York City.
Attention Mr. Fred Stern.
Dear S i r :

2855

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of
the 10th, in which you enclose trust receipts Nos.
8-13 inclusive, to cover an advance aggregating
$100,888.00.
In accordance with your letter of even date, we
hand you herewith our check for $47,688.00 as an
advance against trust receipts Nos. 8 and 9.
On Monday, April 14th, we will hand you our
check for $53,200.00 as an advance against trust
receipts Nos. 9, 12 and 13.
Trusting to be favored with your invoices accompanied by a letter of assignment addressed to
the purchasers, in duplicate, we are,
Very truly yours,
U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION,
President,

2856

HM/MK.
encl.

953
2857

Plaintiff's Exhibit 58
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
New York, Apr 14 1924

No. 1864

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$53200.00 Fifty Three Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars.
ULTRAMARES

CORPORATION

H . MANNING

A . VON GOEBEN

Cashier

President

2858

(Endorsed)
Pay to the order of
The Chemical Nat'l Bank
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Endorsements Guaranteed
Rack Department
Apr 15 1924
The Chemical National Bank
of New York
No. 12

2859

954
Plaintiff's Exhibit 59

2860

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
New York, Apr 11 1924

No. 1851

T H E MECHANICS & METALS N A T I O N A L B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$47688.00 Forty Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Eighty Eight Dollars.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION
2861

A . VON GOEBEN

H . MANNING

President

Cashier
(Endorsed)

Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stem & Co. Inc.

2862

Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Apr 12 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

955
2863

Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 for Identification.

Period
Apr.

Acct.
No.

Advances
made by
Ultramares

Interest and
Commission
Charges

Collections
from
Accounts
Receivable

5/24-June 28/24

1

589,426.00

15,917.00

444,211.90

June 28/24—July 31/24

1

105,000.00

3,395.99

222,062.44

July 31/24—Sept. 3/24

1
2
3

180,100.00
224,692.00

52.40
3,233.18
549.67

69,788.84
97,029.40
19,522.23

Sept. 3/24-Sept. 30/24

2
3
4

369,800.00

74.37
5,597.35
6,004.97

70,544.53
173,792.04
39,959.67

Sept. 30/24—Oct. 31/24

3
4
5

79,000.00
249,000.00

10.00
5,353.64
2,821.32

47,976.20
300,535.22
53,912.11

Oct. 31/24—Nov. 30/24

4
5

351,800.00

223.07
4,998.28

86,877.82
191,245.11

Nov. 30/24-Dec. 31/24

4
5

195,000.00

35.70
3,440.85

12,990.73
300,320.57

Dec. 31/24-Jan. 31/25

5

1,058.15

77,399.63

$52,765.94

$2,208,168.44

Oct. 20/24-

$2,343,818.00
Total advances made by Ultramares
Interest and commission charges

$2,343,818.00
52,765.94

Total charges to Jan. 31/1925
Total credits to Jan. 31/1925

$2,396,583.94
2,208,168.44

Deduct commission on loans wholly or partly unpaid Jan.
31/1925

2864

$ 188,415.50
1,950.00

Balance due Jan. 31/1925
Interest to April 1/1929

$ 186,465.50
47,238.05

Payments by Ultramares since Jan. 31/1925
Interest thereon to April 1/1929

$ 233,703.55
52,329.49
4,105.33

Credit collections since Jan. 31/1925

$ 290,138.37
35,394.21

Credit interest on collections to April 1/1929

$ 254,744.16
4,506.76

B A L A N C E April 1/1929

$ 250,237.40

2865

956
Plaintiff's Exhibit 61.

2866

This consists of the amendment of the complaint
incorporating the second cause of action; this is
already printed in the record following the complaint.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 62.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO., INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Nov. 25th, 1924.

2867

Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipt as follows:
#105—75 Tons, $50,000.—sold to Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio

2868

We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds, i. e., $50,000.—to finance the above lots.
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to you
within a few days.
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
(Enc)
CF—

957
2869

Plaintiff's Exhibits.
TRUST

RECEIPT.

New York, N. Y., Nov. 25th, 1924.
from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
William St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:
Marks
No.
Commodity
E AC
B A T OE
S.S. "Veendyke"
75 Tons
F C
H&C
RECEIVED

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for the provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 105
$50,000.
Sold to
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio
75 Tons

2870

2871

958
2872

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.
#19765

#12364

FRED STERN & CO. INC.
277 Broadway
New York, Dec. 15th, 1924.
Messrs. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.
Payable to Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
25 South William St., New York.
Terms: Net cash 15 days from date of bill of lading.
2873

All claims for damage or deficiency to be made within three days
after receipt of goods. Goods shipped at the risk of buyers.

Payable in New York Funds
Your Order No. 903
Date of Sales #15944 10/28/24
Blocks
C H
903

To 335 c/s Peruvian Tails,
G 159512 T 24216 N 135296 lbs. @ 17½ per lb. $23676.80
Rubber Association Fee,

40.59
$23717.39

Weight slip herewith
Bill of Lading to follow
(8413)

2874

This invoice is assigned and made payable to the
Ultramares Corp., 25 South William St., New York.
FRED STERN & C o . , I N C . ,
FRED STERN,

President.
Pd 1/2/25

959
Plaintiff's
FRED

Codes:

Exhibits.

STERN

& CO.,

2875
INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Dec. 16th, 1924.
Messrs. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.
Dear Sirs:
We are enclosing herewith invoice covering
335 c/s Crude Rubber amounting to $23717.39
You will note this invoice bears a notation that
same is assigned and made payable to the Ultramares Corp. 25 South William St. New York, and
we would appreciate if you would forward your
remittance for the above amount to the Ultramares
Corp. on due date.

2876

Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& C O . , INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
(Enc)
CF—

877

960
2878

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.
December 16th, 1924.

The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio
Dear Sirs:
We beg to hand you herewith invoice in triplicate of Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. for $23,717.39
accompanied by weigher's certificate, bill of lading
and a letter advising the assignment of this account to our corporation.
Trusting to be favored with your check to our
order at the maturity of this invoice, we remain,
2879

Very truly yours,
Cashier.
HM :hv
encl.
(No Receipt Necessary)
Statement of Remittance in Favor of
Messrs Ultramares Corp
25 South William St
New York N Y

2880

12-15-24
D/M #1308
D/M #1078

Dec 1924
2371739

1687

4059
15912
19971

19971
2351768

Fred Stern & Co Inc
277 Broadway
New York N Y

Invoice

Yours truly,
T H E FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER Co.

961
Plaintiff's Exhibits 62-A, 62-B, 62-C, 62-D,
62-E, 62-F and 62-G.

2881

Exhibits 62-A, 62-B, 62-C, 62-D, 62-E, 62-F and
G2-G include the following invoices which were delivered and assigned by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to
Ultramares Corporation under and pursuant to
Trust Receipt No. 105:
Date of
Invoice

Purchaser

of

Merchandise

Quantity

2190 lbs.
Whitall Tatum Co.
International Shoe Co.
1490½ lbs.
Detroit Insulated Wire Co.
4459 lbs.
International Shoe Co.
4495½lbs.
Cooper Corp.
9466 lbs.
Clifton Mfg. Co.
4723 lbs.
Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.
27,297 lbs.
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.
444 lbs.
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.
4519 lbs.
Dec. 23, 1924 Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.
4504½ lbs.

Dec. 23, 1924
Dec. 17, 1924
Dec. 23, 1924
Dec. 24, 1924
Jan. 1, 1925
Jan. 1, 1925
Dec. 23, 1924

Price

$ 672.86
573.36
1,759.67
1,723.43
2,435.39
1,215.16
9,280.98

2882

150.96
1,536.46
1,531.53

Plaintiff's Exhibit 63.
U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION

25 South William Street
New York City
New York, Nov 25 1924 No. 6642
NATIONAL B A N K OF COMMERCE
in New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$10000.00 Ten Thousand Dollars through the New
York Cleaning House.
ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
A . VON GOEBEN

President

2883

962
2884

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

(Stamped)
Accepted
Nov 25 1924
Payable through the New York Clearing House
and only if Unaltered since issuance
and if Properly Endorsed
National Bank of Commerce
in New York
(Endorsed)

2885

Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Nov 26 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

Plaintiff's Exhibit 63-A.
2886

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 13449

New York, Nov 25 1924 $15000.00

THE: EQUITABLE TRUST COMPANY OF N E W Y O R K

Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Fifteen Thousand Dollars. Payable through the
New York Clearing House.
ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
A . VON GOEBEN

President

963
Plaintiff's

2887

Exhibits.

(Stamped)
Certified
Payable through New York Clearing House
Nov 25 '24
When Properly Endorsed
The Equitable Trust Company
of New York
37 Wall St.
(Endorsed)
Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

2888

Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Nov 26 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

Plaintiff's Exhibit 63-B.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 3570

2889
New York, Nov 26 1924

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars.
ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
A . VON GOEBEN

President

964
2890

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

(Endorsed)
Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Nov 28 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

2891

Plaintiff's Exhibit 64.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO., INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Nov. 29, 1924.

2892

Messrs. Ultramares Corp.,
25 So. William St.,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sirs:
Kindly be advised that we expect to make delivery immediately to the following manufacturers:
Tons Amount Terms
Endicott Johnson, Johnson City, Pa
25
$16,000 15 Days
National Metal Moulding
Co., Economy, Pa
20
14,000 10 Days
$30,000

965
2893

Plaintiff's Exhibits.
Kindly advise us if you care to finance the above,
and oblige,
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
JKU :WM

FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO., INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

2894

277 Broadway
New York, Dec. 1st, 1924.
The Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipt as follows:
#106: 45 Tons, $30,000—sold to
Endicott Johnson Corp.
Johnson City, N. Y.
National Metal Moulding Co.
Economy, Pa.

25 Tons
2895
20 Tons

We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds, i. e. $30,000.—to finance the above lots.

966
2896

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your
good-selves within a few days.
Yours very truly,
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
(ENC)
CF

2897

TRUST

RECEIPT.

New York, N. Y., Dec. 1st, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
William St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows :

Marks
EAC

2898

No.
M S Dollar

Commodity
45 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for the provision for the payment of the Ultramares Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as
its security for the payment of any other indebtedness or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.

967
Plaintiff's

2899

Exhibits.

We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 106
$30,000.

2900

Sold to
Endicott Johnson Corp.
Johnson City, N. Y.
National Metal Moulding Co.
Economy, Pa.

25 Tons
20 Tons

Plaintiff's Exhibits 64-A, 64-B and 64-C.
Exhibits 64-A, 64-B and 64-C include the following invoices which were delivered and assigned by
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to Ultramares Corporation
under and pursuant to Trust Receipt No. 106:
Date of
Invoice

Purchaser

Dec. 5, 1924 National
Co.
Dec. 17, 1924 Endicott
Dec. 20, 1924 Endicott
Dec. 22, 1924 Endicott
Dec. 4, 1924 National
Co.

of

Merchandise

Metal Moulding
Johnson Corp.
Johnson Corp.
Johnson Corp.
Metal Moulding

Quantity

Price

15732
11274
6019½
38090½

lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.

$5,501.60
3,875.44
2,069.20
13,093.61

29090

lbs.

10,170.51

2901

968
2902

Plaintiff's Exhibit 65
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 3014

New York, Dec 1 1924

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$30000.00 Thirty Thousand Dollars.
ULTRAMARES

CORPORATION

H . MANNING

2903

H.

Cashier

MEYERS

Vice-President
(Endorsed)

Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Dec 2 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier
2904
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 66.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

2905

& CO., I N C .

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Dec. 8th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipts as follows:
#107: 40 Tons, $29,700.— sold to
Detroit Insulated Wire Co. 5 Tons
Detroit, Mich.
Whitney Blake Co.
18
"
New Haven, Conn.
Goodyear Rubber Ins. W. Co. 7
"
New York
Michelin Tire Co.
10
"
Milltown, N. J.
#108: 48½ Tons, 34,000.— sold to
Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. 5 Tons
Yonkers, N. Y.
G. R. Cummings Jr. & Co.
3
"
St. Louis, Mo.
Hadley Bros. Uhl Co.
2
"
St. Louis, Mo.
Johns-Manville, Inc.
"
Manville, N. J.
Toycraft Rubber Co.
3
"
Akron, Ohio.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 30
"
Akron, Ohio.
#109 : 60 Tons,
38,700.— sold to
Lovell Mfg. Co.
20 Tons
Erie, Pa.
Pharis Tire & Rubber Co. 20
"
Findlay, Ohio.
Corduroy Tire Co.
20
"
Grand Rapids, Mich.
$102,400.—

2906

2907

970
2908

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds, i. e. $100,000.—to finance the above lots.
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your
good-selves within a few days.
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
JKU :CF
(Enc)
2909

Plaintiff's Exhibits 66-A, 66-B, 67, 67-A, 67-B,
70 and 70-A.
Exhibits 66-A and 66-B include the following
invoices which were delivered and assigned by
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to Ultramares Corporation
under and pursuant to Trust Receipt No. 107 :
Date of
Invoice

Dec. 30, 1924
Dec. 30, 1924
Dec. 30, 1924

Purchaser

of Merchandise

Hood Rubber Co.
Hood Rubber Co.
Garlock Packing Co.

Quantity

22403½
22232
33750

lbs.
lbs.
lbs.

Price

$7,224.47
7,171.01
13,064.48

These exhibits included Trust Receipt No. 107,
which is as follows:
2910
TRUST RECEIPT.
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1921.
from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows :
RECEIVED

Marks
EA C

No.
M. S. Dollar

Commodity
40 Tons

971
Plaintiff's

2911

Exhibits.

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for the provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.

2912

F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 107
$29,700.—
2913

Sold to
Detroit Insulated Wire Co.
Detroit, Mich.
Whitney Blake Co.
New Haven, Conn.
Goodyear R. Insulating Co.
New York
Michelin Tire Co.
Milltown, N. J.

5 Tons
18 Tons
7 Tons
10 Tons

972
2914

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

Exhibit 67-A is Trust Receipt No. 108, which
is as follows:
TRUST R E C E I P T .
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:

Marks
H L K
I H EC
2915

2916

No.
Madioen

Commodity
48½
Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to hold said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.

973
Plaintiff's

2917

Exhibits.

Trust Receipt No. 108
$34,000.—
Sold to
Habirshaw Electric Cable Co.
Yonkers, N. Y.

5 Tons

G. R. Cummings Jr. & Co.
St. Louis, Mo.

3 Tons

Hadley Bros. Uhl Co.
St. Louis, Mo.

2 Tons

Johns-Manville, Inc.
Manville, N. J.

5½

"
2918

Toycraft Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.

3

"

30

"

Exhibit 67-B is Trust Receipt No. 109, which
is as follows:
TRUST RECEIPT.
New York, N. Y., Dec. 8th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:

Marks
MS
184
M W

No.

Commodity

Madioen

60 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said

2919

974
2920

2921

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 109
$38,700.—
Sold to
2922

Lovell Mfg. Co.
Erie, Pa.

20 Tons

Pharis T & R Co.
Findlay, Ohio.

20 Tons

Corduroy Tire Co.
20 Tons
Grand Rapids, Mich.

975
Plaintiff's
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Exhibit 70 is Trust Receipt No. 110, which is as
follows:
TRUST R E C E I P T .
New York, N. Y., Dec. 12th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows :

Marks
A F T
R S S

No.
City of Yokohama

Commodity
45 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
W e further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
F R E D S T E R N & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.

2924

2925

976
Plaintiff's

2926

Exhibits.

Trust Receipt No. 110
$25,000.—
Goodyear T. & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio
Michelin Tire Co.
Milltown, N. J.

25 Tons
20 Tons

Exhibit 70-A is Trust Receipt No. 111, which is
as follows:
TRUST RECEIPT.

2927

New York, N. Y., Dec. 23rd, 1924.
from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:
RECEIVED

Marks
AFT BEN
EA C
578

2928

No.
S.S. "Teucer"

Commodity
70 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to keep said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultra-

977
Plaintiff's

2929

Exhibits.

mares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No.
$40,000.—

111

Sold to

2930

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.

70 Tons

Plaintiff's Exhibit 68.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William St.
No. 11533

New York, Dec 9 1924

B A N K OF N E W Y O R K AND TRUST COMPANY

52 Wall Street

2931

Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars.
ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
A . VON GOEBEN

President

978
2932

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

(Endorsed)
Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.

2933

Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Dec 10 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

Plaintiff's Exhibit 68-A.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 3622

New York, Dec 9 1924

T H E MECHANICS & METALS N A T I O N A L B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$75000.00 Seventy Five Thousand Dollars.
2934

ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
A . VON GOEBEN

President

979
2935

Plaintiff's Exhibits.
(Endorsed)
Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Dec 10 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier

2936

Plaintiff's Exhibit 69 for Identification.
This is a statement produced by the Trustee in
Bankruptcy of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the
records of the said Trustee, purporting to show the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as
of August 1, 1924.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 3627

2937
New York, Dec 13 1924

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$25000.00 Twenty Five Thousand Dollars.
ULTRAMARES
H . MANNING

Cashier

CORPORATION
H.

MEYERS

Vice-President

980
2938

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

(Endorsed)
Pay
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank, N. Y.
or order
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Prior Endorsements Guaranteed
Dec 15 1924
The American Exchange Nat'l Bank
New York
W. B. Tallman, Cashier
2939
Plaintiff's Exhibit 72.
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION

25 South William Street
No. 3632

New York, Dec 23 1924

T H E MECHANICS & METALS NATIONAL B A N K

of the City of New York
Pay to the order of Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
$40000.00 Forty Thousand Dollars.
ULTRAMARES

CORPORATION

H . MANNING

A . VON GOEBEN

Cashier
2940

President
(Endorsed)

Pay to the order of
The Chemical Nat'l Bank
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
Received Payment
Through New York Clearing House
Endorsements Guaranteed
Rack Department
Dec 24 1924
The Chemical National Bank
of New York
No. 12

981
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 73.
FRED

Codes:

STERN

& CO., INC.

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Dec. 9, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.,
25 South William St.,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sirs:
Confirming our telephone conversation regarding
our loan of $100,000, kindly be advised that we
will make arrangements to liquidate this loan
within a week's time.
Thanking you for your efforts in this matter, we
remain,

2942

Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO.,

INC.,

P e r FRED STERN,

Pres.
JKU :WM
2943
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 74.

2944

December 18, 1924.
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
New York City.
Att. Mr. Fred Stern.
Dear Sir:

2945

2946

With reference to our conversation of to-day, at
which you advised us that not having received the
funds which you expected from one of your clients,
you were unable to meet your obligation to reimburse us in the amount of $125,000.00 re-payment
of which you had promised would be effected on
December 16th, 1924.
We are considerably disappointed in respect to
this matter as we had expected the reimbursement
of the funds in accordance with the arrangements
as agreed upon between you and ourselves, but in
view of the circumstances in connection with this
matter, we will extend the time of re-payment until
December 24th, 1924, but must insist that payment
of the amount be made on or before that date for
reasons as previously explained to you.
We also wish to point out that there is a considerable amount due us in invoices and would
appreciate your expediting the shipments in order
that we may be put in possession of the assigned
invoices.
Thanking you for your kind attention to this
matter, we are,
Very truly yours,
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,
President.
HM/MK.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 75.
Cable Address "Retexo"

Telephone Broad 0801

ENGLAND

N E W YORK
CHICAGO
CLEVELAND
ST. LOUIS
MINNEAPOLIS

London

Birmingham

CANADA

Montreal Toronto
Winnipeg Calgary
Edmonton Vancouver

Sir George Touche, Bart.
J. B. Niven
A. W. Tait
C. R. Whitworth
H. E. Mendes
F. J. Clowes
E. H. Wagner
V. H. Stempf
C. A. Narlian

SOUTH

AMERICA

Buenos Aires Rosario
Rio de Janeiro Sao Paulo
Montevideo
Valparaiso Santiago

TOUCHE, N I V E N & CO.
PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS

2948

42 Broadway
New York, February 16, 1923
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern
& Company, Incorporated, for the year ended December 31, 1922, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet is in accordance therewith and
with the information and explanations given us.
We further certify that, subject to provision for
federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our
opinion, presents a true and correct view of the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Company, Incorporated, as at December 31, 1922.
TOUCHE N I V E N & CO.
Public Accountants.

2949
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FRED STERN & COMPANY, INCORPORATED
BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1922
ASSETS
Current

LIABILITIES

Assets:

Cash:
Current funds
,
$ 48,673.11
Held by banks in anticipation of
maturity of acceptances under
letters of credit and loans
149,249.19

Current

$ 197,922.30

Notes and trade acceptances receivable:
Held by the Company, accrued in
part by collateral which has
been repledged of a face value
of $53,811.93
$ 117,895.51
Pledged as collateral for loans,
etc
173,901.69

Unsecured :
Accounts payable.

Capital and

Trade accounts receivable and sundry debtors:
Held by the Company
1,255,715.86
Pledged as collateral for loans,
etc
...
435,055.38
Accrued interest
5,826.63
for doubtful ac-

$1,988,395.07
575,613.41

Pledged as collateral for loans :
Voting trust certificates, Racine Horseshoe
Tire Corp
Furniture

Total surplus, subject to provision for federal
taxes on income for current and prior years
165,122.40

$2,324,766.70

7,106.39
1,502.33

and Fixtures

Less reserve for depreciation.

10,000.00

Capital surplus at date of acquisition
$ 390,439.14
Earned surplus
158,865.75

548,940.34

at Cost:

Advances for participating interests
in miscellaneous syndicate
$
Participation certificate in Class A
preferred stock, Bennett Day Co..

$ 415,000.00

$ 425,000.00

Inventory of crude rubber pledged under trust
receipts and letters of credit
Marketable securities :
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company 8% prior preference
stock at redemption price :
Held by the Company, 100
shares
$
8,560.00
Pledged as collateral for
loans, etc., 1,829 shares. . . 156,562.40
Investments

$1,378,670.53

Surplus:

Issued, 100 shares.

1,412,781.66

$1,269,914.00
108,756.53

Capital Stock:
Preferred—
Authorized, 10,000 8% cumulative redeemable shares of
$100.00 each
$1,000,000.00
Issued, 4,150 shares*
Common—
Authorized, 100 shares of
$100.00 each
$ 10,000.00

$ 291,797.20

Less reserve
counts

Liabilities:

Secured by cash, notes, trade acceptances, trade
accounts receivable, merchandise and securities
per contra and borrowed securities aggregating
$1,617,914.92:
Bank loans
$ 143,069.13
Bank dollar acceptances
543,415.15
Sterling acceptances
583,429.72

$

8,608.72

19,600.00

Contingent liabilities:
Trade acceptances discounted... $
Loss as at December 31, 1922 on
future short sales—356 tons at
$.0556 per lb
Securities borrowed and pledged
of a nominal value of about..

549,304.89

* 974,304.89

89,700.81
44,359.00
81,000.00

$ 215,059.81
28,208.72

8,683.92
8,683.92
$2,352,975.42

$2,3

* The corporation is under obligation, as soon as specific accounts and notes receivable aggregating over $585,000.00 have been realized by the receipt c
or other valuable consideration, to issue fully paid preferred stock of par value corresponding to the amount of accounts and notes so realized but
excess of $585,000.00. The preferred stock so issued will be charged against capital surplus after unnecessary reserves provided for the collection
specific accounts and notes have been credited thereto.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 76.
No.
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14

Date of
Date of
Loan
Assignment
Apr. 5, 1924 Apr. 7, 1924
a
Apr. 10, 1924
Apr. 17, 1924
Apr. 7, 1924 Apr. 22, 1924
Apr. 21, 1924
Apr. 14, 1924
Apr. 19, 1924
Apr. 17, 1924
Apr. 7, 1924
Apr. 11, 1924 Apr. 14, 1924
Apr. 14, 1924 Apr. 17, 1924
Apr. 25, 1924
Apr. 11, 1924 Apr. 21, 1924
Apr. 11, 1924 Apr. 17, 1924
Apr. 14, 1924 Apr. 25, 1924
"
May 16, 1924
May 27, 1924
Apr. 21, 1924 May 29, 1924
May 29, 1924

15

"

19

Apr.
"
Apr.
1, 1924 May
May
1, 1924 May
May
"
May

20

"

21

"

16

17

May

18

May

22
23
24
25

May
May

May
6, 1924 May
6, 1924 May
May
May
"
May

29, 1924
22, 1924
5, 1924
17, 1924
15, 1924
16, 1924
5, 1924
17, 1924
13, 1924
12, 1924
20, 1924
17, 1924
17, 1924

2953
Date of
Payment
Apr. 22, 1924
May 16, 1924
May 5, 1924
May 7, 1924
May 22, 1924
May 15, 1924
June 6, 1924
May 20, 1924
May 8, 1924
May 22, 1924
Apr. 28, 1924
May 5, 1924 2954
May 8, 1924
May 5, 1924
May 8, 1924
May 9, 1924
May 16, 1924
June 9, 1924
June 12, 1924
June 20, 1924
June 9, 1924
May 29, 1924
June 4, 1924
May 19, 1924
June 2, 1924
May 31, 1924 2955
May 19, 1924
May 15, 1924
June 14, 1924
June 12, 1924
June 17, 1924
May 31, 1924
June 2, 1924
May 31, 1924

986
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Date of
Date of
Loan
Assignment
May 22, 1924 May 22, 1924
July 1, 1924
June 16, 1924
28
June 9, 1924
June 6, 1924
June 13, 1924
29
May 29, 1924
30
June 2, 1924
31
May 29, 1924
32
33)
May 27, 1924
34}
35 May 26, 1924 June 7, 1924

No.
26
27

2957

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
2958

June 30, 1924
June 9, 1924
June 6, 1924
June 12, 1924
May 27, 1924 June 13, 1924
June 9, 1924
June 4, 1924
June 13, 1924
June 10, 1924
June 6, 1924
May 29, 1924
June 2, 1924
June 23, 1924
June 25, 1924

46

47

48
49

June 10,1924

June 10, 1924

June 10, 1924
J u n e 20, 1924
June 17, 1924

Date of
Payment
July 1, 1924
"
July 29, 1924
July 2, 1924
"
June 25, 1924
July 10, 1924
July 21, 1924
"
June 5, 1924
"
July 2, 1924
"
June 24, 1924
"
June 9, 1924
"
June 17, 1924
July 10, 1924
June 16, 1924
"
July 9, 1924
"
June 19, 1924
"
July 7, 1924
"
July 18, 1924
July 9, 1924
"
Aug. 1, 1924
"
June 19, 1924
"
June 13, 1924
"
June 21, 1924
"
July 2, 1924
June 14, 1924
"
June 10, 1924
June 5, 1924
July 25, 1924
July 26, 1924
June 19, 1924
July 9, 1924
June 26, 1924

987
Plaintiff's

No.
50

53

July

Date of
Date of
Payment
Assignment
July 18, 1924 "Aug. 18, 1924
July 17, 1924
July 10, 1924 July 17, 1924
July 17, 1924 July 26, 1924
July 10, 1924 Aug. 7, 1924
July 21, 1924 Aug. 18, 1924
July 9, 1924 July 15, 1924
7, 1924 \ July 9, 1924 Aug. 12, 1924
July 17, 1924
July 8, 1924 Aug. 8, 1924
July 11, 1924 July 28, 1924 2960
July 18, 1924 "July 30, 1924
July 9, 1924
July 18, 1924

54

55

56

2959

Date of
Loan
July 3, 1924

51

52

Exhibits.

July
July
July
July
July

14, 1924
15, 1924
17, 1924
17, 1924
21, 1924

July
Aug.
July 24, 1924 Aug.
July
Aug.
July
"
Aug.
July

31, 1924
1, 1924
5, 1924
25, 1924
5, 1924
24, 1924
9, 1924
24, 1924

Aug. 8, 1924
Aug. 25, 1924
"Aug. 15, 1924
July 22, 1924
Aug. 1, 1924
July 25, 1924
Sept. 4, 1924
Aug. 20, 1924
Aug. 19, 1924
Aug. 23, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924 2961
Aug. 22, 1924
"
Aug. 20, 1924

Aug. 30, 1924
Sept. 5, 1924
Aug. 8, 1924

988
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No.

57

2963

Date of
Loan

Date of
Assignment
Aug. 15, 1924
Aug. 11, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924
Aug. 4, 1924

July 26, 1924
Aug.

5, 1924

Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
58
"
July
Aug.
July
59 July 29, 1924 Aug.
July
Aug.
Aug.
July
"
Aug.
60

29, 1924
4, 1924
5, 1924
9, 1924
31, 1924
4, 1924
30, 1924
5, 1924
31, 1924
5, 1924
19, 1924
31, 1924
19, 1924

Aug. 21, 1924
Aug. 9, 1924
Aug. 6, 1924

2964

61

Aug. 14, 1924
Aug. 12, 1924
Aug. 6, 1924 Aug. 11, 1924
Sept. 5, 1924
Aug. 15, 1924
Aug. 28, 1924
Sept. 2, 1924

Date of
Payment
Aug. 20, 1924
Sept. 9, 1924
Sept. 10, 1924
Sept. 3, 1924
Sept. 2, 1924
Aug. 30, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924
Aug. 14, 1924
Sept. 2, 1924
Sept. 12, 1924
Aug. 30, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924
Aug. 14, 1924
Sept. 6, 1924
Sept. 5, 1924
Aug. 21, 1924
Sept. 19, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924
Aug. 27, 1924
Sept. 17, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924
Sept. 4, 1924
Sept, 11, 1924
Sept. 23, 1924
Sept. 11, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924
Sept. 15 1924
Sept. 26, 1924
Sept. 24, 1924
Oct. 10, 1924

989
Plaintiff's

No.

Date of
Loan

62

Exhibits.

Date of
Assignment
Aug. 8, 1924
Aug. 9, 1924
Aug. 6, 1924
Aug. 16, 1924
Aug. 12, 1924
Aug. 15, 1924
Aug. 14, 1924
Aug. 15, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924

63

Aug. 13,1924

Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.

28, 1924
19, 1924
29, 1924
27, 1924

Aug. 25, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924
Aug. 16, 1924
Aug. 19, 1924

64

Aug. 13, 1924

Aug. 28, 1924
Aug. 27, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924
Aug. 20, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924

65

Aug. 25, 1924

Aug. 27, 1924
Aug. 29, 1924
Sept. 5, 1924

2959
Date of
Payment
Sept. 8, 1924
Sept. 10, 1924
Sept. 20, 1924
Sept. 16, 1924
Sept. 20, 1924
Sept. 2, 1924
Aug. 21, 1924
Sept. 17, 1924
Aug. 25, 1924
Sept. 12, 1924
Sept. 10, 1924

2966

Aug. 27, 1924
Sept. 19, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924
Oct, 1, 1924
Sept. 23, 1924
Sept. 5, 1924
Sept. 23, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924
Sept. 2, 1924
Sept. 18, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924
Sept. 26, 1924
Sept. 23, 1924
Oct. 1, 1924
Sept. 23, 1924
Sept. 8, 1924
Sept. 10,
Sept. 10,
Oct. 8,
Oct. 4,

1924
1924
1924
1924

2967

900
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66

Aug. 25, 1924

67

Aug. 29, 1924

68

Sept. 2, 1924

Sept. 3, 1924
Sept. 6, 1924
Sept. 3, 1924
Sept. 6, 1924
Sept, 26, 1924

69

Sept. 5, 1924

Sept. 11, 1924
Sept. 4, 1924
Sept. 11, 1924
Sept.18,1924

70

Sept. 8, 1924

Sept. 11, 1924

2969

Sept. 9, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924

2970

71

Sept. 12, 1924

72

"

73

Sept. 12, 1924
Sept. 13, 1924
Sept. 12, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924
Sept, 19, 1924
Sept. 18, 1924

[Sept. 15, 1924
Sept. 27, 1924
Sept. 15, 1924 Sept. 24, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924

Sept. 18, 1924
Oct. 6, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924
Oct. 1, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924
Discounted
Sept. 27, 1924
Oct. 27, 1924
Sept. 29, 1924
Oct. 16, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924
Oct, 20, 1924
Oct. 29, 1924
Sept. 29, 1924
Oct. 10, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924
Oct. 14, 1924
Oct. 15, 1924
Oct. 14, 1924
Sept. 22, 1924
Sept. 19, 1924
Sept. 16, 1924
Sept. 17, 1924
Oct. 21, 1924
Oct, 18, 1924
Sept. 26, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924
Oct. 18, 1924
Sept. 29, 1924
Oct. 29, 1924
Oct. 30, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924

991
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No.

74

Date of
Loan

Exhibits.

Date of
Assignment

Sept. 23, 1924
Sept. 19, 1924 Sept. 26, 1924
Sept. 29, 1924
Sept. 26, 1924
Sept. 29, 1924
Oct. 3, 1924

75 Sept. 26, 1924

Oct, 9, 1924
Oct. 6, 1924
Sept. 30, 1924
Oct. 1, 1924
Oct. 4, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924
Oct. 7, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924

76

Sept. 29, 1924
Oct. 10, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924

77

Oct.

Oct.

Date of
Payment
Oct. 8, 1924
Oct. 9, 1924
Oct. 14, 1924
Oct. 15, 1924
Oct. 7, 1924
Oct. 14, 1924
Nov. 3, 1924
Oct. 20, 1924
Oct. 31, 1924
Dec. 9, 1924
Oct. 27, 1924 2972
Oct. 28, 1924
Nov. 1, 1924
Oct, 10, 1924
Nov. 19, 1924
Nov. 6, 1924
Oct. 16, 1924
Nov. 19, 1924
Nov. 7, 1924
Nov. 10, 1924
Oct. 24, 1924
Nov. 3, 1924
"

3, 1924
Oct. 11, 1924
Oct. 9, 1924
Oct. 10, 1924
Oct. 11, 1924

78

2971

7, 1924
Oct. 16, 1924
Oct. 8, 1924
Oct. 17, 1924

Nov. 21, 1924 2973
Nov. 11, 1924
"
Nov. 10, 1924
Oct. 25, 1924
Nov. 1, 1924
Oct, 16, 1924
Jan. 6, 1925
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Plaintiff's
No.

79

2975

Date of
Loan

Date of
Assignment
Oct. 21, 1924
Oct. 25, 1924
Oct. 22, 1924
Oct. 20, 1924 Oct. 29, 1924
Oct, 30, 1924
Nov. 3, 1924
Nov. 1, 1924
Oct. 24, 1924 Oct. 31, 1924
Nov. 8, 1924
Nov. 3, 1924
Oct. 28, 1924
Oct. 27, 1924 Nov. 13, 1924
Nov. 6, 1924
Nov. 5, 1924

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88 Oct. 28, 1924 Nov. 10, 1924
89
Nov. 12, 1924
90
91
92
93

2976
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Nov

Nov. 20, 1924
Nov. 12, 1924

94

Nov. 20, 1924
Nov. 15, 1924
Nov. 13, 1924
Nov. 8, 1924

95
96
97

Nov. 15, 1924
3, 1924 Nov. 5, 1924
Nov. 3, 1924

Nov.

6, 1924 Nov. 20, 1924
Nov. 14, 1924
"
(Nov. 24, 1924
1Nov. 19, 1924

Date of
Payment
Oct. 29, 1924
Oct. 30, 1924
Nov. 22, 1924
Nov. 14, 1924
Nov. 17, 1924
"
Nov. 14, 1924
Nov. 11, 1924
Nov. 19, 1924
Nov. 29, 1924
"
Dec. 15, 1924
"
Dec. 8, 1924
"
Nov. 13, 1924
Dec. 11, 1924
"
Nov. 22, 1924
"
Nov. 12, 1924
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.

26, 1924
6, 1924
"
11, 1924
"
22, 1924
21, 1924
"
25, 1924

Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.

4,
22,
11,
17,
25,
22,
19,

1924
"
1924
"
1924
1924
1924
1924
1924

Dec. 6,
Nov. 22,
Dec. 2,
Dec. 8,

1924
1924
1924
1924

993
Plaintiff's

"

Date of
Assignment
Dec. 8, 1924
Nov. 26, 1924
Nov. 22, 1924
Dec. 1, 1924

"

Nov. 26, 1924
Dec. 2, 1924

No.
98

99

100
101
102

Date of
Loan
Nov. 12,1924

Exhibits.

Nov. 18, 1924

Dec. 6, 1924
Dec. 2, 1924
Dec. 4, 1924
Dec. 12, 1924
Dec. 1, 1924

Dec. 12, 1924
"
Nov. 25, 1924
"
Nov. 26, 1924
Nov. 19, 1924 Nov. 26, 1924
Nov. 28, 1924

103

Nov. 24, 1924
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
"

104

Nov. 24,1924

4, 1924
13, 1924
12, 1924
15, 1924
12,1924

Dec. 4, 1924
"Dec. 13, 1924
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.

16,
15,
12,
16,
18,

1924
1924
1924
1924
1924

2977
Date of
Payment
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
"Jan.

18, 1924
26, 1924
20, 1924
27, 1924
31, 1924
18, 1924
19, 1924
20, 1924
24, 1924
27, 1924
2, 1925 2978

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
"Dec.

9,
11,
18,
13,
11,

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

13, 1924
2, 1924
4, 1924
13, 1924
27, 1924
26, 1924
26, 1924 2979
23, 1924
22, 1924
18, 1924
19, 1924
29, 1924
2, 1925
2, 1925
10, 1925
14, 1925
16, 1925

1924
1924
1924
1924
1924
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29S0
Date of
Loan

No.

Date of
Assignment

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov. 25, 1924 Dec.

105

16, 1924
23, 1924
26, 1924
27, 1924

Dec. 27, 1924
Dec. 23, 1924
106

Dec.

1, 1924
Dec. 6, 1924
Dec. 15, 1924
Dec. 31, 1924

2981
107

Dec.

9, 1924

Date of
Payment
Jan. 2, 1925
Dec. 30, 1924
Jan. 5, 1925
Jan. 8, 1925
"
Jan. 5, 1925
Feb. 9, 1925
"
Feb. 3, 1925
Jan. 3, 1925
"
Jan. 7, 1925
Dec. 17, 1924
Payable
Jan. 12, 1925
"
Payable
Jan. 29, 1925

108

Dec. 9, 1924
109 Dec. 9, 1924
110 Dec. 12, 1924
111 Dec. 23, 1924

Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 for Identification.
2982

This exhibit is the testimony of Alexander von
Goeben under Section 21-A before the Referee in
the Matter of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., Bankrupt ;
this was thereafter read into the record and appears as part of the testimony herein.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 78.

2983

This exhibit was admitted as seventeen invoices
in the book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. (Exhibit 3),
containing copies of invoices ; these seventeen invoices were claimed by plaintiff to be fakes; all of
the seventeen invoices are in the same form and
one of them is printed as follows:
"#18252
Dec. 7th, 1923
Messrs. Western Electric Co.
New York.
Fred Stern & Co. Inc.
New York.
Due March 15th, 1924.

2984

To 300 c/s Prime Ribbed Smoked Sheets.
G 86762½ T 3798 N 82964½ lbs. @
35¢ per lb
$29037.57"
This exhibit includes, also, several hundred other
invoices in the book of Fred Stern & Co., Inc. (Exhibit 3), admittedly genuine, all in the same form,
and one of them is printed as follows:
"#18004 #10547
Dec. 31st, 1923.
Messrs. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
Mishawaka, Ind.
Bank of New York & Trust Co.
48 Wall St. New York
Net cash 10 days from date of invoice.
S/S ' A L C I N O U S '
E A C
Various
RTCM
204/70
S

#14579

7/16/23

T o Thin First Latex Crepe Rubber,
160 c/s G 25389

1 "

179½

T 2981 N 22408

16

163½

lbs.

"

161 c/s G 25568½ T 2997 N 22571½ lbs.
Net 22571½ lbs. @ 25¾ per lb.
Cartage,
Rubber Association Fee,

$5812.16
51.14
6.77
$5870.07

Weight slip herewith
Bill of Lading
"
(7597 160 7533 1)"

2985
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Schedule No. 1.
FREDS T E R N

& COMPANY,

INC.

SCHEDULE OF FICTITIOUS SALES INVOICES—NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1923

Date of
Invoice
1923

Invoice
Number

Due Date and Amount
of Invoice

Address

L. F.
Customers'
Ledger

Amount

Due Date 1924

Terms
Per Ledger

M 3
S 7
G9

$ 75,835.20
50,198.40
74,998.00

May 1
Mar. 1
Apr. 1

N/C 10 days D/I
N/C 30 days D/I
N/C 15 days

F 3

49,442.40

Mar. 15

N/C 15 days B/L

T O T A L POSTED TO GENERAL LEDGER IN NOVEMBER, 1923

$250,474.00
Mar. 1
Mar. 1
Mar. 15

N/C 30 days D/I
N/C 15 days D/I
N/C 30 days D/I

Name of Customer

Nov. 24
Nov. 24
Nov. 24

17790
17791
17792

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
Spreckles Savage Tire Co.
G. F. Goodrich Co.

Mishawaka, Ind.
San Diego, Cal.
Akron, Ohio

Nov. 24

17793

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

Akron, Ohio

Comments

Nov. 17
Nov. 18
Dec. 7

18235
18236
18237

Brunswick Balke Collender Co.
Endicott Johnson Corp.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America

Chicago, Ill.
Johnson City, N. Y.
Buffalo, N. Y.

B10
E23
D30

$ 52,948.82
28,337.72
48,426.84

6
12
12
15
13
21

18238
18239
18240
18241
18242
18243

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
General Tire & Rubber Co.
Garlock Packing Co.
Hood Rubber Company

Akron, Ohio
Detroit, Mich.
Akron, Ohio
Akron, Ohio
Palmyra, N. Y.
Watertown, Mass.

F 3
F15
G 1
G8
G20
H 2

56,873.36
64,641.14
57,393.75
46,090.10
29,850.80
34,279.35

Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Apr.
Mar.

Nov. 13
Dec. 15

18244
18245

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
Miller Rubber Co.

Mishawaka, Ind.
Akron, Ohio

M 3
M10

38,315.00
56,977.20

Mar. 1
Apr. 1

N/C 15 days B/L
N/C 10 days D/I
N/C 15 days D/I
N/C 15 days D/I
N/C 10 days D/I
N/C 30 days
Delivery Boston
N/C 10 days D/I
N/C 30 days D/I

Nov. 16

18246

Michelin Tire Company

Milltown, N. J.

M12

30,076.17

Mar. 1

N/C 30 days D/D

Dec. 8
Dec. 8
Dec. 17
Nov. 3
Dec. 7

18247
18248
18250
18251
18252

Pennsylvania Rubber Co.
Spreckles Savage Tire Co.
A. A. Wire Co.
American Hard Rubber Co.
Western Electric Co.

Jeannette, Pa.
San Diego, Cal.
Newark, N. J.
New York
New York

P11
S 7
A13
A27
W10

47,323.17
40,904.28
21,531.12
23,836.68
29,037.57

Apr.
Apr.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.

15th Prox.
N/C 30 days
N/C 10 days
N/C 10 days
N/C 30 days

T O T A L POSTED TO GENERAL LEDGER IN DECEMBER, 1923

$706,843.07

T O T A L FICTITIOUS SALES INVOICES

$957,317.07

Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.

15
1
15
15
1
15

1
1
15
1
15

D/I
D/S
B/L
N/C
D/D

=
=
=
=
=

D/I
D/I
D/D
D/I

Numerous Dec. items on 10 day terms
Last previous sale June 1922.
Some advance dating
Dec. 13 sale on 15 days terms

Numerous subsequent Dec. items on usual
terms
Dec. 13 sale on 15 days terms
Nov. & Dec. items on usual terms
Nov. & Dec. items on usual terms
Dec. items on usual terms
Numerous Dec. items on 10 day terms
Numerous Nov. & Dec. sales on usual
terms
Numerous Nov. & Dec. sales on usual
terms
Nov. & Dec. sales on usual terms
Dec. sales on usual terms
Nov. sales on usual terms

Date of Invoice
Date of Shipment
Date of Bill of Lading
Net Cash
Date of Delivery
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Schedule No. 2.
FRED

STERN

& COMPANY,

INC.

S U M M A R Y OF JOURNAL ENTRIES PREPARED BY TOUCHE, N I V E N & COMPANYTRUSTEE'S E X H I B I T 22, M A R C H 23, 1926

Journal Entry
Number
5
6

7

8

9
10

Purchase Acct.
Debited
19,031.65
5,473.12
14,807.84
18,728.20
225,590.94

12
16

37
29
30

27.62
6,439.64
14,025.39
$312,550.70

Acceptances
Account
Credited

Inventory
Debited
$

8,513.75

$87.45
8,426.30

5,473.12
47,361.94
6,254.09

6,254.09
8,687.50

Inventory
Credited

$67,602.90

Purchase
Account
Credited

$ 19,031.65
14,807.84
18,728.20
178,229.00
27.62

$15,029.04

Accounts
Receivable
Credited

$230,824.31

3,687.50
$ 6,439.64
14,025.39
$20,465.03

$8,687.50

COMMENTS :
No. 5

To record following shipments *** sold to Dunlop T & R and
paid for by them Dec. 18, 1923 (Shown by J. B. Moors & Co. on
their confirmation letter Dec. 31, 1923)

No. 6

To charge the purchase account with the following lots which
have been included in the inventory twice. ***

No. 7

To record the following shipment not entered in the Purchase
Account till Jan. 1924 but sold to Hood Rubber Co. Dec. 26, 1923
Inv. 17978 *** (Shown on Bingham & Co. Statement Dec. 31,
1923)

No. 8

To eliminate from Inventory Dec. 31, 1923 Lot 7586 *** which
was sold and charged to Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. in
Dec. 1923

No. 9

To eliminate the following
been sold in Dec. 1923

Lots from inventory, same having

No. 10

To eliminate items taken into inventory which were not received
till January and drafts for which are not reported by banks as
having been accepted in Dec. 1923 and to set up as liability other
items in the inventory which were not put through books until
January but drafts for which were accepted by Huth & Co. in
December ***

No. 12

Accepted by Huth & Co. in Dec. 1923 but not entered until
Jan. 1924

No. 16

To correct error in original inventory figures

No. 17

T o take out of Inventory item already included in Claim Acct.

No. 29

Invoice 18006 sold in Dec. 1923 but purchase not charged Rubber
purchases till January ***

No. 30

T o adjust the following accts. for invoices ( A t cost) paid for
in Dec. and charged to accounts but invoices not credited to
creditors accounts. All this merchandise was sold in Dec. ***
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HUTH & CO.
30 Pine St.
Cable Address : Huth-New York

FREDK. H U T H & Co.

London
New York, January 18, 1924.

2993

Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co.,
80 Maiden Lane,
New York City, N. Y.
Dear Sirs:
With reference to your letter of January 3rd,
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., were liable on December 31st for the following:
Total drafts accepted by us
$127,423.20
Balance remaining on Loan of
$15,491.91
4,879.20

2994

as per accounts rendered to the above Corporation.
On the other hand we held $5,170.12, to be used
as anticipation funds on Sterling Drafts accepted
by Messrs. Fred'k Huth & Co., London.
As collateral for the dollar acceptances we held
the following securities:
£ 2,000.—
£ 100.—
£ 1,500.—
50 shares
$28,836.03

Ecuadorian Corp. Ltd. 6% Deb.
British Funding 4% 1990 Loan
British Victory 4% 1919 Loan
The Asbestos Textile Co. 1st Preferred
Note of The Syra Cord Tire Co. of Syracuse, due Jan. 2nd, delivered to Messrs.

999
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2995

Exhibits.

Fred Stern & Co., Inc. on Dec. 28th for
collection for our account. Payable in
preferred stock for face of note.
As security for the Loan Account we held a
promissory note signed in the Corporation's name
for the full amount and trade acceptances as listed :
Gregory Rubber Co.
Larkide Co.
Eno Rubber Co.
Trent Rubber Co.
McTe
"
"
Gregory Rubber Co.

Jan. 2nd
"
8th
"
15th
Feb. 16th
"
16th
"
1st

$ 374.50
900.—
326.82
4,800.—
250.—
374.50

2996

With reference to the various credits opened and
drafts accepted by Messrs. Fred'k Huth & Co. of
London, we are advising you by separate letter.
We are, dear Sirs
Yours very truly,
H U T H & CO.
P.S. We also enclose a list of invoices that are
assigned to us covering the merchandise against
which the dollar drafts are drawn.
2997
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Plaintiff's
ACCEPTANCES FOR

Exhibits.

$43,898.40, due Jan. 28th against 71¼ Tons

Rubber
Invoice
Date

12/22/23
12/26/23

Tons

20
15
25
10

Payer

Terms

Dunlap Tire & Rubber Corp.
Hood Rubber Co.
"

"

"

"

Amount

30 d/d Inv.
"
"

70
ACCEPTANCES
Invoice
Date

12/1/23
11/21/23

Tons

20¼
5

$42,828.86

FOR $21,400.— due Feb. 4th, against 35 Tons
Rubber
Payer

Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.
Murray Rubber Co.

2999

Terms

Amount

60 d/d Inv.

½—60 d/s T.A.
½—90 d/s "

25¼
ACCEPTANCES
Invoice
Date

Tons

$12,862.08
8,882.74
15,162.21
5,921.83

$11,709.53
3,012.12
$14,721.65

FOR $30,844.80 due Feb. 11th against 45 Tons
Rubber
Payer

12/1/23

20½

Murray Rubber Co.

11/22/23
12/1/23

25
5

Western Electric Co.
Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.

Terms

Amount

½—60 d/s T.A. $12,821.30
½—90 d/s "
60 d/d Inv.
60 d/d Inv.

50½

14,990.12
2,924.21

$30,735.63

due March 7th against 762 cases
of Rubber purchased from United Baltic Corp.

ACCEPTANCES FOR $ 3 1 , 2 2 0 . —

No Invoices.

3000

P.S.—On all of the above acceptances we held Trust Receipts covering the Rubber.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 82.
H U T H & CO.
30 Pine St.
Cable Address: Huth-New York

FREDK. H U T H & Co.

London
New York, January 31, 1924.
Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co.
80 Maiden Lane
New York City

3002

Dear Sirs :
In reply to your letter of the 3rd instant, we
beg to give below list of Confirmed Credits open
on our books, per the 31st of December, 1923, for
account of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and our London
friends' acceptances thereunder:
L/C #2495—£6,710.—.—
. /. paid off 1,160.—.—
£5,550. in favor of United Baltic Corp.,
Ltd., London
Acceptances: £ 132.17.- due Jan.
"
653.11.1
668.13.7
666.14."
1,331.13.3
531. 5.6
664. 2.6
164. 7.1
"
664. 2.6
Feb.
£5,477. 6.6

18 in London
16 "
"
19 "

"

"
3003"
"
"

"
"

31 "
15 "

"
"

"
"

"

"""
"
"

1002
3004

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

L/C #2500—£4,200. in favor of Francis Peek &
Co., Ltd., Batavia
Acceptances: £4,168.15.7 due Mar. 2 in London
L/C #2501—$26,700. in favor of Francis Peek &
Co., Ltd., Batavia
Acceptances: $13,399.10 due Feb. 23 in London
$13,300.90 " Mar. 21 "
"
L/C #2503—£8,500. in favor of Francis Peek &
Co., Ltd., Batavia
3005

Acceptances: £5,348.8.7 due Mar. 21 in London
L/C #2504—£6,900. in favor of United Baltic
Corp., Ltd., London
Acceptances: £1,360.13. 9 due Mar. 6 in London
684. 1.10 "
" 13
681.12. 8 "
" 16
1,369. 3. 5 "
" 16
506.16.11 "
" 23
675. 9. 9 "
" 23
£5,277.18. 4

3006

L/C #2505—£3,500, in favor of United Baltic
Corp., Ltd., London
Acceptances: £3,409.3.1 due Mar. 5 in London
L/C #2508—£3,500. in favor of United Baltic
Corp., Ltd., London
Acceptances:

None

L/C #2510—£3,200. in favor of Low Peng Yam
Bros., Singapore
Acceptances:

None

""
""
""
""
""

1003
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Plaintiff's Exhibits.
L/C #2512—£4,000. in favor of Rowley, Davies &
Co., Ltd., London
Acceptances: £1,310.12.8 due Mar. 22 in London
L/C #2514—£3,200. in favor of Neesoon & Sons,
Ltd., Singapore
Acceptances: None
L/C #2520—£1,450. in favor of Alfred Stern, London
Acceptances: £1,439.15.10 due Apr. 2 in London
We also enclose a list of invoices that are assigned and payable to us, aggregating $41,966.82.
We enclose a repetition of the above letters of
credit and acceptances thereunder showing totals
as follows:
London Acceptances:
"
"
Confirmed Credit Open

£26,432.—. 7
$26,700.—
£44,000.—.—

Total of Credit

£44,000.—.—

3008

$26,700.—
Yours very truly,
JRS/AMT

H U T H & CO.

P.S.—We also held on December 31, 1923, $5,170.12 cash as anticipated cover against the above
London acceptances. This was already mentioned
in our letter to you of the 18th instant.

3009

1004
3010

Plaintiff's

Exhibits.

REpETTIOn OF LONDON LETTERS OF CREDIT

3011

3012

Contingent
Liability
for Unused
Portion
of Ls/C

L/C
No.

Total
Amount
of L/C

Accepted
Drafts

2495
2500
2501
2503
2504
2505
2508
2510
2512
2514
2520

£ 5,550.
£ 4,200.
$26,700.
£ 8,500.
£ 6,900.
£ 3,500.
£ 3,500.
£ 3,200.
£ 4,000.
£ 3,200.
£ 1,450.

£ 5,477. 6. 6
£ 4,168.15. 7
$26,700.
£ 5,348. 8. 7
£ 5,277.18. 4
£ 3,409. 3. 1
None
None
£ 1,310.12. 8
None
£ 1,439.15.10

£
£
$
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£

Total £44,000.
$26,700.

£26,432.—. 7
$26,700.

£17,567.19. 5
None

72.13. 6
31. 4. 5
None
3,151.11. 5
1,622. 1. 8
90.16.11
3,500.
3,200.
2,689. 7. 4
3,200.
10. 4. 2
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LIST OF INVOICES ASSIGNED & P A Y A B L E TO H U T H & CO., N. Y.
Invoice
Date

Cases
Rubber

Buyer

Amount

Due
Date

Re: London acceptance £653.11. 1, due Jan. 16, against 77 cases per
S/S T A L T H Y B I U S
Nov.

1
3

Reliance Rubber Corp., Keyport
Boston Belting Co., Boston

8
65

$ 338.97
3,180.28

Nov. 11
Dec. 3

Re London acceptance £668.13. 7, due Jan. 17, against 68 cases per
S/S H A L F MOON
Nov. 2
Nov. 14
10

Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co., Jersey City 43
Avon Sole Co., Avon
'
12
Hadley Bros. Uhl Co., St. Louis
14

$1,658.97
730.73
657.89

Nov. 12
Dec. 14
Nov. 25

Re: London acceptance £666.14.—, due Jan. 19, against 68 cases per
S/S EGREMONT CASTLE
Nov. 24

Metal Hose & Tubing Co., Brooklyn,
N. Y.

56

$3,156.72

3014
Dec. 24

Re: London acceptance £531. 5. 6, due Jan. 26, against 60 cases per
S/S A N T I L O C H U S
Nov. 26

Toycraft Rubber Co., Ashland, O.

14

$707.45

Dec. 26

Re: London acceptance £664. 2. 6, due Tan. 28, against 70 cases per
S/S V I R G I N I A DOLLAR
Nov. 24
Dec. 27

Whitall Tatum Co., N. Y.
Essex Rubber Co., Trenton

28
51

$1,675.60
3,545.28

Dec. 2
Feb. 27

Re: London acceptance £164. 7. 1, due Jan. 31, against 18 cases per
S/S V E E N D Y K
Dec. 26

Durkee, Atwood Co., Minneapolis.
Minn.

16

$580.86

Feb. 26

Re: London acceptance $13,399.10, due Feb. 23, against 305 cases per
S/S STEEL N A V I G A T O R
Dec. 21
"
22

E. M. Smith Co., Los Angeles
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of
America, Buffalo

3015

9

$411.37

Dec. 31

300

$12,862.08

Feb. 22

Re: London acceptance £4,168.15. 7, due Mar. 2, against 441 cases per
S/S STEEL N A V I G A T O R
Dec. 31

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co., Mishawaka, Ind.

136

$5,877.34

Feb. 15

Re: London acceptance £1,360.13. 9, due Mar. 6, against 160 cases per
S/S ALCINOUS
Dec. 31

Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of
America, Buffalo

160

$6,583.28

TOTAL

$41,966.82

Mar. 2
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B I N G H A M & CO.
91 Wall Street
New York
Successors to

Cable Address "Chasbing'
Telephones
Bowling Green 5930-37

Letter of Credit,
Import, Export,
Calcutta and Strawbraid
Departments of Smith & Schipper
L E T T E R OF CREDIT

Chas. T. Bingham
Chas. E. Bingham
DEPARTMENT

New York Agents for
W M . B R A N D T ' S SONS & CO., L O N D O N .

New York, Jan. 12, 1924
3017

Messrs. Touche Noven & Co.
80 Maiden Lane
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sirs,
In accordance with your letter of the 3rd instant, we enclose herewith statement of account of
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., New York, with
Messrs. Wm. Brandt's Sons & Co., London, as of
December 31, 1923.
Very truly yours,
per pro B I N G H A M & CO.

3018

LAWRENCE

RIPLEY,

FRANK A.

DILLON,

Joint Attorneys.
BH :DW
Enclosure
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STATEMENT

OF ACCOUNT
of
Fred Stern & Co. Inc. New York, with Wm. Brandt's Sons & Co. London
as of December 31, 1923.
L/C No.

Due in London

29848
30046
29953

Jan. 10/1924
12/ "
16/
"
17/
23/
26/
Feb. 8/
Mar. 5/

"

"

30046
30162
30232
"

"

"

"

30141
"

"
"
"
"
"
"

6/ "
8/ "
12/ "
15/

DRAFT ACCOUNT
Draft Amount
Merchandise
£ 1225
2893
259
639
649
649
1303
1446
1248
2027
945
3107
678
1260
1890

0 0
6 8
17 3
8 8
13 9
13 9
0 2
13 4
6 8
0 6
18 " 8
"/
8 11
5 11
0 0
0 0

Vessel

140 cases Rubber
200
22
48
55
56
100
100
140
168
77
246
50
130
195

C I T Y OF B E N A R E S
TALTHYBIUS
"

C I T Y OF B O S T O N
TALTHYBIUS
HALFMOON
EGREMONT CASTLE
ANTILOCHUS
BELLEROPHON
CELTIC PRINCE
WEST MAHOMET
ALCINOUS
SURUGA
ALCINOUS
CELTIC PRINCE

£20223 14 3
COLLATERAL ACCOUNT
W e had on hand Dec. 31/1923 the following assigned invoices:
Invoice Date"
Sold to
Mdse.
Amount of Invoice
Nov. 20/1923
"
"/ "
Dec. 10/ "
Oct. 31/ "
Nov. 27/ "
Dec. 12/ "
Nov. 13/ "
"

" /

"

"

"

"

"

" /

/

"

Dec.
Nov.
"
"
Dec.
"
"

8/
14/
27/
13/
1/
11/
"/

"
"
"
"
"
"
"

"
"
"
"

18/
27/
28/
26/

"
"
"
"

Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Co.
Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co.
Metal Hose & Tubing Co.
Gryphon Rubber Tire Corporation
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America
American Rubber & Tire Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.
Star Rubber Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.
J. C. Haartz Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.
Plymouth Rubber Co., Inc.
Indiana Rubber & Insulated Wire Co.
Atlantic Insulated Wire & Cable Co.
Murray Rubber Co.
Mercer Rubber Co.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
American Hard Rubber Co.
Garlock Packing Co.
Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co.
Hood Rubber Co.

50 cases
33 "
56 "
25 "
75 "
100 "
11 "
22 "
12 "
11 "
8 "
31 "
37 "
55 "
206 "
47 "
135 "
70 "
213 "
33 "
130 "

$ 3,255.71
1,857.23
3,117.24
1,352.10
3,522.64
6,249.11
658.83
1,168.29
1,085.26
686.62
724.84
1,180.71
1,499.26
3,090.71
12,821.30
1,721.67
6,036.75
4,714.80
11,753.36
1,346.70
5,921.85

$ 3,255.
1,857.
3,117.
1,352.
3,522.
6,249.
658.
1,168.
1,085.
686.
724.
1,180.
1,499.
3,090.
12,821.
1,721.
6,036.
4,714.
11,753.
1,346.
5,921.
$73,754.

L/C No. in favor of
30162
30281
30288
30358
30386
30425

L E T T E R OF C R E D I T A C C O U N T
Amt. of L/C
Amt. Used

Mann Taylor & Co. Ltd., London
Boasson & Van Overzee, Batavia
Chin Seng Hong & Co., Singapore
Neesoon & Sons Ltd.
Lewis Lazarus & Sons, London
Thornett & Fehr
"

£3800.—
3500.—
3700.—
3100.—
11500.—
6300.—

£1248.6.8
—
—
—
—
—

Amt. still open
£2551
£3500
£3700
£3100
£11500
£6300

13
0
0
0
0
0

4
0
0
0
0
0

£30651 13 4
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 84.
Schedule No. 3
FRED STERN & COMPANY, INC.
SCHEDULE OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ASSIGNED TO H U T H & COMPANY AND W M . BRANDT'S SONS & COMPANY
AS AT DECEMBER 31, 1923

Late

of

Invoice
1923

Customer

Assigned to
Huth & Co.

Dec.
Dec.
Dec. 26
Dec. 26
Dec. 1

Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp,
Hood Rubber Co.
Hood Rubber Co.
Hood Rubber Co.
Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.

$ 12,862.08
8,882.74
15,162.21
5,921.83
11,709.53

21
1
22
1
1
3
2
14
10

Murray Rubber Co.
Murray Rubber Co.
Western Electric Co.
Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.
Reliance Rubber Corp.
Boston Belting Co.
Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co.
Avon Sole Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.

3,012.12
12.821.30
14,990.12
2,924.21
338.97
3,180.28
1,658.97
730.73
657.89

22
26

Nov.
Dec.
Nov.
Dec.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.

Assigned to
Bingham & Co.

$ 5,921.85

12,821.30

To Whom Assigned
Per Customers' Ledger Acct.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Chemical National Bank
Chemical National Bank
Chemical National Bank
Central Trust & Savings Co.
Central Trust & Savings
Central Trust & Savings
Bank of N. Y. & Trust
Central Trust & Savings
Huth & Company
Huth & Company
Huth & Company
Huth & Company
Huth & Company

Co.
Co.
Co.
Co.

Nov. 24-

Metal Hose & Tubing Co.

3,156.72

Huth & Company

Nov. 26
Nov. 24

Toycraft Rubber Co.
Whitall Tatum Co.

707.45
1,675.60

Huth & Company
Huth & Company

Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Nov.
Nov.
Dec.

27
26
21
31
31
20
20
10

Essex Rubber Co.
Durkee, Atwood Co.
E. M. Smith Co.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. of America
Safety Insulated Wire & Cable Co.
Gutta Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co.
Metal Hose & Tubing Co.

3,545.28
580.86
411.37
5,877.34
6,583.23

3,255.71
1,857.23
3,117.24

Chemical National Bank
Chemical National Bank
J. B. Moors & Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Bingham & Co.
Bingham & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.

Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Nov.

31
27
12
13

Gryphon Rubber Tire Corp.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.
American Rubber & Tire Co,
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.

1,352.10
3,522.64
6,249.11
658.83

Bingham & Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Metropolitan Trust Co.
Bingham & Co.

Nov. 13
Nov. 13

Star Rubber Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.

1,168.29
1,085.26

Bingham & Co.
Bingham & Co.

Nov. 13
Dec. 8

J. C. Haartz Co.
Hadley Bros. Uhle Co.

686.62
724.84

Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.

14
27
13
11
11
18
27
28

Plymouth Rubber Co., Inc.
Indiana Rubber & Insulated Wire Co.
Atlantic Insulated Wire & Cable Co.
Mercer Rubber Co.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
American Hard Rubber Co.
Garlock Packing Co.
Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co.

1,180.71
1,499.26
3,090.71
1,721.67
6,036.75
4,714.80
11,753.36
1,346.70
$117,390.88

$ 73,764.98

Bingham & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
Bingham & Co.
Central Trust & Savings Co.
Bingham & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Chemical National Bank
Chemical National Bank
J. B. Moors & Co.

( B I N G H A M & COMPANY, A G E N T )

To Whom Assigned
Per Touche, Niven & Company
Working Papers
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Chemical National Bank
Chemical National Bank
J. B. Moors & Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Chemical National Bank
Central Trust & Savings Co.
Central Trust & Savings Co.
Bank of N. Y. and Chemical
Bank of N. Y. and Chemical
No open balance
Huth & Company
J. B. Moors & Co.
No open balance
Huth & Co. and
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
and Chemical N. Bk.
J. B. Moors & Co.
Chemical N. Bk.—
Open Balance $449.69
Bank of N. Y. and Chemical
J. B. Moors & Co.
Huth & Company
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Credit Balance $8.99
Chemical National Bank
J. B. Moors & Co.
and Chemical
J. B. Moors & Co.
Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co.
Metropolitan Trust Co.
Huth & Co. and
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
Huth & Co. and
J. B. Moors & Co.
Chemical National Bank
Huth & Co. and
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
No open balance
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.
J. B. Moors & Co.

Number of
Times
Assigned

Paid by Cash,
Note or Trade
Acceptance
Before
Dec. 31, 1923

2
2
2
4
3
2
3
2
3
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2

*

*

*
*
*

*
*

2
2
2

1

2

2
2
2
2

*

*

*

2
2

*

2
2

*

2
2
2
1
2
3
3
3
2

*

*

*

*

*
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3025

This is Defendants' Exhibit M for Identification,
which was received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 85; it is an article on accountancy by George
O. May.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 86.

Codes:

Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union
FRED

STERN

&

NEW

YORK

CO.,

INC.

277 Broadway

3026

New York, Nov. 24th, 1924.
The Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
Attached herewith you will find signed Trust
Receipt
#104—75 Tons, $50,000.—sold to Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio.
We would appreciate if you would put us in
funds, i.e. $50,000.—to finance the above lot.
Invoices for the above will be forwarded to your
good-selves within a few days.
Yours very truly,
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
(Enc)
CF

3027

1010
3028

Plain tiff 's Exhibits.
TRUST RECEIPT.
New York, N. Y., Nov. 24th, 1924.
RECEIVED from ULTRAMARES CORP. of 25 South
Williams St., New York, for their account, merchandise specified as follows:

Marks
313
DEI
RMC S P
YACO

3029

3030

No.

Commodity

S.S. Perseus

75 Tons

For delivery under sales, and in consideration, we,
Fred Stern & Co. Inc., hereby agrees to hold said
goods in trust for the Ultramares Corp. of New
York and at its disposal for the purpose of delivering same under contracts, and to deliver as soon as
received the full net proceeds thereof direct to the
Ultramares Corp. and until such delivery to hold
the same separate and apart for account and as the
property of the Ultramares Corp. all as its security
for due provision for the payment of the Ultramares
Corp. for the amount noted at foot, and as its security for the payment of any other indebtedness
or liability of ours to the Ultramares Corp.
We further agree to hold said property insured
against fire, payable in case of loss to the Ultramares Corp. with the understanding that it is not
to be chargeable with any insurance incurred
therein, hereby waiving any lien which might
otherwise have as regards the Ultramares Corp.
for insurance duties or charges to be paid thereon.
FRED STERN & CO., INC.,
FRED STERN,

President.
Trust Receipt No. 104
$50,000.
Sold to
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Akron, Ohio.

1011
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87.

3031

A S S I G N M E N T S OF A C C O U N T S R E C E I V E D BY U L T R A M A R E S
C O R P O R A T I O N B E T W E E N DEC. 9 A N D DEC. 16, 1924.
T. R.
No.

104

Date of
Assign.

Nov. 24

Dec. 12

Dec. 13

Dec. 15

Debtor

$ 1794.24
4249.25
1560.79
2354.24
807.22

Cummings
Johns Manville
Goodyear
Habishaw

$ 1631.70
2587.56
5135.98
2553.89

Poison

$ 874.57
889.98
1743.78

Detroit
Dec. 16

Carborundum
Falls

105

Nov. 28

"

Amount

Johns Manville
Armstrong Rubber Co.
Hadley Bros.
Toycraft
Montgomery

Firestone

$ 258.75
1478.62
1603.33
894.89
23717.39

$10,765.74

$11,909.13

3032
$ 3,508.33

$27,952.98
$54,136.18

3033
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 88.
ASSIGNMENTS RECEIVED BY U L T R A M A R E S
A F T E R DEC. 16, 1924.

3035

CORPORATION

T. R.
No.

Date
T. R.

Date of
Assign.

104

Nov. 14

Dec. 18
"
"

Davis Jones
Canfield
Canfield

$ 901.92
342.23
1121.55

105
106

Nov. 25
Dec. 1

Dec. 23

International Shoe
Endicott Johnson

I 573.36
3875.44
2069.20
13093.61

Debtor

Amount

105

Nov. 25

Dec. 26

Firestone

$12499.93

105

Nov. 25

Dec. 27

Detroit
International Shoe
Cooper
Clifton

$ 1759.67
1723.43
2435.39
1215.16

107

Dec. 9

Dec. 31
"

Garlock
Hood

$13064.48
7224.47
7171.01

$ 2,365.70

$19,611.61
$12,499.93

$ 7,133.65

$23,459.96
$65,070.85

Plaintiff's Exhibit 89 for Identification.
P A Y M E N T S RECEIVED BY U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION ON
ACCOUNT OF ASSIGNED INVOICES FROM DECEMBER
9, 1924, TO DECEMBER 16, 1924, INCLUSIVE.

3036

December 9, 1924
11,

"

13,

"

15,

"

Home Wire Co.
Montgomery Bros. Inc.
Hood Rubber Co.
Carborundum Co.
Pharis Tire Rubber Co.
General Tire Rubber Co.
Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.
Whitehall Tatum Co.
Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.
Firestone Tire Rubber Co.
Michelin Tire Co.

$3,557.36
3,873.66
601.39
785.59
18,114.07
766.25
8,506.33
16,012.47
14,527.99
2,140.63
9,834.86
3,831.46
7,635.89
7,655.10
11.130.72

1013
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3037

P A Y M E N T S RECEIVED BY U L T R A M A R E S CORPORATION ON
ACCOUNT OF ASSIGNED INVOICES FROM DECEMBER
17, 1924, TO DECEMBER 31, 1924, INCLUSIVE.
December 17, 1924
18,

"

Nat. Metal Mold Co.
Perfect Rubber Co.
General Tire Rubber Co.
Less disct. 9 ds. at 5

$2177.11
2.99

$ 10,170.51
5,501.60
765.69

Ford Motor Co.
Voorhees Rubber Mfg. Co.
19,

"

Goodyear Rubber Ins. Co.
Less disc. 22 ds. at 6

$5135.98
18.83

Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. $2553.89
Less bill 12/8
$33.45
" 12/9
67.17
100.62
20,

"

22,
23,
24,
26,

"
"
"
"

27,

"

Hadley Bros. Uhl Co.
Hood Rubber Co.
Geo. S. Cox Bros. Inc.
Armstrong Cork Co.
Johns Manville Inc.
Detroit Ins. Wire Co.
Poison Rubber Co.
Johns Manville Inc.
Mansfield Tire Rubber Co.
G. R. Cummings Jr. Co.
Montgomery Bros. Inc.
Hood Rubber Co.

2,174.12
37,141.51
1,188.49
1,503.77
5,117.15

2,453.27
1,598.45
7,361.59
1,575.29
4,249.25
1,794.24
814.05
874.57
889.98
2,587.66
11,004.51
1,631.70
768.54
9,439.04

3038

Plaintiff's Exhibits 91, 92 and 93 for
Identification.
These are pleadings in other actions against
Ultramares Corporation.

3039

1014
3040

Plaintiff's Exhibit 94.

Loans
Date
107, 8 & 9 Dec. 9, 1924
110
" 13, "
111
" 23, "

Amount
$100,000.00
25,000.00
40,000.00
$165,000.00
43,367.50

Interest
to April
8th, 1929
$26,350.00
6,570.83
10,446.67
$43,367.50

$208,367.50
Collections by Ultramares Corporation
3041

Oct. 11, 1927
Jan. 13, 1928
" 14, 1928

$ 6,523.26
7,177.42
5,543.05

$ 592.50
538.30
416.65

$19,243.73
1,547.45

$1,547.45

$20,791.18
Total advances & interest... $208,367.50
"
collections & interest. .
20,791.18
Balance as of Apr. 8/29.. $187,576.32

3042

Plaintiff's Exhibit 95.
This consists of the time sheets of George Rea.
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3043

May 5, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:
We beg to acknowledge receipt to-day, check
from the Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.,
for $16,944.50 in payment of the following invoices:
$6,245.36
4,492.71
1,091.12
5,115.31
3044
and from the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. for
$46,905.83 in payment of the following invoices:
$12,529.35
3,135.54
31,240.94
which amounts we have placed to the credit of
your account.
We presume that we will receive from you today, invoice for the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
and would appreciate your advising us when we
may expect the invoice covering the advance made
against merchandise represented by trust receipts
No. 17-21 inclusive.
Thanking you for your kind attention to this
matter, we are,
Very truly yours,
Cashier.
HM/MK.

3045

1016
3046

Defendants' Exhibit B.
May 1, 1924.
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:

3047

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of
the 30th ultimo, and in accordance with your request we are enclosing two (2) checks aggregating
$66,188.00 as an advance against merchandise covered by trust receipts Nos. 17-21 inclusive.
We would appreciate your including in your applications the price at which the merchandise has
been sold and also a description of the rubber.
Trusting to receive your invoices together with
your letters of assignment in due course, we are,
Very truly yours,
T C
Cashier.
HM/MK
encl.

3048
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3049

November 3, 1924.
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc.,
New York City.
Dear Sirs:
With reference to our advances to you against
contracts covering sales of rubber, we would appreciate your confirming to us that the amounts
are to be refunded as follows:
Invoices (except in cases otherwise agreed upon)
are to be assigned and made payable to the Ultramares Corporation.
All invoices are to be paid promptly at their respective maturities and should any invoice become
overdue beyond a reasonable time of transit for the
remittance, the amount advanced against the same
together with interest and expenses becomes due
and payable by Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., at the
option of the Ultramares Corporation.
In the event of the failure, suspension or assignment for the benefit of creditors of any of the purchasers whose invoices are thus assigned to the
Ultramares Corporation, the amount of such advance or advances plus interest and expenses shall
forthwith become immediately due and payable by
Msrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., to the Ultramares
Corporation without further notice from the latter
Corporation. Kindly confirm the above.
Very truly yours,
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,
President.
HM/MK

3050

3051
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Defendants' Exhibit D.
FRED STERN & CO., INC.

Codes :

N E W YORK
Tel. Worth 2411-2412-2413-2414-2415
Cable Address: Sternbrunn
Liebers, A. B. C. 5th Edition Private
Western Union

277 Broadway
New York, Nov. 5th, 1924.
Messrs. Ultramares Corp.
New York.
Dear Sirs:
In accordance with your request as stated in
your favor of Nov. 3rd, we take pleasure in con3053 firming to you in regard to your advances to us
against contracts covering sales of rubber, that the
amounts are to be refunded as follows:
Invoices (except in cases otherwise agreed upon)
are to be assigned and made payable to the Ultramares Corporation.
All invoices are to be paid promptly at their respective maturities and should any invoice become
overdue beyond a reasonable time of transit for the
remittance, the amount advanced against the same
together with interest and expenses becomes due
and payable by Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc., at
the option of the Ultramares Corporation.
In the event of the failure, suspension or assignment for the benefit of creditors of any of the
3054
purchasers whose invoices are thus assigned to the
Ultramares Corporation, the amount of such advance or advances plus interest and expenses shall
forthwith become immediately due and payable by
Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. Inc. to the Ultramares
Corporation without further notice from the latter
Corporation.
Yours very truly,
FRED

STERN

& CO., INC.,
FRED

STERN,

President.
FS :CF

1019
Defendants' Exhibit E for Identification.

3055

This exhibit is a letter dated March 31, 1924,
which is not printed.

Defendants' Exhibit F.

Dec. 1923
Jan. 1924
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
August
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan. 1925

High
271/8
265/8
255/8
251/8
231/8
225/8
195/8
23½
27¼
283/8
32¾
351/8
401/8
397/8

Low
26
247/8
25
21
22
175/8
181/8
185/8
233/8
26½
285/8
34
35½
343/8

3056

Ribbed Smoked Sheets

Defendants' Exhibit G.
This exhibit is the account between Ultramares
Corporation and Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which is
attached to the bill of particulars.

3057

1020
Defendants' Exhibit G-1.
This exhibit is a summary of Defendants' Exhibit G, showing advances made by Ultramares
Corporation to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and charges
made in the account for interest and commissions.
Account
No.

Date of
First
Advance

Date of
Last
Advance

1

Apr. 5, 1924

July

2

Aug. 1, 1924

3

Advances

Interest

Commissions

7, 1924

$ 694,426.

$ 3,556.00

$15,809.39

Aug. 1, 1924

180,100.

1,056.30

2,251.25

Aug. 6, 1924

Sept. 2, 1924

224,692.

1,126.47

5,030.55

4

Sept. 6, 1924

Oct.

7, 1924

448,800.

2,353.22

9,294.86

5

Oct. 20, 1924

Dec. 23, 1924

795,800.

4,560.60

7,758.00

TOTALS

$2,343,818.

$12,657.59

$40,144.05

Defendants' Exhibit H.
This exhibit is the summons and complaint in an
action instituted by Equitable Trust Company of
Baltimore against Ultramares Corporation in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in February, 1926. The complaint alleges that two shipments of rubber, of
seventy-five and fifty tons, respectively, which had
been given up by the Equitable Trust Company to
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., under trust receipts executed by the latter, in accordance with letters of
credit previously issued, had been sold by Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., and the accounts receivable therefor had been assigned to and collected by the Ultramares Corporation. The complaint further alleged
that although Stern had executed and delivered to
Ultramares Corporation so-called "trust receipts,"
Ultramares Corporation had not relied thereon nor
on any of the documents delivered by the plaintiff

1021
3061

Defendants' Exhibits.
to Stern under its trust receipts. The following is
taken from the complaint:
"ELEVENTH : At none of the times when the
defendant received any of the said documents
purporting to be trust receipts, and at no time
prior thereto, did the said defendant advance
any money or give any negotiable instrument
or other obligation in writing upon the faith
of any possession entrusted to the bankrupt of
any bill or bills of lading, custom-house permit
or permits, warehouseman's receipt or receipts
for the delivery of, or other documentary evidence of title to, the said 750 cases of rubber
or any part thereof, nor upon the faith of any
possession entrusted to the bankrupt of said
750 cases of rubber or any part thereof, nor
upon the faith, induced by any such possession,
that the bankrupt was the true owner of said
750 cases of rubber or any part thereof; and
said documents purporting to be trust receipts
were invalid and of no force or effect, and did
not convey to the defendant any interest whatever in said 750 cases of rubber or the proceeds
of the sale thereof.
*

*

*

*

*

3062

*

FOURTEENTH: At none of the times when
the defendant received any of the said documents purporting to be assignments of the accounts receivable resulting from the sale of
said 750 cases of rubber as aforesaid, and at
no time prior thereto, did the said defendant
advance any money or give any negotiable instrument or other obligation in writing upon
the faith of any possession entrusted to the
bankrupt of any bill or bills of lading, custom-

3063

1922
3064

3065

Defendants' Exhibits.
house permit or permits, warehouseman's receipt or receipts for the delivery of, or other
documentary evidence of title to, the said 750
cases of rubber or any part thereof, nor upon
the faith of any possession entrusted to the
bankrupt of said 750 cases of rubber or any
part thereof, nor upon the faith, induced by
any such possession, that the bankrupt was the
true owner of said 750 cases of rubber or any
part thereof; and said documents purporting
to be assignments of the said accounts receivable were invalid and of no force or effect, and
did not convey to the defendant any interest
whatever in said accounts receivable or the
proceeds thereof.''

Defendants' Exhibit I.

3066

This exhibit is the answer in the action instituted by Equitable Trust Company of Baltimore
against Ultramares Corporation. It was verified
March 23, 1926, by Horatio Manning, its treasurer;
it denies the allegations of the complaint, Defendants' Exhibit H, supra, including the paragraphs
quoted, and admits only that Ultramares Corporation received the sum of $47,746.33 from General
Tire & Rubber Company and the sum of $34,141.51
from the Ford Motor Company.
The answer also alleges seven affirmative defenses. The following is taken from the third defense :
" I X . The plaintiff entrusted Fred Stem &
Co., Inc., as agent, with the possession of the

1023
Plaintiff's Exhibits.
bills of lading: and other documentary evidence
of title in and to the rubber mentioned in the
first cause of action and authorized said Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., to take possession of said
rubber and to sell and dispose of the same and
to deal therewith and with the accounts receivable created by the sale thereof as the sole
and true owner thereof; that said Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., represented to defendant that it
was the sole true and lawful owner of such
rubber and of the accounts receivable created
by the sale thereof, and defendant believed
such representations to be true and on the faith
thereof and of the apparent ownership by said
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., of the said rubber and
of said accounts receivable and without knowledge of any right or claim on the plaintiff's
part advanced money and gave other valuable
consideration to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
in an amount in excess of the amount mentioned in the first cause of action; that said
representations made by Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., were made by it for the purpose of inducing the defendant to make such advances
and to give such valuable consideration, and,
if defendant had known of plaintiff's alleged
claim or alleged rights, such advances would
not have been made nor such consideration
given.
X. Upon the making of the advances and
giving such valuable consideration by the defendant to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as aforesaid,
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., duly assigned to defendant said accounts receivable created by the
sale of said rubber; the defendant duly notified
the purchasers of said rubber of the assign-

3067
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3071

3072

Defendants'

Exhibits.

ment of such accounts receivable, and the defendant duly collected the said accounts receivable created by the sale of said rubber when
the said accounts severally matured, to-wit, on
November 22, December 6 and December 11,
1924, but neither upon said respective dates or
at any time prior thereto, nor at any time prior
to January 5, 1925, did the plaintiff make any
claim in or to the said accounts receivable or
the proceeds thereof or demand the same or the
proceeds from the purchasers of said rubber or
the said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., or from the
defendant, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff
permitted the defendant to retain the said proceeds as its own without question and without
claim thereto by the plaintiff and without having notified the purchasers of said rubber at
any time of any right, title or interest of the
plaintiff in and to the accounts receivable for
said rubber or the proceeds thereof. That relying upon the due transfer of the said accounts
receivable by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to the
defendant and relying upon defendant's title
in and to ownership of said accounts receivable
and the proceeds thereof, the defendant after
said three dates respectively advanced to Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., large sums of money which
have not been repaid by the said Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., and which vastly exceed the aggregate of the amounts mentioned in the various
causes of action set forth in the complaint.
That if plaintiff had asserted its claim, if any,
to the ownership in and to such accounts or the
proceeds thereof, defendant would not have
made advances to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., upon
said accounts or given such valuable considera-
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tion subsequent to the said dates, and would
not have made such further advances, but, on
the contrary, would have resorted to its legal
right against the said Fred Stern & Co. and
against its president, Fred Stern, who personally participated in the representations aforesaid, with knowledge of the facts herein set
forth."

Defendants' Exhibit J.
This exhibit is the balance sheet made by Touche,
Niven & Co. of the accounts and records of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1921.
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Defendants' Exhibit K.
This exhibit is the balance sheet made by Touche,
Niven & Co. of the accounts and records of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1920.

Defendants' Exhibit L for Identification.
This is an article on accountancy by Charles B.
Couchman printed in the Journal of Accountancy
for January, 1929.

Defendants' Exhibit M for Identification.
This is the same as Plaintiff's Exhibit 85.
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FRED

STERN

&

CO.

COMPARATIVE CONDENSED B A L A N C E

ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS:
Notes and accounts receivable:
Notes and trade acceptances
Trade accounts and sundry debtors
Reserves for doubtful accounts

Inventory of rubber
Total current assets
DEFERRED A S S E T S :
Notes, trade acceptances, etc.,
subsequent to June 30, 1922
INVESTMENTS
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES

SHEETS

1920

1921

1922

1923

$1,194,221.99
1,226,341.92

$ 309,701.46
1,353,210.58

$ 291,797.21
1,696,597.86

$ 208,762.91
2,252,566.26

$2,420,563.91
425,066.00

$1,662,912.04
700,605.06

$1,988,395.07
575,613.41

$2,461,329.17
427,541.78

$1,995,497.91
236,078.75
199,383.55
102,756.01

$ 962,306.98
112,638.13
285,097.81
310,527.00

$1,412,781.66
197,922.30
548,940.34
165,122.40

$2,033,787.39
206,051.69
131,423.81

$2,533,716.22

$1,670,569.92

$2,324,766.70

$2,371,262.89

28,208.72

176,188.55

maturing

371,170.29
35,000.00
7,345.32

4,145.44
3,220.44

P R E P A I D CREDIT INSURANCE
$2,576,061.54

2,045,885.65

,352,975.42

$2,550,671.8

CURRENT L I A B I L I T I E S :
Secured
Unsecured

$1,307,252.94
270,961.41

$ 812,488.29
206,481.03

$1,269,914.00
108,756.53

$1,362,357.90
117,598.72

NET

$1,578,214.35
997,847.19

$1,018,969.32
1,026,916.33

$1,378,670.53
974,304.89

$1,479,956.62
1,070,715.26

$2,045,885.65

$2,352,975.42

$2,550,671.88

LIABILITIES

WORTH.

$2,576,061.54
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6% Interest
Commission
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$12,657.59
40,144.05

Total Return on Advances

$52,801.64

If
6% =$12,657.59
Then 1% =
2,109.59
and $40,144.05 = 19% +
6% +
19%
=
25%
Interest Commission Total Return on Loans
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Defendants' Exhibit P.
AGREEMENT

made this

day of December,

1924, between FRED STERN & Co. INC., hereinafter

called the Company, and

ALEXANDER VON GOEBEN,

WITNESSETH :

The parties hereto mutually agree as follows:
1. The Company hereby employs the said Von
Goeben as Manager of its financial affairs, for the
term hereof.
2. The Company agrees to pay to the said Von
Goeben as and for compensation for his services,
the sum of $18,000. per annum, payable in equal
monthly instalments of $1,500. each, and in addition thereto, as further compensation, to pay to
the said Von Goeben annually, a sum equal to
twenty (20%) per cent. of its net profits. Said
net profits shall be ascertained at the end of each
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calendar year, and the compensation to said Von
Goeben as measured thereby, shall be payable on
or before February 1st of each year.
3. Said Von Goeben hereby accepts said employment and agrees to devote his best efforts and
his entire time and attention to the business of the
Company.
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4. This agreement shall be for a term of at least
three (3) years commencing January 1st, 1925, and
ending December 31st, 1927. It may be terminated
on December 31st, 1927, by six (6) months previous
written notice by either party to the other, and
unless so terminated, it shall continue from year
to year thereafter until terminated on December
31st of any year thereafter by either party giving
to the other six (6) months previous written notice.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have

hereunto set their hands and seals the day and
year first above written.
In presence of:
FRED STERN & CO. INC.,
B y FRED STERN.
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A L E X A N D E R VON GOEBEN

(L. S.)
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Defendants' Exhibit Q.
AGREEMENT

made this

day of December,

1924, between FRED STERN & Co. INC., hereinafter

called the Company, and

CARL

J.

VON

GOEBEN,

WITNESSETH :

The parties hereto mutually agree as follows:
1. The Company hereby employs the said Von
Goeben to perform such duties as the directors may
direct, for the term hereof.
2. The Company agrees to pay to the said Von
Goeben as and for compensation for his services,
the sum of $6,000., per annum, payable in equal
weekly instalments.
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3. Said Von Goeben hereby accepts said employment and agrees to devote his best efforts and
his entire time and attention to the business of the
Company.
4. This agreement shall be for a term of at least
three (3) years commencing January 1st, 1925,
and ending December 31st, 1927. It may be terminated on December 31st, 1927, by six (6) months'
previous written notice by either party to the other,
and unless so terminated, it shall continue from
year to year thereafter until terminated on December 31st of any year thereafter by either party
giving to the other six (6) months' previous written notice.
the parties hereto have
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and
year first above written.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF,

In presence of:
FRED STERN & CO. INC.,
B y FRED STERN.

CARL J. VON GOEBEN

(L. S.)
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Statement as to Evidence.
The foregoing case contains all of the evidence
adduced and proceedings had upon the trial herein,
together with the exceptions of both sides taken on
said trial.

Stipulation as to Exhibits.
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I T IS HEREBY STIPULATED that the original of any
exhibit received in evidence upon the trial of this
action, which exhibit is not printed or printed in
part only, in this record, may be referred to by
either of the parties in their respective briefs or
upon the argument of the appeal and the original
of said exhibits or any of them may be handed up
to the Court.

Dated, New York, March

6

, 1930.

LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.
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Opinion.
SUPREME

COURT,

TRIAL T E R M — P A R T

XVIII.

By Mr. Justice WALSH.

Ultramares Corp'n v. Touche et al.—This action
was tried before the court and a jury and resulted
in a verdict for the plaintiff. Motions were made
at the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the
conclusion of the trial to dismiss the complaint
upon which decision was reserved. After the rendition of a verdict a motion was made to set same
aside, as to which decision also was reserved. Defendants are public accountants. In February of
1924 they were employed by Fred Stern & Compoy, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Stern), to
audit its books and prepare a balance sheet as of
December 31, 1923. The audit was made and the
balance sheet prepared. Attached to the balance
sheet was a certificate of defendants attesting to
their examination and certifying that the balance
sheet was in accordance therewith and represented
in their opinion a true and correct view of Stern's
financial condition as of December 31, 1923. Defendants negligently performed their work. The
balance sheet prepared by them was incorrect and
showed Stern to be a going concern with assets
greatly in excess of liabilities, whereas had defendants' audit been carefully made the balance sheet
would have shown that Stern was insolvent. Defendants were not informed by Stern that the balance sheet was to be used by it for any particular
purpose or that the same was to be presented to
any particular person or persons. They knew generally that the same would be used by Stern to
evidence its financial condition; that it probably
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Opinion.

would be exhibited to banks or to creditors or to
stock brokers or purchasers or sellers; that balance
sheets prepared by auditors are used for the purpose of securing credit and that the balance sheet
furnished by them might be used by Stern to extend loans, secure credit and to induce banks and
others to advance money to it; also that lenders to
whom Stern might apply for loans would probably
rely upon the balance sheet as indicative of its
financial condition. Beginning in March, 1924,
and continuing for the balance of the year plaintiff advanced to Stern large sums of money, relying
upon the correctness of the balance sheet pre3095
pared by defendants. In the latter part of 1924
Stern was adjudged a bankrupt. Some of the
moneys so advanced were not repaid to plaintiff.
It is to recover the amount of these unpaid advances that this action was brought. Negligence
is not actionable unless there is a breach of a duty
owing by defendants to plaintiff. There must exist between the party inflicting the injury on the
one injured some privity by contract or otherwise
by reason of which the former owes some legal
duty to the latter. Contractually, defendants owed
no duty to plaintiff because no such relationship
existed between them, nor was there such privity
between the plaintiff and the defendants as to im309G pose upon the latter a liability to the former for
their negligence in performing their contract obligation with Stern. While in this state a party may
sue on a contract made expressly for his benefit,
though he is not a party thereto, the doctrine has
not been extended so as to place upon the promisee
under a contract a duty to all who either potentially or incidentally may be beneficiaries thereof.
The doctrine of beneficial interest is recognized as
an exception to the general rule, which proceeds
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on the natural presumption that a contract is intended only for the benefit of those who are parties to it, and therefore before a stranger can avail
himself of its benefits he must at least show that
it was intended for his direct benefit. The right
of the beneficiary to sue on contracts made for his
benefit is confined to a limited class of cases
(Scaver v. Ransom, 234 N. Y., 233), in which this
neither categorically nor in principle is included.
To hold that defendants' duty extended not only to
Stern, but to all persons to whom Stern might exhibit the balance sheet and who would act in reliance thereon, would compel defendants to assume
a potential liability to practically the entire world.
The law does not go so far, but limits the liability
to those for whose direct benefit, to defendants'
knowledge, the work for Stern was performed
(Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S., 195; Day v.
Reynolds, 23 Hun, 131; Glawatz v. Peoples Guaranty Search Co., 49 A, D., 465; Derry v. Peek,
L. R., 14 App. Cas., 337; Le Lievre v. Gould, 1
Q. B., 491; National Wire & Steel Co. v. Hunt,
312 Ill., 245). The cases relied on by plaintiff
are no authority to the contrary. In Glanzer v.
Shepard (in 233 N. Y., 236) plaintiff, to defendant's knowledge, was a direct beneficiary of the
work performed by defendant. So also in the cases
in other jurisdictions where liability has been
fastened on abstracters, notaries, inspectors, &c.,
for negligently furnishing a certificate or performing work, it has invariably been shown that the
work was to be performed or the certificate made
to the knowledge of the one performing the work
or issuing the certificate: that the same was for
direct use and benefit of the injured persons
(Economy Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey
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Title Guaranty Co., 64 N. J. L., 27 : Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 312 Tenn., 320; Murphy v. Fidelity
Abstract & Title Co., 114 Washington, 77; Western
Loan Co. v. Silver Abstract Co., 31 Mont., 448).
International Products Co. v. Erie RR. (244
N. Y., 331) merely holds that a negligent statement when acted upon by one to whom a duty is
owing may be the basis for the recovery of damages. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (in 217
N. Y., 382) is an extension of the doctrine of
Thomas v. Winchester (6 N. Y., 397), as liberalized
by Devlin v. Smith (89 N. Y., 470) and Statler v.
Ray
Manufacturing Co. (395 N. Y., 478). The
3101
rule in these cases is that a person supplying goods
or machinery which may be used by others, which
articles were negligently made, are reasonably certain to place the lives and the limbs of others in
peril, is under a duty to make same carefully, and
the right to enforce liability for the manufacturer's
negligence is not confined to the immediate buyer,
but extends to the persons or class of persons for
whose use the thing is supplied. Liability in such
cases is held to rest not upon contract or direct
privity between the manufacturer and the persons
injured, but upon the general duty which the law
imposes on everyone to refrain from doing that
which is dangerous to the lives and limbs of others.
3102 This doctrine has not been extended beyond personal injury cases. As defendants were under no
duty to plaintiff, no cause of action against them
has been established, and hence the complaint must
be dismissed. This determination renders unnecessary a consideration of the other grounds urged
by defendant to set aside the verdict. Submit order on notice.
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Stipulation Settling Case.
I T IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED that the
foregoing case contains all the evidence adduced,
proceedings had, and exceptions taken upon the
trial of this action, and that the same may be
settled and ordered on file.

Dated, New York, March

6

, 1930.

LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.

3104

Order Settling Case.
Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the foregoing case contains all the
evidence adduced, proceedings had, and exceptions
taken upon the trial of this action, and the same
is hereby settled and ordered on file.

Dated, New York, March

13

, 1930.

JOHN L. WALSH,
J. S. C.
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Stipulation Waiving Certification.
Pursuant to Section 170 of the Civil Practice
Act, it is hereby stipulated that the foregoing consists of true and correct copies of the notice of
appeal, the judgment roll, and case and exceptions
as settled, and the whole thereof, now on file in
the office of the Clerk of the County of New York,
and certification thereof by the Clerk, pursuant to
Section 616 of the Civil Practice Act, is hereby
waived.
Dated, New York, March
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6

, 1930.

LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.

Order Filing Record in Appellate Division.
Pursuant to Section 616 of the Civil Practice
Act, it is

3108

ORDERED, that the foregoing printed record be
filed in the office of the Clerk of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department.
Dated, New York, March

13

, 1930.

JOHN L. WALSH,
J. S. C.
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Notice of Appeal of Defendants to Court of
Appeals.
SUPREME

3109

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
against
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

FRANCIS

J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

6473-1927.
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H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, doing
business under the firm name
and style of Touche, Niven &
Co.,
Defendants.
Sirs:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named defendants, George A. Touche, John B. Niven, Andrew W. Tait, Charles R. Whitworth, Henry E.
Mendes, Francis J. Clowes, Victor H. Stempf,
E. H. Wagner and C. A. H. Narlian, co-partners,
doing business under the firm name and style of
Touche, Niven & Co., hereby appeal to the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York, from so much
of the judgment herein, entered in the office of the
Clerk of the County of New York on or about June
18, 1930, as modifies the judgment entered herein
on July 1st, 1929, in the office of the Clerk of the
County of New York, and the order entered on the
25th day of June, 1929, by reversing so much
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Notice of Appeal of Defendants to Court of Appeals.
thereof as set aside the verdict and dismissed the
amended complaint as to the first cause of action,
and as reinstates the verdict of the jury in favor
of the plaintiff, for $187,576.32 and grants the
plaintiff judgment against the defendants for
$187,576.32, with interest from April 12, 1929,
amounting to $13,317.90, together with $2,164.75
costs, amounting in all to $203,058.97, and upon
such appeal said defendants will bring up for review so much of the order entered in the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, First Department,
on or about June 13, 1930, and as resettled by the
order entered in said Appellate Division on July
3, 1930, as orders, adjudges and decrees that said
judgment entered July 1st, 1929, and said order
entered June 25th, 1929, be modified as aforesaid.
Dated, New York, July 9, 1930.
Yours, etc.,
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants,
Office and Post Office Address,
No. 120 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
New York City.

3114
TO:

Messrs. LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
No. 160 Broadway,
New York City.
And to the
COUNTY CLERK OF N E W Y O R K COUNTY.
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Notice of Appeal of Plaintiff to Court of
Appeals.
SUPREME
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COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
against
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,
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FRANCIS

J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E.

H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, doing
business under the firm name
and style of Touche, Niven &
Co.,
Defendants.

Sirs:
that the above-named plaintiff hereby appeals to the Court of Appeals of the
State of New York from so much of the order of the
Appellate Division herein entered the 13th day of
June, 1930, as resettled nunc pro tunc by order
dated July 2, 1930, and from the judgment entered
thereon in the office of the Clerk of the County of
New York on or about June 18, 1930, as (1) affirmed any part of the judgment herein entered
July 1, 1929, and the order herein entered on the
25th day of June, 1929, and (2) such part as failed
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE,
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Notice of Appeal of Plaintiff to Court of Appeals.
to reverse that portion of the judgment herein entered the 1st day of July, 1929, which dismissed the
second cause of action contained in the amended
complaint herein upon the merits.
Dated, New York, July 14, 1930.
Yours, etc.,
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Office & Post Office Address,
No. 160 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
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To:
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants,
Office & Post Office Address,
No. 120 Broadway,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
COUNTY CLERK OF N E W YORK COUNTY.

3120

Esqs.,

1041
Order of Appellate Division.

3121

At a term of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court held in and
for the First Judicial Department in
the County of New York, on the 13th
day of June, 1930.
P r e s e n t : Hon. VICTOR J. DOWLING,

Presiding Justice,
"

EDWARD R .

"

JOHN V . MCAVOY,

FINCH,

"

FRANCIS MARTIN,

"

JAMES O'MALLEY,

Justices.
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ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Applt.,
vs.
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

5435.

FRANCIS

J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, etc.,

Respts.
3123
An appeal having been taken to this court by the
plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court,
New York County, entered on the 1st day of July,
1929, and from an order made by said court and
entered on the 25th day of June, 1929, setting aside
the verdict of the jury and directing said judgment,
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Order of Appellate

Division.

And said appeal having been argued by Mr.
Herbert R. Limburg, of counsel for the appellant,
by Mr. James Marshall, of counsel for the respondents, and by Mr. Mahlon B. Doing, of counsel for
the American Institute of Accountants, as amicus
curiae; and due deliberation having been had
thereon,
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED ( t w o of t h e

3125

justices dissenting) that the judgment and order
so appealed from be and the same are hereby, in
all things, modified by reversing so much thereof
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended
complaint as to the first cause of action, and by
directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment entered thereon, with costs to the plaintiff,
and as so modified affirmed without costs.
Enter,
E. R. F.
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Resettled Order of Appellate Division.

3127

At a Term of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court, held in and
for the First Judicial Department in
the County of New York, on the 2nd
day of July, 1930.
P r e s e n t : Hon. EDWARD R . FINCH,
"

JOHN V. MCAVOY,

"

FRANCIS MARTIN,

"

JAMES O ' M A L L E Y ,

Justices.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

\
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Appellant,
against
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

FRANCIS

J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, etc.,

Respondents.
An application having been made to resettle the
order made and entered herein, bearing date the
thirteenth day of June, 1930, and the said application having duly come on to be heard,
Now, on reading and filing the notice of application for resettlement, and on motion of Limburg,
Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, attorneys for appellant,
it is
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Resettled Order of Appellate Division.
ORDERED, that the said order of June 13, 1930, be
and the same hereby is resettled nunc pro tunc so
as to read as follows:
At a Term of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court held in and
for the First Judicial Department in
the County of New York, on the 13th
day of June, 1930.
P r e s e n t : H o n . VICTOR J. DOWLING,

Presiding Justice,
3131

"

EDWARD R . F I N C H ,

"

JOHN V . MCAVOY,

"

FRANCIS MARTIN,

"

JAMES O ' M A L L E Y ,

Justices.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Applt.,
VS.
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

3132

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

5435.

FRANCIS

J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, etc.,

Respts.

An appeal having been taken to this court by the
plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court,
New York County, entered on the 1st day of July,
1929, and from an order made by said court and
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Resettled Order of Appellate Division.
entered on the 25th day of June, 1929, setting aside
the verdict of the jury and directing said judgment,
And said appeal having been argued by Mr.
Herbert R. Limburg, of counsel for the appellant,
by Mr. James Marshall, of counsel for the respondents, by Mr. Martin Conboy, of counsel for Federal
International Banking Company, as amicus curiae,
and by Mr. Mahlon B. Doing, of counsel for
the American Institute of Accountants, as amicus
curiae; and due deliberation having been had
thereon,

3134

I T IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED ( t w o of t h e

justices dissenting) that the judgment and order
so appealed from be and the same are hereby, in
all things, modified by reversing so much thereof
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended
complaint as to the first cause of action, upon the
law and the facts, the Court having found the verdict of the jury to be in accordance with the facts,
and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and
judgment entered thereon, with costs to the plaintiff, and as so modified affirmed without costs.
Ent.,

3135

J. V. M.,
J.
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Judgment Entered on Appellate Division
Order.
SUPREME

COURT,

N E W YORK COUNTY.

ULTRAMARES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
against
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES

3137

HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

FRANCIS

6473-1927

J. CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A . H .

NARLIAN, co-partners, doing
business under the firm name
and style of Touche, Niven &
Co.,
Defendants.

3138

Issue having been joined in the above-entitled
action, and the action having duly come on for trial
before Honorable John L. Walsh and a jury at
Trial Term, Part X V I I I , of this Court, on the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th
days of April, 1929, and the plaintiff having appeared by Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch &
Hess, Esqs., its attorneys (David L. Podell and
Herbert R. Limburg, Esqs., of counsel), and the
defendants having appeared by Messrs. Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall (James Marshall,
Esq., of counsel), and the jury having rendered a
verdict on the 12th day of April, 1929, for the plaintiff for the sum of One hundred eighty-seven thou-

1047
Judgment Entered on Appellate Division Order.

3139

sand five hundred seventy-six and 32/100 Dollars
($187,576.32), and a motion having been granted
and order made on June 25, 1929, setting aside the
verdict upon the law only and not upon the facts
and dismissing the complaint upon the merits, and
judgment having been entered on the 1st day of
July, 1929, dismissing the complaint upon the
merits and awarding defendants One hundred
twenty-six and 26/100 Dollars ($126.26) costs, and
an appeal having been taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, by the plaintiff herein from the said judgment and order; and said appeal having duly come
on to be heard in the said Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department;
and said Appellate Division having ordered and
adjudged (two of the justices dissenting) that the
judgment and order so appealed from be modified
by reversing so much thereof as set aside the verdict of the jury and dismissed the amended complaint as to the first cause of action, and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment
entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff, and as
so modified be affirmed without costs; and the
plaintiff's costs having been duly taxed at $2,164.75,
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Now, on motion of Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch
& Hess, it is

3141

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the judgment entered herein on the first day of July, 1929,
and the order made by this Court and entered on
the 25th day of June, 1929, be modified by reversing so much thereof as set aside the verdict and
dismissed the amended complaint as to the first
cause of action, and it is further
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the verdict
of the jury in favor of the plaintiff for $187,576.32
be reinstated and that the plaintiff herein recover
judgment against the defendants, George A.
Touche, John B. Niven, Andrew W. Tait, Charles
R. Whitworth, Henry E. Mendes, Francis J.
Clowes, Victor H. Stempf, E. H. Wagner and
C. A. H. Narlian, co-partners, doing business under the firm name and style of Touche, Niven &
Co., for $187,576.32, with interest thereon from
April 12, 1929, amounting to $13,317.90, together
with $2,164.75 costs, amounting in all to $203,058.97, and that plaintiff have execution therefor.

Judgment entered June 18, 1930.

(Seal)
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D A N I E L E. F I N N ,
Clerk.
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Appellant,
against
GEORGE
NIVEN,

A.

TOUCHE,
ANDREW

CHARLES
HENRY

E.

R.

JOHN
W.

B.

TAIT,

WHITWORTH,

MENDES,

No. 5433.

FRANCIS

J . CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF,
E . H . WAGNER a n d C. A .

H.

NARLIAN, co-partners, etc.,

Respondents.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Supreme
Court, New York County, made at Trial Term,
granting defendants' motion to set aside a verdict in plaintiff's favor on the first cause of
action herein and dismissing the complaint;
and from a judgment entered thereon.
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CHARLES
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MCAVOY, J . :

3150

The defendants, public accountants, have been
held liable to the plaintiff, to whom they owed no
contractual duty through any contract of employment which the plaintiff entrusted to them.
Whether a duty arises here, in the absence of direct
contractual relation, out of the situation shown
by the evidence, is the problem for solution.
The general principle involved, and upon which
plaintiff relies for imposition of liability, is that
if one undertakes to discharge any duty by which
the conduct of others may be governed, he is bound
to perform it in such a manner that those who are
thus led to action in the faith that such duty will
be properly performed, shall not suffer loss through
improper performance of the duty or neglect in its
execution. Thus, we have the buyers of merchan-
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dise given recovery against public weighers who
were to make return of the weight and to furnish
buyers with a copy. The public weighers certified
the weight and the buyers paid the sellers on that
basis. Discovery that the weight had been incorrectly certified as a result of defendant's negligence
was found to give the plaintiffs the right to the resulting damage.
It was decided there that the use of the certificates was not an indirect or collateral consequence
of the action of the weighers; that it was a consequence "which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the
end and aim of the transaction." The sellers
ordered, but the buyers were to use the certificates.
Public weighers hold themselves out to the public
as "skilled and careful in their calling." (Glanzer
v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 238.)
The duty was held not to be bound in terms of
contract, nor of privity; although arising from contract, its origin is not exclusive from that realm.
If the contract and the relation are found, the duty
follows by rule of law. Diligence—it was pointed
out—was owing not only to the person who ordered
the employment, but also to those who relied thereon.
Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. The
defendants were engaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
to audit its books and accounts and certify a balance sheet as of the end of the year 1923. They
prepared a balance sheet and attached it to a certificate signed by them, which they dated February 26,
1924. This balance sheet stated that Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., had a net worth amounting to $1,070,715.26, when the fact (as thereafter found) was
that at the very time of this certification the firm
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was insolvent, with impairment of thousands of
dollars in its assets and credit and much enhancement of its reported liabilities.
The finding of the jury would justify a conclusion that defendants were guilty of a gross degree
of negligence in their audit, and it is even urged
that the evidence also warranted the finding that
the balance sheet was made up in fraud of the rights
and obligations which accountants, engaged in public calling, would owe to those to whom they had
reason to believe such balance sheets would be exhibited for purposes of obtaining loans, extending
credit, or to induce the sale of merchandise.
The evidence showed that these accountants knew
for four years that their client (Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc.) was a borrower from banks in large sums;
that these banks required certified balance sheets
as a basis for making loans; and that Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., would require these certified balance
sheets for continuing existing loans and securing
new loans. So that this might be done, some thirtytwo original counterparts of the certified balance
sheet were requested by the client, Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and furnished by the accountants (defendants ).
The jury's verdict thus imports that defendants
knew that the certified balance sheets would be
used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose of
procuring loans, and that the very purpose of employment in the transaction between Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the accountants,
was to allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it
about through these balance sheets. This results:
that loans on the faith thereof would be made by
persons who would be governed by its declarations.
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Financial statements in the course of trade have
come to be used customarily for the purpose of securing credit, and accountants indicate in their
public advertisements that makers of loans should
require the safeguard of an independent audit prepared by public accountants, so a correlative obligation is placed upon them. It is their duty—if they
do not wish their audit to be so used—to qualify
the statement of their balance sheet and the certificate which accompanies it in such a way as to prevent its use. One cannot issue an unqualified statement which will be so used, and then disclaim responsibility for his work.
Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these
defendants, require certified balance sheets from
independent accountants, and upon these audits
they make their loans. Thus, the duty arises to
these banks and merchants of an exercise of reasonable care in the making and uttering of certified
balance sheets.
The facts here are brought within the rule in
the case of International Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co. (244 N. Y. 331) that "there must be
knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information
is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom
it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that if
false or erroneous he will, because of it, be injured
in person or property. * * * The relationship of
the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise,
must be such that in morals and good conscience the
one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving the information owes
a duty to give it with care."
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The certificate which these accountants attached
to the balance sheet reads:
"TOUCHE, N I V E N & Co.,

Public Accountants,
Eighty Maiden Lane,
New York.
February 26, 1924.
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS.

3161

We have examined the accounts of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ended December
31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and
with the information and explanations given
us. We further certify that, subject to provisions for federal taxes on income, the said
statement in our opinion, presents a true and
correct view of the financial condition of Fred
Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.
TOUCHE, NIVEN & Co.,

Public Accountants."

3162

From this certificate and the findings made by
the jury which are entitled to be held conclusive in
behalf of the plaintiff there is established: That
the defendants knew that the result of the audit
would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to represent its financial condition to persons from whom
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might seek to borrow money,
and that the balance sheet would be relied upon
by such persons as indicating the true financial
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defendants, in exercising their public calling as auditors,
did not exercise that care and skill required of
them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner,
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as a consequence of which the balance sheet made
by them was incorrect, and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss sustained by
plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation between the neglect and the loss sustained which
could reasonably have been anticipated, and that
the presentation of the balance sheets, as certified
by defendants, was the inducing cause for making
these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which plaintiff made, and that the loss was not caused by reason of any change in the financial condition of
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time of the presentation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of
any reliance of plaintiff on other intervening
causes; and that plaintiff's conduct was free from
contributory negligence, and we therefore conclude
that a liability was properly found, arising out of
a duty owed by the defendants to plaintiff not to
misrepresent, wilfully or negligently, the financial
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that the
judgment for the plaintiff was correct and should
not have been set aside.
That the particular person who was to be influenced by defendants' act was unknown to the
defendants is not material to a right of recovery,
for it is not "necessary that there should be an
intent to defraud any particular person." In this
case there was no mere, casual representation made
as a matter of courtesy; there was a certificate intended to sway conduct. There was "the careless
performance of a service which found in the words
of a certificate its culmination and its summary."
Here is an act performed carelessly, intended to
influence the actions of third parties, and one that
reasonably might be expected, when carelessly performed, to cause substantial loss.
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A duty exists towards those whom the accountants know will act on the faith of their certificates.
The loss occurring here was the very result which
reasonably was to be anticipated if the balance
sheet was carelessly prepared.
While negligence was established and was the
proximate cause of the loss, and, as we have seen,
the duty arose out of this situation which, while not
contractual, was, nevertheless, a ground of liability,
yet we do not think that there was sufficient proof
upon which to found a liability in fraud. We think
that there was no error at the close of the entire
case, in the Court's decision to dismiss the second
cause of action based upon that ground. Misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, however
marked, is not fraud. The mere breach of duty,
or the omission to use due care is not fraud. Intentional fraud, as distinguished from a mere
breach of duty or the omission to use due care, is
an essential factor in an action for deceit (Kountze
v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124).
We think that there was a proper conclusion
with respect to damages. The amount of cash loans
made to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with interest thereon, credited with all monies repaid or collected by
plaintiff, whether through voluntary action or suit,
without deduction of costs of collection, was the
approximate damage, and while other proof of damage was excluded by the Trial Court, no appeal has
been taken by plaintiff which raises a construction
of that rule.
The judgment and order appealed from should
therefore be modified by reversing so much thereof
as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the amended
complaint as to the first cause of action, and by
directing that the verdict be reinstated and judg-
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ment entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff,
and as so modified affirmed without costs.
Bowling, P.J., and O'Malley, J., concur.
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FINCH, J. (Dissenting) :

Assuming that the defendants may be held liable
for the negligence of their employees where they
undertake a duty to a definite plaintiff (Glanzer v.
Sheppard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite class
(Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253
N. Y. 369), yet, for the following reasons the de3171
fendants are not liable to this plaintiff: first, because they undertook to make only a "balance sheet
audit" at the request of their client; second, because in their certificate the defendants purported
only to furnish their opinion based upon an examination in connection with "the information and
explanations given us." But even more important,
the defendants furnished such a report and certificate without reference to any particular person or
class of persons.
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The plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case
at bar to a case where the defendants were to make
an audit which to their knowledge was for a definite
plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make loans
thereon.
(Glanzer v. Sheppard, supra.)
This
record does not sustain such a contention. The
courts have not gone to the length of holding that
defendants in a case like the case at bar can be
held liable in negligence to the whole world, or, as
has been aptly said, liable for "negligence in the
air."
In other words, not only the purpose for which
the statement is to be used, but the person or class
of persons who is to rely thereon, must be definite
to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff
relies upon the stipulation in the record that the
defendants "knew generally that these reports
would be used as financial statements to banks or
to creditors or to stockholders or to purchasers or
sellers." In accordance with the authorities, this
general knowledge is not sufficient.
As Judge Andrews said in International Products Co. v. Erie E. E. Co. (244 N. Y. 331), speaking of the information given,
"that he to whom it is given intends to rely
and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he
will because of it be injured in person or property."
In Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation (245 N. Y. 377), Judge
Pound writes:
" I t (the defendant) did not deal with appellant, had no relations with it and was under
no duty of care to it." (See also Savings Bank
v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195.)
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The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, certifies for his client and not for all the
world. If the client makes it clear to such a man
that the statement is to be used in a particular
transaction in which a third party is involved, such
circumstance should create a duty from the professional man to such third party. If the accountant
is to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons
who may act on the faith of the certificate, the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a
verification so rigid that its cost might well be
prohibitive and a limited but useful field of service
thus closed to him. The smallness of the compensation paid to the defendants for the services requested is in striking contrast to the enormity of
the liability now sought to be imposed upon them.
I f in the case at bar the plaintiff had inquired of
the accountants whether they might rely upon the
certificate in making a loan, then the accountants
would have had the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk, and determine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the account
should be before assuming the responsibility of
making the certificate run to the plaintiff.
It also appears in the case at bar that the loss
of the plaintiff resulted because of its own contributory negligence in failing to check the collateral. (Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55; aff'd
242 N. Y. 569.)
In so far as the claim of actual fraud is concerned, there is no proof in this record sufficient to
support such a finding by a jury. The Court, therefore, properly dismissed this cause of action. (Civil
Practice Act, Section 457-a.) This is so, even assuming that personal connivance and fraud on the
part of the employees of defendants could be held
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within the scope of the authority given to these
employees by the defendants, which at least is
doubtful. (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1 ; Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N. Y.
216; Martin v. Gotham Nat'l Bank, 248 N. Y. 313.)
I t follows that the judgment and order should
be affirmed:
Martin, J . , concurs.
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Stipulation Waiving Certification of Court of
Appeals Record.
Pursuant to Section 170 of the Civil Practice
Act, it is hereby stipulated that the foregoing are
true and correct copies of the notices of appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the orders of the Appellate
Division, the judgment entered thereon, and of the
record of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court upon which the appeal was heard, now on
file in the office of the Clerk of the County of New
York, and certification thereof by said Clerk is
hereby waived.
Dated, New York, July 21, 1930.

3180

LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS,

Attorneys for
Appellant.

Plaintiff-Respondent-

GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL,

Attorneys for Defendants-AppellantsRespondents.

